






MEMOIRS  
OF  
JOHN DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH.









John. Duke  
of  
Marlborough.  
Engraved by W. Bond. from an  
Original Miniature in the Possession of Lord Churchill

Published June 10. 1818. by Longman and Co.



# MEMOIRS

OF  
**JOHN DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH;**

ORIGINAL CORRESPONDENCE

FROM THE FAMILY RECESS AT BLENHEIM.

OTHER AUTHENTIC SOURCES.

WITH PORTRAITS, MAPS, AND MILITARY PLANS.

---

BY WILLIAM COKE, M.A. F.R.S. F.S.A.

ABRIDGMENT OF WILTS.

---

VOL. II.

**LONDON:**

PRINTED FOR LONGMAN, HURST, REES, ORME AND BROWN,  
PATERNOSTER-ROW.

1818.





*Manuale*



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have now given a second Portrait of the Duke of Marlborough, painted at a more advanced age than that which is introduced in the first Volume.

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# MEMOIRS, &c.

## CHAPTER 44.

1796.

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# MEMOIRS, &c.

## CHAPTER 44.

1706.

*Arrival of Marlborough at the Hague—Gloomy state of foreign affairs—in Spain—in Italy—on the Upper Rhine—in the Netherlands—His design of leading an army into Italy—Project for a descent on the western coast of France—Declines the instances of the emperor to assume the command on the Moselle—Difficulty of obtaining troops for the Expedition—Negotiations with Prussia, Denmark, and Hanover—Success of the French on the Upper Rhine—Marlborough is induced by the dutch to retain his command in the Netherlands—Project for the surprise of Namur—Opening of the campaign—Offensive movement of the enemy, and counter movement of the allies.*

ON the 25th of April, Marlborough arrived at the Hague, where he was welcomed with the usual testimonies of respect. To counterbalance, however, the satisfaction which he derived from the tranquil and prosperous state of England, the affairs of the continent bore the most gloomy aspect.

In the eastern provinces of Spain, the capture of Barcelona was the prelude to a counter-revolution, which extended through the kingdoms of Valencia and Murcia. The little town of Denia first declared itself for Charles, and the example was immediately followed by the capital. In the course of a few weeks, the only places in the two kingdoms, which remained in the possession of the Bourbon troops, were the small but strong fortresses of Alicante and Peñiscola. The ferment extended even into Aragon; and it was with difficulty that Saragossa was prevented from imitating the defection of the sister capitals.

But these rapid successes proved the proximate cause of



misfortune; for the victorious troops, though sufficient to give an impulse to public opinion, were yet too few to maintain their conquests; and being scattered over an extensive surface, presented on every side vulnerable points to the aggressions of an organised and regular force. Private feuds contributed to aggravate the mischief. The earl of Peterborough, to whom this brilliant success was principally owing, was involved in a serious misunderstanding, not only with Charles and his dependents, but with lord Galway and Das Minas, who commanded the combined army on the portuguese frontier. He in fact rendered himself so obnoxious, by his violent and overbearing temper, that his meritorious services were forgotten; and every post brought remonstrances and appeals against his continuance in Spain, both from Charles himself and the court of Vienna.

On the other hand, the most strenuous efforts had been made by the french monarch to turn the tide of invasion. A numerous army of french and spaniards, headed by Philip himself, appeared at this moment before the walls of Barcelona, while the fleet from Toulon blockaded the place by sea. Philip confidently hoped, not merely to reduce the capital of Catalonia, and crush the insurrection in its focus, but even to terminate the war by the capture of his rival.

While the principal force of Spain was directed towards the north-eastern quarter, the portuguese army on the western frontier was kept in awe by a Spanish force under the duke of Berwick, so celebrated for his skill in defensive warfare; and there was not the slightest cause to hope, that the operations on this side would tend to divert or lessen the danger which threatened the other. In these circumstances the only chance of preserving the eastern part of the Peninsula depended on naval succours; and therefore the british government had made strenuous exertions to fit out a powerful fleet, to sail from Lisbon with all the land forces which could be drawn from the army in Portugal. It was, however, much doubted whether the usual hazards of a long voyage, the uncertainty of naval operations, and the superior strength of the enemy, would not frustrate the attempt to carry relief to Barcelona.



In Italy the prospect was equally discouraging. Count Maffei, the minister of the duke of Savoy, who was dispatched from England early in the spring, to convey to his sovereign the assurance of prompt and effectual aid, reached Vienna in the midst of the preparations for opening the campaign. In his correspondence with Marlborough, he conveys a melancholy picture of the disorder and tardiness which reigned in the military system of the confederates. The unfavourable auguries which he drew from the state of affairs were too soon realised. Before Eugene could reach the Italian frontier, the small remains of the imperialists were surprised in their quarters by Vendome, and with the loss of 3,000 men, killed, wounded, and prisoners, were driven into the mountainous recesses behind the lake of Como. The passages of Italy thus seemed to be totally closed against the allies, and the foundation on which the duke of Savoy had long built his hopes, to be destroyed. Indeed, the sudden appearance of Eugene alone prevented the entire dispersion of the army; and all his activity, skill, and resources, were called forth to maintain a position on the frontier, till Marlborough could collect and forward the succours, which he had laboured to obtain from every quarter.

On the Upper Rhine the margrave of Baden displayed his usual forwardness and procrastination. Instead of adopting effectual measures for opening the campaign, he cavilled at every project which was submitted to his judgment, and in his turn persisted in proposing schemes, which were inefficient or impracticable. Messengers after messengers were continually on the road between Vienna and Rastadt; and the season for action advanced without adequate preparations, either offensive or defensive, and even without the arrangement of any consistent plan of conduct. To use an expression of Marlborough, in one of his letters to Godolphin, it seemed as if the German commander had no other object in view than to preserve his own capital and residence.

The state of affairs in the Netherlands was far from compensating for the gloomy prospects which opened in more distant quarters. No efficient force could apparently be collected in



time for offensive operations ; and even could the means of aggression be provided, the situation of the country, and the jealous spirit of the dutch government, seemed to present insuperable obstacles to such enterprises as might speedily accomplish the object of the grand alliance.

We have already shewn the obstructions which Marlborough experienced during the two first campaigns of the war from the dutch deputies and generals ; obstructions which frustrated his skilful combinations, and more than once arrested his victorious career. In 1704, however, he was fortunately delivered from these shackles, and the splendid success of the campaign was the natural consequence. But in 1705, the same pernicious system of controul was revived, and attended with the same fatal effects. In the present campaign, he therefore determined no longer to remain the sport of ignorance, timidity, or treachery, and formed the plan of leading an army into Italy, where he hoped to act without restraint, and to be again associated with Eugene, whose temper and spirit were congenial with his own.

Collaterally with this project, a plan was formed for a descent on the coast of France, which was expected to divert a considerable portion of the enemy's force, or to produce a serious impression, while their attention was attracted to other quarters. This plan was suggested by the marquis of Guiscard, a french nobleman, who had first embraced the ecclesiastical profession, and was appointed abbot of La Bourlay. From some family disgust he quitted his abbey, and being of an ardent and enterprising temper, formed a correspondence with the camisards, who had risen in the Cevennes. Being compelled to retire from France, he repaired to the different courts of the allied powers, and obtained the protection of the duke of Savoy, and Eugene. He also attracted the notice of pensionary Heinsius, was patronised by Mr. St. John, secretary at war,\* and finally ingratiated himself with Marlborough.

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\* In a letter to the duke, in which the secretary encloses some plans of Guiscard for two descents on the coast of France, he observes :—" I cannot omit doing him the justice to say, his conduct has been full of zeal, very discreet, and very moderate."



A distinct account of the plan appears in the Marlborough papers. The disembarkation was to take place between Blaye and the mouth of the Charente; Xantes was to be occupied and fortified, and from thence the refugee officers, who had accompanied the expedition, were to be detached into Quercy and the Cevennes to rouse the people. The troops were to act according to the effect which this alarm might produce among the malcontents. If no commotion was excited, they were to burn the ships at Rochfort and retire; but if the people could be induced to revolt, they were to maintain themselves in Guienne, and during the winter a sufficient force was to be sent to undertake active operations. For this design twelve regiments of infantry, and some dragoons, were ready for embarkation at Portsmouth, with a sufficient number of refugee officers, to form six regiments of infantry and a body of cavalry, and Guiscard was appointed lieutenant colonel. Nine battalions of infantry, and three regiments of dragoons were encamped at Kingsale for the same purpose, and a body of dutch troops was marched to places of embarkation, in order to co-operate in the enterprise. After much deliberation, Marlborough recommended lord Rivers to command the land forces, and Sir Cloudesley Shovel was appointed to head the fleet. The preparations were in forwardness, and the hopes which he conceived from this enterprise will appear in many parts of his correspondence.

Marlborough quitted England with the full expectation of leading an effective army into Italy;\* but soon after he reached the continent, he received the most pressing instances from the emperor himself, to resume the design which had been foiled the preceding year on the Moselle.

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It is singular sometimes to observe how the wisest persons are deceived in judging of characters and tempers, particularly when political motives influence their decision. We here see that St. John was as much mistaken in his opinion of Guiscard, as Marlborough in his opinion of St. John, when he assured Godolphin, "you may rely on him, he will *never* deceive you."

\* Instructions for the duke of Marlborough, &c. in the hand-writing of Harley.



*“March 10th.* In forwarding this courier to inform you of my resolution for the ensuing campaign on the Upper Rhine, as well as on the Saar and the Moselle, of which you will receive the details from Sinzendorf and Wratislaw, I cannot avoid expressing my impatience to witness the commencement of those operations, which I hope will complete the work you put in so good a train the last campaign. Your zeal for my service and for the common cause is so well known to me, that I cannot but expect the most happy results, and at the same time take this opportunity to give you farther proofs of my particular esteem and friendship.”

From the communication of Wratislaw, to which reference is here made, we find that, after repeated but fruitless invitations to the margrave to repair to Vienna, or send his plan for the ensuing campaign, a council, consisting of the prince of Salm, Eugene, counts Sinzendorf and Wratislaw, was held in the presence of the emperor. The principal subjects of their deliberations were the intended operations of the German army, and the measures to be pursued towards the margrave. Convinced that he would either not act on the Moselle, or if associated in the command, would display his usual frowardness; it was decided to leave him on the Upper Rhine, with a defensive army, and to consign to Marlborough the command of an offensive force, which was to be assembled on the Moselle. For this purpose he was to be joined by 2,000 german troops, and 2,000 imperial horse under the count of Staremburg, in addition to the troops which he might lead from the Low Countries, and those already stationed in the empire. This design was not to be communicated to the margrave, but he was to be amused with discussions till the season arrived for opening the campaign. In the interim, count Schlick was to make arrangements with the elector of Mentz, for providing the means of transport, and to settle for the supply of artillery, as soon as the resolution of the duke was known. The time and mode of commencing the operations were to be left also to Marlborough, and the utmost secrecy to be observed towards the german princes.



After imparting this communication, Wratislaw concludes with an observation intended to prove the sincerity and earnestness of the imperial court.

“To conclude this matter, I ought to inform you that the prince of Salm was the first who gave his opinion on this subject to our master, with all necessary firmness. And knowing him as you do, you ought to be persuaded, that the friendship which he formerly had for the prince of Baden, has not prevented him from acting on this occasion, in a manner becoming the service of the emperor; and that we cannot doubt of his continuing to do the same on future occasions.”\*

However, convinced that the country watered by the Moselle and Saar, was the most vulnerable part of France, Marlborough had learnt by experience to despair of any design which depended on the co-operation of the German princes, or the promises of the imperial court. He was also conscious that it was equally impossible to deceive or conciliate the prince of Baden. We cannot therefore wonder that he declined this proposal, and persisted in his design of carrying the war into Italy.

This was a favourite project of Marlborough, and he flattered himself that acting without restraint, and in conjunction with that colleague, with whom he had gained the victory of Blenheim, he should at once illustrate his own reputation, and promote the public cause. In conformity with this design, he carried instructions from the british cabinet, to obtain the acquiescence of the States for detaching 40 battalions and 40 squadrons into Italy; and to make such augmentations as the necessity of the service required. So forcibly was he determined to execute this project, that he was authorised, by additional instructions, on the refusal or delay of the States, to send forward to Italy the troops in british pay to that amount, and to assume the command in person. He was likewise empowered to make all necessary arrangements relative to the expedition. The news of this design raised the

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\* Translation from the original in the french tongue.



most elevated hopes in Italy ; and the duke of Savoy, in particular, testified his gratitude and impatience for so timely and powerful a succour.

“ *Turin, May 8th.* Count Maffei has communicated to me the very kind manner in which you interest yourself in the unfortunate situation of my affairs, and of your plan to give the most fatal blow to France. It is in truth worthy of you. To you is reserved the glory of rescuing Europe from slavery, and of carrying to the greatest possible height the arms of the queen, by rendering them triumphant even in Italy, which, as well as Germany, will owe her liberty to you. I entreat you, therefore, to give to that enterprise all the attention which it deserves, accelerating your speedy arrival, in which I take a double interest ; for I am expecting the commencement of this siege, for which the enemy will employ 60 battalions, as many squadrons, and 110 pieces of artillery, with a considerable number of mortars.

“ The imperialists have experienced a check in the Bressano, and will not be soon in readiness to act : consequently you will see that the smallest time is precious, and how much it imports the confederates to save with this capital the remnant of my troops ; for you cannot fail of reflecting, that should this capital be lost, the enemy will have it in their power to turn all their force against prince Eugene, and compel him to abandon Italy.”

From the moment of his arrival at the Hague, Marlborough had employed all his activity and influence to collect the means of accomplishing his enterprise ; but he encountered insuperable obstacles. In vain he attempted to extort the acquiescence of the dutch in the march of their native troops to such a distance ; nor was he more successful in his attempts to remedy the deficiency by the aid of the kings of Prussia and Denmark, and the princes and states of Germany. The non-payment of the arrears which had induced the danish monarch to suspend the progress of his troops toward the Netherlands, was a still more powerful motive to prevent them from marching to so distant a country as Italy.

Notwithstanding the apparently favourable result of Marlborough's journey to Berlin, and the consent of the prussian



monarch to the continuance of his troops in Italy, the arrangement was far from being complete or satisfactory. The acrimonious complaints against the court of Vienna and the dutch were revived; enormous demands were again brought forward for the arrears of subsidies and various military allowances; and an application was even made, peremptorily requesting the queen's support, for the liquidation of the debts which were owing by the austrian sovereigns of Spain. In addition to the difficulties derived from this source, other embarrassments arose from the intrigues and factions of the prussian court. Count Wartemberg, the great chamberlain and prime minister, who had long enjoyed the confidence of the king, was assailed by a numerous cabal, at the head of which we particularly distinguish count Ilgen, and general Grumbkow. They found a plausible pretext to injure him in the mind of his royal master, by expatiating on the imperious and interested character of his wife, who had offended the nobility, and even the princesses of the blood, by her claims for precedence. They even accused her of an illicit connexion with the british ambassador, lord Raby; and from her influence over the mind of her husband, they argued that she had induced him to sacrifice the interests of his own country to those of the maritime powers. So deep indeed was the impression produced by these insinuations, that the king peremptorily insisted on the recall of lord Raby, suspended the march of his auxiliary troops, and threatened in unequivocal terms to secede from the grand alliance.

The duke of Marlborough maintained a secret correspondence with all the contending parties; and while he laboured to soothe the jealousy of the king, he endeavoured to turn their jarring views to the advantage of the common cause. In this delicate task his letters display his usual address and discretion; and before the season for action commenced, we find his efforts crowned with success.

In his transactions with Hanover Marlborough experienced similar difficulties. The attempts recently made to conciliate the electoral family had not produced the expected harmony; for the



presence of Marlborough had no sooner ceased to operate, than the insinuations of the tories excited new bickerings. The jealousy fostered against the british court revived, and the offer of the garter, as well as the different regulations to secure the protestant succession, were contemptuously treated as the effects of fear and self-interest.

This captious conduct provoked reciprocal dissatisfaction in England, and the queen was readily persuaded to write with her own hand an expostulatory letter, which was transmitted to Marlborough to be delivered to the elector. It was also to be apprehended that the resentment which she fostered against the electoral family might easily be inflamed into open enmity, which could only terminate in a breach between the two courts.

Marlborough foresaw all the injurious consequences which must result from this feud, as well to England in particular, as to the grand alliance in general. He therefore, of his own authority, withheld the ill-timed remonstrance, and omitted no effort to soothe and satisfy both parties. Fortunately his representations, sanctioned and enforced by the treasurer, outweighed the hasty advice given by the other part of the cabinet. The queen was induced to sacrifice her own feelings; and secretary Harley, though with unfeigned reluctance, announced her change of sentiments. "I received," he observes, "the honour of your grace's letter. The queen very much approves of your grace's not sending her majesty's letter to Hanover, though I cannot but think that court does not know this country, or else they have very little value for our good opinion."\*

On the other hand, the interference of Marlborough, aided by the influence of the whigs, was so far successful, that the court of Hanover manifested a more amicable temper; and a compromise was effected by the mission of lord Halifax, who was charged by the queen to convey a public declaration of her friendship and esteem for her successor, and her zeal for the protestant settlement.

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\* May 10-21, 1706. S. P. O.



The letters of Marlborough in this interesting period, will shew the magnitude of these embarrassments, and the effect of his negotiations.

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

“ *Hague, April 16--27.* The inclosed letter from the elector of Hanover has given me very melancholy thoughts; for if he persists, it will be an argument for these people not to agree to the sending a detachment to Italy, and will make it impracticable for me to make use of the queen's last instruction, since there will be no other troops but those of her majesty's subjects which can be obliged to march. That nothing might be wanting on my side, I have this afternoon sent colonel Cadogan to Hanover, that the elector may be made sensible, if possible, of the consequence of this matter, which I think will be the making of a good or bad campaign, which in its consequence is that of a good or bad peace. I desire you will let her majesty know this, but it must be kept a secret, for I do not let any body know the reason of Cadogan's journey.

“ You will see by the copy of my letter to the king of Prussia, which I have sent to Mr. Secretary, the fears I have of the french doing something considerable in Germany; for they have sent so many troops from hence, that they now begin to believe here that the french have no thoughts but of being on the defensive in this country. However, they will not be persuaded as yet to part with any more troops than those of Hanover and Hesse, which are ordered to be assistant to the prince of Baden till farther orders. These two bodies of men are 19,000.”

“ *Hague, April 19--30.* I am to have a meeting next Sunday with some of the chief burgomasters of Amsterdam; for those I have consulted here dare not agree to what I propose, unless I can persuade them to approve of it. I hope by the next post to let you know what I shall be able to do, for by that time I expect Cadogan. For if the elector of Hanover does persist in not letting his troops march, it will be impossible to have the number, though these people should consent, for they are very positive that they dare not consent to the letting their own countrymen go. In short, they are very much afraid of the king of Prussia, and their own people. By



all that I can hear, there is but too much reason to fear that the king of Prussia's intentions are that his troops shall not be of much use to us this year. The letters from Paris say nothing of their fleet, but that they hope to be masters of Barcelona by the end of this month."

" *Hague, April 23--May 4.* The wind continuing in the east, I have no hopes of receiving any letters from England, which adds a good deal of uneasiness to other disappointments I meet with; amongst which, the inclosed letter from the king of Denmark is one; for by it you will see that I cannot make use of any of his troops in the project I have so much at heart. And if Cadogan should not prevail with the elector of Hanover, nor the messenger I have sent to the landgrave of Hesse, it will be almost impossible to find the number of troops, though this state should be as desirous of the project as your humble servant.

" The little zeal that the king of Prussia, the king of Denmark, and almost all the other princes shew, gives me so dismal thoughts, that I almost despair of good success. However, I have the satisfaction of being sure that you do me the justice to believe, and that you will assure her majesty, that nothing shall be omitted that I am capable of, that this campaign may tend to her glory.

" M. Buys went yesterday for Amsterdam, and is to be back on Thursday; so that by the next post I shall be able to let you know the opinion of that town as to the business of Italy. Before the next post, I hope Cadogan, as well as the answer from the landgrave of Hesse, will be here. The letters from Paris this day, speak of a second action in Italy, where prince Eugene was in person, and that he was beaten; but till we have our letters from Italy we shall not believe it so bad as they write it. The good news from Alcantara gives us hope that lord Galway will advance towards Madrid. I forgot to send you by the last post the inclosed from prince Eugene. I shall send you what letters I receive from him, and desire you will keep them for me.

" *April 28--May 9.* I am so tired, that you will excuse my not giving you any other account of Cadogan's voyage to Hanover, but



what you will see by the elector's inclosed letter,\* his obstinately persisting in letting none of his troops march, notwithstanding he very much approves of the project. The danes and hessians having also excused themselves upon their treaties; so that though the pensioner and the town of Amsterdam had approved of sending the forty squadrons and forty battalions, now that they must of necessity be of the english and dutch only, they dare not consent, since it must leave them in the hands of the strangers, for so they call the danes, the hanoverians, and the hessians. So that I believe to-morrow the resolution will be taken, for the sending immediately ten thousand men more to prince Eugene, which if they come in time, I hope will be sufficient not only to hinder the siege of Turin, but to give such a superiority as to make him capable of acting offensively with two armies. We having now 19,000 men in Germany; and these 10,000 for Italy has made it so hard matter for me to convince them that nothing of consequence can be done in this country, upon which I have pressed them for a greater number of troops for the descent, than what we first asked. They made me many compliments, and told me, that if they might assure the States that I would continue at the head of the army on their frontier, there should be nothing I could think reasonable to propose, but they would readily comply withal.

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While Marlborough was in vain labouring to overcome the objections of the kings of Prussia and Denmark, as well as of the elector of Hanover, and landgrave of Hesse; and while he was concerting with Overkirk the means of maintaining a defensive campaign in the Netherlands during his absence, his plans were suddenly disconcerted by disastrous intelligence from the Upper Rhine. Villars, who had not, like the margrave, spent the season in suspense and inactivity, suddenly took the field, and being reinforced with a corps from the Netherlands, under Marsin, forced the german lines on the Motter, drove the margrave back to the Lauter, reduced Drusenheim, and Haguenau, which

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\* This letter, which is dated April 23, is printed in Macpherson, vol. 2, p. 39.



contained the principal magazines, and was preparing to overrun the palatinate.

The intelligence of this reverse infused an alarm into the dutch, and they became doubly anxious for the protection of Marlborough and the british forces. Their constitutional jealousies and petty objections were instantly overcome by their fears; and they offered to relieve the british commander from the shackles under which he had hitherto laboured, by secretly giving him the choice of the field deputies, or by privately enjoining them to conform implicitly to his orders. This concession, joined with the impossibility of obtaining an efficient army for any other quarter, induced him to abandon his design on Italy, though with unfeigned reluctance. The same motive rendered him anxious to give greater efficiency to the intended descent on the french coast.

This change of plan, though a severe disappointment to himself, was hailed with satisfaction by Godolphin, who besides the anxiety of friendship, was of too cautious a character to enter with equal spirit into distant and perilous enterprises.

“Yesterday,” observes the treasurer, in a letter dated, Sunday, April 28, “I received the favour of your’s of the 25th, from the Hague, with the inclosed letters from prince Eugene, and the elector of Hanover. I am very sorry the last has so little regard to what would so much please this country, and in particular be so useful to the common cause. But I take it now for granted, there’s an end of the project of Italy, which I must own to you does not give me so much uneasiness as it seems to give you. For besides that I could never swallow so well the thoughts of your being so far out of our reach, and for so long a time; if we can have the good fortune to succeed in Spain, I think it may be almost as well for the allies to have the balance kept up in Italy, as to drive the french quite out of it, which would enable them to contract both their troops and their expence, and more expose us on this side to their force.

“I am glad to find by your’s that you have hopes of increasing the number of troops for the descent. I cannot help thinking that if that design be rightly pursued and executed, it may prove



of the greatest advantage imaginable to us. I should be glad to hear how it advances from time to time in Holland, and what measures they have already taken towards it."

Full of chagrin and uncertainty respecting the plan and nature of his future operations, Marlborough departed from the Hague on the 9th of May, in order to assume the command of the army, which had been directed to assemble between Borchloen and Tongres. Accompanied by Overkirk, he passed through Ruremond, and arrived at Maestricht on the 12th. From hence he proceeded without delay to review the dutch troops, who being quartered on the Meuse, had already reached the point of rendezvous. The enemy, however, appeared determined to maintain their position behind the lines which had been formed on the Dyle, and the british commander looked forward to a campaign more inefficient than the last.

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

"*May 4--15.* When I left the Hague on Sunday last, I was assured that I should find the army in a condition to march. But as yet neither the artillery horses nor the bread waggons are come, so that we shall be obliged to stay for the english, which will join us on Wednesday, and then we shall advance towards Louvain. God knows I go with a heavy heart; for I have no prospect of doing any thing considerable, unless the french would do what I am very confident they will not; unless the marshal de Marsin should return, as it is reported, with thirty battalions and forty squadrons; for that would give to them such a superiority as might tempt them to march out of their lines, which if they do, I will most certainly attack them, not doubting, with the blessing of God, to beat them, though the foreign troops I have seen are not so good as they were last year; but I hope the english are better. If the french should neglect the affairs in Germany, in order to have a superiority here, these people will then not let their troops go for the descent. But I think that project is so very necessary, that if you provide transport ships for five regiments of foot, and one of dragoons, you may depend upon having them out of the english; and I will press them all that in me lies to get some of



theirs, so that the project of the descent might be the more considerable."

TO THE DUCHESS.

"*May 4--15.* You will see by my letters to lord treasurer, that in all likelihood I shall make the whole campaign in this country, and consequently not such a one as will please me. But as I infinitely value your esteem, for without that you cannot love me, let me say for myself that there is some credit in doing rather what is good for the public, than in preferring our private satisfaction and interest; for by my being here in a condition of doing nothing that shall make a noise, has made me able to send ten thousand men to Italy, and to leave nineteen thousand more on the Rhine, till the marshal de Marsin shall bring his detachment to this country."

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

"*Tongres, May 6--17.* I must beg you will make my excuse to her majesty, that I take upon me not to send her letter to the elector of Hanover, for before it came to me I had received the second refusal; and besides, if he should consent, it would, as every thing is now, be of no use.

"If every thing goes well, as I hope in God it will, in Catalonia, by all I hear, the king of Spain will be easy in letting some troops go to the duke of Savoy, if lord Peterborough should have a mind to go with them.

"By the time the english can join us, I hope we shall have the artillery, and every thing that is necessary for our march, which I hope shall be upon Thursday. I go to-morrow to see the new works at the citadel of Liege, which I am told are very much improved since I was there.

"The minute you are sure that Barcelona is safe, I should think it might be of service to let the duke of Savoy know what care her majesty has taken that troops may come to his relief; for I believe we may take it for granted, that the french will besiege Turin. The loss of that town would end the war in Italy, which is what we ought to prevent by all the means possible.

"You will see by the inclosed, the unreasonable proceedings at the court of Berlin."



At this moment, however, brighter prospects appeared to open. Early in the year, the british commander had established a secret correspondence with one Pasquier, an inhabitant of Namur, and conceived the design of surprising that fortress through his agency. In this design, he combined two objects. If he secured Namur, he rendered the defensive system of the enemy inefficient, by turning the right flank of their lines; and if they endeavoured to prevent the attempt, he hoped to find an opportunity of forcing them to an engagement. With these views, he adopted the resolution of advancing towards Tirlemont, which would at once favour the enterprise on Namur, and enable him to take a prompt and effectual advantage of the enemy's movements.\*

The plan succeeded to his most sanguine wishes. Villeroy received positive orders even to risk a battle for the safety of Namur, and the cavalry of the detachment under Marsin was recalled by hasty marches, to take a share in the expected conflict. The english troops had, therefore, no sooner approached the intended point of junction with the dutch, than Villeroy and the elector of Bavaria, with their united forces, passed the Dyle, and directed their march on Tirlemont. They were influenced in this movement by the knowledge that the hanoverians were yet at a distance, and that the danish cavalry had refused to march, till they had received the arrears of their pay, a deficiency which rendered the allied army much inferior in force.

Marlborough was rejoiced at the disposition evinced by the enemy to meet him in the open field. He obtained a promise from the danes to advance, by engaging for the discharge of their arrears, and sent the most pressing orders for the immediate junction of all his forces. He communicated the news with exultation to his correspondent.

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

“ *Borchloen, May 9--20.* The french knowing that it is not in our power, in less than three weeks, to have the hanoverians or

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\* For an account of this project, see *Relation du Ressort Secret qui a donné lieu à la bataille de Ramillies*, in *Lamberti*, t. 4, p. 51. *House of Austria*, chap. 73.



hessians from the Rhine, they have taken the resolution of drawing as many of their troops out of their garrisons as is possible, and marched yesterday out of their lines, and are now camped at Tirlemont. The english join the army this day, and the danes two days hence. We shall be 122 squadrons, and 74 battalions.\* They pretend to be stronger both in foot and horse; but, with the blessing of God, I hope for success, being resolved to venture; for as yet they have but twenty squadrons of the marshal de Marsin's detachment. With my humble duty, assure her majesty, that with all my heart and soul, I pray to God I may be able to send her good news, so that your faithful friend and servant might have some quiet before he dies."

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\* We are spared the trouble of an investigation to ascertain the strength of the contending parties, because we learn their amount from the authority of Marlborough himself. According to his latest statement, written after the engagement, the confederates were 73 battalions, and 123 squadrons; and the enemy 74 battalions, and 128 squadrons. The numerical force cannot be accurately ascertained; but as it was at the opening of the campaign, and the battalions and squadrons at their full complement, we may estimate the force of the allies at about 60,000, and that of the french at 62,000 men.



# BATTLE OF RAMELLES.

## Historical

a. Order of battle of the allies from their march on 18 June.

b. French position.

c. French position on the 19th June in the morning.

d. French position on the 20th June in the morning.

e. French position on the 21st June in the morning.

f. French position on the 22nd June in the morning.

g. French position on the 23rd June in the morning.

h. French position on the 24th June in the morning.

i. French position on the 25th June in the morning.

j. French position on the 26th June in the morning.

k. French position on the 27th June in the morning.

l. French position on the 28th June in the morning.

m. French position on the 29th June in the morning.

n. French position on the 30th June in the morning.

o. French position on the 1st July in the morning.

p. French position on the 2nd July in the morning.

q. French position on the 3rd July in the morning.

r. French position on the 4th July in the morning.

s. French position on the 5th July in the morning.

t. French position on the 6th July in the morning.

u. French position on the 7th July in the morning.

v. French position on the 8th July in the morning.

w. French position on the 9th July in the morning.

x. French position on the 10th July in the morning.

y. French position on the 11th July in the morning.

z. French position on the 12th July in the morning.

aa. French position on the 13th July in the morning.

ab. French position on the 14th July in the morning.

ac. French position on the 15th July in the morning.

ad. French position on the 16th July in the morning.

ae. French position on the 17th July in the morning.

af. French position on the 18th July in the morning.

ag. French position on the 19th July in the morning.

ah. French position on the 20th July in the morning.

ai. French position on the 21st July in the morning.

aj. French position on the 22nd July in the morning.

ak. French position on the 23rd July in the morning.

al. French position on the 24th July in the morning.

am. French position on the 25th July in the morning.

an. French position on the 26th July in the morning.



ao. French position on the 27th July in the morning.

ap. French position on the 28th July in the morning.

aq. French position on the 29th July in the morning.

ar. French position on the 30th July in the morning.






ps in Tavieres.  
 routing the Dismounted  
 ank of the French Horse.  
 by the Duke to reinforce the left.

with intervals.  
 ismounted dragoons, in  
 ps in Tavieres.  
 ted Dragoons.  
 s upon Ramelies  
 pursuit of the Allies.  
 Cavalry & the Regiments of

by Woods Cavalry.  
 o Judoigne.

ing brought up by the Duke in person  
 Roi to the British Dragoons.



CALE.





## CHAPTER 45.

1706.

*Battle of Ramilies—Consternation, defeat, and flight of the french—Letters from Marlborough to the duchess and lord Godolphin—Advance of the confederates—Congratulatory letters from St. John, and Prior—Rejoicings for the victory in England.*

FULL of these pleasing forebodings, Marlborough witnessed the junction of the english forces with the dutch, at Bilsen, on the 20th of May. He instantly dispatched orders for the advance of the provision waggons; and by engaging with the dutch deputies, for the payment of the arrears due to the danes, prevailed on the duke of Wirtemberg, their leader, to advance without delay. On the 22nd, drawing towards the Little Gheet, he encamped with his right at Borchloen, and his left at Corswaren. Here he had the satisfaction to receive intelligence, that the danes, by forced marches, were arrived within the distance of a league. By this accession, he calculated that his army would consist of 73 battalions and 123 squadrons, making a numerical total of about 60,000 men, which so nearly approached the force of the enemy, as to leave little cause for apprehending the result of a battle. At the same time he was apprized that the enemy had crossed the Great Gheet, and were moving on Judoigne. Resolving to attack them in this position, he gave orders to march by the left, in eight columns, intending to pass round the sources of the Little Gheet, and come in contact with the enemy, in a situation where they could draw no advantage from nature or art.

The army was again in motion in the morning, but a violent rain, which fell during the night, retarded the advance of the infantry. While the heads of the columns halted, to close the march, the duke, who led the way, accompanied by the dutch generals and deputies, was informed that the enemy had anticipated his design, and were moving towards the position of Mont St. André, between the two Gheets and the Mehaigne. To



gain certain intelligence, Cadogan was dispatched at one in the morning, with 600 horse, the ordinary guard of the day. He advanced in a thick fog; but on reaching the uplands near Mierdorp at eight, he descried the enemy traversing the plain of St. André, and stretching their right by Ramilies, towards the Mehaigne, on the very ground which the confederates hoped to occupy.

On receiving this information, the allied commanders proceeded about ten, to reconnoitre; but could not decide whether the squadrons in sight were pushed forward to cover the advance of the main body, or to protect a lateral movement towards their new lines. Meanwhile the allied forces continued their march; and the duke, as yet uncertain of the enemy's designs, ordered the cavalry to push forward, resolving, should the troops seen by Cadogan be merely a rear guard, to charge them with the cavalry only. But the heads of the columns had no sooner passed the demolished lines, than the fog dispersed; the two armies appeared in sight of each other; and the enemy made dispositions to receive the attack in the strong camp of Mont St. André. As this ground is rendered memorable by a battle which decided the fate of the Netherlands, we shall delineate its features, and illustrate our description, by a plan, drawn from authentic materials.

The most elevated part in the plains of Brabant, is the tract of land between the sources of the two Gheets, the Mehaigne, and the Dyle. These streams finding at first but little descent, render the ground marshy towards their rise, partially swampy along their whole course, and in some places even impassable. The banks of the Great Gheet are steep; those of the Mehaigne and Little Gheet less abrupt. The ground rising suddenly above them, forms a plain, the surface of which is varied with gentle undulations, and dotted with coppices. That portion, which was the scene of conflict, is divided into two parts by the Little Gheet: the eastern is called the plain of Jandrinœuil; the western, the position of Mont St. André, from a village on the Gheet, which forms nearly an equilateral triangle with Autreglise, or Anderkirk, and the tomb of Ottomond. From this tomb or



barrow, which crowns the highest point of the plain, and overlooks the marshes bordering the Mehaigne, the position extends as far as Ramilies, near the head of the Little Gheet; and then following the marshy course of the rivulet, is continued to the rising ground on which Offuz is situated. From Offuz, bending forward on the left bank of the stream, it proceeds along the verge of the eminence to Autreglise, where it terminates in the fork, made by the confluence of the Jauche and the Little Gheet.\*

When the heads of the allied columns had cleared the village of Mierdorp, they diverged into the open plain of Jandrincœuil, preparatory to formation. The first and second marched along the Chaussée de Brunehault; the third and fourth towards the heights of Ottomond; the fifth and sixth upon the steeple of Offuz; and the seventh and eighth kept those of Foulz and Autreglise in a direct line. They then formed in order of battle, between Boneffe and Foulz, in two lines, the infantry in the centre, and the cavalry on the wings, except twenty squadrons of danes, who were posted behind the left centre, as they arrived. This formation began at ten in the morning, and was completed at one.

The enemy's light troops having gradually fallen back before the advancing columns, the allied commanders proceeded to reconnoitre more closely the hostile position, and found them posted in two lines. The left consisting of infantry, stretched nearly from Autreglise to Offuz, between the two branches which form the little Gheet; the centre, in similar order, extended from the inclosures of Offuz, to the high ground behind Ramilies; and the right, comprising almost the whole cavalry, in number 100 squadrons, in two lines, with intervals between, occupied the open space in

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\* It appears that the disadvantages of this locality had not escaped the french engineers when they constructed the lines of the Gheet; for observing that the plain of Jandrincœuil offered a counter position, convex in shape, and of which the right and centre were as well defended as the opposite points across the Little Gheet; and remarking, that should an assailant take this position, the wings being refused, it would be in his power to reinforce either flank with greater celerity than his opponents, they wisely resolved to include both the plains within their defences, and to carry the lines across the Gheet at Orp le Petit, and from thence direct to the Mehaigne at Wasseige. These lines were demolished by the allies, in August, 1705. See chapter 36.



front of the tomb of Ottomond, between Ramilies and the Mehaigne. The first line was composed of gardes du corps, gens d'armes, mousquetaires, and horse grenadiers, with the bavarian cuirassiers on the left extremity; the second entirely of french horse. Into Ramilies, which is surrounded by a drain, and inclosures, were thrown twenty battalions; and Offuz and Autreglise were likewise occupied. To protect their right, the enemy posted a brigade of infantry at the bridge of Tavieres, situated about a quarter of a mile in front, amidst marshes and enclosures; and scattered parties of light infantry lined the hedges about Franquinay, the marsh of the Mehaigne being every where impassable, excepting at the bridge.

Although this order of battle was formidable, the defects of the position were too obvious to escape the penetrating eye of the british commander. From its concave shape, it afforded great advantages to an assailant, who performing his manœuvres on the chord, while the enemy must traverse the arc, could bring a superior force into action on a given spot, and in a given time. He saw also that the left wing would be cramped in its movements, by the nature of its situation, and prevented from attacking by the morass which protected it from aggression. He perceived likewise that the tomb of Ottomond was the key of the field, and that Tavieres was too far in advance, either to give or receive protection. He judged therefore, that to facilitate an attack upon the hostile right, it would be requisite to induce the enemy to derange their dispositions, by making a feint against their left: a manœuvre which would compel them to strengthen the point menaced, and weaken that which was the real object of attack. Finally by carrying Tavieres, he should uncover the flank of the horse, and by gaining the commanding point, which is crowned by the tomb of Ottomond, enfilade the whole position.

With these objects in view, he formed his plan. He ordered the british, dutch, and german infantry, composing the right, to march down from the heights of Foulz, in two lines, sustained by the cavalry, and form a demonstration of attack against the villages



of Autreglise and Offuz. The stratagem produced the desired effect; for no sooner did Villeroy discover his left to be menaced, than he drew a very considerable corps of infantry from his centre, which marched with the greatest celerity to reinforce the detached troops about Autreglise. While these were replacing by part of his infantry of the right, and the hasty movement had somewhat disordered the hostile lines, Marlborough directed his own right to face about and reascend the high elevation, from whence the first line alone would be visible to the enemy. As soon as the second, now foremost in retiring to the first position, had passed the crest of the ground, and was no longer in view, he directed most of the battalions to march rapidly to the left, and to form in rear of the left centre.\* The twenty squadrons of danes were placed in a third line, behind the cavalry of the left wing. Four battalions, including the dutch guards, with two pieces of cannon, were detached from the left of the infantry, and formed near Boneffe, with orders to march parallel to the cavalry, and dislodge the enemy from Franquinay and Tavieres; and twelve battalions, under general Schultz, were also selected from the infantry on the left, to form an attack on Ramilies.

About half past one the artillery of the confederate army opened its fire, and was immediately answered by that of the enemy. Colonel Wertmuller, who commanded the detachment against Tavieres, dislodged the hostile parties of infantry, lining the hedges near Franquinay; and as he advanced along the valley of the Mehaigne, the horse of the left wing, headed by Overkirk, moved gradually and perpendicularly upon the right of the enemy. On approaching Tavieres, the dutch guards encountered considerable resistance, the enemy being covered by the inclosures, and encouraged by the prospect of a reinforcement.

The vigour of the assault on Tavieres having now convinced

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\* This masterly manœuvre is mentioned only in General Kane's Memoirs; but as he was stationed in one of the regiments of the first line, and was himself an excellent tactician, there is no doubt of the fact. It may be regarded as the primary cause of the victory.—Kane's Campaigns, p. 65.



Villeroy, that the real design of the allies was, to gain his right flank, he ordered fourteen squadrons of dragoons to dismount, and leaving their horses on the rise, behind a streamlet opposite the tomb of Ottomond, to hasten to the support of the troops in the village. To these were joined two battalions of swiss infantry. But before they could arrive, the confederates carried Tavieres by storm, and the danish horse wheeling round, intercepted the reinforcement on the borders of the village, and either cut them in pieces, or drove them into the Mehaigne.

In the midst of this masterly movement, which frustrated the enemy's reliance on the protection of a flank fire from Tavieres, Overkirk charged their cavalry. His troops, pressed into compact order by their advance, overbore the first line of the enemy, which was weakened by the intervals between the squadrons. But being assailed in his turn by the second line, the foremost ranks were driven back on those behind, and the whole body thrown into confusion. The bavarian cuirassiers profited by the disorder to bear on their right under the protection of the battery at Ramilies; but the duke in person coming up with seventeen squadrons from the right, and the danes who returned from the defeat of the reinforcement, prolonging the left, the efforts of the enemy were checked by the danger which menaced both their flanks.

In the height of this conflict, the twelve battalions under general Schultz, supported by the contiguous lines of infantry, commenced the attack on Ramilies, the fire from which had hitherto impeded the movements of the left wing. Advancing his troops in four columns, on the front and flank of the village, he drew the concentrated fire from the batteries on his own corps, and thus enabled the left wing to regain their order.

Marlborough perceiving the confusion of the horse, ordered up from the right wing every remaining squadron, except the british, to give efficiency to the attack, which still continued in suspense, and hurried forward himself to encourage his soldiery. In this effort he was exposed to the most imminent danger. His person being recognised, some of the french dragoons advancing from their



ranks closed round him, while he was entangled with his own recoiling troops. Attempting to disengage himself by leaping a ditch, he was thrown to the ground, and in danger of being made prisoner. At this moment his aid-de-camp, captain Molesworth, dismounted and supplied him with his own horse. On this, as on many other occasions, it seemed as if Providence specially protected the days of this extraordinary man; for while he was remounting, a cannon ball struck off the head of colonel Bingfield, his equerry, who held the stirrup. He, however, succeeded in escaping, and regained his own lines in safety, though severely bruised. His danger redoubled the energy of his troops, and in full gallop they returned with new spirit to the charge.

At this crisis 20 squadrons arrived in full speed from the right, and formed a fourth line on the right flank in the rear. The view of so powerful a reinforcement rushing across the plain, produced an evident pause in the hostile lines, and gave new advantage to the assailants. Before this reinforcement could come into action, the danish squadrons, led on by their undaunted leader, the duke of Wirtemberg, penetrated between the morass of the Mehaigne, and the right flank of the household troops; while the prince of Hesse Cassel, with the dutch guards, and Opdam and Dopff dragoons pressing upon their rear, drove them round Ramilies towards Geest à Gerompont, although Villeroy and the elector exposed their persons, and used their utmost exertions to rally the fugitives.

After this successful onset, the allied horse crowned the height of Ottomond, and the success of the day was no longer doubtful. General Schultz, mean time, had advanced with his columns, under the protection of a heavy fire of shot and shells. He first forced back some battalions of Swiss, and gained the skirts of the houses. He then took the bavarian grenadiers, who were on the right, in flank, and drove them together with their foot guards through the center of the village; yet the two battalions of Cologne guards still stood firm, and the marquis de Maffei, who commanded the bavarians stationed in the valley, ordered them to occupy the reverse of the hollow road which leads out of Ramilies towards Ottomond, in hopes that the



gallo-bavarian cavalry was still in possession of the high plain behind him. By this manœuvre he regained part of the village; but the allied infantry, reinforced with twenty battalions of their centre, pressed with redoubled vigour upon the disordered troops, and the whole took to flight. Coming on the plain, Maffei mistook the allied horse for his own, and was taken prisoner.\* At the same time his infantry was intercepted, and cut to pieces or captured, except the french and swiss guards, who being posted more towards the left, escaped the general destruction.

The battle had now lasted three hours and an half, and it became necessary for the victorious cavalry of the left wing to pause and restore order. Of this interval the enemy availed themselves. The elector and Villeroy, with part of the cavalry of their left, endeavoured to make a movement between Geest à Gerompont and Offuz, to cover the formation of the broken troops; but were impeded by their train and baggage, which had been suffered to remain too near the rear of their first position.

The british commander saw the confusion and dismay which pervaded their ranks, and with that promptitude which marked his actions, seized the moment to strike the final and decisive blow. By his direction, the troops who had made or sustained the attack on Ramilies, penetrated through the swamp towards Offuz, and were supported by general Wood, who had been ordered up from the right, with part of the british horse. The enemy, however, gave way without waiting their approach; and Wood finding Offuz evacuated, advanced upon the rising ground behind the village at the head of his own regiment, and that of Wyndham.

In the midst of this route the infantry regiments of Churchill and Mordaunt, who with five squadrons of Lumley, Hay, and Ross, had hitherto continued on the heights of Foulz, did not remain idle spectators of the conflict. With that boldness which characterised all the movements of the day, they forced their way through the morass, ascended the acclivity between the Jauche and the Gheet, and coming in the rear of Autreglise, charged and defeated the troops which remained on the left flank

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\* Memoires du marquis Maffei.



of the enemy.\* The five squadrons who accompanied them now joined in the pursuit, and overtaking the regiment du Roi, compelled them to throw down their arms, and surrender themselves prisoners of war.

Meanwhile the regiments of Wyndham, with general Wood at their head, continued to press the retreating army. Approaching the farm of Chantrain, they came in view of the spanish and bavarian horse guards, who being animated by the elector in person, preserved a firm countenance, and were endeavouring to cover the retreat of the artillery belonging to the left wing. With his own regiment, general Wood instantly charged the bavarians, who formed the left, while that of Wyndham attacked the spaniards. The shock was fatal, numbers were killed or made prisoners; the standard and kettle drums became the trophies of the victors, and even the elector himself escaped with difficulty.

The fate of the regiment struck such consternation in the waving mass of the french army, which was retiring with some vestiges of order, that, regardless of the security which they derived from the depth of their front, and the protection of the Great Gheet, they suddenly burst from all controul. Throwing themselves headlong down the descent leading to the river, they strove to gain Judoigne, or spread in all directions like a scattered swarm. As the baggage waggons, broken down, overturned and locked into each other, obstructed the roads, the crowd could not escape along the direct way to the rear, and the british cavalry being quite fresh, overtook and captured vast numbers. Almost all the cannon, and the whole of the baggage fell into the hands of the victors, who continued the pursuit with unabated vigour, through Judoigne, till two in the morning. At this time the duke and Overkirk, with the main army, halted at Meldert, five leagues from the field of battle, and two from Louvain.

Lord Orkney, however, with some squadrons of light horse, continued the pursuit to the vicinity of Louvain, the enemy flying in the greatest confusion, dropping their heavy baggage, flinging

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\* This spirited attack, according to Ledyard, was led by colonel Churchill, a natural son of general Churchill, who headed his father's regiment.



away their arms, and not deeming themselves safe though they were covered by the Dyle.

This surprising victory was principally owing to the skilful dispositions of the duke, to his presence and activity in every quarter where danger threatened, or disorder began to take place, and to the firmness and perseverance of the dutch infantry and cavalry, who bore the brunt of the first attack. The german infantry also sustained their national character in the attack of Ramillies; and the horse of the right, who came late into the action, are entitled to the merit of having rendered the victory complete and decisive.\*

The gallant marshal Overkirk vied with Marlborough in deeds of skill and valour, and the success of the first and principal attack was due to his exertions. He fought at the head of the dutch troops, and continued on horseback till one in the morning, when he narrowly escaped from the treachery of a bavarian captain of horse, whom he had taken prisoner. Having kindly returned his sword, saying, "you are a gentleman, and may keep it," the villain abused his mercy, by an attempt to stab his benefactor in the back, and was only prevented from perpetrating the infamous deed, by the marshal's groom, who rode up and shot him dead on the spot.

The event of the day cost the enemy 13,000, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, among whom were several officers of distinction, particularly the princes of Soubise and Rohan, a nephew of lord Clare, who fell in the action, and a son of marshal Tallard, who was mortally wounded. The desertion which followed the engagement, swelled their loss to 15,000 men. The spoils of this memorable day amounted to 80 colours and standards, and

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\* Our principal authorities are the letters of Marlborough; Relation de la bataille de Ramillies, MS.; the official accounts in the Gazette; the different letters in the complete History of Europe, and in Lamberti; Dumont's Military History of Eugene and Marlborough. —Also Kane, Milner, Ledyard, the dutch and french biographers, Brodrick, Cunningham, and Conduct of the duke of Marlborough; and among the french authors, Quincy, Grimoard, Feuquieres, Reveries of Marshal Saxe.

The plan which illustrates this description was constructed by major Smith, from a personal inspection of the ground, and a comparison of the different relations; as well as from an original plan preserved in the king's library.



almost the whole french artillery, with the baggage which had not been sent to the rear. The allies acknowledged 1,066 killed, and 2,567 wounded. Of these 82 officers were killed, and 283 wounded; but none of distinction fell, except the prince of Hesse Cassel, and five colonels.

The elector and Villeroy, after escaping from the perils of the field, fled to Louvain. Holding a council in the market place by torch light, they hastily resolved to abandon the fortified towns and open country, and to save their discomfited army by a rapid retreat, behind the canal of Brussels.

The humanity displayed by the victorious general towards his prisoners, deserves to be recorded for the applause of an impartial posterity. The sick and wounded were lodged in hospitals, and treated with the same care and attention as the troops of the allies. The prisoners were conveyed into Holland with the sympathy due to their misfortune; and supplied with all the comforts which their situation required. To the beneficent example which Marlborough displayed on this, as on other occasions, we are indebted for the refined tenderness which has taken place in the intercourse of hostile armies. This virtue extorted the admiration even of the enemy; and a french writer pays a just eulogium to our great commander, for a quality which could not be said to distinguish the chiefs of his own and preceding ages. "Marlborough always shewed the utmost attention to his prisoners, and set the example of that humanity which has since soothed the horrors and calamities of war." \*

From the field of battle the victorious general sent couriers with the joyful news to London, and to the Hague. Colonel Richards conveyed the dispatch to England, with an official account in a letter to secretary Harley, which is given in the Gazette. On the ensuing morning the duke expressed his feelings to the duchess and Godolphin.

"*Monday, May 24th, 11 o'clock.* I did not tell my dearest soul in my last, the design I had of engaging the enemy if possible to a battle, fearing the concern she has for me, might

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\* Duclos, v. 1, p. 9.—Somerville's Queen Anne, p. 134.



make her uneasy ; but I can now give her the satisfaction of letting her know, that on Sunday last we fought, and that God Almighty has been pleased to give us a victory. I must leave the particulars to this bearer, colonel Richards, for having been on horseback all Sunday, and after the battle marching all night, my head aches to that degree, that it is very uneasy to me to write. Poor Bingfield, holding my stirrup for me, and helping me on horseback, was killed. I am told, that he leaves his wife and mother in a poor condition. I can't write to any of my children, so that you will let them know I am well, and that I desire they will thank God for preserving me. And pray give my duty to the queen, and let her know the truth of my heart, that the greatest pleasure I have in this success is, that it may be a great service to her affairs ; for I am sincerely sensible of all her goodness to me and mine. Pray believe me when I assure you that I love you more than I can express.

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

“*Monday, May 24, N.S.* I believe my last might give you expectation of an action. We have been in perpetual motion ever since ; and on Sunday last we came in presence with the enemy, who came with the same intentions I had, of fighting. We began to make our lines of battle about eleven o'clock, but we had not all our troops till two in the afternoon, at which time I gave orders for attacking them. The first half hour was very doubtful, but I thank God after that we had success in our attacks, which were on a village in the center ; and on the left we pursued them three leagues, and the night obliged us to give it over. Having been all Sunday, as well as last night on horseback, my head aches to that degree, that I must refer you to the bearer. I shall only add that we beat them into so great a consternation, that they abandoned all their cannon ; their baggage they had sent away in the morning, being resolved to fight. They had 128 squadrons, and 74 battalions ; we had 123 squadrons, and 73 battalions, so that you see the armies were near of a strength ; but the general officers which are taken, tell us that they thought themselves sure of victory, by having all the king of France's household, and with them the best troops of France. You will easily believe this victory



has lost us a good many men and officers; but I thank God we have but 3 english regiments that have much suffered; the dutch horse and foot have suffered more than we. I am going to get a little rest, for if our bread comes by six this evening, I will then march to Louvain this night, in hopes to find them in such disorder, as that we may be encouraged to attack them behind their lines, for they can have no cannon but what they can take out of Louvain. I beg you will assure the queen, that I act with all my heart, and you know how necessary it is for her affairs that we should have good success.

“Poor Bingfield is killed, and I am told he leaves his wife and mother in a bad condition.”

Consulting the feelings which he testifies in both his letters, towards the relations of his unfortunate equerry, he induced Godolphin to make a particular application to the queen in their behalf, and had the satisfaction to find from the answer of the treasurer, that his appeal had been crowned with success.

“May 17--28. God be thanked for the good news you sent us by Richards, who arrived here yesterday evening, and more particularly for the great escape you have had in your own person. I am very sensible you could not avoid exposing yourself upon this occasion; but where so much consequence turns upon one single life, you must allow your friends the liberty to think and say it ought not to be done without an absolute necessity.

“I have not had an opportunity of talking enough with Richards to know many particulars, or to be able to judge of the consequences of this great victory, any otherwise than as your letter leads me to hope, the enemy will not withstand your army any where.

“But this great blow to the french coming so immediately upon their misfortune at Barcelona, and in Spain, makes me presently return to my usual apprehensions, that France will lose no time in sending *carte blanche* to Holland, nor omit any arguments to obtain a favourable reception of their proposals. I don't question but you will have a watchful eye upon this danger.

“You may depend that her majesty will not fail to take care of poor Mr. Bingfield's widow.”



The queen in her wonted style of gracious condescension, congratulated her victorious general on this signal success. "I want words," she said, "to express my true sense of the great service you have done to your country, and I hope it will be a means to confirm all good and honest men in their principles, and frighten others from being troublesome." After kindly mentioning the alloy it was to her satisfaction, to consider the dangers to which he exposed himself, she obligingly concluded, "I must repeat my earnest request that you would be careful of yourself." \*

From the mass of congratulatory letters to which this victory gave birth, we shall select only two; one as the production of an eminent statesman, and the other of a no less eminent poet.

FROM MR. ST. JOHN.

"17--28 *May*, 1706. My lord;—Every man that wishes well to the common good of Europe, must be transported with the glorious action of Sunday last; but those who are particularly devoted to the service may pretend to a greater degree of joy. The vast addition of renown which your grace has acquired, and the wonderful preservation of your life, are subjects upon which I can never express the thousandth part of what I feel. France and faction, are the only enemies England has reason to fear, and your grace will conquer both; at least, while you beat the french, you give a strength to the government, which the other dares not contend with."

FROM MATTHEW PRIOR.

"*Cockpit*, *May* 24, O.S., 1706. My lord;—If I did not write sooner to your grace, upon the mighty success with which God has been pleased to bless your arms in the glorious day of Ramilies, it was that I thought you as yet too busy in pursuing the sad remains of the troops you there defeated, and in receiving the acknowledgments of the cities you delivered, that you would hardly find time to read my letter. And now I do write, my lord, it is rather to express my own particular joy and satisfaction, that your grace is preserved from those dangers, to which your person was exposed in the battle, than to endeavour to describe the

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\* Conduct, p. 174.



glory of the victory, the defeat of sixty thousand the best men that France ever saw, and the restitution of Brabant and Flanders, projected and achieved by the counsel and conduct of one english subject. My wishes for the continuance of all good to my patron and protector, may properly be the contents of a private man's letter: the conquests and honours of the duke of Marlborough, must be the subject of our historians, and the theme of our orators and poets. Learning and gratitude must conspire to set his actions above oblivion and envy, and all parties and degrees of men, who wish well to their country, are obliged to praise the success of that general, who has carried the glory of the english arms beyond what our chronicles can parallel, or our own imagination could have expected. In one word, my lord, without aiming at any flattery to your grace, I think all honest men join heartily in this justice to your merit; though I must tell you, that amongst us some there are that are so bad as to do it, only because they are ashamed or afraid to do otherwise, and that there are more Stevens's than one.

“But of this I will not trouble your grace at present, though it may give me occasion of speaking or writing to you on that subject hereafter. For my own part, I must confess in honest prose, as I did two years since in indifferent verse,\* that I did not see how the honour of Blenheim field could be improved; and as matters now stand, I see your grace at such a pitch of glory, that I can wish no farther for you in that behalf.

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\* Prior had already testified his admiration and gratitude in his poetical effusions on the brilliant campaign of 1704; and soon after he had written this letter, he gave another proof of his devotion in his ode to the queen on the success of her arms in 1706, which is printed in his works. This production he sent to his patron, with the following letter, which is equally adulatory.

“*Westminster, July 5, 1706.* My lord;—The inclosed contains the best answer I can make to your grace's letter from Arzele, and to all your favours while you were last in England. I own to your grace, that 'tis time for me to quit poetry, but my zeal for her majesty's glory, and my obligations to you, my lord, are eternal. I assure myself, that your grace will find this *written from the heart*, and I tell every body in my preface when I intend to write again in verse. As to prose, I always attend your grace's order. In the mean time, that you may continue victorious and happy, is my constant prayer, as it is my endeavour and ambition to approve myself, &c.”



“ Since I dare not trouble your grace often by letter, I take this occasion to thank you most humbly for having mentioned to my lord treasurer an affair so small as my fortune. I have, as your goodness advised me, assured his lordship of my continued obedience to his commands and zeal for his service ; and I think I have all the reason in the world to hope his favour and protection. I must yet detain your grace one moment from the great affairs in which all Europe is concerned, whilst I repeat my being ever, &c.”


The intelligence of the victory and its immediate consequences excited as much enthusiasm in England as that of Blenheim. A proclamation was instantly issued for a public thanksgiving, which on the 29th of June was celebrated with the usual solemnity, the queen repairing to the cathedral of St. Paul's in the same state, and amidst the same acclamations as upon similar occasions. Addresses were poured in from all quarters; envy and malignity seemed to be silenced; and the name of the undaunted and renowned general was mingled with that of his royal mistress in shouts of national exultation. No one felt higher delight than the treasurer, but a brief, though affectionate letter, expressing his joy, is mingled with the usual querulous complaints of the factious spirit, which the victories of Marlborough repressed, but could not subdue.

“ *Windsor, Monday 24.* The queen is come to town to give God thanks next Thursday for your victory. I assure you I shall do it from every vein within me, having scarce any thing else to support either my heart or my head. The animosity and inveteracy one has to struggle with is unimaginable, not to mention the difficulty of obtaining things to be done that are reasonable, or of satisfying people with reason when they are done.”











## CHAPTER 46.

1706.

*Continuation of Marlborough's successful career—Surrender of Brussels, Ghent, and the principal towns of Brabant—Correspondence—News of the relief of Barcelona, and disastrous retreat of Philip into France—Congratulatory letter from Marlborough to lord Peterborough, on this splendid success—Surrender of Antwerp—Journey of Marlborough to the Hague—Correspondence—Siege and capture of Ostend.*

NO commander ever displayed more promptitude and activity in prosecuting his success, and no victory, perhaps, produced more important consequences than that of Ramilies. Marlborough, to use his own simple, but energetic expression, “pressed the enemy while confusion remained among them.” After a short repose at Meldert, he prepared to advance against Louvain; but hearing that it was already evacuated, he sent forward a corps of 500 men to take possession, and soon afterwards entering the place, was received with those enthusiastic acclamations, which announced the rapid progress of the subsequent revolution.

After crossing the Dyle with his whole army, he encamped on the heights of Bethlehem, in the vicinity of Louvain, and on the 26th moved to Dieghem, taking up his head quarters at the castle of Beaulieu, midway between Mechlin and Brussels. The advance of the victorious army produced the expected effect. In this camp he received a deputation from the governor and magistrates of Brussels, as well as from the states of Brabant, expressing their satisfaction at their delivery from the oppression of the french, their obligation to England and Holland, and their readiness to recognise king Charles as their legitimate sovereign. In consequence of this notification, the duke and the dutch deputies sent a joint declaration, testifying the intention of the queen and the States General to maintain the just rights of his catholic majesty, king Charles the third, to the kingdom of Spain and all its dependencies. They likewise guarantied the entire



enjoyment of all their liberties and privileges, both ecclesiastical and secular; and promised that Charles should confirm all the grants and concessions which are contained in the well known charter, called *La Joyeuse Entrée*, in the same manner as they were granted by the late king of Spain and his royal predecessors. This declaration had its due effect upon a loyal and free people.

On the 28th the deputies from Brussels presented letters from the sovereign council, from the states of Brabant, and from the magistrates of the capital, testifying their allegiance to their legitimate sovereign, and their gratitude to the victorious general.

The duke did not delay availing himself of this effusion of public sentiment. He dispatched his brother, general Churchill, from Grimberg, whither he had moved his camp, to take possession of Brussels; and on the 28th, himself made his public entry in great pomp. At the gates, being met by a procession of magistrates and nobles, accompanied by a vast concourse of people, he received the keys which were presented to him. He returned them with assurances of her majesty's protection, and after being splendidly entertained, repaired to the camp.

The victory of Ramilies produced no less effect among the members of the grand alliance than among the enemy. The king of Prussia, who had hitherto kept aloof, and suspended the march of his troops, now listened to the mediation of Marlborough, and effected a reconciliation with the dutch and the court of Vienna. He even ceased from pressing the immediate recal of lord Raby, and afterwards desisted entirely from his demand. The same motives operated on the elector of Hanover, who evinced his usual cordiality for the success of the common cause. "This," Marlborough observes in a letter to secretary Harley, "I take to be owing to our late successes."\*

Marlborough likewise successfully combated the selfish demands of the dutch, who were eager to levy contributions on the recovered provinces. He opposed with no less zeal the limited views of Godolphin, who with a laudable, but ill-timed œconomy, was desirous to claim a share in these exactions, for the interest of

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\* Letter to secretary Harley, June 14.—State Paper Office.



England. On these, as well as on other subjects, his correspondence obviates the necessity of any farther comment.

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

“ *Brussels, May 16--27.* Since my last, we have not only passed the Dyle, but are masters of Louvain, Mallines, and Brussels; you will see by what I send to Mr. Secretary Harley, what has passed between me and the states of Brabant, which I found assembled at Brussels. As there could not be time for orders from England, I hope her majesty will approve of what I have done. It is not to be expressed the great success it has pleased God to give us, by putting a consternation in the enemy's army; for they had not only a greater number than we, but all the best troops of France. The consequence of this battle is likely to be of greater advantage than that of Blenheim; for we have now the whole summer before us, and with the blessing of God, I will make the best use of it. For as we had no council of war before this battle, so I hope to have none this whole campaign; and I think we may make such a campaign as may give the queen the glory of making an honourable and safe peace; for the blessing of God is certainly with us.

“ I send you a copy of the treaty signed by M. Gilder-Massen, with the landgrave of Hesse, as also his and the landgrave's letters to me, with my answers. If I venture to take too much upon me, pray assure the queen that it is my zeal for her service and the public good that makes me do it, for there ought to be no time lost in the sending those troops to Italy. I do not doubt but you have had the demands of the king of Prussia, on which he is contented to let his troops serve in this country. This will cost some money to England and Holland. He is certainly very unreasonable; but we should be more, if we should let those troops continue at Wesel all this summer, which is what France expects and desires.”

TO THE DUCHESS.

“ *Brussels, May 16--27.* I have been in so continued a hurry ever since the battle of Ramilies, by which my blood is so heated, that when I go to bed I sleep so unquietly that I cannot get rid



of my head ach, so that I have not as yet all the pleasure I shall enjoy, of the blessing God has been pleased to give us by this great victory. My lord treasurer will let you see what I send by this express to Mr. Secretary Harley, by which you will see that we have done in four days, what we should have thought ourselves happy if we could have been sure of it in four years. I bless God that he has been pleased to make me the instrument of doing so much service to the queen, England, and all Europe, for it is most certain that we have destroyed the greatest part of the best troops of France. My dearest soul, I have now that great pleasure of thinking that I may have the happiness of ending my days in quiet with you.

"I have appointed next Sunday for the army to return thanks to God, for the protection he has been pleased to give us. For on this occasion it has been very visible, for the french had not only greater numbers than we, but also all their best troops. I hope the queen will appoint a speedy thanksgiving day at St. Paul's, for the goodness of God is so very great, that if he had suffered us to have been beaten, the liberties of all the allies had been lost. The consequences of this battle are likely to be greater than that of Blenheim, for I have now the whole summer before me. Pray make my excuse to lord Sunderland that I am not able to write, but he may, if he pleases, see what I write to lord treasurer. My dearest life, I am ever your's.

"Brussels has submitted to king Charles the third, and I am promised, that in eight days the states of Brabant will also proclaim him."

The submission of the capital, as Marlborough foresaw, had a natural effect on all the other cities of Brabant, which were not restrained by french garrisons. Among others Mechlin, Alost, and Lierre, made a formal recognition of Charles the third, and admitted the confederate troops.

On the 30th the duke of Wirtemberg was detached with the pontoons, to throw bridges over the Scheldt, and the army again moving to interrupt the retreat of the enemy towards their own frontier, took post at Alost. The discomfited troops did not,



however, wait the approach of the victors ; and the duke continuing to advance, encamped at Merlebeck, five leagues south of Ghent. Here he remained several days, spreading detachments over the country, and receiving hourly, fresh indications of the happy revolution in the public sentiment.

The transport of joy and enthusiasm produced by this sudden and momentous change, extended rapidly from Brabant into Flanders. When Cadogan, at the head of a strong detachment, approached Ghent, the inhabitants scarcely waited the retreat of the french garrison, before they crowded to the walls, and with shouts of welcome invited the allied troops to enter the place. Indeed, Marlborough himself seems to have been no less surprised than gratified, by this overwhelming tide of success, and his feelings are strikingly depicted in his correspondence.

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

“ *Merlebeck, near Ghent, May 20--31.* We did this day design the passing the Scheldt at Gavre, by which we should have cut the french army from their old lines ; but they rather chose to abandon Ghent, which they did this morning at break of day, so that I have camped the left of the army at Gavre, and the right at this place. I shall send to-morrow a detachment to Bruges, they having also abandoned that town. As soon as we can have the cannon, and what is necessary, we shall attack Antwerp ; after which I should be glad the next place might be Ostend ; for unless they draw the greatest part of their army from Germany, they will not be able to hinder us from doing what we please on this side their lines. I tell you my thoughts, but if you think there is any thing better for the queen's interest, I shall endeavour to do it, having that more at heart than my own life.”

TO THE DUCHESS.

“ *Merlebeck, near Ghent, May 20--31.* We are now masters of Ghent, and to-morrow I shall send some troops to Bruges. So many towns have submitted since the battle, that it really looks more like a dream than truth. My thoughts are now turning to the getting every thing ready for the siege of Antwerp, which place alone, in former years, would have been thought good



success for a whole campaign ; but we have the blessing of God with us, and I hope we shall do more in this campaign than was done in the last ten years war in this country, which is a great pleasure, since it is the likeliest way to bring me to my happiness of ending my days quietly."

" *Merlebeck, June 3.* Every day gives us fresh marks of the great victory ; for since my last, which was but two days ago, we have taken possession of Bruges and Damme, as also Oudenard, which was besieged the last war by the king, with sixty thousand men, and he was at last forced to raise the siege. In short, there is so great a panic in the french army, as is not to be expressed. Every place we take declares for king Charles. To-morrow the marshal de Marsin joins their army with 18 battalions of foot, and 14 squadrons, which will be very little assistance to them ; so that if they will oppose us, they must draw more troops from their other armies.

" You are very kind in desiring I would not expose myself. Be assured I love you so well, and am so desirous of ending my days quietly with you, that I shall not venture myself but when it is absolutely necessary ; and I am sure you are so kind to me, and wish so well to the common cause, that you had rather see me dead, than not to do my duty. I am so persuaded that this campaign will bring us a good peace, that I beg of you to do all you can that the house at Woodstock may be carried up as much as possible, that I may have a prospect of living in it. I do not trouble the queen with thanking her for her obliging letter, but beg you will with the most dutiful expressions do it, as also for the letter she writ to lord treasurer before the battle, which I will endeavour to deserve, by venturing at all times my life with pleasure for her service.

" Make my excuse to lord Sunderland, and that I desire he would do it to the rest of our friends, that I have not time by this post to thank them for their obliging letters."

In consequence of these successes, the duke ordered a public thanksgiving on the first of June, and it was celebrated with those marks of serious devotion, which the soldiery appeared to



have imbibed from the example of their commander. On the ensuing day, he made his public entry into Ghent, a small body of Spaniards left in the citadel, having previously surrendered as prisoners of war. We detail his farther successes in his own words.

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

“ *Merlebeck, June 3.* I have three of your letters to answer, but must beg you to allow me to do it by the next post; for I have hardly one minute to spare to myself.

“ We have every day marks of the consternation the enemy is in, for they have this day surrendered Oudenard, a very strong place, and we in no condition of taking it for want of cannon. They had three regiments in the town, two of this country, and one french. The two first have declared for king Charles, as also Bruges and Damme, which we have taken since my last letter. I have sent brigadier Cadogan with six squadrons of horse, to offer terms to the town and citadel of Antwerp. If I can have that place, without a siege, it will gain us a month. I am doing all I can to gain the governor of Dendermond, which place would be of great consequence. They have let out the waters, so that we cannot attack it. As soon as we have Antwerp, and can get our artillery to Ostend, we shall attack that place, at which time it would be necessary that the Dunkirk squadron should help us. You see that I make use of the consternation.

“ Marsin will join them to-morrow with eighteen battalions and fourteen squadrons, and I am assured that orders are gone to the marshal de Villars to send 30 battalions more, and 40 squadrons; so that prince Louis may act if he pleases. I have ordered the Hanover troops to join me, and we hope to have the prussians, which will enable me to make the detachment for the descent. If prince Louis makes use of this occasion, to press the french in Alsace, as I will, with the blessing of God, in this country, the king of France will be obliged to draw some troops from Italy, by which Turin may be saved. We have nothing now that stops us but the want of cannon; for the french cannot have their troops



from Germany in less than three weeks. We march to-morrow to Deynse, and the french are retired behind Menin, by which you see we are at liberty to attack Ostend and Nieuport, if we had our artillery. My service to Mr. Godolphin, and all with you."

In this disastrous state of their affairs, the french made no effort to maintain themselves in Brabant, but separated their army into two bodies, one of which was posted at Mortagne, on the Scheldt, and the other at Armentieres, on the Lys. The elector of Bavaria threw himself into Mons, and reinforcements were detached to Tournay, Lille, Ypres, Menin, and other points of the frontier, which were more directly menaced. The principal towns in Brabant having announced their submission, except Antwerp and Dendermond, the duke sent a summons to both, and receiving a defiance, made preparations to attack Antwerp.

On the 4th of June he traversed the Scheldt, and having accepted the surrender of Oudenard, pitched his camp between Arsele and Caneghem. While he was detained by the want of artillery, he had the satisfaction to receive intelligence, confirming the news of the relief of Barcelona.

The campaign in Spain had opened with the most melancholy prospects to Charles. Hemmed in by a powerful army, and surrounded by a turbulent populace and burghers, who were alienated by the exactions of his german partisans, it seemed impossible to maintain so extensive a city as Barcelona. Lord Peterborough and the count of Cifuentes, who gave energy to the flying corps scattered in the mountainous districts, had indeed thrown in reinforcements and supplies; interrupted the operations of the besiegers; and protracted the crisis. But though they prolonged the siege, their efforts could not counterbalance a vast superiority of numbers and resources, and the young monarch was left to depend on his own energy, and the enthusiasm with which he inspired his catalan subjects, whose aversion to the castilian government absorbed all other feelings. He braved every danger and



fatigue, animated his troops by his presence and example, and seemed determined to verify the resolution, which he had announced, of burying himself under the ruins of Barcelona.

All efforts were, however, unavailing. The garrison were exhausted with fatigue, and thinned by the sword, breaches were formed in the ramparts, and Peterborough, as well as the adherents of the Austrian prince, concurred in conjuring him to withdraw from a situation, in which he had no other prospect than captivity or death.

In this awful moment of mingled hope and despair, the long expected relief approached. The combined fleets of England and Holland, under the command of Sir John Leake, departed from the rendezvous at Lisbon, in April; and after taking on board additional reinforcements at Gibraltar, skirted the eastern coasts of Spain, anxiously inquiring into the state and forces of the enemy. The exaggerated and contradictory intelligence which was artfully circulated, alarmed the admiral, and a momentary doubt prevailed, whether it were more prudent to retire, or risk the safety of the fleet against superior numbers. In this situation, an officer dispatched by general Stanhope, to the flying camp of lord Peterborough, returned with more cheering intelligence. By the decision of Stanhope, the fleet proceeded to its destination, the hostile squadron retired on their approach, and on the 9th of May the british flag was descried with joy and exultation from the ramparts of Barcelona.\*

To guard against a desperate effort of the enemy, troops were instantly landed, and spent the night in arms behind the breaches. But the precaution was needless; for the Bourbon prince no sooner learnt the approach of the allied squadron, than he abandoned an enterprise, which he deemed hopeless, broke up his camp in the greatest disorder, left his sick, artillery, and stores, and directed his hasty march towards the frontier of Rousillon, to shelter his discouraged army behind the

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\* Journal of the proceedings for the relief of Barcelona, by an officer who attended general Stanhope—Conduct of lord Peterborough—Memoirs of the kings of Spain, chapter 14th.



barrier of the Pyrenees. Lord Peterborough and the count of Cifuentes harassed their toilsome progress through Catalonia, and swelled the losses of their precipitate retreat. This event seemed to augur the speedy triumph of the austrian cause in Spain; and even Marlborough himself expressed his hopes and satisfaction, in a congratulatory letter to Peterborough:

“ I have no doubt that your lordship has already escorted the king to Madrid, and take this opportunity to felicitate you on this glorious exploit, which is every where attributed to your valour and conduct. All the allies exult in the advantages which are likely to result from this splendid success, and I particularly rejoice in the new lustre which it will shed on your glory. After such astonishing actions, there is nothing which we may not expect from you; so that I flatter myself you will not consider our hopes as ill founded, if we reckon upon the speedy reduction of Spain to the obedience of its legitimate sovereign, since it seems as if Providence had chosen you to be the happy instrument. I heartily wish you all success till you have completed the great work.”

In the midst of the exultation inspired by this event, the british general was gratified with intelligence no less satisfactory.

A schism having broken forth between the walloon and french regiments, who composed the garrison of Antwerp, the former with the marquis of Terracina, governor of the citadel, were naturally anxious to imitate the example of their countrymen in acknowledging the legitimate sovereign. The consequence of this feud was, a secret correspondence, which within a few days terminated in the surrender of the place. An arrangement was made by the garrison, in virtue of which, the french troops were permitted to retire with all the honours of war, and marched to Quesnoy and Landreci, leaving the spaniards in possession of the town and citadel, and waiting for an opportunity to deliver up the place to the orders of the commander in chief. Marlborough thus, without the loss of a single man, became master of a fortress, which was sufficiently garrisoned to have detained his career a month.



These wonderful successes inspired all parties with the most sanguine hopes, and no enterprise was deemed too hazardous for the skill of the victorious commander. Even the sedate temper of Godolphin was warmed into enthusiasm. Knowing the shock which it would prove to France, to gain possession of so important a post as Dunkirk, he earnestly pressed Marlborough in one of his letters to direct his force against that place.

“ *May 31--June 11.* Not hoping for the Holland letters before this goes out, I shall only add to the hint I gave you in my last.

“ If you find any room to attack Dunkirk, and will promise to demolish it, the advantage of that conquest will be perpetual to England. I do not see why Holland should not be as desirous as we, and I must own the greatest prospect I have from the french expedition, is the hope I have it may give us an opportunity of destroying Rochfort. Any thing we can do at that place, Toulon or Dunkirk will prove a real good to us after the peace; but whenever peace comes, I don't much expect that any great advantages will be stipulated in it for England; and, therefore, I think it concerns us the more to endeavour to obtain some security for ourselves before the war is ended.”

But the duke well knew that such an attack could not succeed while Ostend and Ypres were held by the enemy; and in his reply, exhibits the difficulty of the enterprise :

“ *June 14.* If we take Ostend in any seasonable time, it will be much the best place for the transports to come to, and I will take care to have the troops there. The efforts the french are making to have a strong army I am afraid will make it impossible for us to take Dunkirk this year; but whenever we can have it, I agree with you, that the best thing we can do is to spoil the harbour.”

“ *Rousselaer, June 21.* I see by your's that you do not expect any great advantages for England, when the treaty of peace is once begun. I ask your pardon on being of another opinion, for I think you may expect every thing that is for the safety and good of England. I do not mean by that, any places in this country, for I am persuaded that it is much more for her



majesty's service and England, not to be master of any towns in this country, since it would create a jealousy both at home and abroad. I know this should not be the language of a general, but I do it as a faithful subject.

“ M. Overkirk has found so many difficulties for the siege of Nieuport, that he has taken the resolution of attacking Ostend, which was to have been done after the taking of Nieuport. We can never think of going to Dunkirk till we are masters of Nieuport and Ypres, which is not to be attempted, unless we could have troops sufficient for two armies.”

“ *Rousselaer, June 24.* I had the favour of your's of the 4th, O. S., yesterday, and find you are very desirous of having Dunkirk. I am as sensible as any body of the mischief that place does England, so that you may be sure I shall do my utmost, that we might have it in our power to destroy that harbour. But I must own to you, I see so many difficulties, that I dare not flatter you with the hopes of having it this year; and I am also of the opinion, that I think France will find itself in such a condition this next winter, that rather than venture the next campaign, they will consent to any reasonable terms for a peace; but as God has blessed the beginning of this campaign beyond what the thoughts of man could reasonably suppose, so it must be our duty to improve it as far as occasion shall offer. \* \* \* \* \*

For these reasons, Marlborough was doubly anxious to hasten the descent, which he considered as more practicable, and more likely to create a diversion, and spread alarm into the interior of France. To promote this enterprise, as well as to settle a plan of operations for the remainder of the campaign, he profited by the short interval, which elapsed before the arrival of the artillery, to make a journey to the Hague. His objects are best described in his own words, written before the preceding letters to Godolphin:

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

“ *Arsele, June 7.* \* \* \* \* \* I am extremely obliged to you for your kind concern for my safety. I am now at an age not to take pleasure in exposing myself, but when I think it absolutely

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necessary. You can never say enough to the queen for her goodness to me in the letter you sent me. Though I take myself to be a good englishman, and wish well to the common cause, yet my great joy in this success is, that it hath pleased God to make me the instrument of doing that, which must be of great consequence to her service.

“ I received this morning your's of the 21st, and in my next, which will be from the Hague, you shall be sure to have an account of the number of troops you will have from this country for the descent. I take this time of going to the Hague, we being at a full stand for want of cannon; for the french being retreated into their own country behind their strong towns, have put the greatest part of their foot into Ostend, Nieuport, Ypres, Menin, Tournay, and Lille. The marshal de Villeroy is camped with the rest of the french at St. Amand, and the elector of Bavaria is at Lille. The capitulations for the surrender of the town and citadel of Antwerp were signed yesterday; so that we are now in possession of all Brabant. Our next thoughts will be for the attacking Nieuport and Ostend, which I see you have a great mind we should; so that I beg there may be no time lost in sending such ships as are ready to cruize before those two places, which will be of great use to us. By the letters from Paris, we see they would have us believe that they are taking the necessary measures to have a superiority in this country, which I think they will never be able to do, unless they put themselves on the defensive in Italy, as well as in Germany. For the good of the common cause, I wish they may endeavour it, for the men they have here, will very unwillingly be brought to fight again this campaign.

“ The reason of my going to the Hague is, to settle what shall go for the descent, and to acquaint them with my thoughts for the farther operations of this campaign, so that they may take care for every thing that will be necessary; as also to persuade them to draw more troops out of their garrisons, and to let them see that if this campaign be pushed on with vigour, with the blessing



of God we may expect to bring France to what conditions we please."

TO THE DUCHESS.

"*Hague, June 10.* I came to this place last night, and to-morrow morning I return to the army, having settled the troops for the descent, which was my chief business; for what concerned us in Flanders might have been done by letter. But they were so unwilling to part with their troops, that I think nothing but my coming hither would have prevailed with them, since they are very apprehensive that the king of Prussia will not let his troops join us. I have all the reason imaginable, to be satisfied with the expressions these people have made."

Returning from the Hague on the 11th of June, Marlborough passed the night at Moerdyk, and on his way to the camp was met at Merxheim by the bishop and clergy of Antwerp, who came to announce their recognition of king Charles. Approaching the city, he received a similar communication from the burghers, conveyed by the margrave of Antwerp; and the magistrates and the first pensionary delivered the keys, with an appropriate harangue, declaring that they had never been surrendered to any person since the great duke of Parma.

To his correspondence we shall again refer for his farther views, and operations against Ostend.

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

"*Arsele, June 17.* The troops designed for the siege of Ostend, marched that way two days ago, and I shall march with what remains of the army, to cover the siege to-morrow; I have with me 50 battalions of foot, and 99 squadrons of horse. I hope to have the prussians and hanoverians with me, before the enemy can have their detachment from Germany."

Notwithstanding the accession of force occasioned by the detachments drawn from different quarters, which nearly replaced the losses sustained by the french army, Marlborough pursued the design mentioned in the preceding letters, with his usual energy and decision. Ostend being selected as the object of



attack, it was necessary to obviate difficulties which would have startled a less enterprising commander. The environs were intersected with dikes, canals, and water-courses, which afforded innumerable means of resistance; and the defence could be increased by inundations. The avenues were commanded, on one hand, by the small, though strong fortress of Nieuport; and, on the other, by the fort of Plassendael, and the intrenched bridge of Sandwort. The enemy, by the possession of Furnes and Dunkirk, could pour reinforcements into Nieuport, or interrupt the communications of the covering army. Finally, the place itself was difficult of access, and the surrounding soil a mixture of marsh and sand, where no excavations could be made a foot below the surface, without encountering water. The garrison, consisting of about 5,000 men, were encouraged by the recollection, that in the preceding century, Ostend had sustained a siege of uncommon duration, and was not reduced by Spinola, the first warrior of the age, till after a lapse of three years, and the loss of 80,000 men.

Marlborough appretiated these difficulties; but at the same time, he was not unacquainted with circumstances which afforded a prospect of success. The burghers were influenced by the example of the other towns in Flanders; the garrison was partly composed of walloons, who participated in the sentiments of their fellow soldiers at Antwerp; and the governor himself was not partial to the Bourbon cause. The works of the place had suffered considerable dilapidation from long neglect; and the army, to which it must ultimately look for succour, was not yet sufficiently recovered from its panic, to contend a second time with a victorious enemy.

At the same time every precaution was taken to ensure success. A squadron of nine ships of the line, besides smaller vessels, was hovering on the coast, to assail the sea-defences, and favour the efforts of the besieging army. As the possession of Nieuport and Plassendael was deemed necessary to facilitate the operations against Ostend, Marlborough, as we have already seen, prevailed on Overkirk to move with 28 battalions, and 10 regiments of



horse against Nieuport. He also detached general Fagel with a sufficient force to reduce Plassendael and Sandwort. With the main army Marlborough, on the 18th, took post at Rousselaer, where he at once threatened Menin and Ypres, and covered the operations of the siege. Fagel succeeded in securing Plassendael, and the bridge of Sandwort, by which he obtained possession of the sluices, and deprived the enemy of the advantages which they might have derived from their inundations. Overkirk attacked the outworks of Nieuport, and captured the detached fort of Nieuendeim; but finding the place too well defended to be taken by storm, he masked it, and advanced along the coast to Mariekirk, south of Ostend. The trenches would have been immediately opened; but it was found that the loose and swampy nature of the ground did not afford sufficient cover for the troops without the aid of fascines and gabions; and it was necessary to wait the arrival of the artillery, and the co-operation of the fleet.

Meanwhile, the commander in chief was not inattentive to the movements of the enemy; and at once, to prevent them from interrupting his designs, by harassing his rear, he detached general Pollant, on the 23rd of June, to strengthen Courtray and Oudenard, which operated as a check on the enterprises of their garrisons on the Haine, the Lys, and the Scheldt.

The preparations for the intended siege being at length matured, the trenches were opened on the night of the 28th, on the south west front of the place. A heavy and incessant fire from the besieged did not obstruct the progress of the assailants, and on the first of July, the batteries were completed, and mounted with artillery. Arrangements being made with the admiral, a fire was opened on the 3rd, both by land and sea, and before the following morning, flames burst forth in several quarters of the town, and the sea-defences were reduced to ruin. The progress of the besiegers not being sufficiently rapid to satisfy the impatience of Marlborough, he repaired from Rousselaer, to confer with Overkirk and the admiral, and to hasten the progress of the works. His presence produced an immediate effect; the counterscarp was carried on



the 6th, and the besieged, after a fruitless sally, to recover their loss, were discouraged by the construction of the breaching batteries on the glacis, and beat a parley. According to the capitulation, they quitted the place without military honours, under promise not to bear arms against the allies for six months. Two walloon battalions, and four troops of dragoons, the greater part of the garrison, entered into the service of the allies. In the harbour were found two men of war, one of 80, and the other of 50 guns, with 45 smaller vessels. This valuable conquest was atchieved with the loss of only 500 men.\*

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\* History of Europe for 1706—Gazette—Brodrick—Ledyard—Correspondence of Overkirk with Marlborough during the siege.



## CHAPTER 47.

1706.

*Difficulties respecting the arrangement of the government in the Netherlands—Jarring interests and views of the dutch, and the house of Austria—The States anxious to appropriate the administration—Offer of the government to Marlborough, by the emperor, and king Charles—He accepts the grant with the approbation of the queen—Obliged to decline it, by the opposition of the dutch—Ulterior difficulties, and correspondence on the subject.*

**N**OTWITHSTANDING the difficulties which Marlborough had overcome, he found it easier to effect the conquest of the Netherlands, than to arrange the internal government, to the satisfaction of all the parties interested; to quiet the jealousies between the dutch and the house of Austria; and at the same time to allay the umbrage conceived against England, with regard to the settlement of the barrier and commercial interests.

On the conquest of Spanish Guelderland, the administration had been consigned by the emperor Leopold, in the name of king Charles, to count Sinzendorf, who was then imperial resident at the Hague. This appointment was afterwards transferred to his successor, the count de Goes; and the elector palatine, brother in law of the emperor, was joined in the commission. Under this arrangement the administration had been conducted, until the battle of Ramilies, and no material difficulty had occurred, as the exercise of this delegated power was confined to the countries bordering on the Lower Meuse. But the decisive victory, which produced a revolution in the Netherlands, opened a new scene, by awakening the cupidity of the austrian and dutch governments, which had slumbered while the recovery of these rich provinces was deemed uncertain. A violent contest now arose who should appoint, or rather who should exercise the



powers of government. Under the dukes of Brabant and counts of Flanders, the administration and finances had been managed by a council of state, composed of the most considerable natives. Its functions had, however, been gradually abridged by the austrian sovereigns of Spain, till it had become little better than an empty name; and on the usurpation of the french, it was superseded by an intendant, while the internal government was assimilated to that of France.

This change was, however, far from being grateful to a people jealous of their privileges, and the discontent it excited was among the prominent causes which occasioned the sudden declaration in favour of Charles. Of this disposition the dutch readily availed themselves; and on the expulsion of the french, they laboured for the restoration of the council of state, with the hope of acquiring a paramount influence over a government similar to their own, and appointed under their auspices.

The views of the dutch, however, had not escaped the penetration of the imperial court, and immediately on the reduction of Louvain, the count de Goes demanded an audience of the States to require their recognition of his authority as administrator. His demand being eluded, under the plea of consulting the queen, he dispatched a messenger for the instructions of his court, and in the interim repaired secretly to Dusseldorf, to advise with the elector palatine, to whom he was directed to refer in cases of difficulty. On his return he endeavoured to effect a species of compromise, by requiring that the police should be consigned to his direction, and offering to enter into a treaty for the management of the financial and military administration.\* His instances were, however, again eluded under the same plea, and all the ingenuity of the dutch government was called forth to secure their point, either by implicating the duke of Marlborough in some arrangement, or by consigning the regency to a spaniard till the pleasure of Charles could be known. The person who appears to have been selected for this purpose, was Don Bernardo de Quiros, who

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\* Lamberti, tome 4, p. 312.



had acted as ambassador, first of Charles the second, and afterwards of Philip, and had declared for the austrian sovereign soon after the victory of Ramilies.

In this state of affairs, an unexpected resolution on the part of the emperor gave a new turn to the views of the dutch government.

By a singular coincidence of circumstances, the very day which gladdened the court of Vienna with news of the relief of Barcelona, brought intelligence of the triumphant victory at Ramilies. In a transport of joy and gratitude, the emperor filled up a blank power, which had been left by his brother, for any occurrence of emergency, with a decree, consigning to Marlborough the administration of the Netherlands; although the elector palatine, brother of the empress dowager, seems to have expected the offer of the government, and was entitled to great consideration, as well from his relationship to the emperor, and his services to the grand alliance, as for having been already associated in the office. This patent Joseph transmitted with a gracious letter,\* in the latin tongue, stating that the government of the belgic provinces could not be better confided than to the hand which had recovered them; and expressing a strong desire, that neither the duke himself, nor the queen and States would object to a disposition so just, and so advantageous to the common cause.

Marlborough was himself not merely gratified by these spontaneous and unexpected proofs of favour and confidence, but appretiated all the advantages to England, and the confederacy in general, from such an authority confided to his hands. He therefore instantly imparted the news with the utmost secrecy to the treasurer, for the decision of the queen and cabinet; and in particular, requested his friend to convey the welcome intelligence to the whig leaders, for their approbation.

“*June 28.* I received last night an express from Vienna, with the inclosed letter, in Latin, from the emperor, and the powers

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\* Dated Vienna, June 18.



from the king of Spain, in spanish; that of the king of Spain, was a blank signed by him, and left in the emperor's hand. As I have not been able to have the spanish translated, I do not know exactly the powers. I shall keep it here a secret, till I know from you what her majesty's pleasure is, as also I shall take measures with my friends in Holland to know how they will like it; for I must take care that they take no jealousy, whatever the queen's resolution may be. I beg no notice may be taken till the emperor's minister shall apply to her majesty. I beg you to assure the queen, that I have in this matter, nor never shall have in any other, any desire of my own, but with all the submission in the world, be pleased with what she shall think is for her interest."

The minister was no less gratified than his friend, and the queen and cabinet participated in his satisfaction. The whig leaders also were unanimous in their approbation. Lord Godolphin, in reply, expressed their common sentiment.

"*Windsor, June 24--July 5.* Since I had written this far, I have the favour of your's of the 28th, with the several papers inclosed. I do not return you the spanish paper, not having had time to get it translated for you, as I intend to do; but I have been able to read it in english to the queen, who likes the thing very well, and leaves it to you to do as you shall judge best for her service, and the good of the common cause. I have not communicated this to any body yet, but lord Somers and lord Sunderland, who are both much pleased with it, as what they think is like to keep every thing in those countries upon a right foot, at least during the operations of this summer. They seemed to think there was no reason for the dutch not to like it as well as we do, and both concluded with myself, that it was one of the rightest thoughts that ever came from the emperor's counsel. The queen has not yet had any notice of it from the imperial minister."

But although Marlborough had calculated on some trifling objections from the States, he was far from foreseeing the violent opposition which he was to encounter from the partial views and interested policy of the republic.



While the confederates were employed in recovering the Low Countries, their union with the dutch was in general cordial and sincere; but no sooner had the victory of Ramilies secured their object, than national interest began to operate. The dutch were now only anxious to obtain an effectual barrier against the power of France, and with that view were desirous to extend their territorial possessions at the expence of the spanish monarchy. To this single object they sacrificed every other consideration, and made it the principle of all their negotiations and arrangements. Eager to appropriate the government, or at least the resources of the Low Countries, they even issued orders, and established regulations, by their own authority; and it was with difficulty that Marlborough succeeded in persuading them to relinquish a system which must alienate Austria, England, and Spain.

At the moment when they had reluctantly consented to resign this darling object, the offer of the administration to Marlborough awakened their jealousies with double force. This feeling operated with peculiar effect, even on pensionary Heinsius, and the warmest friends of the british commander, and they did not disguise their sentiments of disapprobation.

If the adherents of England were thus warm and decisive in their opposition, the friends of France, and the independent party were still more indignant, and fears were justly entertained lest the dutch should be induced by pique, to accept the overtures of peace to which they had already listened.

This opposition alarmed the austrian cabinet, and perplexed the ministry in England. But Marlborough was too prudent, as well as too disinterested to accept an appointment, however lucrative and honourable, in such invidious circumstances; and therefore, after a short deliberation, he declined the proffered grant, in terms which do credit to his sentiments and feelings.

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

"*Rousselaer, July 1.* M. Hope is come this day from Brussels, and I have communicated to him the emperor's letter, and the powers from the king of Spain. He made me great compliments, but I find by him that he thinks this may give uneasiness in Hol-



land, by thinking that the court of Vienna has a mind to put the power of this country into the queen's hands, in order that they may have nothing to do with it. If I should find the same thing by the pensioner, and that nothing can cure this jealousy but my desiring to be excused from accepting this commission, I hope the queen will allow of it; for the advantage and honour I might have by this commission is very insignificant, in comparison of the fatal consequences that might be, if it should cause a jealousy between the two nations."

The reply of the pensionary to the communication is not extant; but the answer of Marlborough enables us to trace the sentiments of his friend, and to estimate the warmth with which he opposed the appointment.

"*Rousselaer, July 3.* Sir;—By your's of the 30th of the last month, which I received last night, I find you had not received mine, in which I sent you the copies of what I had received from Vienna, but that the count de Goes had acquainted you with his dispatch. I write this to beg of you to do me the justice to be firmly persuaded that I shall take no step in this matter, but what shall be by the advice of the States; for I prefer infinitely their friendship before any particular interest to myself; for I thank God and the queen I have no need nor desire of being richer, but have a very great ambition of doing every thing that can be for the public good; and as for the frontier, which is absolutely necessary for your security, you know my opinion of it. In short, I beg you to assure yourself, and every body else, that I shall with pleasure behave myself in this matter, and all things else, that you may think for the good of the republic, as you would have me; for next to serving the queen and my country, I have nothing more at heart, than to have your good opinions. And let me, on this occasion, assure the States, that I serve them with the same affection and zeal that I do my own country, so that they need be under no difficulty; for if they think it for their service, I shall with pleasure excuse myself from accepting this commission."



He inclosed this letter in one to lord Godolphin, in which he expressed his earnest wish, that the queen would permit him to decline the offer.

“ *Harlebeck, July 6.* I came so late last night to the army from Ostend, and was obliged to march so early this morning, that I must beg pardon that I cannot answer your's of the 13th and 14th by this post. I sent you by last post, a letter from the pensioner, and I now enclose the answer I thought it was for her majesty's service I should make to it.

“ The inclosed letter of the same date confirms me, that if I should accept of the honour the emperor and the king of Spain do me, it would create a great jealousy, which might prejudice the common cause, so that I hope her majesty will approve of what I have done. And I beg you to be so just and kind to me as to assure the queen, that though the appointments of this government are threescore thousand pounds a year, I shall with pleasure excuse myself, since I am convinced it is for her service, unless the States should make it their request, which they are very far from doing; for they have told me that they think it not reasonable that the king of Spain should have possession of the Low Countries till they had assurances of what barrier they should have for their security. I hope this compliance of mine will give me so much credit, as to be able to hinder them from hurting themselves; for it is certain, if they follow their own inclinations, they will make such demands upon this country, as will very much dissatisfy the house of Austria, and be thought unreasonable by all the allies, of which the french would be sure to make their advantage.”

Godolphin, however, did not bear this disappointment with equal complacency, but in his answer inveighs bitterly against the selfishness and ingratitude of the dutch.

“ *July 4--15.* I have received the favour of your's of the 6th, by captain Stanhope, and I must not disown to you, that it both surprised and troubled me very much. It is amazing, that after so much done for their advantage, and even for their safety, the States can have been capable of such a behaviour. Those of the



french faction must have seen their advantage upon this occasion, to fill them with jealousy of your having, and consequently of England's having, too much power; and if this be at the bottom, we shall soon see that argument made use of on other occasions, as well as this. But your prudence and good temper will get the better, I hope, of all this folly and perverseness. The first steps you have made towards it, in your letter, of which you have sent me a copy, cannot, in my opinion, be mended. But I wish very much that Mr. Stepney were at the Hague, to second your letters to the pensioner upon all occasions that may arise, by his instances to the States."

Marlborough had no sooner received the sanction of the queen, than he announced to the States his decisive resolution not to accept the appointment. But notwithstanding the readiness with which he yielded to the prejudices of the dutch, they became more anxious not only to exclude England from all share in the government of the Low Countries, but even to appropriate the whole authority to themselves. The remonstrance which he made on this subject to the pensionary, obviates the necessity of any farther explanation.

"*Camp of Harlebeck, July 10, 1706.* Sir;—I have learnt by the honour of your letter of the 3rd instant, that M. Hope was to come to me on the part of the States General, as in fact he came, Thursday night; and he has probably written to their high mightinesses, that with the permission of the queen, I was firmly resolved not to charge myself in any manner with the commission with which his catholic majesty has been pleased to honour me. This you will have the goodness to confirm to them on my part. This new instance ought to convince their high mightinesses, how much I have their interest and particular satisfaction at heart, as well as that of the common cause.

"On this occasion I take the liberty of reminding their high mightinesses, that when the army came to Louvain, and in the farther progress which we have made with the advice of the army deputies, we jointly gave assurances, in writing, to all the towns and people of the country, in the name of the queen, of their high



mightinesses, and of his catholic majesty, that those who should submit to their legitimate sovereign, should regain the same rights, privileges, and advantages, which they enjoyed in the time of king Charles the second ; and to these assurances, with the help of God, I am persuaded we must partly attribute the facility with which we entered into possession of so many strong places, where every one testified universal joy.

“ However, by the resolution of the States of the 19th of last month, which M. Hope sent me translated into french, it seems as if their high mightinesses are of opinion that their deputies should sign alone the authorization, for the council of state, the chambers of finance and other judicatures, who ought not to conclude any thing without having previously consulted, and with the approbation of the said deputies, to the exclusion even of the queen.

“ However, according to what I have learnt, or have been able to comprehend hitherto, it has always appeared that the States had nothing else in view but a good barrier, and a reasonable security for their country. I beg, then, you will, with all submission to their high mightinesses, intreat them to reflect maturely on such a step, which is perhaps the true means of attaining those objects. I am persuaded, that when the States shall come to deliberate thereon, with their usual prudence and wisdom, their high mightinesses will find many reasons beyond what I can suggest to them to bring them to take those measures in this government, which may be most useful to the country.

“ I am more than gratified personally with the friendship and kindness their high mightinesses have at all times shewn me, and this obliges me to give them my thoughts without disguise, in every thing which I think concerns their interests. I persuade myself also, that they do me the justice to believe, that I wish them as much happiness and prosperity as they can themselves desire, and I shall continue always to entertain the same sentiments of respect towards them.”

Too deeply interested on this point to rely on his own influence, Marlborough pressed the lord treasurer to combat the mischievous proposal of the States, with all the authority of England.



“ *Helchin, July 12th, 1706.* By my last letter, which I sent by way of Ostend, you will see the measures that the dutch are desirous to take concerning the management of this country, which would certainly set this whole country against them; so that I hope you will find some way of not letting them play the fool. You know that I am always very ready to speak freely to them, when I think it for their service. But in this matter I am not at liberty, fearing they might mistake me, and think it might proceed from self-interest. I am sure, in this matter, I have with pleasure sacrificed my own interest, in order to make them reasonable, which I hope will be approved by my friends; for should I have acted otherwise, the party that is for peace would have made a very ill use of it. For the favourers of the french faction endeavour all they can to persuade the people in Holland, that the king of Spain will be governed by the queen, and that this success will all turn to the advantage of England, so that they must not rely upon any body, but secure their frontier now that they have it in their power. This is so plausible in Holland, that I am afraid the honest people, though they see the dangerous consequences this must have, yet dare not speak against it; and I can assure you, these great towns had rather be under any nation than the dutch.”

“ *Harlebeck, July 14.* You will see by three or four letters that I have lately writ to you, the care I have taken not to give any occasion of jealousy in Holland, and that I was in hopes that my declining the honour the king of Spain had done me, would give me so much power with the States, as that I might be able to hinder them from doing themselves, and the common cause hurt. But such is their temper, that when they have misfortunes, they are desirous of peace, upon any terms, and when we are blessed by God with success, they are for turning it to their own advantage, without any consideration how it may be liked by their friends and allies. You will see by the inclosed copy of a letter I have this day writ to the pensioner, that if they cannot be brought to change their resolution of the 19th of the last month, they will create so great a jealousy in this country, that they shall



be under the absolute government of the dutch, that it would turn very much to the advantage of the french. Besides that, the king of Spain will have just reason to complain. M. Hope tells me the States have directed M. Vryberg to acquaint her majesty, and her ministers, with their reasons and proceedings. In my poor opinion, her majesty cannot give too kind an answer; but she must be careful that the king of Spain, and the house of Austria, have no reason given them to be angry.

“Now the States have applied to her majesty, I cannot act with safety, but by her majesty’s directions by one of the secretaries of state. I must beg of her majesty, for her own service, and the public good, that she will be pleased to allow of my declining the honour of the king of Spain’s commission; otherwise the party in Holland that are for peace, rather upon ill terms than good, would make a very ill use of it, though in my opinion the States might have avoided many inconveniences and irregularities that must now happen, if they had approved of my acting; for I should have done nothing but what must have turned to their safety. And at the same time they might have treated with the king of Spain concerning their barrier; but by this step of their’s, they will very quickly be obliged to declare not only to the queen, but to every body else, that till they have their *surety*, as they call it, by having such a barrier as they shall think reasonable.\* I dread the consequences of this matter, for I cannot write so freely to the States as I should otherwise, if I were not personally concerned. You may be sure the french have too many partisans in Holland, not to be informed of this proceeding, so that they will be sure to make their advantage of it.”

The remonstrances of the british cabinet, the private representations of Marlborough, and above all, the magnanimous sacrifice which he had so cheerfully made, seem at length to have weighed with the dutch. At their instance, a provisional government was proposed for the Low Countries, by which the administration was

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\* Some words omitted in the original.



to be shared by the two maritime powers; though to satisfy the natives, it was to be conducted in the name, and under the authority of Charles the third. Marlborough was not willing to suffer their favourable inclinations to cool, but closed with the proposal, and hastened to communicate this arrangement to Godolphin, earnestly soliciting the approbation of the queen.

“*Helchin, July 19.* Notwithstanding the wind has been fair, we have no letters from England, I suppose for want of packet boats.

“The english are embarked at Ostend, and I hope to hear this day, or to-morrow, that the dutch are so also, the wind having been favourable these three days, to bring their transports from the Texel to Ostend. I think I have convinced the States General that their resolution of the 19th of the last month, in which they reserved to themselves the signing all the powers, and consequently governing this country in their names, was excluding her majesty and England from being able to perform to these people, what I promised in her majesty's name, which if they had persisted, must have produced a very ill effect; for the great towns depend much more upon the queen's protection, than upon that of the States.

“I shall by the next post send a copy of the commission, and powers, and instructions I shall be obliged to sign for the settling the council of state that must govern this country, till the king of Spain can give his directions. I am obliged to do this, for the public good, before I am authorized by her majesty; so that I beg you will move the queen, that I may have powers sent me, as her ambassador and general, to act in conjunction with the States General, what shall be thought proper for the public good. For my security, I beg the date of this power may be some few days after you had the news of my being at Brussels.

“You will be pleased to communicate, and take the advice of Mr. Secretary Harley in this matter.”

The dutch were no sooner pacified, than a difficulty of a similar kind arose in a another quarter.



Although the court of Vienna had sufficient confidence in the british general, to confide the administration to his hands, they were too well acquainted with the grasping spirit of the dutch, and their views of extending their territorial possessions on the side of the Netherlands, to acquiesce in any arrangement which gave the republic so large a share of power. Anxious to check this encroaching spirit, they still fostered the hope that Marlborough might be induced to depart from his resolution, and looked to his appointment, as the only means of securing the rights and dignity of the spanish crown. From the correspondence which took place on this occasion with the imperial court, we select a letter from count Wratislaw to the duke, which best exhibits the feeling and apprehensions of the emperor.

“ *Vienna, Aug. 4, 1706.* My lord duke;—We yesterday held a conference on the letter written by your highness to his imperial majesty, on the 11th past, by which you thank the emperor, touching the government he has confided to you, and excuse yourself on the plea, that for the good of the common cause you cannot yet accept it, notwithstanding the consent of the queen. This word *yet* gave me an opportunity of keeping the thing in suspense, believing that it would be proper to ask you for a more positive explanation; or, in case you thought it in no way right to charge yourself with the said government, what you advise us to do, in the present conjuncture, and in what manner we ought to treat with the dutch on this subject, as it is impossible that we can permit the States to act as they do in the Low Countries, without suffering the provinces, and even the towns, to do homage to the king of Spain. Your highness, who is on the spot, will see better than any one, the unfortunate impressions of this conduct; and our letters from that country are so full of it, that it seems as if the nobility and people begin to repent of having changed their master, and fear that, under the pretence of the barrier, they may remain always dependent on the States General. This matter, so delicate in the present conjuncture, particularly in the very middle of a glorious campaign, is more likely than any thing else to cause a collision among the allies, to the great prejudice of the



common cause. Hence, notwithstanding the impetuosity of some, I have endeavoured so to direct the business, that without having a previous answer from you, the court will do nothing on this subject, either in England or Holland, except that count Goes will tell the pensionary, that notwithstanding the permission of the queen, you yet make a difficulty of accepting this government, under the plea of not injuring the common cause. At this answer we have been much surprised here, not believing that a government given to a person who commands the armies of the allies, and who is of the same religion as the States, can occasion any prejudice to the common cause, particularly as the pensionary must judge that this business can not remain long on the present footing.

“The count de Gallas will not be ordered to take any step in England; for the emperor confides in you to tell him both when and how we ought to act; but you will easily judge, that if England does not interfere, the impertinence of the dutch will daily become greater, and at last be insupportable. If your highness makes any difficulty of explaining yourself freely in the letter to his imperial majesty, from a desire that your name should not appear in the advice you may suggest to us, you have only to explain yourself in a private letter, to whom you will; and I assure you that the secret will be strictly kept.”

This letter was followed by one from the emperor, expressing his reluctant acquiescence in the decision of Marlborough.

“Most illustrious cousin, and dearest prince;—I am very glad to find by your letters of the 12th of July, from Helchin, that the queen had consented to my brother’s provisional appointment of you for the government of the Low Countries, which I take very kindly, as a fresh proof of the queen’s friendship to my family, and of her zeal for the common cause. And since it is your opinion, that to take openly upon you the commission, through the uneasiness it will give the States, will neither be for the king’s interest nor for the service of the public; yet as you generously offer all the assistance which so great a man can give, that nothing be done to the prejudice of the king’s authority or interest, or the



good of those provinces; so I doubt not but you will persist in the same resolution, and impart to me from time to time your opinion of the affairs in the Low Countries, and especially of the council at Brussels. I will send my brother a particular account of all the proceedings in this affair; and what I have writ to count Goes upon this subject, you will see by the inclosed. I see by the happy reduction of Ostend, which has hardly held out against you so many days as it formerly did years, that the progress of your arms is not yet stopped. I hope the good God, who by his wonderful providence has raised you up to be an avenger of a righteous cause, will preserve you long for farther successes for the common good; and herewith I renew the assurances of my great affection to you.\*

“Given at Vienna, August 5, 1706.”

All parties continued in this state of irritation and suspense till the commencement of September; the court of Vienna still pressing the duke of Marlborough to retract his resolution, and still murmuring against the arrangement which had been adopted for the provisional government.

At this period an incident occurred, which contributed to increase the dissatisfaction already subsisting, as well as to involve the british general in new difficulties.

Marlborough had not only hastened to announce to the king of Spain, the victory which restored these valuable provinces to his crown, but on receiving the offer of the administration, he had dispatched count Lecheraine, minister of the elector palatine, to signify his acceptance, and to describe the situation of the Netherlands. The news produced the same effect on Charles as on his brother; and notwithstanding the numerous interests which he was obliged to conciliate, and the pretenders to so honourable an office among his own adherents, he sanctioned the appointment, with a degree of cordiality, which evinced his gratitude and esteem.

“My lord duke, and prince; *Camp of Peral, Sept. 23, 1706.*

“The count of Lecheraine having lately delivered to me your

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\* Official translation from the original latin.



letters of June, and given me an ample relation of the present state of the Netherlands, as well as of your plan for the conclusion of this campaign, I was unwilling to delay sending him to you, to announce my gratitude for your zeal and attention to my service, and particularly for your acceptance of the commission for the administration of the Netherlands, which the emperor, my brother, has conferred on you in my behalf. As I have always placed implicit confidence in you, you will be easily persuaded that this step of his serene majesty was highly agreeable to me, particularly as those countries cannot be better governed than by the wisdom and experience of him whose valour has conquered them. Nor do I doubt but that until I can make another disposition, my beloved and faithful subjects of my Netherlands will consider themselves as fortunate in being governed by the same hand to which they owe the recovery of their liberty, and their restoration to me and to my house.

“ Having also observed in one of your letters to prince Lichtenstein, a remark on the necessity of conciliating the States General, and the conduct you propose to adopt, not to excite their jealousy; I am anxious at the same time to applaud your prudence, and to discover some expedient for enabling you to execute my commission, without exposing you to embarrassment.

“ With this view I inclose two patents, one of which is for you alone, and the other for Don Bernardo de Quiros, who is appointed your coadjutor, and whom I have nominated my counsellor of state, leaving it to your discretion to make use of one or the other, as may be most beneficial for my service and the common cause. I refer you for farther information to the count de Lecheraine, who will explain to you my intentions in detail, with the same exactness as he has brought your's. Moreover, I pray God, my lord duke, and prince, to have you in his sacred keeping, assuring you at the same time of my perfect esteem and gratitude.”\*

Notwithstanding the solemn and explicit manner in which Marlborough had already declined the government, the dutch

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\* Translation from the french original.



were so much alarmed, that the mere intelligence of this confirmation created a new ferment greater than the first.

The duke being absent in England when the rumour was divulged, received from the british envoy, Mr. Stepney, a description of the effect it produced at the Hague.

“ *Hague, January 4, 1707.* I hope your grace will have received by count Lecheraine, my letter of the 21st, which will have prepared your grace for the contradiction which these people make of admitting the patent which was lately brought from Spain: this report has occasioned a very great clamour here of late, as I presume your grace will understand by this post, from the pensionary himself, who attacked me very vigorously yesterday at the congress on that subject, so far as to exclaim, *Mon Dieu, est-il possible qu'on voudroit faire ce pas sans notre participation?* He added, that the best excuse he could find to appease the tumult which this news had raised in their assembly was, by supposing this patent was only a bare confirmation of what had been issued by the imperial court, under a blank; and that the king of Spain had not received your grace's refusal when this patent was dispatched. By which suggestion your grace may infer, that he expects no less than that your grace should again decline the offer. I took the liberty of arguing with him that this unreasonable jealousy was hardly to be conceived, and that I was at a loss to imagine from whence it could proceed; that the States General in their letter to the emperor, objected only that the barrier was not yet settled, which I had orders to treat of, whenever they would come to reasonable methods. To this he answered short, that there were no thoughts of proceeding here to that treaty, as long as there was any probability of your grace's accepting the said patent. And count Rechteren afterwards told me, they would never allow the emperor and the king of Spain, without their approbation and consent, to dispose of the government of a country wherein their barrier and security was so nearly concerned. All I could do was, to desire them to forbear that clamour and censure till your grace thought fit to explain your own mind, and thereby either leave your grace the



merit of declining once more this offer, by your own free act, or to hear in what methods you thought fit to avail yourself of what the king of Spain might have generously proposed to you, and not to come to such warm discourses before the matter of fact was certain, and rightly stated. I added, it might appear very strange in the world that the States General, who had been so near witnesses of your grace's zeal, conduct, and success, should be the chief opposers of any advantage which was proposed to you, by a prince who could not but acknowledge your grace, under God, to have been the main instrument of his recovering those provinces. But all that can be said, makes no impression at present, and it may require your grace's serious attention in what manner these people are to be brought to other thoughts, which I scarce think any thing but your own presence will effect. I beg leave to congratulate your grace on the juster sense which her majesty and the parliament have of your important services, and I heartily wish that generous example may be imitated here. When you shall be pleased to direct me what I shall do for your service, I shall endeavour to approve myself with all duty."



## CHAPTER 48.

1706.

*Sieges of Menin, Dendermond, and Ath—Correspondence of Marlborough during these operations—Prevented by the dutch from closing the campaign with the capture of Mons—Visits Brussels—Distributes the troops into winter quarters—Repairs to the Hague.*

ON the reduction of Ostend, Marlborough prepared to carry into execution the design he had already announced, of turning his efforts against Menin, which would secure the line of the Lys, protect his conquests, and afford the means of pushing his attacks with effect the next campaign. To this object all his movements were directed, and he confidently anticipates success in a letter to lord Godolphin.

“*Rousselaer, June 28th.* The method the king of France has taken to make good his word to the elector of Bavaria, of putting him at the head of an army of 80,000 men, are the 18 battalions and 14 squadrons which came with the marshal de Marsin; the detachment that is now marching from Alsace, of 30 battalions and 40 squadrons; and 14 battalions, which the comte de Gassy commanded in the lines, which were not at the battle. These, joined with the troops that were at the battle, would make above 100,000 men; but as of necessity they must put garrisons into several towns, I flatter myself that they will find it very difficult to form such an army as will be able to hinder me from making the siege of Menin, as soon as that of Ostend is over. Menin is one of their strongest towns, but there is a necessity of attacking that in the first place, for that will let us into their *pays conquis*. I do hope the descent will oblige them to make a detachment from this country, or force them to raise the siege of Turin.”

He was, however, detained by the tardiness of the dutch in making the necessary preparations, and strongly expresses his disappointment.



“*Helchin, July 15.* \* \* \* \* M. de Gelder Massen came here last night from Ghent, and I find we must not expect all our cannon till the end of this month; but on the 22nd I think to invest Menin, and employ the first six or seven days in covering some of the quarters; for we cannot spare above thirty-two battalions for the siege. There will remain with me seventy-two, which I hope will be a sufficient strength to oppose whatever they can bring, though the elector of Bavaria says he is promised an hundred and ten battalions. They have certainly more horse than we; but if they had greater numbers, I neither think it their interest nor their inclinations to venture a battle; for our men are in heart, and their's are cowed. If the duke of Vendome should be obliged to stay in Italy, we are told we are then to have the prince of Conti.”

Before Marlborough quitted the camp at Rousselaer, where he had remained during the siege of Ostend, the prince of Holstein Beck, with eight battalions, took possession of Courtrai. On the 5th of July a detachment, which had encamped at Oudenard, marched to Harlebeck; and the prussian and hanoverian troops, who were also in their way to join the army, were directed to advance to Ninove, in order to cover the country between the Scheldt and the Dender from any irruption on the side of Mons. The duke then moved with the main army from Rousselaar, and encamped between Courtrai and Harlebeck, having the Lys in his rear.

At this period, the three regiments destined to join the expedition in England, marched to Ostend, where they were to embark. On the following day the army again moved to Helchin, where bridges had been prepared for the passage of the Scheldt, the army of Overkirk at the same time occupying the post of St. Eloi Vive, near Harlebeck. As the french had endeavoured to prevent the navigation of the Scheldt, by means of sluices and drains, which lowered the water, general Salisch was dispatched with a proper force, to destroy all such works between Lille, Armentieres, Menin, and Courtrai.

Menin, the object of attack, was considered as one of the masterpieces of the celebrated Vauban. The defences were low, without



being commanded, the approaches rendered difficult by inundations, and the garrisons sufficiently numerous, and well provided with means of resistance. The marquis of Bully was governor, but the military command was intrusted to the marquis of Caraman, who was versed in the defence of fortresses, and was assisted by able engineers. On the 23rd the place was invested by general Salisch, who was charged to conduct the siege with 32 battalions, and 25 squadrons. He took post from Werwick to Wevelghem, and a competent number of pioneers were employed in forming lines of circumvallation.

The heavy artillery having arrived from Ghent, on the 30th of July, the attacks were opened on the night of the 4th of August against the bastion of Capucins and that of Ypres, on the west front; and pushed with a vigour which proved the determination of the allies to profit by the remains of the season for action. On the 18th the works being advanced to a state proper for an attack on the covert way, Marlborough drew his army nearer to Menin, by taking post between Belleghem and Pont d'Esperries, and himself repaired to the trenches, to superintend the important operation. At seven the same evening the signal was given, by the explosion of two mines, which had been formed on the salient angles of the work called the Half Moon of Ypres. The assailants instantly advanced to the pallisades, threw grenades into the covert way, and entering amidst the confusion, swept every thing before them. For two hours they withstood a heavy fire from the ravelins, and other works commanding their position; but at length, the establishment was effected, and stretched to the pallisades of the four angles. The loss in this terrible combat amounted to no less than 1,400 men.

The success of this operation, although not immediately effectual, was decisive; for on the following night, signals of distress were made by the besieged: their artillery was dismounted, and their whole strength scarcely sufficed to occupy the three half moons fronting the attacks. At this juncture, however, the duke of Vendome arrived at Valenciennes, to assume the command of the french army; and it was natural to expect, that as soon as he had



collected his troops, he would make an effort for the deliverance of Menin. Marlborough, therefore, changed his position, by stretching his right to Lauwe, though his head quarters still continued at Helchin, from whence he wrote to Godolphin.

“*Helchin, August 9.* The duke of Vendome having strengthened the garrison of Menin, and ordered several troops to march that way, he is to be at Ypres this night, so that I have sent this day twelve battalions to strengthen those of the siege. Our cannon began to fire this morning. Three or four days we hope will dismount so many of their cannon, that we may with security carry on our trenches. M. de Vendome has given orders to all the troops to be in readiness to march at twenty-four hours warning, so that in three or four days he may draw them together. By his language we ought to expect another battle, but I cannot think the king of France will venture it; if he should, I hope and pray that the blessing of God may continue with us.”

During this interval, Cadogan, his confidential friend, was surprised and made prisoner, in protecting a foraging party. Before his fate was ascertained, Marlborough testified his keen regret for the loss of so faithful an adherent, in terms which do honour to his feelings.

#### TO THE DUCHESS.

“*Helchin, August 16.* An officer is just come to me to give me an account of the forage we have made this day, and he tells me that poor Cadogan is taken prisoner or killed, which gives me a great deal of uneasiness, for he loved me, and I could rely on him. I am now sending a trumpet to the governor of Tournay, to know if he be alive; for the horse that beat him came from that garrison. I have ordered the trumpet to return this night, for I shall not be quiet till I know his fate.”

He had soon the satisfaction to find his apprehensions unfounded; Cadogan being sent back on his parole, two days afterwards, by the french commander. This act of courtesy was immediately repaid by the liberation of the baron de Pallavicini, who had been made prisoner in the late battle.

We cannot refrain from adding, another letter to lord



Godolphin, written before the close of the campaign, which exhibits the affectionate character of the british general, in a no less amiable light.

“*Cambron, Oct. 24, 1706.* I find by your last letter, that applications are made by Mr. Mordaunt, and others, for my brother's place in the tower. I beg you will not be engaged, and that the queen will gratify me on this occasion. I would not have this place disposed of as yet; but when I shall think it a proper time, I would then beg the queen would be pleased to let brigadier Cadogan have it, since it will be provision for him in time of peace. As I would put my life in his hands, so I will be answerable for his faithfulness and duty to the queen. I have for the queen's service obliged him this war to expose his life very often, so that in justice I owe him this good office.”

The breaching batteries being now opened against Menin, the duke again went to hasten the progress of the attack. Within a few hours he had the satisfaction to observe the last defences of the place in a state of ruin, and the garrison reduced to propose a capitulation. After some trifling discussion, the terms were arranged, and on the 25th of August the gates were opened to the allies, the garrison retiring with warlike honours to Douay. This success was immediately announced to the treasurer.

“*Helchin, August 23.* Yesterday morning the enemy at Menin planted a white flag on their breach, and as I was there, I immediately ordered an exchange of hostages. We have this morning possession of one of their gates, and on Wednesday, being St. Louis's day, they are to march out, with the usual marks of honour. We must have eight or ten days for the levelling our lines, and putting the place in a posture of defence. In the mean time, I am taking measures for the siege of Dendermond. If the weather continues dry, we shall take it; but if it should rain, we cannot continue before it. The duke of Vendome continues to talk more than I believe he intends to perform; however, he strengthens himself every day, with all the troops he can possibly get.”

Among the cannon of the place were four english pieces taken



at the battle of Landen, which being considered as a trophy of victory, were sent back to England. The injury which the works had suffered in the attack was speedily repaired. The loss which the allies incurred in the reduction of so strong and valuable a fortress, amounted to no less than 3,000 killed and wounded ; that of the garrison to 1,500.

On the surrender of Menin, Vendome collected his troops, and occupied a strong position behind the Lys and the Dyle, to prevent any enterprise against Lille : but the views of Marlborough were directed to another quarter. Dendermond, though not a place of magnitude, was yet so strong by its marshy situation, and so advantageously situated for securing the winter quarters, which he intended to occupy, that he resolved to wrest it from the possession of the enemy. The requisite arrangements were no sooner completed at Menin, than the blockade it had undergone was turned into a siege, and troops detached for the attack, the main army still occupying the camp of Helchin. The views of the british general will best appear from his correspondence.

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

“ *August 26.* I have not had the happiness of any of your's since my last, and am very impatient to hear of the descent, so that I beg you will constantly let me have all the particulars you receive of that matter. I saw the garrison of Menin march out yesterday, they were near 4,500 men. The fear they had of being made prisoners of war, made them give up the place five or six days sooner than, in decency, they ought to have done.

“ My brother will be to-morrow before Dendermond, and I hope the cannon may fire by Monday ; and if we have no rain, five or six days may make us masters of that place, which has always been thought unattackable ; and in truth we should not have thought of it, but the extraordinary drought makes us venture it. If we succeed at Dendermond, and can in time have more ammunition from Holland, we shall then make the siege of Ath, which will be a security to our winter quarters, notwith-



standing the duke of Vendome's army. If we could have been sure of having the necessaries for the siege of Ypres, I believe we should have undertaken it, for that place is very difficult to be relieved when the posts are once taken; but we can't expect the stores that are sent for in less than three weeks, so that we should have consumed all the forage before we could have been able to have begun the attack. I give you the trouble of all this, that you may see that I should have preferred Ypres before Ath, but the dutch like Dendermond and Ath much the best; so that I hope they will not let us want ammunition for them."

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

"*Helchin, August 30.* The engineer sends me word that he finds much more water at Dendermond than he expected. I go there in three or four days, and then I shall be able to send you the certainty of what we may expect."

"*Sept. 1.* I go there to-morrow, and hope by my next to let you know that they have overcome the difficulty; for that place would be very troublesome, it being in the midst of the winter quarters."

The attack against Dendermond was confided to general Churchill. The attention of the garrison being diverted by a skilful feint, the trenches were opened on the left bank of the Scheld, without loss, and the approaches pushed with such unusual celerity, that the place was reduced to surrender unconditionally on the 5th of September.

To Godolphin the british commander thus writes, in the exultation of success:

"*Sept. 9.* In your's of the 23rd, you were afraid that if there were any good news from this country, it would find the way over, whereas you had three packets due. When they come to you, you will find every thing you could expect from hence. That of Dendermond, making them prisoners of war, was more than was reasonable, but I saw them in a consternation. That place could never have been taken but by the hand of God, which gave us seven weeks without any rain. The rain began



the next day after we had possession, and continued till this evening."

" \* \* \* \* \* The express that carried the good news to the States, of our being masters of Dendermond, was dispatched in such haste, that I could not write to you. I believe the king of France will be a good deal surprised, when he shall hear that the garrison has been obliged to surrender themselves prisoners of war; for upon his being told that preparations were making for the siege of Dendermond, he said, 'they must have an army of 'ducks to take it.' The truth is, God has blessed us with a very extraordinary season.

" I do not give myself the honour of troubling the queen with a letter, so that you will give my duty to her, and to the prince, and acquaint them with this good success. What makes it the more remarkable is, that this place was never before taken, though once besieged by the french, and the king himself with the army. I hope in seven or eight days we shall have in this town all the cannon and ammunition that is necessary for the siege of Ath.

" I should think, if you have not already, you should now acquaint the dutch envoy, that her majesty has directed Mr. Stepney to come to the army, so that he may act with their deputies at Brussels, in what may be for the public good, she having commanded me to return to England as soon as the campaign shall be at an end. As Mr. Stepney is to be joined to me in that commission, so he will have orders to follow the directions I shall leave with him. You must also let him see that this was absolutely necessary in my absence; so that there might be no opportunity lost for the settling of the barrier with king Charles the third. I am the more tedious on this subject, being very sure that the dutch will not like his coming."

Notwithstanding the advance of the season, Marlborough would not close this long and active campaign, without some new and signal enterprise. The various detachments being recalled, the army passed the Scheld; and Overkirk, with a competent force,



on the 16th, invested Ath, a small but important place on the Dender. Marlborough himself occupied the position of Liege, and established his head quarters at Grametz. On the 22nd the trenches were opened, the covert way was carried on the 29th, and the batteries played with decisive effect on the interior defences. The garrison in consternation forced the governor to beat a parley, on the 1st of October. The terms offered by the assailants being deemed too severe, the attack recommenced; but the renewal served only to convince the besieged of their hopeless situation. On the 4th they submitted to their fate, and 800 men, the only effective remains of a garrison of 2,000, marched out as prisoners of war to Berghen-op-Zoom.

During this operation, Vendome had taken post on the Scheld, between Condé and Mortagne. With a discouraged and unequal force, he could not risk the chance of an engagement; and now, justly dreading an attempt on Mons, or Charleroy, he strengthened those garrisons. Indeed his fears were not without foundation; for Marlborough intended to close the campaign with the capture of Mons, had he not been restrained by the timid counsels of the dutch. He thus expresses his regret to his correspondents in England:

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

“*Grametz, Sept. 27, 1706.* We have nothing new in this country. The enemy continue in their camp, as you see I do in mine. I believe they have no thoughts of disturbing the siege of Ath, so that if I march before the siege is ended, it will be for the conveniency of forage. This last success at Turin has so disheartened their army in this country, that if the dutch can furnish ammunition enough for the siege of Mons, I shall endeavour to persuade them to undertake it; for I am persuaded, if the weather continues fair, we shall have it much cheaper this year than the next, when they will have had time to recruit their army. But the backwardness I have found in some, even for this siege of Ath, makes me fear that they may create so many difficulties, that we shall be obliged to do nothing more after this siege is



over ; so that I desire you will not speak of Mons, till you hear more from me. If we shall do nothing after the siege of Ath, but the putting of Courtrai in such a condition as that we may leave eight battalions in it this winter, you may then depend upon my being at the Hague by the end of the next month. Considering the humour those people are in, at this time, I believe there will be a necessity for the queen's service, that I stay at least ten days, unless you shall order it otherwise."

"Sept. 30. We have had at this time too much rain ; however, I continue of opinion we ought to make the siege of Mons, if we can have a sufficient quantity of stores ; for the taking of that town would be a very great advantage to us for the opening of next campaign, which we must make, if we will bring France to such a peace as will give us quiet hereafter."

After the reduction of Ath, Marlborough broke up from Grametz on the 12th of October, passed the Dender at Leuze, and being rejoined by Overkirk, pitched his camp between Chievre and Lens, establishing his head quarters in the abbey of Cambron. Vendome boasted that during this movement he would attack the rear guard of the allies ; but he disappointed the hopes of the british commander, who really felt all the eagerness, which his antagonist affected to feel for an engagement.

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

"Cambron, Oct. 14, 1706. After having had very bad weather, we have now the finest that is possible ; I hope you have the same at Newmarket. I send you one sheet of the Paris Gazette, that you may see what they say of the affairs of Spain. I hope you will have better news from that country by the way of Portugal. M. de Vendome tells his officers that he has it in his power of strengthening his army to 140 battalions, and 180 squadrons ; and that if my lord Marlborough gives him an opportunity, he will make him a visit before the campaign ends. I believe he has neither will nor power to do it, which we shall see very quickly ; for we are now camped in so open a country, that if he marches to us, we cannot refuse fighting. What I most



apprehend is, that he will have it in his power to give us trouble about Courtrai."

Alluding to the disputes which then reigned in the cabinet respecting the appointment of Sunderland, he continues:

"You will have seen by my last how uneasy I was at some news I have heard from England. I shall continue so till I have your thoughts on that matter; for my trouble proceeds from my friendship to you, and my duty to the queen. For the consequences of what may happen to the rest of Europe, mankind must and will struggle for their own safety; and for myself, I shall be much happier in a retired life, when I have the queen's and your leave for it."

The opinion which Marlborough expressed in the preceding letter, was verified by the event; for although Vendome advanced from Mons on the 18th and 20th, at the head of a strong reconnoitring party, and made demonstrations of an attack, he did not venture to carry his threat into execution, but retired as soon as his able antagonist took precautions to oppose him.

Having relinquished all farther operations, Marlborough broke up from Cambron on the 26th, and fell back to Ghieslingen, between Enghien and Grammont. Here he left the command to Overkirk, and departed for Brussels, to regulate the government of the conquered provinces. He made his public entry into the capital of Brabant, in the most splendid manner, amidst the joyful acclamations of the inhabitants; was presented with the keys of the town; and received with all the honours usually paid to the antient dukes of Burgundy. The magistrates offered, on this occasion, what was called the wine of honour. It was contained in a tun, gilt and painted with the arms of his highness, on a carriage adorned with streamers, and drawn by six horses, preceded by trumpets and kettle drums. The procession was led by a cavalcade of students, richly habited, who presented to the hero of Ramilies, devices indicating the great events of this extraordinary campaign.

On the 31st he rejoined the army, and in the beginning of



November distributed his troops into quarters, the english at Ghent, the danes at Bruges, and the troops of Prussia and Lunenburg along the Demer. Overkirk was left commandant in the Low Countries, Tilly was sent to Louvain, general Salisch to Mechlin, and general Churchill was intrusted with the government of Brussels. The duke himself embarking, on the 7th, at Antwerp, repaired on the 9th to the Hague, to complete the arrangements which were rendered necessary, by the recent occurrences on the Rhine, in Italy, and in Spain; to concert the plan of operations for the ensuing campaign; and to take a share in the negotiations, which the dutch government had now opened with the court of France.



## CHAPTER 49.

1706-7.

*Disastrous commencement of the campaign in Italy—Danger of the duke of Savoy—Siege of Turin—Junction of Eugene with the duke of Savoy—Defeat of the french, and relief of Turin—Impolitic and selfish views of the imperial court—Letters from lord Godolphin—Recovery of the Milanese, and blockade of the french troops in Lombardy—Inactivity of the campaign on the Upper Rhine—Complaints and recriminations of the imperial ministers, and the margrave of Baden—Events of the campaign in Spain—March of the anglo-portuguese to Madrid—Disputes between Charles and lord Peterborough—The gallo-spaniards recover from their disaster, and straiten the allies—Arrival of Charles in the allied camp at Guadalaxara—Contentions among the generals—Departure of lord Peterborough—Retreat of the allies into Valencia—Complaints against Peterborough—Disappointment of Marlborough—Correspondence—Arrival of lord Rivers with reinforcements—His intrigues against the other generals—Expedition of Charles to Catalonia.*

**D**URING the siege of Ath, Marlborough had the satisfaction to learn that his indefatigable efforts in procuring succours of men and money, for the relief of the duke of Savoy, were crowned with the most gratifying success.

Anxious to compensate for the disasters in the Netherlands and Spain, the french king redoubled his efforts in Italy, where the strength of his army, and the magnitude of his preparations, seemed likely to ensure a favourable issue. Since the surprise of the imperialists in their quarters, unusual exertions had been made to complete the ruin of the duke of Savoy, by the reduction of his capital, which was the last rampart of the allies in Italy. He was compelled to seek a retreat in the recesses of the Alps; and while a covering army, under Vendome, seemed to command every avenue by which relief could approach, La Feuillade, the son in law of Chamillard, minister of war, was intrusted with the direction of the besieging force, in the full confidence that speedy success would entitle him to the highest military honours.



Fortunately no common obstacles could baffle the enterprising spirit of so skilful and active a general as Eugene; for he no sooner received the promised reinforcements, than he resumed the offensive, at the moment when the cause of the allies appeared most desperate. Descending from the Alps, by passages scarcely deemed pervious, he suddenly appeared in the plains of the Veronese, baffled the combinations of his opponents, and traversing the rivers and canals, with which the country is intersected, compelled the enemy to fall back behind the river Parmegiana.

At this moment Vendome was recalled to recover the fortune of the french arms in the Netherlands, and the command was transferred to the duke of Orleans, under the direction of the count de Marsin. But the new generals were less able to withstand the progress of their enterprising antagonist, than their skilful predecessor. Driven behind the Po, they had the mortification to witness the rapid advance of the imperial general, and his junction with the duke of Savoy; and they had no other means of prosecuting the siege of Turin, than by taking post behind the lines of circumvallation, which they considered as impregnable.

The momentous enterprise of Victor Amadeus, and Eugene, was conducted with consummate skill and promptitude. They met, for the first time, in a meadow near Carmagnola, and having settled their dispositions, effected the junction of their troops on the ensuing day. Ascending the heights of Superga, which command the plain surrounding the capital, they surveyed the dispositions and works of the enemy, and arranged the plan of attack. Inspired by a succour so unexpected, the confidence of the duke of Savoy equalled his former depression. To the master of his household, who inquired where he intended to dine on the ensuing day, he replied, with impatience and enthusiasm, "at Turin! at Turin!"\* Nor did the event disappoint his sanguine hopes. The ensuing day the hostile lines were attacked, between the Doria and the Stura, and the advantage of superior numbers

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\* Journal du baron de Montolieu St Hippolit.



being rendered unavailing, by the skilful combinations of the assailants, the enemy were forced, after a bloody resistance; and the victorious commanders carried relief to the capital, at the moment when breaches were opened in the rampart, and the garrison was reduced to the last charge of powder.\* Marsin was mortally wounded, and made prisoner, 9,000 men were either killed or taken, and the army which had so long given law to Italy, was driven in confusion and disgrace towards the borders of Dauphiné. Eugene imparted the joyful intelligence to his friend and colleague, with his characteristic brevity.

“Your highness will not, I am sure, be displeased to hear by the baron de Hondorff, of the signal advantage which the arms of his imperial majesty and his allies have gained over the enemy. You have had so great a share in it, by the succours you have procured, that you must permit me to thank you again. Marshal Marsin is taken prisoner, and mortally wounded. The troops have greatly signalised themselves. In a few days I will send you a correct account; and in the mean time refer you to that which you will hear from the bearer of this letter, who is well informed, has seen every thing, and is competent to give an accurate relation. Your highness will excuse the shortness of this letter as I have not a moment of time.”†

This victory inspired the british commander with no less joy than if it had been his own achievement, and he expressed his satisfaction in the warmest language.

#### TO THE DUCHESS.

“Sept. 26. I have now received the confirmation of the success in Italy, from the duke of Savoy, and prince Eugene; and it is impossible for me to express the joy it has given me; for I do not only esteem, but I really love that prince. This glorious action must bring France so low, that if our friends can be persuaded to carry on the war one year longer, with vigour, we could

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\* History of the House of Austria.

† Eugene modestly omits to allege, in excuse for the abruptness of this letter, the pain of a dangerous wound in the head, which he received during the attack of the lines.



not fail, with the blessing of God, to have such a peace, as would give us quiet in our days; but the dutch are at this time unaccountable."

It was natural to hope that this important victory would not only liberate Italy, but be followed by such decisive operations against France, as might realise the expectations of Marlborough, by bringing the war to a speedy conclusion.

The defeat of the french before Turin, however, produced the same effects in Italy, as their discomfiture in the Netherlands. The jealousies of the duke of Savoy and the emperor, which had with difficulty been suspended in adversity, were revived by success; and the maritime powers, in their turn, had just reason to complain, that the emperor profited by this revolution of affairs to gratify his own interests, at the expence of the common cause. The most obvious plan of operations was, to leave the force which still remained in the Milanese to melt away, and by a vigorous attack on the retreating army, to draw the attention and strength of the enemy from other quarters. To this wise plan of operations the british cabinet looked with impatience and hope. Godolphin, in several letters to Marlborough, speaks both his own feelings and the expectations of his colleagues.

"Sept. 17." After congratulating him on the victory at Turin, he adds, "I shall be impatient to hear the next steps of the duke of Savoy, and prince Eugene. I am apprehensive the orders of the latter may direct him to the Milanese. But I hope the duke of Savoy will rather incline to push the french from Pignerol, where, as I am informed, they cannot protect themselves against a superior army. You will best judge what can be properly said to them upon this subject, from their allies on this side; and whatever is said by yourself, will have more weight with them, than from any body else."

"Sept. 18. \* \* \* \* \* Nor is it less necessary on the other hand, to press the duke of Savoy and prince Eugene to follow the remainder of the french army which retired to Pignerol, and from thence perhaps into Dauphiné; for if those troops should be at liberty to be employed elsewhere, we shall soon feel the weight of



them upon us in Spain. I have spoken very earnestly to the comte de Briançon\* upon this subject, and perhaps a word from you to count Maffei, and a letter to prince Eugene, and also to the duke of Savoy himself, may be very useful. Or otherwise the consequence of this great victory, to which England has so much contributed, will not only serve to make the war of Spain so much more difficult and expensive to us; and considering how ready the queen has been to do every thing that could be desired for the support of the duke of Savoy, she may reasonably expect so much regard from him as this comes to. Besides this, I have gone so far as to let the comte de Briançon hope, that whenever peace comes to be adjusted, we would use our best endeavours to keep France on this side of the Alps."

These just and pertinent remarks do honour to the penetration and judgment of Godolphin, and were perfectly in unison with the sentiments of the general, who urged this suggestion to the imperial cabinet and Eugene with his usual zeal. But their forebodings were too fully realised; for they had soon the mortification to learn that the enemy had been suffered to continue their retreat to Pignerol unmolested, while the views of the imperial court were carried into effect, by operations for the recovery of the austrian possessions in Lombardy. Within a few days after the battle, the combined army turned their attacks against a french corps, left in the Milanese, under the command of Medavi, passed the Tesino, recovered the city of Milan, and finished the operations of the campaign, by penetrating into the Mantuan and Cremonese, and confining the french forces to the citadels of Milan, Mantua, and the other strong holds which they were unprepared to besiege.

The military operations on the Upper Rhine were far from exhibiting the splendid character which marked the campaign in the Netherlands, and in Italy. The successes of Marlborough had indeed checked the enterprising spirit of Villars, who, instead of restoring the honour of the french arms in Germany, as he had

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\* Minister of the duke of Savoy.



boasted at the commencement of the campaign, saw his forces diminished by continual draughts to the quarter, where the victorious army threatened to break through the iron frontier of France. The german commander, however, was unable, even if inclined, to profit by the favourable turn of affairs ; for his army was also fluctuating by the repeated draughts which the emperor made from his own forces, to feed the war in Hungary ; and he was himself gradually sinking under a mortal disorder, which rendered him incapable of exertion, but irritable and impetuous, and impatient of advice or remonstrance.

Marlborough interfered to mediate an arrangement with the hungarian insurgents, which might prevent this perpetual drain, but without effect ; for both the emperor and the insurgents were too elevated in their expectations, and too exorbitant in their demands, to enter into any serious accommodation.

During the whole course of the campaign, therefore, an active, though fruitless correspondence, took place ; in which, appeals were made to Marlborough, on every side. From the imperial ministers, against the inactivity of the margrave of Baden ; from the margrave, against the imperial cabinet ; and from the members of the british administration, who equally censured the want of zeal, and concert manifested by both. The confidence which was placed in his integrity and conciliating manners, also drew on him a series of appeals and counter appeals on one side from the imperial cabinet, and on the other, from prince Ragotski, and the chiefs of the hungarian insurrection.

In Spain, the close of the campaign was as disastrous as the commencement was brilliant and successful. Instead of prosecuting their advantages, and profiting by the confusion of a discomfited enemy, the allies displayed that want of concert which generally attends the operations of powers, actuated by discordant interests, and directed by different heads.

On the western frontier, the united troops of Portugal, England, and Holland, were long held in suspense respecting the fate of Barcelona. Although they advanced without obstruction as far



as the pass of Almaraz, on the Tagus, lord Galway\* in vain urged Das Minas to proceed to Madrid, where no force remained to oppose them. Under pretence of securing the frontier, the portuguese general compelled his colleague to assist in reducing the fortresses of Alcantara, Ciudad Rodrigo, and Salamanca; and he could not be induced to direct his tardy march towards the spanish capital, until the intelligence from Catalonia removed all pretence for delay.

On the other hand, the feuds which agitated the petty court of Charles, produced a still more fatal effect. A council of war was indeed held at Barcelona, on the 18th of May, and it was decided that the young monarch should immediately take his departure for Madrid. In furtherance of this plan, Peterborough was dispatched into Valencia, with 4,000 men, to collect and organise an army, and open the way through the mountains which skirt the frontier of New Castile. Instead, however, of displaying the promptitude and decision which the case required, Charles lingered yet a month at Barcelona, importuning the british envoy and generals for pecuniary supplies, that he might appear in his capital with the splendour becoming a monarch.† Finally, at the very moment when he was anxiously expected in Valencia, he suddenly changed his resolution. Availing himself of a revolution which took place at Saragosa, he directed his course

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\* LORD GALWAY TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

*"Camp of Nuestra Señora de Oega, April 12--23, 1706.*

\* \* \* \* \* The king of Portugal has sent his positive orders to the M. das Minas to march directly towards Madrid, so we have now a fair game to play, except these people will openly betray their king, and the common cause. But at the same time, M. das Minas has so set his mind on the siege of Badajos, that he does not show the satisfaction one might expect upon such great successes as we've had in a few days. He daily makes new difficulties and doubts, and expresses much unwillingness to go on. I give my lord ambassador notice of it, that he may get the king's positive orders repeated to him, which I hope we may receive at Placentia, to which place I reckon I may persuade him to march, tho' not without difficulty."

† While he was importuning for supplies of money, and excusing his delay by alleging his want of an equipage, Mr. Stanhope replied, "Sir, the prince of Orange entered London in a coach and four, with a cloak bag behind it, and was made king not many weeks after." *Memoirs of Lord Walpole.*



through Aragon, under the pretence of receiving the homage of that kingdom, though in reality to obtain contributions from the States, as well as to escape from the controul of lord Peterborough.

Meanwhile Galway and Das Minas had commenced their march to Madrid, in the full confidence that Charles, with the army of lord Peterborough, would anticipate their arrival. Reaching the capital on the 26th of June, they observed no symptom of welcome or exultation on the part of the people, and received no intelligence of the monarch, or the army on whose junction they had fondly calculated. Even Peterborough, whose aid would, at this moment, have been of the highest advantage, imitated the example of Charles, in delaying his march towards the scene of action. The disappointment was rendered more grievous, by reports which were artfully circulated, of the death of Charles, and which deterred many, even of his zealous partisans, from manifesting their devotion to his cause. The confederate generals, however, proclaimed his accession, amidst the gloomy silence of an almost deserted capital, and pushed a corps to Toledo, where a commotion was excited in his favour, by the intrigues of the widowed queen, and cardinal Portocarrero.\*

By these delays and divisions, the Bourbon prince was enabled to recover from his disasters and perilous situation. Hastening back into Spain, by the road of Pampeluna, he appeared in the capital, at the very moment when his cause was considered as hopeless, and by this proof of firmness and attachment, gave an impulse to the loyalty of his people. At the same time, Berwick conducted the army, on which the fate of the monarchy depended, with a skill and circumspection, equal to the magnitude of the danger. Without exposing himself to an attack, he hung on the movements of the anglo-portuguese, and skirting the borders of Castile, protected the person of Philip ; while he superintended the removal of the queen, the court and tribunals, towards Burgos. No effort was omitted to collect reinforcements, and rouse the

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\* Memoirs of the Kings of Spain, &c. ch. 14.



public enthusiasm ; and Philip not only joined the army of Berwick with full reliance on the devotion of his subjects, but had soon the satisfaction to see the two Castiles and Andalusia, swarm with new levies ; while hordes of armed peasantry, and enterprising partisans, straitened the communications of the allies in every direction.

At this juncture the allied generals received intelligence that Charles was at length advancing, and Galway leaving Madrid under the protection of Das Minas, pushed forward to Alcala with a considerable force, to facilitate his junction. But it was now too late to remedy the mischiefs occasioned by their procrastination. Berwick still skilfully avoided an engagement ; and retreating as his antagonists advanced through Guadalaxara to Xadraca, was hourly joined by reinforcements, not only of new levies, but of the troops who had retreated from Barcelona.

Meanwhile Das Minas quitted Madrid on the 11th July, and the whole force of the allies was directed against the army of Berwick, which they expected to overwhelm ; but approaching his position on the 1st of August, they were confounded to find themselves in the presence of a superior force. Their whole attention was now directed to secure their junction with Charles, of whose movements they at length received certain intelligence. After lingering a month at Saragosa, he took a circuitous route, with a small escort, through the borders of Valencia, and was joined by Peterborough, at Pastraña ; but the confederate generals had no sooner directed their views to this quarter, than Berwick sent a detachment which recovered Madrid, and expelled their garrisons from Segovia and Toledo.

In this alarming predicament Charles reached the camp of Guadalaxara, on the 6th of August, accompanied by Peterborough, count Noyelles, general Stanhope, and the prince of Lichtenstein ; but brought with him, instead of an army, which was expected, not more than 700 horse, and 1,500 foot. Within a few days he was followed by the rest of the force, which together did not exceed 5,000 men.

Amidst the public rejoicings for the long expected arrival of



a prince, whose presence was expected to ensure the conquest of Spain, the camp became a scene of altercation, and the person against whom all parties directed their enmity, was the earl of Peterborough. Finding himself censured for his delays in Valencia, and mortified by the unwelcome reception which he experienced from Charles, the eccentric peer anticipated his recall, by soliciting permission to fulfil the instructions which he had previously received from the queen, to raise money and succours for the relief of the duke of Savoy.

In a council of war, held in the palace at Guadalaxara, his proposal was warmly recommended, and he was still farther authorised, after he had relieved the duke, to return with the fleet for the conquest of Minorca. That nothing might be wanting to facilitate his departure, the portuguese general and ambassador consigned to him bills of exchange to negotiate at Genoa, and the king gave him full power to mortgage any part of his dominions to the republic.

Thus loaded with vain promises, and impracticable commissions, he took his departure the same evening, to the gratification of all parties, whose private piques and jealousies were absorbed in their common aversion to a general, to whose froward and overbearing temper they all ascribed the disasters with which they were menaced.

The combined generals, to whom the load of responsibility was now transferred, found themselves in a situation of imminent peril and perplexity. They were dissatisfied with the tardiness of the king, disgusted with the interference of his German ministers, without magazines and without money, in the midst of an hostile country, and opposed by an enemy superior in force. Behind, their communications were cut off by the loss of Madrid, Toledo, and Segovia, and around them swarmed innumerable enemies, while continual reinforcements swelled the army of Philip. They had therefore no alternative but to take the only road, which now remained open, to Valencia, and on the 11th commenced their retreat. Proceeding by hasty marches towards the mountains bordering New Castile, they suffered many hardships



from the attacks of the enemy, the want of shelter, and the scantiness of provisions. They closed their long and harassing march at Requena, the last town in New Castile, on the 29th of September, and distributed their exhausted troops into quarters of refreshment.

On the 27th, the king quitted his army during their retreat, and passing through Requena, repaired to Valencia, where his reception seemed for a moment to suspend the recollection of his recent reverse. He could not, however, reflect on this dishonourable retreat, without the deepest regret; and in the course of the march dispatched count Zinzerling, one of his confidential counsellors, to communicate his complaints to Marlborough, and to request that he might be relieved from similar mortifications in future. The letter which he sent by the same messenger, though written with the utmost caution, will shew the poignancy of his feelings.

“*Camp of Peral, Sept. 22.* My lord prince, and duke of Marlborough;—You will have seen from my other letters which you received by the count of Lecheraine, how much I interest myself in every thing that can contribute to your glory and advantage, and the reward of your merits.\* Doubting not that you will continue in the inclination you express of advancing my interests, as well as those of the common cause; I am persuaded you will be sensibly affected by the misfortunes I have experienced this campaign, since I joined the army of my allies from Portugal. Of these you will be apprized, by my counsellor, Zinzerling, the bearer, who will impart to you my most secret thoughts and projects. After what has happened, you will be aware that my honour, authority, and reputation, do not allow me any longer to expose myself to the same accidents and prejudice; and that we cannot hope for a prompt and glorious conclusion of the present war in Spain, unless we adopt other measures; and unless I am enabled to obtain the necessary succours, and act vigorously with my own troops on the points most sensible to France.”

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\* Alluding to his confirmation of the grant, conferring on Marlborough the administration of the Netherlands.



He then solicits the advice and support of Marlborough, and having requested subsidies and other assistance from the queen and the States, he adds, "they may be assured that I will neither spare my person, nor omit any exertion to perform what may be expected from me. You will believe, my dear lord, that I entertain no other views, than such as are most useful to the common cause, and most advantageous to the liberty of Europe, and the strict union with the crown of England. This I will always maintain, as a proof of the perfect gratitude I feel for benefits so essential as those I have just experienced from the queen, your mistress.

"It is necessary also that I should make known to you the great satisfaction I feel in the prudent and zealous conduct of Mr. Stanhope, a gentleman who is endowed with every good quality, and possesses my entire confidence and satisfaction. As he has shewn himself equally able in the cabinet and the field, you will give me great pleasure by confiding to him such powers as will enable me to profit by his assistance the ensuing year. On this subject, as well as on other important and secret points, I have ordered my counsellor, Zinzerling, to communicate with you in the fullest confidence, and beg you to impart your sentiments with similar freedom.

"The services you have rendered to the public and to me, and those which I expect in future from your discretion, will ever be so deeply impressed on my memory, that I shall neglect no opportunity of giving you convincing proofs of my gratitude and esteem for your merit."\*

After the departure of the king, Galway and Das Minas remained with the army, to re-organise the troops, and settle the disposition of their quarters. Peterborough, who had not been permitted to share in the disgrace of the retreat, found on his arrival at Valencia, an order from the british government to dispatch a squadron to the West Indies. The intelligence which arrived at the same time from Turin, superseded his intended

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\* Translation from the original, in french.



expedition to Piemont, so that after a short stay to press the siege of Alicante, he departed for Genoa, to exchange his military command for the equally difficult, though less honourable occupation of collecting pecuniary supplies. \*

By this fatal reverse, Marlborough was not only mortified and disappointed, but placed in a predicament equally critical and unexpected. Admiring the chivalrous spirit, fascinating manners, and courtly address of Peterborough, he had recommended him to the command, and bestowed unqualified praise on his splendid achievements. He was therefore deeply chagrined to find that success had rendered him impatient of controul, ambitious of pre-eminence, and no less vain and visionary in his designs, than petulant in his manners, and unaccommodating in his disposition. He had also not only treated with contempt and levity the young monarch, under whom he was commissioned to act, and whom he was interested to conciliate; but from pique and revenge he was suspected of having so far swerved from his duty, as to make private overtures, proposing to assist in raising the duke of Savoy to the spanish throne. †

In addition to the uneasiness arising from these causes, the intemperate effusions and acrimonious complaints of Peterborough, evinced an envious and vindictive spirit, which it was dangerous to provoke, and impossible to gratify. It appeared that he had already prepared documents to perplex and embroil the administration at home, and had even begun to manifest the hostility to which he afterwards gave full scope, by distributing them through his agents in England, among the chiefs of the disaffected, and the leaders of opposition.

The correspondence of Marlborough is therefore filled with complaints against the misconduct and perverseness of all who were intrusted with the direction of the war in Spain, more

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\* *Memoires de Berwick*—Narrative of lord Galway—Conduct of the earl of Peterborough—MS. Letters from Peterborough to the duke and duchess of Marlborough, and to lord Sunderland—*Journal des Operations en Espagne*, in a letter dated Lisbon, Oct. 23; by an officer in the service of the allies.

† Letter from Godolphin to Marlborough.



especially of Peterborough, to whose froward and arrogant spirit he and Godolphin principally ascribed the unfortunate result. A few extracts will suffice to display their sentiments and opinions, on a subject in which they took so deep an interest.

FROM LORD GODOLPHIN.

“*June 11--22.* I have had other notices agreeing with count Wratislaw's letter, which you sent me concerning lord Peterborough; but I reckon they come all from the complaints of the prince of Lichtenstein. And though I can easily believe occasion enough may have been given for them, yet I certainly know by several letters from Mr. Crowe and others, that the conduct of him who complains has been worthless and contemptible to the last degree. Count Noyelles's letter is very modest, and does not pretend to decide between the two noblemen.”

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

“*June 18.* The duke of Savoy has desired that lord Peterborough may go with the succours. That part is left to the king of Spain, who, I suppose, will not be sorry to part with him, and his lordship will be naturally willing enough to go, if he does not suspect that it will make the king of Spain easy.”

FROM LORD GODOLPHIN.

“*Windsor, July 18.* Mr. Montague, a nephew of my lord Halifax, and one of my lord Galway's aids-de-camp, arrived here with eight letters from his lordship, dated from the camp of Madrid, of the 16--27 of June; but this gentleman did not leave him till the 29th. I will not trouble you with particulars, because I send you the letters, which he brought, desiring they may be sent to me again at your own conveniency.

“The same packet brought me a letter from my lord Peterborough, of a very old date, from Barcelona. It is full of extraordinary flights, and artificial turns. But one may see by it, that there is room for every thing that has been thought or said of his conduct there; and, at the same time, by that and other letters of more credit, nothing ever was so weak, so shameful, and so unaccountable, in every point, as the conduct of the prince de Lichtenstein, and the rest of the king of Spain's German followers.



If Mr. Crowe calls upon you in his return, as I hope he will, I shall not need to trouble you with any more of it now. But it looks as if the king of Spain would never have come to Madrid, if my lord Galway had not sent to him from thence, though there was no enemy in the field to hinder him.

“In short, as we have had good luck in what has passed, we shall want it no less in what is to come, except the king of Spain keeps my lord Galway near him, at least for some time, as I have most humbly desired him to do, in a letter to himself, purely for that purpose.”

“*Windsor, July 19--30.* Since my letter of yesterday, from this place, I have the favour of your's of the 22nd, with the inclosed from count Noyelles, whose complaints I believe truly are as just as the matter of them is unjustifiable; but vanity and passion are capable of carrying people, who have no principle, to do strange things.

“Upon the joining of our portugual and catalonian troops with the king of Spain at Madrid, it has been thought proper, for preventing disputes, to settle in whom the superior command of all the queen's troops should be lodged. The lords here have been unanimously of opinion, that it ought to be in my lord Galway, as having the elder commission from the queen, and that the king of Spain's commission to my lord Peterborough ought not to interfere in this case. I think this is right for the service, but how it may make him fly out, I cannot answer.”

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

“*Helchin, August 5.* I had yesterday your's of the 13th. I send you back lord Galway's letter. You will have seen by my former letter, the fears I have that the duke of Anjou, being joined by M. Legale, may be in a condition to oblige lord Galway and the portuguese to retire from Madrid, which will make it very difficult for king Charles or lord Peterborough to join them. I do with all my heart wish lord Galway with king Charles; for it is certain, since the relief of Barcelona, he has done every thing as the french ought to have wished. For had he made use of the time, and marched to Madrid, every thing must have gone



well in that country. The cabinet council are certainly in the right in advising the queen to give the command to lord Galway, but I am afraid the character of our ambassador is what will be very uneasy to king Charles."

"*Helchin, August 16.* I agree with you that the germans that are with king Charles are good for nothing; but I believe the anger and aversion he has for lord Peterborough is the greatest cause of taking the resolution of going to Saragosa, which I am afraid will prove fatal; for Mr. Crowe told me, that he once said to him, that he would never have any thing to do with lord Peterborough, that he would not accept of health from him: I suppose this expression is better in spanish than english. The king of Spain was not to be at Saragosa till the 15th of last month; and by our letters from France, lord Peterborough had not joined lord Galway the 1st of this month, nor have we any account where he is; but I am afraid the troops are so divided in that country, that the duke of Anjou may be encouraged to attempt the portuguese. Mr. Richards and Mr. Crowe will give you so full an account of what passes in that country, that I have already troubled you too much. However, I must repeat to you what I have already said to Mr. Richards, that I thought the end of June a very wrong time to send on so long a message, the man that has the sole care of the train of artillery; for lord Peterborough could not expect him back till the month of October."

FROM LORD GODOLPHIN.

"*St. James's, August 13--24.* Lord Peterborough has written a volume to Mr. Secretary Hedges. It is a sort of remonstrance against the king of Spain and his ministers, in the first place; and secondly, a complaint against all the orders and directions sent from hence, and as if he had not authority enough given him, either at sea or land. In a word, he is both useless and grievous there, and is preparing to be as troublesome here, whenever he is called home."

"*Windsor, August 15--26.* Mr. Secretary Hedges tells me he is causing lord Peterborough's long letter to be copied, that he might send it to you. It is a sort of two edged sword; first, a



remonstrance against king Charles, in terms as unmannerly as unjust; and secondly, it is prepared to fall on any body here that shall be in his displeasure."

TO THE DUCHESS.


"*Sept. 13--24.* In the letter from lord Rivers, which I sent to the lord treasurer, he proposes to send Mr. Richards immediately to the king of Spain, to concert every thing for their operations. I hope he will also advise with lord Galway; but I must confess if my opinion were to be taken, lord Peterborough should not be consulted. I do not think much ceremony ought to be used in removing him from a place, where he has hazarded the loss of the whole country."

FROM LORD GODOLPHIN.

"*Windsor, Sept. 2--13.* I trouble you with a long letter from the king of Spain. In my answer to it, I have not been able to forbear complaining of his inexcusable delays, in not advancing sooner towards Madrid; though I can agree with you that lord Peterborough's humour may have given a handle to his ministers to prevail with him against his own interest, from a hope they had of squeezing the people of Aragon, as they had before done those of Catalonia. But they have missed their aim in it, as I find by col. Stanhope's letter, which I send you; and in a word, lord Peterborough's extravagancies could not have hurt us, if those germans had not out done him, both in folly and every thing that is worse."

"*Newmarket, Sept. 30--Oct. 11.* You will receive from me by this post, a letter dated from St. Alban's, and I should not have troubled you from hence, but to tell you that colonel Hamilton has brought me a letter from lord Peterborough, of the 4th Sept., old style, in which, the only matter of fact he tells is, that he had left the army and court, upon a council of war, held at Guadaluara, pretending he had orders from the queen to go to Italy. The whole council agreed to it, by which we may conclude they were as well content to be rid of him, as he was to go.

"Colonel Hamilton tells me they had the news at Alicante before he left it, of the victory at Turin. I don't find he can give





any other account of my lord's journey to the duke of Savoy, than to get some dismounted german troopers, and to carry them back to Spain and mount them. This seems so slight an occasion for a general, that I cannot help thinking it might be worth your pains to engage count Maffei to let you know what he says to the duke of Savoy ; for my opinion is, it fully deserves your curiosity."

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

"*Cambren, Oct. 18.* I am obliged to Sir Charles Hedges for sending me copies of all that is come from Portugal and lord Peterborough ; but the bulk is so great, that I shall not have time to read them, till I am on my way to the Hague. I have, however, given them to Mr. Cardonnel, that he may see if there be any thing required of me, so that the queen's service might not suffer by my not reading them."

FROM LORD GODOLPHIN.

"*Nov. 1--12.* I take it for granted Mr. Secretary Hedges sends you extracts of the letters we had yesterday from Spain. I will not trouble you with repeating them, but I find by col. Stanhope's letter to me, that the comte de Noyelles is very well with the king of Spain, and of a temper to make them all very uneasy there. His aim seems to be, that the king should act by himself, with a separate body, and the portuguese by themselves. At the same time they allow, that all their troops joined are not sufficient to oppose the enemy at present.

"My poor lord Galway continues so very pressing to retire, and come home, that I really think it would be too great a barbarity to refuse it him ; but what amazes me is, that he recommends lord Peterborough, as the properest person to succeed him in the care of the whole.

"They press very much for recruits, but seem to think themselves, there is no having them in time, unless whole regiments be sent them from hence, or from Ireland. I should hope the force gone with lord Rivers might be a reinforcement sufficient for them ; but how the command shall be settled when my lord Gal-



way comes away, is a matter which I hope you will turn your thoughts to, against your coming over."

Meanwhile lord Peterborough continued to importune the ministers with letters and memorials, vindicating his own conduct, and bitterly reflecting on king Charles and his ministers, as well as on the generals commanding in Spain. He hoped also to secure an interest with the duchess of Marlborough, on whose mind his fascinating conversation and adulatory letters had already produced a considerable effect. One of these will be sufficient to shew his design, and display his character and address.

"*On board the Resolution, in Alicante Road, Sept. 4, 1706.* Madam ;—The favour of your grace's letter, and the honour of those brought from my lord duke of Marlborough, by the count of Lecheraine, I received at the same time. I wish I could have answered both from Madrid, and then my next wish would have been the satisfaction of seeing your grace at the lodge.

"You were pleased, madam, to allow me to be fortunate, till I had nothing to wish. Remember, my lady duchess, one of my first wishes is, that I may never lose your good opinion and favour, and yet I am content to suffer the punishment, whenever I deserve it, by failing in my duty to my queen or country, or my private respects due to my lord duke or yourself, for your public merits, and particular favours to me and my family.

"The most disagreeable country in the world is Spain ; the most pleasing, England ; our german ministry and spanish statesmen much alike ; their officers the greatest robbers, and their soldiers the greatest cowards ; the only tolerable thing, your sex, and that attended with the greatest dangers. Judge then, madam, of my joy and disappointment, when I soon expected the honour of seeing your grace, after a war ended in a year, and a treaty finished in two months.

"These pleasing thoughts I had, but I submit to the faults and misfortunes of others, not my own. Hitherto I have been only acquainted with success, but attended with inconceivable fatigues.



Perhaps I may now have a reprieve, or at least the satisfaction of submitting to whatever the queen shall desire or command.

“ I have troubled the ministers with the tedious particulars, but hope my lord Marlborough’s success and conduct have made our follies less fatal and recoverable.”

Marlborough saw the danger to be apprehended from a confidential intercourse with a nobleman of so captious and imperious a temper, in the actual state of affairs ; and therefore, he not only deferred answering the letters with which he was himself assailed, but cautioned the duchess to discontinue a correspondence, which would eventually implicate her in endless squabbles and cabals. He observes, “ What you say concerning lord Peterborough and his fair lady, is certainly very just, for there is nothing that may not be expected from them. I have observed, since I have been in the world, that the next misfortune to that of having friendship with such people is, that of having any dispute with them, and that care should be taken to have as little to do with them as possible.”

From this statement we may judge of the embarrassments created by the affairs in Spain, and in particular we may anticipate the mischiefs which were afterwards raised by so restless a nobleman as Peterborough, when irritated by pique and disappointed ambition, and foiled in all his schemes of aggrandisement and distinction.

The perplexity of Marlborough did not, however, arise from the eccentric and perverse conduct of Peterborough alone ; for the situation of the army, and the rivalry and disputes which reigned among the generals, and in the court of Charles, daily furnished new causes of disquietude. In consequence of the losses sustained during the retreat, the army was scarcely sufficiently strong to defend even the eastern provinces. Hence both Charles and lord Galway sent repeated expresses to England for immediate reinforcements. The only succours, however, which could be furnished with sufficient promptitude, were the troops intended for the descent on the french coast, which were now become useless for their original destination. This expedition



had been so long detained by contrary winds and other obstacles, that the fleet did not reach Plymouth till the 13th of August. At the moment of its intended departure, the marquis de Guiscard, the projector of the expedition, was examined, and his information being found vague and exaggerated, the design was abandoned, much to the disappointment of Marlborough. Orders were accordingly dispatched for the fleet to proceed to Lisbon, with the view of conveying relief to the peninsula. After farther delays, occasioned by the opposition of the elements, the fleet at length sailed, and reached Lisbon towards the latter end of October, the land forces being commanded by earl Rivers, an officer who owed his situation to the interest of the whigs.

Soon after his arrival, the king of Portugal died, and was succeeded by his son John, aged seventeen, a young prince of great spirit and promise, but deficient in experience. The change of government creating considerable confusion, the fleet was again detained, and did not reach Alicante till the 28th of January. About this period lord Peterborough arriving from Genoa, there were no less than three commanders at the head of the british army in Spain. This division of power created great confusion and jealousy, and the embarrassment was increased by the change which had taken place in the disposition of the spanish court; for Galway was, in his turn, become the object of odium, and Peterborough had partially succeeded in reconciling himself to the young monarch and his courtiers. At the same time the count de Noyelles was endeavouring to form a separate party, and by his engaging address had conciliated the good will of Charles; but the person highest in the confidence of the young monarch, was lord Rivers, who laboured to throw equal discredit on his two predecessors, Galway and Peterborough. In the midst of these clashing interests, the three british generals affected a desire to concede to each other the principal command, and all applied for an immediate recal. As it was impossible for all to remain in their actual situation, Peterborough was remanded to Italy; and lord Rivers, unwilling to incur the responsibility of so dangerous a pre-eminence as the command in Spain, announced his deter-



mination to return to England, without waiting for orders. Previous to their separation, a council of war was held at Valencia, to decide on their future operations. The succour brought by lord Rivers, which amounted to above 10,000 men, inspired the generals with a desire to retrieve their recent disasters, and it was decided to clear the frontier of Valencia, and after destroying the magazines of the enemy, to take the route through Catalonia to Madrid. This opinion was sanctioned by all except Peterborough, who, as usual, proposed a different plan of his own.

In the midst of the preparations for carrying the design into execution, and when the junction of the whole army was necessary, and the presence of Charles required to stimulate the zeal of the austrian partisans, he declared his intention to proceed to Catalonia, for the purpose of repelling an expected invasion on the side of Rousillon. His minister, prince Lichtenstein, indeed, apologised for this sudden change of conduct, by declaring that his majesty would be ready to join the army in person, whenever he saw it in a condition to undertake the proposed operations. The real cause was, however, a desire to escape from the controul of the british generals.

Charles himself was fully conscious that his sudden departure at so critical a time, might justly expose him to censure. He therefore sent to Marlborough, a long and laboured vindication of his conduct, which conveys a striking proof of his impatience to liberate himself from restraint, and shews the impracticability of the system hitherto pursued, in giving only the nominal authority to a young and high spirited prince, and confiding the real power to british officers.

After repeating his former protestations against the disrespect and indifference with which he was treated, and complaining that his presence was made only an excuse to cover the faults of others, he continues: "I give you this little detail, because you are interested in whatever concerns me; and, consequently, in my reputation. I leave you to judge whether I can again expose myself to similar mortifications, and whether I am not justified in declaring, that I will not make another campaign in the same



manner. I may add also, that these generals, who think only of advancing, do not condescend to reflect on the necessity of securing what we have already gained, particularly so important a province as Catalonia, when we know that the force of the enemy is augmented in Roussillon. From these considerations, from the conviction that other measures are necessary in the army, and from the fear that the portuguese, as heretofore, have no inclination to act, I have firmly resolved to pass some time in Catalonia, till I can receive your advice and opinion. My reasons are, first, that the generals may act more gloriously, since I have observed that my presence alone incommodes them, that they paid no attention to me, and that if they do nothing, my reputation at least may be saved. Secondly, that I may place Catalonia in a state of defence, and shew to all my allies, and to the world, that I wish to act for the good of the common cause, where I am able to do something. I can relinquish my interests, but for no consideration in the world will I sacrifice my reputation. Lastly, the loss of my kingdom is a fatality which my allies and the maternal bounty of the queen cannot absolutely prevent; but I should deserve it, were I capable of sacrificing my honour; for even if I should lose my crown, my sword will always find fortune as long as I preserve my character. I hope that no one will censure these, my true sentiments, and that you, as my friend, will render justice to my determination, and explain and support my motives with the queen. I am far from refusing to act in any quarter whatever, and will even rejoin the army, when I see that I can be useful, without risking my reputation. You, as well as the queen, will hear much against this expedition; but you will, I trust, see that I cannot do otherwise, and I place my character in your hands.

“From the particular confidence I repose in you, I have explained myself thus freely, and I leave it to your discretion, either to conceal or to impart to the queen, the reasons which have compelled me to pass into Catalonia.”\*

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\* Abridged from the french original.



Charles had no sooner adopted this resolution than he summoned lord Rivers to Valencia, for the purpose of obtaining his sanction. He indeed not only succeeded in his object; but even seems to have conceived hopes, that if he could procure the transfer of the command to a nobleman who appeared anxious to conciliate his good will, he should be relieved from the controul under which he had been held by the other generals. The effect of this interview was, therefore, a letter from lord Rivers, vindicating the intended journey to Catalonia; and conveying by implication, a bitter censure on the conduct of his colleagues; and another from Charles himself, praising the demeanour and judgment of lord Rivers, and warmly soliciting his return to the command. At the same time the appearance of this new candidate for favour produced a total change in the language and conduct of Peterborough. After having censured the proposed expedition of Charles, as the act of a madman, and suggested a series of plans for the conduct of the war in Spain, which were no less absurd than impracticable, he suddenly assumed a different tone and strain of argument, and in imitation of his colleague, justified the departure of Charles, as the only expedient which he could adopt, to deliver himself from the degrading tutelage in which he was held by lord Galway.\*

Amidst these petty intrigues, Marlborough and Godolphin laboured to bring Charles to a sense of his own interest, as well by their remonstrances, as by private applications to the court of Vienna. They even employed the intervention of the queen, who wrote to the young prince, dissuading him from his ill-timed journey, and recommending him to restore lord Galway to his confidence. But no representation could obliterate the deep sense which Charles entertained of his dependence, or counteract the insidious advice of those who were caballing for

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\* Letters from lord Peterborough to the duke, Casale, Nov. 10, 1706; Valencia, Feb. 23, 1707; and from king Charles, Valencia, March 7, 1707.



his favour. A letter from lord Galway to the treasurer will shew the inefficiency of these remonstrances, and the froward temper of the young monarch.

“*Valencia, Feb. 22.*” After expressing his gratitude for the gracious orders of the queen to continue in her service, and the new commission by which he was appointed commander in chief of all the british forces in Spain, he adds: “When I was so pressing for leave to retire, it was not so much on account of my own infirmities, and the disquiets of the service, as of so many difficulties that made it impossible for me to serve the queen as I ought; but seeing her majesty, the ministry, and my friends, believe I can still be serviceable, I submit to their better judgment. But they must answer to the public for any faults I may commit, tho’ I’ll do my utmost to save them from any reproach, if fidelity, application, and vigilance, can do it; but I cannot answer for my capacity in affairs so very difficult to manage. \* \* \* \*

“I am extremely sensible of the encouragements her majesty is pleased to give me. I wish her letter to the king, so much to my advantage, may produce a good effect. He has taken no notice yet of it to me. It would not be easy to represent to you that prince’s character. He cannot but have so much respect for the queen, that he will always outwardly shew me a great regard. He always outwardly agrees with me, when I represent any thing to him; but never does what I advise him to. He has now lately made a german chamberlain of his household, which is one of the greatest offices in Spain, and has shewn very little countenance to the spaniards he is most obliged to. I have already had the honour to tell your lordship how necessary it would be, that prince Eugene came hither to prevent the disorders of the court, as well as those of the field. The king sends Don Pedro Moraes to him. I enclose the copy of the letter I sent him, believing his presence here of an absolute necessity.”

Notwithstanding the opposition of the british cabinet, Charles



departed for Catalonia. He was accompanied by count Noyelles, and took with him two regiments of foot, and five squadrons of horse, a force which could ill be spared in the actual condition of the army, particularly in the weak and defective state of the cavalry.



## CHAPTER 50.

1706.

*Anxiety of Marlborough and Godolphin to obtain the guaranty of the protestant succession from foreign powers—Negotiations on the subject with the dutch—Difficulties relative to the barrier—Correspondence—Effects of the exorbitant demands advanced by the States—Dissatisfaction of the house of Austria—Private overtures made by France to the republic—Rejected—New proposal for a negotiation, through the elector of Bavaria—Conduct of Marlborough—Decision of England and Holland to decline the proffered negotiation—Reply to the elector—Public communication to the ministers of the allies—Attempts of Marlborough to allay the disputes between the emperor and the dutch.*

**I**N the course of his negotiations abroad, Marlborough experienced the commencement of those interminable disputes, relative to the belgic provinces, which deeply affected the vital interests of the grand alliance, and for a century proved a germ of contention to Europe.

From the accession of Anne, when the reins of government were transferred to the hands of Godolphin and Marlborough, they had been incessantly accused of a latent inclination towards the family of their former sovereign, and a culpable lukewarmness towards the protestant succession. They were anxious, therefore, as well to exonerate themselves from this odious imputation, as to complete the system on which they had invariably acted. The liberties of Europe had been in a great degree secured by the victories of Marlborough, and the juncture now seemed favourable for establishing on a stable basis the liberties of England, which depended on the security of the protestant succession. The natural and obvious means were, the union with Scotland, which appeared likely to avert internal dangers, and the guaranty of the succession by foreign powers, which was equally calculated to prevent such as might arise from abroad.

The arrangements for the union with Scotland were wholly consigned to Godolphin, as domestic minister, while those for the



guaranty of foreign powers were intrusted to Marlborough, in virtue of his great interest abroad, and the diplomatic authority with which he was invested. As the foundation of this system of guaranty, a treaty with Holland was formed with the concurrence of the whigs. It comprised an offensive and defensive alliance, in the usual terms, for the security of the protestant succession; and to remedy the imperfect stipulations in the peace of Ryswic, a clause was introduced, binding the contracting powers to extort from France, as a preliminary to any future negotiation, the recognition of the protestant establishment.

It was expected that the example of the dutch would influence other powers, and to secure their acquiescence in the proposed guaranty of the protestant succession, lord Halifax, on his return from Hanover, passed some time at the Hague. His instances however, proved fruitless; for the States declined giving a distinct or positive answer, and he took his departure for England, leaving the negotiation in the hands of Marlborough.

The british commander submitted the question to the States, in July, the day before he repaired to the army; and to obtain their consent, he offered, on the part of the queen, to secure to the republic such a barrier as justice and safety should require.\*

To bring the question of the barrier into discussion, was to touch a cord which vibrated in every nerve of the republic. Perceiving the anxiety of the british cabinet to obtain their guaranty, the dutch hoped to procure a considerable accession both of trade and territory, under the plea of strengthening their frontier. Instead of the right to garrison a chain of fortresses, which had hitherto limited their demands, they now claimed a portion of the adjoining provinces, and their views extended according to the success of the confederate arms. New difficulties therefore continually arose, and every negotiation was entangled with the question of the barrier. Marlborough himself, though so warm a partisan of the alliance with Holland, was offended by their insatiable cupidity; and in his correspondence we find numerous complaints, that instead of confining their views to a

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\* Lamberti, t. 4, p. 77—78.



rational system of security, they were labouring for the acquisition of a considerable kingdom.

These jarring interests not only excited irritation between the two maritime powers, but even affected the more distant members of the alliance. In particular the austrian princes were indignant at this attempt to rob them of the richest prize which they expected to derive from this dangerous and expensive war. The opportunity also was too favourable to be neglected by the enemy. The king of France saw with pleasure, an inexhaustible source of contention between the principal members of the grand alliance, and renewed his offers of negotiation, with the hope of luring the cupidity of the dutch, by the promise of a more extensive barrier than they could expect from the gratitude or policy of their allies. Accordingly before the return of Marlborough to England, he witnessed a new and insidious attempt to sow divisions among the confederates, and arrest his career of conquest.

Soon after the battle of Ramilies, an overture was made to the british commander, by the elector of Bavaria, declaring his indignation at the neglect with which he had been treated by France, and announcing his readiness to join the grand alliance. As a proof of his sincerity, he even offered to surrender the fortresses of Mons, Charleroy, and Namur, which were intrusted to his custody, as governor of the Netherlands. The opportunity appeared advantageous, and a long correspondence ensued. As on a former occasion, the earnest professions, and pressing instances of the elector weighed with the unsuspicious mind of Marlborough. He obtained full powers from the queen to complete the arrangement, and conceived hopes of a satisfactory result. Continual difficulties were, however, started, and the negotiation began to languish. After a short interval, it was renewed with additional warmth, through the agency of the king of Prussia, but with as little effect as before; for the elector rose in his demands, and his offers became more vague and unsatisfactory, in proportion as the allies appeared anxious to purchase his defection.\* At length, Marlborough

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\* Correspondence of Marlborough and Godolphin, and letters from the prussian ministers, Wartensleben and Grumbkow, to the duke.



discovered the insidiousness of the proposal, and broke off a correspondence which could only tend to create umbrage among the allies.

Meanwhile Louis employed the agency of Count Bergueick intendant of the Netherlands, to convey private overtures to the dutch government. The communication was made through Vanderdussen, then chief magistrate of Tergow, and by him imparted to Pensionary Heinsius. The offer comprised the relinquishment of Spain and the Indies, a barrier for the republic, the recognition of the queen's title, and considerable commercial advantages to both the maritime powers, on the condition that the Two Sicilies and Milan should be ceded to Philip. Such a proposal made a deep sensation in Holland, where the national jealousy against the House of Bourbon had so much declined, that Marlborough had reason to observe, "It is publicly said at the Hague, that France is reduced to what it ought to be, and that if the war should be carried farther, it would serve only to make England greater than it ought to be. In short, I am afraid our best allies are very fond of a peace, and that they would engage England to quarrel with the emperor, to have a pretext to come at a peace."\*

The overture did not escape the notice of the british commander, and he succeeded in convincing the pensionary and the partisans of the Grand Alliance, that it was merely intended to lure the republic into a separate negotiation. It was, therefore, declined, though it long occupied the attention of the two governments, and influenced the discussion pending with the dutch, relative to the barrier. The progress and effects of this transaction, are well detailed in the correspondence.

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

"*July 14.* Now that the siege of Ostend is over, I was in hopes we might have lost no time in attacking Menin, but M. Gilder-Massen sends me word, that they have not the necessary preparations ready. But as soon as they come to

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\* To Godolphin, Helchin, August 30, 1706.



Ghent, he will let me know it. I am afraid we shall find at last, that some of our friends are of the opinion that we have *already done too much*; for notwithstanding what I said when I was at Ostend, that two regiments would be enough to leave in that place, they have left six. But I have writ to the Hague, and if they do not give orders that some of them be sent to the army, they do not intend to have much more done this year. This will appear strange to you, but we have so many of these refined politics, that it is high time we had a good peace. At the same time that I say this to you, the greatest part of the people are very honest, and wish well to the common cause; but those that are of the contrary faction are more active and diligent. Every thing goes so well in Spain, that if we have success with the descent, France must submit to a reasonable peace. The wind has continued so long westerly, that I am afraid several of my letters are at the Brill, which makes me desire Sir Stafford Fairburn to send this. The dutch have ordered their transports to Ostend, so that you will have their troops and the english together."

"*July 15--26.* I hope the treaty at the Hague about the succession, as it is now settled by lord Halifax, cannot fail to succeed, since the queen will make no difficulty of warranting the barrier for the States, if they will not be unreasonable."

FROM LORD GODOLPHIN.

"*July 19--30.* I am sorry to find by your's, that the siege of Menin is like to go on so slowly, but I see it is unavoidable. I hope your impatience to make an end of the war in this year will not prevail with you to make any unreasonable attempt, nor to push any thing too fast; for I cannot find that taking that place, and perhaps one or two more, which is the most to be expected, would put an end to the war this year. Success in Italy perhaps would do it, or making a lucky use of the powers sent you from Mr. Secretary Harley, might possibly have the same effect.

"I don't think the dutch are very reasonable, to be so much in pain about their barrier, as things stand; but it is a plain argument to me, they think of joining their interest to that of France,



whenever a peace comes ; and for that very reason, the longer we can keep it off, the better."

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

"*Helchin, Aug. 23.* I send you inclosed a letter from the pensionary, and my answer. I do not doubt Mr. Secretary Harley or yourself will hear from M. Buys, as the french are making applications, I believe, at Vienna, as well as at the Hague. You must be careful what answer you make, for be assured they will not continue the war much longer ; and I am afraid, in a very little time, we shall find that the court of Vienna, and the dutch, are more desirous of quarrelling with each other than with France."

FROM THE DUKE TO THE PENSIONARY.

"*Helchin, Aug. 21.* I have had the favour of your's of the 13th, and shall obey your commands as far as I dare ; for, as a good englishman, I must be of the opinion of my country, *that both by treaty and interest we are obliged to preserve the monarchy of Spain entire.* At the same time, as a friend, I must acknowledge, that I believe France can hardly be brought to a peace, unless something be given to the duke of Anjou, so that he may preserve the title of king. I think that of Milan is unreasonable, since it would make France master of the duke of Savoy, and all Italy. As to what they pretend on the Rhine, I can't think they would insist on that. The explication of the queen's title is certainly very impertinent ; for the last peace, in which they take no notice of the successor, was contrary to custom, and the laws of the land. You see that in few words I let you know my thoughts. But I durst not advise what answer you should give ; but I should think it were very natural for M. Buys to give an account of this proposal to Mr. Secretary Harley, and lord treasurer, who will acquaint her majesty ; by which means you will have the opinion of the queen."

FROM LORD GODOLPHIN.

"*Windsor, Sept. 2-13, 1706.* I now send you a copy of the answer to M. Buys from Mr. Secretary Harley and myself. I hope it will have your approbation, and I am pretty sure it is



what the generality that one can speak with here, will think very reasonable for us to insist upon. If the very first point be agreed to, that before any formal step be made towards peace, both England and Holland shall engage to warrant whatsoever shall be concluded upon that occasion, I shall not doubt but the rest will follow to our satisfaction.

“I beg leave only to add, that I don’t see how this first point can be refused with any tolerable honesty or sincerity, or indeed unless the dutch be absolutely resolved to throw off the mask, declare themselves open friends to France, and not under any obligations to keep farther measures with the queen. This I take to be no easy task, and therefore I am humbly of opinion, that to speak plain to them now, is the best way to divert them from attempting it; for the more complaisance is shewn them, and the more we give way to them, it is both their nature and their practice to be the more assuming.”

REPLY OF MARLBOROUGH.

“*Grametz, Sept. 20.* At my return this day from the camp before Ath, I had the favour of your’s of the 2nd from Windsor, and that of the 3rd from London. Your answer to Buys’s letter is certainly very right; and if they had no view but their true interest, they would think so; but I am afraid you will find they will make reply to it; for the success with which it has pleased God to bless the arms of the allies this campaign has made them very jealous of the great power, as they term it, that England has in the greatest part of the courts in Christendom. It is certain that the dutch carry every thing with so high a hand that they are not beloved any where. I am very much of your opinion that before any step be made towards peace, we ought to have a treaty with Holland for the guaranty of any treaty of peace we may hereafter make with France; and that there be room left for the allies to come into it, that if I have her majesty’s commands I hope it might meet with no opposition at my coming to the Hague.”

FROM LORD GODOLPHIN.

“*Windsor, Sept. 18--29.* I had time but just to thank you by yesterday’s post, for six letters I received at once from you. The



news they brought at last was good enough to make amends for our long expectation.

“ I hope before this comes to your hands you will have taken Ath, and turned your thoughts, not to any new expedition, but to end the campaign as soon as the french will give you leave to do it. I don't think their misfortune at Turin will prevail with them to make any detachments from M. de Vendome's army as long as you are in the field ; but rather I am not out of pain, lest they may yet venture something to redeem the blow at Turin on this side, when they think the season so far advanced as that you could not be able to prosecute any advantage you might have upon them. And this seems the more reasonable, because it would be a great help to their negotiation with the dutch this winter, upon which I believe *they place their greatest hope*.

“ Upon this head I cannot help saying, that though some of the leading men of Holland may be blind or worse ; yet surely the generality cannot be imposed upon so far as to be blown up with a jealousy of the queen's power, when all that power, be it great or little, has been, and is still exerted for their safety, without the least view or desire of any extent of conquest or dominion for England, and when it is plain that in two or three years time France, with the comfort and assistance of peace, will be just where she was before, if the nicest care be not taken to put it out of her power, now there is an opportunity in our hands.

“ But whereas you say in one of your letters we may now be sure of a solid and lasting peace, if *the dutch do not play the fool*, that position is certainly right, if we can agree to carry on the war *with vigour*, as you call it, another year. But the difficulty is in that *agreement*, for I very much doubt whether Holland will make so much as a show of doing it. \* \* \* \*

“ *The 19th.* Since I had written the former part of this letter, I have the favour of your's of the 23rd, by which, as also by the letters from Paris to the venetian ambassador here, I perceive Holland is running very fast towards peace, and therefore I think nothing must be left unattempted of any kind to let them



see that the queen will not be compelled in that matter. On the other side, I am of opinion it would be right to humour them the more in all reasonable things, and particularly in the affair of Munster. I cannot help repeating, that now the election is over by a fair majority, I think the emperor pushes that matter too far; and since he has not done, nor can do any thing considerable but as he is helped by England and Holland, it seems to be an unreasonable assuming; and I doubt you will not do yourself a good office with Holland, by leaving too much to the imperial court in this matter.

“ My Paris Intelligencer says Mr. Rouillé, and the elector of Bavaria, carry on the affairs of Spain with great vigour and success.”

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

“ *Grametz, Sept. 23.* I have forborne writing till this evening, in hopes of having the english letters, or an express from Italy, but neither is come. The germans have at length passed the Rhine, but it is so late in the year, that we must not expect much from them. The 27th of the last month was the post by which you sent me the copy of M. Buys's letter. We hear that packet boat was carried into Calais. I hope they had time to fling the packet overboard, for I should be sorry to have his letter go to Versailles, though I am afraid they are there too well informed of the inclinations of the dutch; for what has passed in Italy, I am afraid will make them neglect what is fit to be done for the support of the war, being not only fond, but as they think, sure of enjoying peace before the next summer, which thought can only end in hurting themselves and friends. For as our affairs are in Spain, how is it possible that the king of France can resolve to send for the duke of Anjou back? so that there is an absolute necessity of supporting the war some time longer, which is what you will find them very averse to. They are so angry with the emperor about the election at Munster, that they very freely say that if France were in a worse condition, they might expect from the emperor to be used by him, as he does his own subjects. This, joined with the jealousy they begin to have of England, may give such advantage to the king of France, that he may in a few years



recover so much strength, as to be able to punish them for their folly."

"*Grametz, Sept. 26, N.S., 1706.* The baron Hondorf, who gives you this, is sent by his master, the duke of Savoy, and prince Eugene, to give her majesty a relation of the glorious action at Turin. Thinking this opportunity safer than my letters that go through Holland, you shall have my thoughts concerning the dutch: they are positively resolved to have peace, being very angry with the emperor, and jealous of England. They cannot agree among themselves concerning their barrier; but the most reasonable are extravagant, so that if that matter be not settled before we come to a formal treaty of peace, the french will certainly make a great advantage of it. They are very positive that the duke of Anjou must have something given him. In short, they think that by supporting that, they make their court to France, at the expence of England. I am afraid the management of the war in Spain will afford them some reasons; so that, the only cure I can see, is, if it be possible, to persuade them to support the war one year longer.

"You know I have great indulgence for what the States General may wish, but they are so very unreasonable in this dispute of Munster, that I hope the queen will not be persuaded by M. Vryberg to enter into that quarrel."

FROM LORD GODOLPHIN.

"*Windsor, Sept. 24--Oct. 4.* I have received the favour of your's of the 23rd, with the inclosed from the pensionary to you, about peace, in which he is pleased to lay weight upon two arguments, which seem to me to have so little, that I cannot help saying something upon them to you, because my answer to M. Buys's second letter, of which I send you a copy, is not so strong upon those particulars as it might have been.

"His two arguments are,

"First, that I take no notice in my letter of the low condition of their finances.

"Secondly, that France may not be so well disposed to treat at another time as now.



“ I took no notice in my letter of the state of their finances, because I thought it unnecessary, the answer to it being so very obvious, for all arguments of that kind must be taken comparatively. And though the land and trade both of England and Holland have excessive burthens upon them, yet the credit continues good both with us and with them ; and we can either of us borrow money at 4 or 5 per cent ; whereas the finances of France are so much more exhausted, that they are forced to give 20 and 25 per cent. for every penny of money they send out of the kingdom, unless they send it in specie, by which means they have neither money nor credit. The result of this first argument is only, that it absolutely destroys the second ; since it is plain the condition of France is in all respects so low, that the greatest support they have at present, comes from the *greediness*, if I may use that *word*, of Holland, to encourage and entertain all projects of peace ; whereas, if the allies would agree not to receive or hearken to any proposals of peace, till the state of war for the next year was settled, I durst venture my little fortune upon it, that France would agree to every point mentioned in my former letter to M. Buys.

“ As to the project brought over by my lord Halifax, he will send you his thoughts by this post, as he did by the last to M. Heinsius. Mine you will see in the copy of my answer to M. Buys, which goes herewith.”

This letter was accompanied with a reply to Buys, of which the draught has been preserved.

“ I am very glad that you approve of the proposition of making a preliminary treaty among the allies, for maintaining the peace that shall be made. I hope my lord Marlborough will agree that with you, when he comes to the Hague. But this cannot properly be done in the treaty for the guaranty of our succession and your barrier ; for it would not be convenient to ask some of our allies to guaranty the succession in the house of Hanover, who are too considerable to be left out of the treaty for the guaranty of the peace.

“ I have seen that project of a treaty which my lord Halifax



brought over, and I believe there must be great alterations made in that before it can be agreed to. I think that part which relates to your barrier is so worded, that it may be interpreted to extend farther than you yourselves mean it should.

“ I am also glad that you agree, that if all the essential points are not settled before we enter upon a public negotiation, we give the enemy too great an advantage. I am so much of that opinion, that I shall despair of obtaining any condition of consequence, after the treaty is begun, that is not agreed to before. The time of beginning these private transactions is much less material than the manner of managing them. If the design of them be clearly to let France know upon what terms we think it safe and honourable to make peace, and this be expressed with great firmness and resolution, and with a general view to the interest of the allies, the sooner they know our minds, and we their's, the better. But if some of our demands are faintly made, only to save appearances with our friends, and France can suspect that we have not equal concern for all the parts of them, and the like resolution to insist upon them, we ought to be very cautious how we begin a transaction, that may create distrust and jealousy among the allies, and give France an opportunity of dividing them.

“ It is very reasonable that Holland and England, who have borne the burthen of the war, should be the arbiters of such disputes as may arise upon the interpretation of our treaties. But would you make use of this authority to lessen any advantage that the allies might have from the success of their arms? Would it be a sufficient excuse for giving the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily to the french, to say they were not expressly secured to the house of Austria in the grand alliance? And, perhaps, the apprehension the neapolitans may have of our being too easy in delivering them up to France, may hinder their attempts to free themselves, which the french will not fail to let them know.

“ For my own part, I think the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily would make the french such entire masters of the Mediterranean, would give them such an authority over all the princes of Italy,



and lay open Milan and Piemont, so much to the attempts that may be made against them on both sides, that the duke of Savoy, after all he has done and suffered, would be exposed to their revenge and ambition. The qualifications and restrictions which you would put upon this article, are the same that were mentioned in the treaty of partition, and were there thought elusive, and of no effect. This was the article most censured in that treaty, and after all our success, I hope we shall not come back to it again.

“ I don't see how the queen can, with honour or decency, enter upon a treaty with France, while they receive and treat another as king of England ; and the case now is very different from what it was in the last war. The monarchy of Spain is now the matter in dispute, as the king's title was in that ; and though the king of France should send the prince of Wales to Rome, he would thereby yield nothing of his pretensions to the crown of Spain, and only remove the offence he has given to the queen and the nation, in setting up another pretender after he had owned the king's right to the crown. To put this off till the public treaty, is to leave it to have the same effect. And as you see the queen would never consent to a cartell, as was done in the former war, neither will she be willing to have her right and dignity lessened in any treaty.

“ You say I have taken no notice of the state of your finances in my letter. I cannot apprehend there can be any argument drawn from thence to induce you to accept a disadvantageous peace, and a good one we all desire. The debts of England are very great, and the burthens on our land and trade, excessive. But we see your credit is good, and we hear they are not at their ease in France, and that their finances are exhausted ; and it would be no more relief to your circumstances to make such a peace, as might draw on another war, than it would be a strength to your government to take such conditions as your allies may complain of, and your own people dislike.

“ Now the duke of Savoy has recovered his dominions, there is not the same occasion to have such regard for the elector of Bavaria ; and, perhaps, if he were made sensible that you are not



so easy in that matter, he might do something to reconcile himself to you, and not stick so firmly to France."

This reply, though at once judicious, firm, and conciliating, does not appear to have restrained the inclination of the dutch government for peace.

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

"*Grametz, Oct. 4.* Every post gives me an account of the great desire some in Holland have to end the war before the next campaign. The knowledge France has of this, is, no doubt, the reason of their having made no new offers since their misfortune in Italy. If Holland can be persuaded to go on with the war the next year, we have reason to expect an honourable, safe, and lasting peace; so that I beg of you that the pensionary and M. Buys, against my coming to the Hague, may be prepared, by letters from yourself and Mr. Secretary Harley, to take with me the necessary measures for carrying on the war the next campaign.

"I shall not care to stay longer at the Hague than is absolutely necessary for the service, being sure they will be very troublesome concerning the peace. Their notions of that matter, in my opinion, are very wrong; so that, with the queen's leave, I must speak plainly to them; for they argue as if they alone were the only people concerned in this war, and consequently in the peace."

"*Grametz, Oct. 9.* I am very far from being of your opinion that the french will venture any thing on this side, for they knew of their loss at Turin before we began the siege of Ath; so that if they could have had any temptation to venture a battle, it ought to have been when we of necessity must have been divided. But I believe they have set up their rest in the hopes they have that their negotiations with the dutch may succeed, so that there will be a necessity of the queen's giving me leave to oppose it in her name, unless they should offer much better conditions than I have yet heard of. I have writ concerning the preliminary treaty you mentioned; but I think it would forward it very much, if Mr.



Secretary Harley would let me have the heads of such a one as you desire.

“The business of Munster is like to be very troublesome. The queen can certainly meddle with it no otherwise than by doing good offices.

“I had a letter last night from the pensioner: he complains that the treaty for the guaranty for the succession stands still, for his want of hearing from lord Halifax. If you have any difficulty in England concerning that treaty, I should know it; if not, it should be pressed, so that I might sign it before I leave that country.”

“*Grametz, Oct. 11.* Since my last we have no letters from England, nor any news from France. I expect the comte de Zinzendorff about a fortnight hence, and then I shall be able to let you know what the emperor's intentions are for the operations of the next campaign on the Rhine; for if they can be brought to act offensively, that will very much help the allies in all other parts.

“It has always been, and is still my opinion, that M. Slingelandt is the best inclined for carrying on the war of any at the Hague. This opinion makes me send you the inclosed letter, that you may see how the humour runs in that place. This letter should be seen by none besides the queen and prince, but such as you would advise with, to know how I ought to carry myself when I come to the Hague. The comte de Maffei has shewn me a letter he has from Paris, in which he is assured that the french are resolved to make no new offers till I am gone for England; and then they will offer whatever they think will be agreeable to the dutch. When I have been at Brussels some few days with Mr. Stepney, I think it will be for her majesty's service that I take Mr. Stepney with me to the Hague, to try, if possible, to cure their jealousies, and then send him back to Brussels.

“Having written thus far, I have received your's of the 23rd of the last month, and a copy from Mr. Secretary Harley of your's to M. Buys, which is so reasonable and just that it will



be impossible for him to give an answer, so that the effect of your letter will be, that they will be angry. For by all that I can learn they are resolved to have a peace; but in my opinion, when they shall endeavour to put it in practice, they will find it very difficult, for I do not think their people will be pleased with any propositions that are not liked by the queen."

"*Cambron, Oct. 14.* By my letter from the Hague, I see they are preparing a great deal of business for me, as to their disputes with the emperor, their barrier, and the peace. But I hope the queen will allow me to speak my mind freely, and then come to England; for in my opinion, they will be so extravagant in their barrier, that it will hinder the treaty for the succession."

FROM LORD GODOLPHIN, IN REPLY.

"*Newmarket, Oct. 10--21.* Since my last, I have received your letter of the 14th. To that of the 11th, I made some answer by the last post, and sent you at the same time the last letter I had from M. Buys, as also the substance of my answer, which was very short.

"I believe, as you seem to do, that notwithstanding the violent passion for peace which appears in Holland, they will have a good deal of difficulty to compass their inclinations against the opinion of England, especially if they will force us to make public upon what terms the queen is willing to approve of peace; since I cannot but think those will not appear unreasonable either to the rest of the allies, or to their own people.

"The chief point in my opinion is, that Holland should, upon your arrival at the Hague, proceed to settle their state of war for the next year; and though France should then make new offers after you were come for England, they could not fail of communicating them here, before any resolutions were taken upon the whole matter. Therefore, it seems best, on all accounts, that you should come over as soon as you can, since you are wanted here as much as there; and what you are wanted for here cannot be supplied by another, as the business on that side may, for aught I know, upon any extraordinary occasion, which shall happen to occur when you are here.



“ I am apprehensive count Zinzendorff's coming to the Hague, will rather increase than appease the differences between the emperor and the States.”

“ *St. James's, Oct. 13--24.* The necessity of the parliament meeting so late here, may, I fear, furnish a handle to the States to put off fixing their state of war for next year, which if they do, it will be the greatest encouragement imaginable to the partisans of France. They have no ground to take any pretext of delay from thence ; since it is necessity, and not choice, which retards the sitting of our parliament.

“ As to the letter you sent me yesterday from the Hague, concerning peace, I can easily believe that and more. The inclinations of the dutch are so violent and plain, that I am of opinion nothing will be able to prevent their taking effect, but our being as plain with them upon the same subject, and threatening them to publish and expose to the whole world the terms for which they solicit, and the terms to which we are willing to consent, if they think fit to insist upon them, in conjunction with those allies, without whose assistance they could not have been able to support themselves. I hope their own people would think this reasonable ; I am very sure the generality of people in England would not be satisfied with less.

“ Lord Somers has shewn me a long letter which he has had from the pensionary, very intent upon settling the *barrier*. He says he sent you a copy of it. I have desired him also to send you a copy of his answer, and I hope he will do it by this post, since I think it may be of use to you, when you come to discourse with them upon this affair at the Hague. I am of opinion they will think it reasonable to specify the particular towns, which they propose to have for their barrier, and are pretty well cured of the folly of affecting the sovereignty to themselves, which, however, they had to a great degree swallowed, from the offers made to them by France, last winter, before you had conquered the country.

“ I am afraid we shall have another difficulty, though of the same nature, with the court of Vienna, about the duchy of Milan.



Italy will be all up in arms, if the emperor thinks to keep possession of it in his own right ; but that is not all. None of the allies will like it any better than the princes of Italy. For this reason, the queen being about to dispatch Mr. Crowe to the king of Spain, will cause him to be particularly instructed to desire that his catholic majesty would be pleased to appoint a governor there in his own right, and let him see that the emperor's pretensions, in that particular, will not be borne by the rest of the allies.

“ Directions will be sent for putting all the queen's forces in Spain and Portugal under the orders of my lord Galway.”

“ *Cambren, Oct. 18.* The inclosed french letter is what I received last post from the duke of Lorraine's minister at the Hague. He is a very honest man. I send it that you may see what he writes concerning the peace. He must not be known to have writ such a letter. You may observe that the french are trying in all courts but that of England, to have a negotiation for peace, by which they hope to slacken the preparations for the next campaign, whilst they are making their utmost efforts.”

“ *Cambren, Oct. 21.* I forgot to send by the last post the inclosed letter from the pensioner ; you will see by it the necessity there is of sending me such instructions as I may communicate to him and M. Buys, who penned the blank for the barrier ; so that you must be the more careful in the objections you make to the wording of that clause. By all I hear from the Hague, we must not expect one step to be made to the succession, but as the barrier goes with it. They are so flattered from France, that whatever is easy to themselves, they think both just and reasonable ; but when I come to the Hague I shall use my endeavours to let the honest men see that the project of France is to make them fall out with their best friends, which is the only method they have left for disturbing of the confederacy.”

While Marlborough was combating the inclination manifested by the dutch to accept the secret overtures of France, he was assailed by a diplomatic artifice of another kind. Louis the



fourteenth being foiled in the attempt to open a separate negotiation with Holland, disclaimed the view imputed to him of dividing the maritime powers by a private negotiation; and as a proof of his sincerity, offered to hold public conferences in any place between the two armies, during the continuance of the campaign, and afterwards in some town between Mons and Brussels. The proposal was made at the same time to the deputies of the States, and to the duke himself, in a letter from the elector of Bavaria. Although the quarter from which this double proposal emanated, and the vague terms of the overture itself sufficiently proved it to be delusive; yet, as it bore a plausible appearance, and was likely to find a grateful reception in Holland, he could not venture to give a specific opinion, much less to reject it. He therefore referred it to the decision of the cabinet in England.

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

“*Cambron, Oct. 24.* I send by this express copies of the elector’s letter to me and the deputies of the army. I am of opinion that this matter has been settled by some in Holland, so that the queen must be the more careful of the directions she shall think fit to give; for should you shew a backwardness to a good peace, they would make an ill use of it; and I believe one of the designs that France has in this proposal is, that it may make the dutch less zealous in their preparations for the next campaign, whilst they are doing their utmost. Another is, to let the world see that they have been managing a treaty these last 12 months. If it were possible to have their proposals without entering into a treaty, I should think that were best; for I am very sure they would not be liked by the confederates; and if they have not an opportunity given them to make a proposal, they will endeavour to induce every country to believe that they should have offered what would have been most agreeable to them.

“I beg I may not be employed in this first step: Mr. Stepney will be very proper. The deputies were very desirous of having my opinion, that they might have sent it to the Hague; but I desired to be excused, by telling them that my opinion in this



matter must be governed by her majesty's commands, and that I was sure the States would give no answer till they had consulted with her. I shall go to Brussels on Wednesday next, being the 27th, and begin my journey to the Hague on the 2nd of the next month. By the enclosed letter from the pensionary you will see what he desires of me. Whatever the queen would have me do at the Hague, I beg I may have her commands by the next post; for I shall be very uneasy till I come to England; for I have never been so uneasy as I am at this time, since her majesty's coming to the crown. I thought to have sent this last night, but was disappointed, so that you will have no other by this night's post. Being to march to-morrow, I have chose this day for seeing the army under their arms, which is a sort of taking leave, tho' I do not intend to quit them till the second of the next month, at which time I design to send them to their several garrisons."

"*Brussels, October 29.* I have been in such a hurry since I came to this town, that I have but just time to tell you I have had the favour of two of your's, and I beg you will make my excuse to lord Halifax, for my not having time by this post to acknowledge the favour of his, and thank him for the copy of his letter to the pensioner, which will be of use to me when I come to the Hague. This will be about the end of the next week, for I shall leave this place on Sunday, and separate the army on the third of the next month, and the same day begin my journey to the Hague, where my inclinations will lead me to make as little stay as possible, tho' the pensionary tells me I must stay to finish the treaty of succession and their barrier, which, should I stay the whole winter, I am very confident would not be brought to perfection. For they are of so many minds, and all so very extravagant concerning their barrier, that I despair of doing any good till they are more reasonable, which they will not be till they see that they have it not in their power to dispose of the Low Countries at their will and pleasure, in which the french flatter them. Mr. Stepney has his powers for Holland, but not for this country; but I hope he will meet them at the Hague, where I think it is for the queen's service he should be, till I come for England;



so that I may be the better able to inform him of all that shall pass."

A matter of such importance was taken into immediate consideration, and the decision of the queen was imparted to the duke by secretary Hedges, and inclosed in a letter from lord Godolphin, dated October 21st, O. S.

"I can never thank you enough for all your kind letters which I have received, particularly those by this messenger, who goes back to you with her majesty's opinion and orders upon the letters you sent by him, from the elector of Bavaria. I shall add nothing to the particulars which you will receive by Mr. Secretary Hedges, but that they have been considered by all our friends here, as the shortness of the time would allow, and upon the whole we think them so reasonable and so fair, as that you will do yourself but right in insisting upon them there. And I think you may depend upon being supported in it here. Besides what is mentioned in Mr. Secretary's letter, the conferences proposed, if they should be admitted, could not fail of giving an immediate ease and support to all France, which lies almost gasping at this time, under an excessive want both of money and credit. I shall long, therefore, very impatiently, for the return of this messenger, and to hear that this blow has been avoided.

"There needs not, I think, any other answer to the letters you have sent me from the pensioner, than what you will find in my lord Halifax's letters to him and to yourself, concerning our remarks upon the treaty for the barrier and the succession, which is, in one word, that it is too general; and when they please to particularise the plans they propose for their barrier, and the troops necessary to maintain them, we shall agree.

"As to the preliminary treaty for the guaranty of the future peace, which the pensioner mentions in his letter to you, I think that must, for the present, be only in general terms, except this treaty for the barrier and succession should be first concluded, in which case it might be particularly warranted in the preliminary treaty."



FROM SIR CHARLES HEDGES.

*Whitehall, October 21.--Nov. 1.* Having laid before the queen copies of the letters sent by your grace from the elector of Bavaria, to yourself and the deputies of the States, relating to a peace, her majesty has judged it for her service that your grace should, upon this occasion, explain very particularly to the States General her majesty's thoughts concerning that matter.

“The queen did find herself obliged last winter to express her sense of a peace in general, in a very public and solemn manner. Her majesty is now pleased farther to declare, that she entered at first into this war, in conjunction with her allies, and for their support, and has ever since continued it at an extraordinary expence to her subjects, with no other view or design, than to procure for herself and her allies an honourable and durable peace.

“Her majesty hopes it must be evident to all the world, that the great successes with which it has pleased God to bless the arms of the allies, have given them a fair and reasonable prospect of obtaining such a peace. In order, therefore, to adjust the particular terms of it, so as that the same good friendship and correspondence in which her majesty has lived with the States General, ever since her accession to the crown, and which she desires to cultivate and improve with the greatest care, may continue as firm and immovable after the peace as it has been during the war; her majesty is of opinion, that the first proper step would be, for herself and the States General to concert and agree, betwixt themselves, upon such a scheme of a peace as may be honourable and safe both for themselves and for the rest of the allies. And her majesty cannot but look upon this method as more honourable for the allies, and more effectual for the end desired, than the conferences proposed by the elector of Bavaria in the name of France, for the foundation of a treaty, without so much as knowing what particulars are to be considered in that treaty. Of which conferences, therefore, her majesty cannot see any other use than to distract the allies with jealousy, and to divert them from making in time their necessary preparations for



continuing the war. These are her majesty's thoughts and apprehensions of this matter; and in case they meet with the approbation of the States, as her majesty hopes they will, she thinks it proper to add, that she is willing to enter upon the adjustment of particulars betwixt herself and the States, in such manner, and at such time, as they shall think fit. In which case also, her majesty thinks it proper that your answer to the elector of Bavaria should be concerted with the States, and agree with the answer from their deputies, that so England and Holland may appear to France to be uniform and of one mind in the transaction of this great affair, by which means it cannot fail of having a happy conclusion."\*

The decisive opinion manifested by the british government, and the judicious reasons on which it was founded, weighed with the more patriotic members of the States, and silenced the clamours of the rest. To prevent the repetition of a similar artifice, a resolution was taken to form a series of preliminaries, which were not merely to be offered to France as the common claims of the confederates, but were to be understood as a mutual pledge among themselves, to support the terms on which the future peace was to be founded. This important document was drawn up by Marlborough, in conjunction with the members of the States; and being transmitted to England for consideration, was returned with the sanction of the queen, accompanied by some remarks of the treasurer.

FROM LORD GODOLPHIN.

"Oct. 22.--Nov. 2. The messenger arrived this morning, and brought me the favour of your's of the 12th and 14th, with the papers inclosed. I have also seen your letter to Mr. Secretary Hedges, with the paper of preliminaries, of which he sends you, by this post, the queen's approbation, provided we keep strictly to every one of them.

"I observe the form of these preliminary articles, which you have sent over, is a little different from what was proposed by the

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\* Draught in the Marlborough Papers.



queen. Her majesty's proposal was, that we should concert and agree to the preliminary articles of a peace to be offered to France, whereas the title of this paper runs thus : ' Preliminaries for a treaty of peace, in case France can be induced to make the offers in the name both of the king of France and the duke of Anjou.' I don't know that there is any thing essential in this observation ; but I had a mind to take notice of it to you, that you might judge whether this difference in the form were only casual, or whether it were affected.

" I find my letter of the 25th of October has been thrown into the sea. You have escaped a good deal of trouble by it, for it was very long, and full of complaints of the emperor's taking possession of the duchy of Milan in his own name, though obtained by our money ; but if these preliminaries take place, that complaint will be pretty well cured. Now if Holland will hold firm to them, I am of opinion, that first or last they will take place ; for, besides all the successes of France, they will have a ruin increasing every day upon them in the point of their money, which they are not sensible of themselves, nor cannot be able to have a right notion of it, from any thing that has happened of that kind within the memory of man in that kingdom. I agree with you that France will not at first receive these proposals ; but I incline to think they will not absolutely reject them, but endeavour to moderate some articles, and graft something upon others ; so as to keep on foot a negotiation upon them, and by that means hope to slacken the preparations of the allies, and gain time to hearten and encourage their friends in Holland.

" It may, therefore, deserve your consideration, whether there should not be a time prefixed and limited to them, within which they should be obliged to declare their final resolution of accepting or refusing them.

" I don't trouble you with one word about the barrier ; because, having communicated the whole to lord Somers and lord Sunderland, I send you a letter unsealed from my lord Halifax, with whose thoughts upon that subject I entirely concur ; and if they can agree to their own demands,



I don't see why any scruples on our part should take up two hours time.

"The powers are sent as you desired for Mr. Stepney, so I hope you will have nothing to hinder you from leaving the Hague soon after you have received these letters."

The intended answer to the elector of Bavaria was then taken into consideration, in an assembly of the States, which was held on the 10th of November, and a reply, conformable to the opinion of the british government, received a public sanction. An answer was accordingly transmitted to the elector by Marlborough, in the name of the queen, and by the deputies in behalf of the States. The letter written on this occasion by the british commander will display the motives which actuated the allies.

"Sir ;—Having communicated to the queen, my mistress, what your electoral highness did me the honour to write to me in your letter of the 21st of last month, of the intentions of the most christian king to endeavour to re-establish the tranquillity of Europe, by conferences to be held for that purpose, between deputies on both sides, her majesty has commanded me to answer your electoral highness, that as she has received with pleasure this notice of the king's inclination to agree to making a solid and lasting peace with all the allies, being the sole end that obliged her majesty to continue this war till now, so she will be very glad to conclude it, in concert with all her allies, on such conditions as may secure them from all apprehensions of being forced to take up arms again after a short interval, as has so lately happened. Her majesty is also willing I should declare, that she is ready to enter, jointly with all the high allies, into just and necessary measures for attaining such a peace, her majesty being resolved not to enter upon any negotiation without the participation of her said allies. But the way of conferences that is proposed, without more particular declarations on the part of his most christian majesty, does not seem to her to be proper for obtaining a truly solid and lasting peace. The States General are of the same opinion. Wherefore your electoral highness will rightly judge, that other more solid means must be thought of to



obtain so great an end, to which her majesty will contribute, with all the sincerity that can be wished, having nothing so much at heart as the relief of her subjects, and the tranquillity of Europe.”\*

To give publicity to these proceedings, and to obviate all jealousy on the part of the confederates, an extraordinary congress was held at the desire of the States, to which the foreign ministers were invited. The deputies for foreign affairs then detailed the different overtures, both private and public, which had been made by France, to open a negotiation for peace, communicating the proposals from the elector of Bavaria, and the answers of the maritime powers. They concluded by professing the determination of the republic to abide by their engagements with their allies, and to accept no overtures for peace without their concurrence and approbation. This declaration seemed to give great satisfaction to the foreign ministers, and was approved with apparent cordiality.

Marlborough was no less gratified with this resolution than with the spirit which it seemed to infuse; and in his final letter to lord Godolphin, from the Hague, he expresses his hope that the allies would continue to prosecute their success, till France was reduced to more reasonable terms.

“*Hague, Nov. 16.* This country, like others, is vexed with different opinions, of which the french must take advantage. I shall not now trouble you with particulars, but I hope all will agree that the war must be carried on till the french be more reasonable; for as yet nothing has been proposed but a partition treaty, which is not only dishonourable to the allies, but in length of time destruction, as I have fully declared to be her majesty’s opinion.”

During his continuance at the Hague, the british general employed his mediation in allaying the disputes which had arisen between the emperor and the States, relative to the bishopric of Munster, and the delicate negotiation for the barrier. An

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\* *Hague, Nov. 20.*—Printed in Ledyard, vol. 2, p. 123.



arrangement was, indeed, considerably facilitated by the condescension of the emperor, who ordered his minister, count Sinzendorff to conform himself to the directions of Marlborough; but the views of the respective parties were yet too much at variance to permit a perfect accommodation.

The question of the barrier also partook of the same difficulties as before; and, therefore, though with unfeigned reluctance, Marlborough referred it to a future negotiation.



## CHAPTER 51.

1706.

*Struggle for the appointment of Sunderland to the secretaryship of state, in the room of Sir Charles Hedges—Opposition of the queen—Correspondence on the subject between the queen, Godolphin, and Marlborough—Resolution of Godolphin to resign, in consequence of the hostile threats of the whigs—Deprecated by Marlborough—His remonstrances with the duchess against the suspicions of the whigs—Continuation of the correspondence—Firmness of the queen in her opposition to the transfer of the secretaryship.*

**D**URING the greater part of 1705, the whole nation had been kept in suspense by the struggle in the cabinet, and by the contention between the two parties relative to the office of lord keeper. The present year did not less teem with similar feuds, and Marlborough was exposed to superior disquietude, in consequence of the struggle which arose from the determination of the whigs to persist in their purpose of transferring the seals of the secretaryship of state, from Sir Charles Hedges to the earl of Sunderland.

On returning from the embassy to Vienna, which he had filled with great prudence and ability, Sunderland expected to be rewarded by an immediate admission into the ministry; and his hopes were encouraged by the other whig leaders, who had promoted his appointment to the embassy, as an introductory step to an office of trust and dignity at home.

We have already mentioned the opposition of Marlborough to the appointment of Sunderland, and his unwillingness to wound the feelings of the queen, by pressing his admission into the cabinet. This feeling he strongly manifested to the duchess, who displayed even more than usual zeal, for the advancement of her son in law.

“*Helchin, August 9.* \* \* \* \* You know that I have often



disputes with you concerning the queen ; and by what I have always observed, when she thinks herself in the right, she needs no advice to help her to be very firm and positive. But I doubt but a very little time will set this of lord Sunderland very right, for you may see by the letter that she has a good opinion of him. I have writ as my friends would have me, for I had much rather be governed than govern. But otherwise I have really so much esteem and kindness for him, and have so much knowledge of the place you would have for him, that I have my apprehensions he will be very uneasy in it ; and that, when it is too late, you will be of my opinion, that it would have been much happier if he had been employed in any other place of profit and honour. I have formerly said so much to you on this subject, and to so little purpose, that I ought not now to have troubled you with all this, knowing very well that you rely on other people's judgment in this matter. I do not doubt but they wish him very well ; but in this they have other considerations than his good, and I have none but that of a kind friend, that would neither have him, nor my daughter uneasy. Writing this by candle light, I am so blind that I cannot read it, so that if there be any thing in it that should not be seen, burn it, and think kindly of one who loves you with all his heart."

Notwithstanding the reluctance which he here manifests, he suffered himself to be overcome by the importunities of the treasurer, and wrote to the queen, urging the appointment with all the arguments which the circumstances of the case suggested. Supported by this recommendation, Godolphin renewed his instances with additional zeal, proposing to remunerate Sir Charles Hedges for the loss of his office, by a place of a more permanent and profitable nature. But the queen still continued inflexible, and dreading a personal altercation, expressed by letter the poignancy of her feelings, and her aversion to the meditated change.

" *August 30--Sept. 10.* I think one should always speak one's mind freely to one's friends on every occasion, but sometimes one is apt to hope things may not come to that extremity, as to make it necessary to trouble them, and therefore it is very natural to



defer doing so as long as one possibly can, The difficulties I labour under at this time are so great, and so uneasy to me, that they will not suffer me any longer to keep my thoughts to myself; and I chuse this way of explaining them to you, rather than endeavour to begin to speak, and not be able to go on. I have been considering the business we have so often spoke about, ever since I saw you, and cannot but continue of the same mind, that it is a great hardship to persuade any body to part with a place they are in possession of, in hopes of another that is not yet vacant. Besides, I must own freely to you, I am of the opinion, that making a party man secretary of state, when there are so many of their friends in employment of all kinds already, is throwing myself into the hands of a party, which is a thing I have been desirous to avoid. May be some may think I would be willing to be in the hands of the tories; but whatever people may say of me, I do assure you I am not inclined, nor never will be, to employ any of those violent persons, that have behaved themselves so ill towards me. All I desire is, my liberty in encouraging and employing all those that concur faithfully in my service, whether they are called whigs or tories, not to be tied to one, nor the other; for if I should be so unfortunate as to fall into the hands of either, I shall not imagine myself, though I have the name of queen, to be in reality but their slave, which as it will be my personal ruin, so it will be the destroying all government; for instead of putting an end to faction, it will lay a lasting foundation for it. You press the bringing lord Sunderland into business, that there may be one of that party in a place of trust, to help carry on the business this winter; and you think if this is not complied with, they will not be hearty in pursuing my service in the parliament. But is it not very hard that men of sense and honour, will not promote the good of their country, because every thing in the world is not done that they desire! when they may be assured lord Sunderland shall come into employment as soon as it is possible. Why, for God's sake, must I, who have no interest, no end, no thought, but for the good of my country, be made so miserable, as to be brought into the power of one set of men? and why may not I be



trusted, since I mean nothing but what is equally for the good of all my subjects? There is another apprehension I have of lord Sunderland being secretary, which I think is a natural one, which proceeds from what I have heard of his temper. I am afraid he and I should not agree long together, finding by experience my humour and those that are of a warmer, will often have misunderstandings between one another. I could say a great deal more on this subject, but fear I have been too tedious already. Therefore I shall conclude, begging you to consider how to bring me out of my difficulties, and never leave my service, for Jesus Christ's sake; for besides the reasons I give you in another letter, this is a blow I cannot bear." \*

Convinced from this declaration that farther arguments would be fruitless, Godolphin recurred to his resolution of withdrawing from a post, which he could no longer maintain with honour to himself, or advantage to his sovereign. He declared his purpose in a letter, which exhibits an interesting picture of his feelings.

"*Saturday Morning, at nine.* I come this moment from opening and reading the letter which your majesty gave yourself the trouble to write to me last night. It gives me all the grief and despair imaginable, to find that your majesty shews inclination to have me continue in your service, and yet will make it impossible for me to do so. I shall not therefore trouble your majesty with fruitless repetitions of reasons and arguments. I cannot struggle against the difficulties of your majesty's business, and yourself at the same time; but I can keep my word to your majesty.

"I have no house in the world to go to, but my house at Newmarket, which I must own is not at this time like to be a place of much retirement; but I have no other. I have worn out my health, and almost my life in the service of the crown. I have served your majesty faithfully to the best of my understanding, without any advantage to myself, except the honour of doing so, or without expecting any other favour than to end the small remainder of my days in liberty and quiet." †

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\* From a copy by the duchess.

† Draft in the hand of lord Godolphin.



Unwilling to lose a tried and zealous servant, the queen endeavoured to compromise the dispute, and save her own feelings, by offering to nominate Sunderland a privy counsellor, with a pension, and to confer on him an office superior in emolument to the secretaryship of state, but which would not entitle him to constant access to her person. This proposal being however regarded by the whigs as a mere expedient to exclude them from power, they persisted the more firmly in their purpose, and began to foster new suspicions of the sincerity of the treasurer. Accordingly Sunderland rejected the offer as injurious to his honour, and Somers and Halifax announced the resolution of their party to enter the lists of opposition, if their demand was not granted without farther delay. Their decision was communicated in a letter from Sunderland to the duchess.

“ *London, Sept. 17--28.* Lord Halifax and I reckoned to have set out to-morrow for Woodstock, and it is with a great deal of regret that we are obliged to put off our journey thither; but when you know the reason of it, I dare say you won't think us in the wrong.

“ When I writ to you last, I gave you some account of a conversation lord Halifax and the lord treasurer had together; but since that, lord Halifax has told lord Somers and me several particulars of that conversation, and among other things, of the great offers of any place, or any other advantage whatever that the lord treasurer was pleased to make to me, in lieu of the thing in question. I can't but think, and we are all of the same mind, that for me to hearken to any such offer, would be in effect to be both fool and knave. Lord Somers, lord Halifax, and I have talked very fully over all this matter, and we are come to our last resolution in it, that this and what other things have been promised must be done, or we and the lord treasurer must have nothing more to do together about business; and that we must let all our friends know just how the matter stands between us and the lord treasurer, whatever is the consequence of it. If the lord treasurer comes to town either to-night or to-morrow, both lord Somers and lord Halifax will let him know this resolution in



the plainest words, and in the fullest manner they can. If he does not come, lord Halifax will go to Windsor to him, and let him know it in lord Somers's name, as well as his own, so that a few days will determine whether it is to be a breach or not. But whether it is or not, you must be assured that every honest englishman will acknowledge, that whatever good has been done is entirely owing to you; and that whatever is not done is for want of your power to do it.

“There is another reason which makes lord Halifax not think it so proper for us to go to Woodstock whilst this matter is in suspense, and lord Somers is of the same mind; that is, that since it is plain that you are very ill with the queen, purely for acting and speaking honestly and sincerely your mind, nobody knows how far some people might make the queen believe, that we were gone only to influence and engage you to be more and more uneasy to her.

“I beg you would let us know whether we are right in this thought or no; for nothing can be a greater mortification than to be prevented of the pleasure of waiting upon you.”

The letter of Sunderland was instantly communicated to Marlborough, and the resolution of the whigs not only aggravated his embarrassments, but increased his dissatisfaction with the party. His feelings were still more deeply wounded, by the reproaches and taunts of the duchess, who inveighed against the tenderness which he manifested towards the queen, as well as against his lukewarmness towards the whigs. Hence his letters are filled with complaints of their unreasonable demands and unjust suspicions; and he solemnly declares his resolution to support the treasurer to the utmost, and to consider as his own enemies, those who should shew themselves the enemies of his colleague.

TO THE DUCHESS.

“What you write me concerning the queen and the lord treasurer gives me a great deal of trouble; for should the consequence be what you say, that there is no relying upon the tories, and that the whigs will be out of humour, it must end in confusion, which will have the consequence of the dutch making peace with France. I am afraid this is what will gratify many of the tory



party; but I can see no advantage that can come to the whigs by the ruin of the lord treasurer; so that I hope they are too wise a people to expose themselves and the liberties of Europe, because some things are not done with a good grace. I would not have you mistake me; for as far as it is in my power, for the sake of my country and the queen, for whom, had I a thousand lives, I would venture them all, I would have every thing that is reasonable done to satisfy the whigs, of which I think the lord treasurer is the best judge.\*

“If it were not for my duty to the queen, and friendship to lord treasurer, I should beg that somebody else might execute my office. Not that I take any thing ill, but that the weight is too great for me, and I find a decay in my memory. Whatever may be told to you of my looks, the greatest part of my hair is grey, but I think I am not quite so lean as I was.”

Marlborough, as we have just seen, sympathised in the embarrassments of Godolphin, and was not less alarmed than the queen, at the design which he had announced of retiring. Without delay he deprecated his resolution, as no less injurious to his friends and country, than to Europe in general.

From Vilaine, Sept. 9, he wrote: “In your’s of the 20th, you say it would be an ease to you to retire from business, the weight of which you cannot bear, if you are not allowed some assistance. I hope the queen will do every thing for your ease, but that of parting with you, in which, should you have a serious thought, you could not justify yourself to God or man; for without flattery, as England is divided, there is nobody that can execute your place but yourself.”

Also from Grametz, Sept. 16. “I have had the favour of your’s of the 30th, from St. Alban’s, and am very much concerned that those of the 27th are lost, since you tell me you had in that, given me an account of a conversation with Mrs. Morley. Lady Marlborough’s letter of the 28th, which mentions that conversation, has very much alarmed me; for, without flattery, I am

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\* This part of the letter is taken from a copy written by the duchess, the remainder from a copy in another hand.



positively of the opinion, that should you quit the service of the queen, you would not only disturb the affairs of England, but also the liberties of Europe; so that I conjure you not to have a thought of quitting till we have obtained a good peace; and then I hope the queen's interest may be so well settled, that she may allow of our living quietly. But as the affairs of Europe, and those of the queen in particular, are at this time, I think both you and I are in conscience and honour bound to undergo all the dangers and trouble that is possible, to bring this war to a happy end, which I think must be after the next campaign, if we can agree to carry it on with vigour.

“We have not as yet any particulars of what has passed at Turin, but we may be assured by the french silence that they are not pleased.

“I shall be very uneasy till I hear from you that every thing is easy between Mrs. Morley and yourself; for without that I shall have no heart to act in any thing, being sure that all things must go to destruction.”

After alluding to some embarrassment in his military operations, he adds, in another letter, dated Grametz, Oct. 12.

“This has given me some trouble, but nothing of what I now feel by a letter I have received this morning from the duchess, concerning the temper and resolutions of the whigs, by which I see all things like to go to confusion. Your's of the same date mentions nothing of it, which makes me fear you have taken your resolution, which if it be to retire, I must lay the consequence before you, which is, that certainly the dutch will make their peace, which will be of fatal consequence, especially considering the advantages we now have; for in all probability one year's war more would give ease to all Christendom for many years.”

Godolphin was as anxious to communicate, as Marlborough to learn his sentiments and situation. He could not however convey more satisfactory information than in the preceding letters; but with a disinterested zeal which does him honour, he laboured to soothe the dissatisfaction fostered by his friend against the whigs.



“ *Windsor, Sept. 10--21.* There being now four posts wanting from Holland, you will not expect one should trouble you very long from this place, from whence one can tell you nothing that is agreeable. The uneasiness betwixt the queen and myself continues as it was; nor do I see how it can ever be mended, unless you were here to do it, either by your credit with the queen, or by your authority and influence with lord Sunderland and lord Somers, and their friends. Not that I think them so much to blame, because they do really not see the difficulties as they are, and one cannot go about to shew them those difficulties, without too much exposing the queen. Now though I really think you might be able to ease all this, yet negotiation not being my talent, I doubt it may be past cure before you come, and there is no reason to hope for the least assistance from Mrs. Freeman in this matter. \* \* \* \* \*

“ The same blustering winds which keep your letters from us, continue to keep the fleet still in Torbay, which is no small mortification.”

In another letter, dated Windsor, Sept. 18--29, after alluding to the eagerness manifested in Holland for peace, and the difficulty of persuading the dutch to *carry on the war with vigour*, he adds, “ As for England, though the generality is entirely for doing it, yet the plain unwillingness in the queen to do any thing for those who have shewn themselves most forward and zealous in promoting all the present advantages, is a discouragement not to be overcome by me alone. And there is not one besides in any ministerial office of the government, that must not be spoken to ten times over before any thing can be executed, even after it is ordered, as I said before, with all the slowness and difficulty imaginable. When I have given you the trouble of telling you this, assure yourself that if you saw me, I would tell you it is very short of the disagreeableness I find upon the subject.”

To relieve the perplexity of his friend, Marlborough wrote another pressing letter to the queen, employing every argument which appeared likely to weigh with her preju-



dices, or to influence her decision. The letter itself is missing, but an extract is preserved in his correspondence with Godolphin.

“ *Oct. 7, 1706.* As I am persuaded that the safety of your government, and the quiet of your life depend very much upon the resolution you shall take at this time, I think myself bound in gratitude, duty, and conscience, to let you know my mind freely ; and that you may not suspect me of being partial, I take leave to assure you, in the presence of God, that I am not for your putting yourself into the hands of either party. But the behaviour of lord Rochester, and all the hot heads of that party, is so extravagant, that there is no doubt to be made of their exposing you and the liberties of England to the rage of France, rather than not be revenged as they call it. This being the case, there is a necessity, as well as justice in your following your inclinations in supporting lord treasurer, or all must go to confusion. As the humour is at present, he can't be supported but by the whigs, for the others seek his destruction, which in effect is your's. Now pray consider, if he can, by placing some few about you, gain such a confidence as shall make your business and himself safe, will not this be the sure way of making him so strong, that he may hinder your being forced into a party ? I beg you will believe I have no other motive to say what I do, but my zeal for your person, and friendship for a man whom I know to be honest, and zealously faithful to you.”\*

But it was to the duchess that he most fully expressed the poignancy of his feelings, and his chagrin at the unjust suspicions which she and the whigs entertained of his sincerity, at the very moment when he had advocated their cause with so much zeal and frankness. After stating his conviction that the queen could place no reliance on the tories, but must give her confidence to those who would carry on the war, and support the lord treasurer,

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\* In this extract, Marlborough has, for the sake of brevity, omitted the title of majesty, and the forms of ceremony, which he never failed to use in his correspondence with the queen herself.



he adds, "I will frankly own to you, that the jealousy some of your friends have that I and the lord treasurer do not act sincerely, makes me so weary, that were it not for my gratitude to the queen, and concern for him, I would now retire, and never serve more. For I have had the good luck to deserve better from all englishmen, than to be suspected of not being in the true interest of my country, which I am in, and ever will be, without being of a faction; and this principle shall govern me for the little remainder of my life. I must not think of being popular, but I shall have the satisfaction of going to my grave, with the opinion of having acted as became an honest man; and if I have your esteem and love, I shall think myself entirely happy.

"Having writ thus far, I have received your two letters of the 20th and 21st, which confirm me in my opinion before. And since the resolution is taken to vex and ruin the lord treasurer, because the queen has not complied with what was desired for lord Sunderland, I shall from henceforth despise all mankind, and think there is no such thing as virtue; for I know with what zeal the lord treasurer has pressed the queen in that matter. I do pity him, and shall love him as long as I live, and never will be a friend to any that can be his enemy.

"I have writ my mind very freely to the queen on this occasion, so that whatever misfortune may happen, I shall have a quiet mind, having done what I thought my duty. And as for the resolution of making me uneasy, I believe they will not have much pleasure in that, for as I have not set my heart on having justice done me, I shall not be disappointed, nor will I be ill used by any man."\*

"*Grametz, October 7.* I am to return you my thanks for five of your's, all from Woodstock. I could wish with all my heart every thing were more to your mind; for I find when you wrote most of them, you had very much the spleen, and in one I had my share, for I see I lie under the same misfortune I have ever done, of not behaving myself as I ought to the queen.

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\* This letter is printed in the *Conduct of the Duchess*, but was deemed too important a document to be omitted here.



“ I hope Mr. Hacksmore will be able to mend those faults you find in the house, but the great fault I find is, that I shall never live to see it finished ; for I had flattered myself, that if the war should happily have ended this next year, I might the next after have lived in it ; for I am resolved to be neither minister nor courtier, not doubting the queen will allow of it. But these are idle dreams, for whilst the war lasts, I must serve, and will do it with all my heart ; and if at last I am rewarded with your love and esteem, I shall end my days happily, and without it nothing can make me easy.

“ I am taking measures to leave the army about three weeks hence, so that I shall have the happiness of being above one month sooner with you, than I have been for these last three years.”

In a letter to Godolphin himself, he expresses in stronger terms the same friendship and attachment which he had repeatedly announced.

“ I have writ my mind with freedom to the queen, so that having done my duty, let what will happen, I shall be more easy in my mind. Allow me to give you this assurance, that as I know you to be a sincere, honest man, may God bless me as I shall be careful *that whatever man is your enemy shall never be my friend*. As soon as you receive this, I conjure you to let me have your thoughts freely, for till then I shall be very uneasy.”

In the mean time, reflection seemed to strengthen the determination of the queen, and she regarded the threat of the whigs as a proof of their design to monopolise all the offices of state, and reduce her to dependence. Instead, therefore, of exposing herself to new expostulations from Godolphin, she wrote a second letter, again pressing the expedient, which she had proposed for Sunderland, and recurring to every argument which her anxiety suggested, to dissuade the treasurer from his purpose of retiring.

“ Sept. 21, 1706. I have read your letter over and over, and considered it very well before I have answered it ; but I cannot but remain of the same mind I was, when I wrote last, concerning Sir Charles Hedges, thinking that he did once desire the place



you have now a mind to get for him, yet it is a hard thing for me to remove him, and I can never look upon it otherways. As to my other difficulties concerning lord Sunderland, I do fear, for the reasons I have told you, we shall never agree long together; and the making him secretary, I can't help thinking, is throwing myself into the hands of a party. They desire this thing to be done, because else they say they can't answer that all their friends will go along with them this winter. If this be complied with, you will then, in a little time, find they must be gratified in something else, or they will not go on heartily in my business. You say yourself, they will need my authority to assist them, which I take to be the bringing more of their friends into employment, and shall I not then be in their hands? if this is not being in the hands of a party, what is? I am as sensible as any body can be of the services lord Sunderland and all his friends have done me, and am very willing to shew I am so, by doing any thing they desire, that is reasonable. Let me therefore beg of you once more to consider of the expedient I proposed, of bringing lord Sunderland into the cabinet council, with a pension, till some vacancy happens. When I mentioned this before, I remember your objection against it was, that so young a man taken into the cabinet council, without having any post, might look more like an imposition upon me, than a desire of my own. May be some people may find this fault; but I confess I can but think if he was made secretary, others would say *that* were also an imposition upon me. One of these things would make me very easy, the other quite contrary; and why, for God's sake, may I not be gratified as well as other people? I cannot but think my lord Sunderland, who has so much zeal and concern for my interest, and believes I have nothing so much at my heart, as the good and happiness of my own subjects, and the quiet of all Europe, will act heartily upon this principle, whatever station he is in, and have patience till it is in my power to put him in some post. And if all his friends have this opinion of me that you say he has, they can't, sure, for their own and their country's sake, but concur in my service, especially when they see, as they will, by my taking lord



Sunderland into the cabinet council, that I am willing to employ them in any thing I can. By this he will be brought into business, and be able both to assist you and have it in his power to do good offices to his friends. If they are not satisfied with so reasonable a thing as this, it is very plain, in my poor opinion, nothing will satisfy them, but having one entirely in their power. This is a thing I have so much at my heart, and upon which the quiet of my life depends, that I must beg you, for Christ Jesus' sake, to endeavour to bring it about. I know very well that you do not serve for advantage or ambition, but with entire duty and affection, which makes me that I cannot bear the thoughts of parting with you; and I hope, after what the duke of Marlborough has said to you, you will not think of it again, for to use his words, 'you cannot answer it neither to God nor man, but are 'obliged both in conscience and honour not to do it.' Let his words plead for her, who will be lost and undone, if you pursue this cruel intention, and begs that you would neither think of it, nor mention it any more to one, that is so affectionately and sincerely your humble servant."\*

Godolphin received this appeal at the moment when he was preparing to depart for Woodstock, to consult with the duchess on the best mode of vanquishing the repugnance of the queen. His reply we shall give without a comment.

"*Woodstock, Sept. 25.* There was so little time before I came from Windsor, after I had the honour of your majesty's letter, that it was not possible for me to answer it, though I thought it was very necessary for your majesty's service, not to lose time in doing it. Your majesty seems to continue desirous I should stay in your service, and not retain a thought of quitting it. I never had such a thought, nor never can have, for my own sake or ease, if I saw a possibility of supporting your service, to which, as I have often said to your majesty, I must be a weight, and not a help, unless you would please to let me have the assistance of those who are able and willing to serve me.

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\* From a copy in the hand of the duchess.



“Your majesty is pleased in your letter to make use of some expressions in the duke of Marlborough’s letter to me, which I had the honour to read to you, that I could not answer it to God or man, that I was obliged both in honour and conscience, not to quit your service. But you are not pleased to take any notice of those other expressions, which he uses in the same letter, as that there is no doubt but the queen will do any thing you can desire to make your service easy, and the like. But I desire nothing to make my service easy ; I propose nothing but what is necessary for carrying on your majesty’s business, especially in this next winter, which is like to be the most critical of your whole reign, and when many things of very great consequence will come to bear all at once. I doubt whether all we can do will be able to keep off the peace this winter. The peace will necessarily bring on the consideration of what fleet, and what army must be continued for your majesty’s safety, and the safety of the government ; besides all this, when the kingdom has been exhausted by a long war, your majesty’s enemies, and mine particularly, which are not a few, will be grumbling at the greatness of your revenue. All these must be defended and supported. These are not slight things.

“These things make me much concerned to trouble your majesty with repeating so often, that the future quiet and happiness of your whole life depends upon what is done in this winter, and you have an opportunity of making your government strong, which you will never have again.

“Your majesty will have me think you are desirous of my advice, and of the continuance of my service, and yet you are not pleased to have any regard to it, in a time, and upon an occasion of the greatest consequence that can ever happen to you. By what your majesty says of some particulars in my letter, I find I have not expressed myself so as that your majesty seems to have rightly apprehended my meaning in them. I must therefore endeavour to explain myself better as soon as I can ; but since to go about it now would make this letter too tedious, I hope you will allow me to do it in words, when I have the honour to wait upon you.



The coldness and brevity of the queen's reply, will shew the slight impression which this remonstrance produced.

“*Kensington, Sept. 28.* Tho' I hope to see you on Wednesday, I cannot help writing a few words, to thank you for your letter, and I beg you would believe I am as sensible as any body can be, that the particular things you mention are of the greatest consequence imaginable, and that this is a very critical time; upon which subject I think there is a great deal could be said, but I shall defer telling you my poor opinion till we meet, and only now assure you, that I am, with all sincerity, your's.”\*

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\* Copy in the hand-writing of the duchess.



## CHAPTER 52.

1706.

*Interposition of the duchess of Marlborough in favour of Sunderland—Contention between her and the queen—Marlborough again intreats the queen to gratify the whigs—Suspensions entertained of the fidelity of Harley—Attempt of the whigs to supplant him—He is supported by Godolphin and Marlborough—Arrival of Marlborough in England—Obtains the appointment of Sunderland.*

THE projected change inflamed the political variance between the queen and the duchess, to which we have already referred. The duchess, who on no occasion was temperate, was warmed with additional zeal, when it was in agitation to raise to one of the highest offices of state, a nobleman who was not only an ardent whig, but her own son in law. It is now, therefore, that we perceive the splenetic effusions of both parties changed into the strongest expressions of resentment, contempt, and indignation, and observe the foundation laid of an enmity as violent and inveterate, as their friendship had been ardent and excessive. To detail their incessant disputes does not fall within the compass of this work, but we shall interweave a few extracts, which will serve to shew the character of their epistolary intercourse.

## THE DUCHESS TO THE QUEEN.

“ I conclude your majesty will believe my arguments upon this subject proceed chiefly from the partiality which I may have for my lord Sunderland, tho’ I solemnly protest that I never had any for any person, to the prejudice of what I believed your interest. And I had rather he had any other place, or none at all, if the party that most assist you would be satisfied without it; for, besides the very great trouble of that office, executed as it should be, he is not of a humour to get any thing by such an employment; and



I wish from my soul that any other man had been proposed to you, that you could not have suspected I had any concern for. But 'tis certain that your government can't be carried on with a part of the tories, and the whigs disobliged, who, when that happens, will join with any people to torment you, and those that are your true servants. I am sure it is my interest, as well as inclination, to have you succeed by any sort of men in what is just, and that will prevent what has been done from being thrown away. Your security and the nation's is my chief wish, and I beg of God Almighty, as sincerely as I shall do for his pardon at my last hour, that Mr. and Mrs. Morley may see their errors as to this notion before it is too late; but considering how little impression any thing makes that comes from your faithful Freeman, I have troubled you too much, and I beg your pardon for it."

The queen was naturally irritated as much by this opposition to her will, as by the intemperance of such language. Mistaking, or affecting to mistake, the word *notion* for *nation*, she treated the observation as a studied affront, refused to reply, and assailed lord Godolphin with complaints against such disrespectful behaviour. The duchess was in consequence induced to write an explanatory and expostulatory letter, although she could not desist from employing the same improper and indecorous style.

"*August 30.* Your majesty's great indifference and contempt in taking no notice of my last letter, did not so much surprise me, as to hear my lord treasurer say you had complained much of it, which makes me presume to give you this trouble to repeat what I can be very positive was the whole aim of the letter, and I believe very near the words. It was in the first place, to shew the reason why I had not waited upon your majesty, believing you were uneasy, and fearing you might think I had some private concern for lord Sunderland. I therefore thought it necessary to assure your majesty that I had none so great as for your service, and to see my lord treasurer so mortified at the necessity of quitting it, or being the ruin of that and himself together. Then I took the liberty to shew, as well as I could, that it was really no



hardship nor unkindness to Sir Charles Hedges ; and I think I might have added, tho' I believe I did not, that your majesty, to carry on your government, must have men that neither herd with your enemies, nor that are in themselves insignificant. At last, I concluded, if I am not more mistaken than ever I was in my life, with these following words, that I did pray to God Almighty, with as much earnestness as I should at my last day for the saving of my soul, that Mrs. and Mr. Morley might see their errors. This is the whole sense of the letter ; and having had the honour to know your majesty when you had other thoughts of me than you are pleased to have now, and when you did think fit to take advice and information, I could not reasonably imagine that you should be offended at my earnest endeavours to serve you, and pray that you nor the prince might not be deceived. But finding that no proofs nor demonstrations of my faithfulness to your interest, can make any thing agreeable to your majesty that comes from me, I will not enlarge upon this subject. I will only beg one piece of justice, and that I fancy you would not refuse to any body, if you believed it one, that you will shew my lord treasurer the letter of which your majesty has complained ; and I wish, from the bottom of my heart, that he, or any body that is faithful to you and the prince, could see every word that ever I writ to your majesty in my life."

Godolphin, who was charged with the unpleasant office of delivering this curious epistle, thus communicates the result of his audience :

" *Windsor, Sunday.* According to your commands, I gave your letter to Mrs. Morley. As she was going to put it in her pocket, I told her that you had made me promise to beg of her to read it before I went out of the room. She did so, and then said she believed she had mistaken some words at the latter end of the former letter, which she seemed to think had a different sense from that which I had given her from you ; but because you desired I might see it, she would look for it, and give it me, which she did, and desired me to return it to her to day. I come now from giving it back into her hands, and I think I have



convinced her that her complaint was grounded upon her having misapprehended the sense of your letter, by not reading it right, that is to say by reading the word *notion* for *nation*.

“To explain this the more clearly to you, I send you a copy of the conclusion of your first letter to her, taken as far back as I thought was enough to shew the plain sense and meaning of your letter. At the same time I must own that in your original letter, that word *notion* was not so distinctly written, but that one might naturally read it *nation*, if the sense of two or three lines together before did not fully explain your meaning.

“As to the main point, she has only told me that she had written a letter to me, as she said she would, to explain her difficulty, but she must write it out before she could give it me.”

The interposition of Godolphin, aided by more deliberate reflection, contributed to sooth the resentment of the queen; but, contrary to her usual custom, she suffered a week to elapse before she replied.

“*Friday morning.* Since my dear Mrs. Freeman could imagine my not taking notice of her letter that was writ before she went to St. Alban’s, proceeded from indifference or contempt, what will she think of my not answering her other in another week’s time? But I do assure you it was neither of the reasons you mention that hindered me from writing, *nor no other*, but the concern I have been in since the change of the secretary was proposed to me. I have obeyed your commands in shewing your letter to my lord treasurer, and find my complaint was not without some ground, a mistake any body might make upon the first reading; for you had made an *a* instead of an *o*, which quite altered the word. I am very sensible all you say proceeds from the concern you have for my service, and it is impossible to be more mortified than I am, to see my lord treasurer in such uneasiness; and his leaving my service is a thought I cannot bear, and I hope in God he will put all such out of his own mind. Now that you are come hither again, I hope you will not go to Woodstock without giving me one look, for whatever hard thoughts you may have of me, I am sure I do not deserve them, and I will



not be uneasy if you come to me ; for though you are never so unkind, I will ever preserve a most sincere and tender passion for my dear Mrs. Freeman."

Several other letters passed, which it would be needless to insert, as they all bear the same tone and character. The queen indeed became disgusted with this epistolary controversy, and gradually delayed her replies, till the correspondence on the unpleasant subject was discontinued.

The lord treasurer was now sensible that the interference of the duchess was become as fruitless as his own, and that their different appeals had served only to render the queen more pertinacious. He had, therefore, no other alternative than to renew his instances to Marlborough, with the conviction that nothing but his just and temperate arguments, supported by the merit of his great services, could produce the expected effect.

Before, however, his application could reach the camp, we find a letter from the duke to the duchess, written in a style which shews his perplexity and concern.

"*Cambren, Oct. 18.* \* \* \* \* I hope you will order it so, that after I have been some days at London, we may go to the lodge and be quiet, for I am quite weary of the world ; and since I am afraid there is a necessity of my serving in this country as long as this war lasts, let me have a little more quiet in England than I have been used to have, and then I shall be the better able to go through what I must endure in this country ; for upon the success we have had this year, our friends grow less governable than when they were afraid of the french. \* \* \* \*

"As I have no farther prospect of doing any more service to the public this campaign, but that of putting Courtray in a condition, every day is very tedious ; and for the two or three days I shall be at Brussels, I shall be tore to pieces, there being twenty pretenders to every place that must be given ; for I have not been able to prevail with the deputies to declare them before my arrival, which would have given me ease.

"Having writ thus far, I have had the happiness of your kind letters of the 23rd, 26th, and 29th of the last month, from Wood-



stock. The express you mention which the lord treasurer writ me word from St. Alban's he would send, yet I hear nothing of it, though I have received another letter of his from Newmarket. I have already more than once writ my mind very freely, so that my conscience is at ease, though my mind is very far from it; for I did flatter myself that my zeal and sincerity for the queen were so well known to her, that my representations would have had more weight than I find they have. But nothing can ever hinder me from being ready to lay down my life when she can think it for her service; for I serve with an entire affection, as well as the utmost duty; for you and I, and all our's, would be the most ungrateful people that ever lived, if we did not venture all for her good. By this, do not mistake me; for I am very sensible that if my lord treasurer be obliged to retire, I cannot serve in the ministry. But when these projectors have put all in confusion, I shall then readily not only venture my life, but all that I have, to shew my gratitude. When the express comes, by which I shall see all that has passed, I shall once more write, as becomes me, and will yet hope it may have its effect; if not, God's will be done."

On the arrival of the expected messenger, Marlborough did not hesitate to fulfil his promise, though hopeless of success. He again wrote to the queen a letter, at once firm and respectful, displaying in detail the mischiefs which she must expect to encounter, if she persisted in consulting rather her own personal prejudices, than the public interest. At the same time he inclosed a letter from the treasurer, which he supposed would give additional weight to his instances.

"*Cambren, Oct. 24.* I have had the honour of your majesty's of the 27th and 1st of this month. The last has mortified and troubled me very much, since by it, I see the little effect my letters have had with your majesty, so that I was resolved to have been silent, till I should have had the honour of being near your person. But finding by the lord treasurer's letters, as well as by others, that the measures you must take before the meeting of the parliament will have the consequence of making every



thing go easy, or ruining your business, I could not avoid troubling you on this subject. The lord treasurer assures me that any other measures but those he has proposed, must ruin your business, and oblige him to quit his staff, which would be a great trouble to him, and I am afraid will have the fatal consequence of putting you into the hands of a party, which God only knows how you would then be able to get out of it. It is true that your reign has been so manifestly blessed by God, that one might reasonably think you might govern without making use of the heads of either party, but as it might be easy to yourself. This might be practicable if both parties sought your favour, as in reason and duty they ought. But, madam, the truth is, that the heads of one party have declared against you and your government, as far as it is possible, without going into open rebellion. Now, should your majesty disoblige the others, how is it possible to obtain near five millions for carrying on the war with vigour, without which all is undone. Your majesty has had so much knowledge and experience yourself of the capacity and integrity of the lord treasurer, that you cannot but know you may safely rely upon his advice, and if there be any opinions different from his, your majesty will allow me to say, they neither know so much of these matters, nor can they judge so well of them.

“ I take the liberty of sending a copy of a letter the lord treasurer writ to me on the 13th of the last month. I shall repeat nothing in it, but earnestly desire you will once more read it. And as I would, in return for your many favours, die to make you and your government easy, makes me take the liberty, with all submission on my knees, to beg for your own sake, the good of your country, and all the liberties of Europe, that you would not lose one day in giving the lord treasurer that necessary assistance he thinks proper, for carrying on of your business in parliament, by which you will not only enable him to make your business go well, but also that of governing the only party that can be made use of. I am very confident the lord treasurer thinks he shall be able to govern them to your satisfaction, or he would not say so much as he does ; and as for myself, I beg your



majesty's justice in believing that I shall take all the care I can to make them sensible of the obligations they have to you, so that you may never have reason to repent the measures, I hope in God, you will now take. I can have no ease nor quiet till I have the honour of hearing from your majesty, being with the utmost duty and respect, &c.

"I do most humbly beg you will be pleased to keep the inclosed letter till I have the honour of waiting upon you."

The purport of this letter was of course communicated to Godolphin. Marlborough observes :

"October 25. You will see by the inclosed copy what I writ to the queen, and I hope you will not disapprove of my sending a copy of your's, to the queen, writ on the 13th of the last month. If the queen has complied with your desires, you will be the best judge of what may be proper to be done with my letter, either to deliver it or to burn it."

A subsequent letter indicates still more strongly his despair of success.

"Brussels, Oct. 29. If the letter I sent you by the express has no effect with the queen, I shall conclude that God intends that way to punish us for our faults; for I think what you write in your's of the 13th of September, is not to be answered; for in England no minister can, or ought to govern without help. God preserve her, and send you to serve her long."

These letters, as well as similar appeals at a future period, did not produce the expected effect. We find, from a letter of Godolphin to the duchess, not only that the queen continued indisposed towards her, but that she still manifested the same repugnance against the admission of Sunderland.

"Mrs. Morley sent for me this morning, and complained much of Mrs. Freeman's letter, and particularly of the last two or three lines, upon that part which related to 110. She appealed to me, upon which I said I could not but remember she had some difficulties, and I believed she liked this man better than she expected to do; and from thence I went on to tell her that I knew very well all Mrs. Freeman's complaints proceeded from having



lost Mrs. Morley's kindness unjustly, and her telling her truths which other people would not ; to which she said, as she has done forty times, how could she shew her any more kindness than she did, when she would never come near her. I said, she had tried that several times, and complained it was always the same thing. Upon that she said, Mrs. Freeman would grow warm sometimes, and then she herself could not help being warmer than she ought to be, but that she was always ready to be easy with Mrs. Freeman. I said I hoped then she would be so, for that I would die, with all my soul, to have them two as they used to be. Then she said she would send me a letter for you, and so she did last night, intending I should have sent it by the post, but I thought it was better to keep it for this messenger. But when all this is done, you may see by her letter to lord Marlborough, which he sent me, that she leans still towards expedients, though I have told her, that to satisfy her, I had tried how far that would go, and the thing was not capable of any expedient, and that I was convinced by what had been said to me by lord Somers and lord Halifax, that it was infinitely more for her advantage not to think of any such thing as an expedient. But she told me the other day, she believed I thought it strange that she said nothing upon my shewing her lord Marlborough's letter ; but it was, that though she was very uneasy to see what he writ, she could not, for her life, be convinced but her expedient was better ; and when he comes over she will certainly talk so to him ; but if he holds firm to what he has written and said, as I do not doubt he will, I dare say she will do the thing."

The concluding observation of Godolphin was verified ; for although the parliament was on the point of assembling, the queen still continued to protract her final decision.

The repugnance which the queen manifested to these changes, notwithstanding the instances of Marlborough and the treasurer, turned the suspicions of the whigs into a new course. Justly ascribing to Harley the opposition made to their views, they were anxious to involve him in the disgrace of Sir Charles Hedges, and thus to exclude still more the remnant of the opposite party from the ostensible offices of state. With this intention the



agency of the duchess was employed, to inspire the duke and Godolphin with similar jealousies of a minister who abused their confidence, and was exerting his favour with the queen to their detriment. Their representations, though founded on fact, did not make the desired impression on the two friends. Marlborough in particular was fascinated by the zealous professions and apparent candour of Harley, and treated the imputation as the usual fruit of party spirit. With Godolphin also the accusation seems to have had little weight, for we find him at this very moment appealing to Harley for information concerning the relative strength of the contending parties.

Harley indeed was not without hope of gaining the two ministers, and turning their influence against the whigs; and his replies prove his anxiety to revive the tory propensities of the treasurer. After adverting to the original principle adopted by Godolphin and Marlborough, of uniting the moderate and able of both parties, he endeavours to prove that no concession would gratify the whigs, till they had usurped the whole power of the state, hinted that their preponderance was more apparent than real, and contended that in a new parliament, if supported by the favour of the crown and the influence of the ministers, the tories would certainly regain the ascendancy. One of these letters has been already printed,\* the other is here given as a striking specimen of the adroit, supple, and insinuating character of the writer.

“*November 16.* My lord;—I received the honour of your lordship’s letter, and shall be very ready, whenever your lordship thinks it a proper time, to receive your commands about Vienna, or any thing else; for I do assure your lordship I have no thoughts but for the queen’s service and your lordship’s, neither would I ever mention any thing disagreeable to your lordship, if I was not persuaded that the public interest were concerned in it. I have no obligation to any party; I have no inclination to any one more than another; I have no animosity to any. But I think I should not do the duty of a public servant to

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\* See Somerville’s *Queen Anne*, p. 622.—From the Hardwicke Collection.



your lordship, if I did not tell you what your lordship may hear if you please, from people of undoubted credit, from whigs themselves, that all that has been done has not obliged the party; whether it has their pretended leaders, will be shewn hereafter. I have no concern; but only that what has been done, I wish the best of the whigs had been the better for it. As for the violence of the other side, I hope I have shewed myself as zealous against them as any one whatever. I think the distinction of the tackers was what they justly deserved. But, my lord, this is now carrying farther. Not only the 134\* are to be persecuted, but all the rest; not only those who upheld them, but those without whose assistance these gentlemen could not have been an equality, much less a majority. They have endeavoured their ruin; nay, they have proceeded so far as to proscribe (to use the words of a zealous whig and no whimsical†) many of their own party. In short, the lay and ecclesiastical policy is, by misrepresentation, to make those they do not like desperate; they are doing their best to turn the pyramid on its point. But I hope your lordship will rescue us from the violence of either party; and I cannot forbear saying, I know no difference between a mad whig and a mad tory, and as for the inveteracy of either party

“ *Iliacos intra muros peccatur et extra.*

“ There is no need of going back two years, nor scarce four months, to hear the most inveterate, malicious things said by their leaders against the queen, my lord duke, and your lordship, that tongue could utter, besides what the last parliament could produce from their undertakings; and this is so notorious, that it is very common to match one malicious story from a tory with another from a whig. I will trouble your lordship no more; but there is a disposition to do every thing that is reasonable, without any previous engagement; there is no need of faith, where works only are to be the proof.

“ It will be very hard ever to bring the nation to submit to any

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\* The number of those who voted for the tack.

† This epithet was applied to the violent of all parties.



other government but the queen's. In her they will all center, and another election will shew that the party, as a party, are very far from being a majority, though clothed with all manner of authority that can be given it.

"I must now beg your lordship's pardon for this tedious letter, which is dictated by a heart unfeignedly devoted to your service."

Not content with these insinuations to the treasurer, Harley wrote to the general, censuring the whigs, and making a more direct and explicit offer of the services, which the tories were prepared to render.

"Sept. 6. My lord;—The last of the scots lords are gone down this week; I hope they will be in earnest to carry the union thro'. It is so just and beneficial to both nations, that none can be against it, but those who do not understand it, or are ill intentioned to the common good. It is plain the duke of Hamilton has it more his interest than any one man in that nation, that the union should succeed, yet I believe he is gone out of Lancashire into Scotland, resolved to oppose it. I do not understand that country, and therefore cannot tell what will be the success; but I think, in my poor opinion, it is very easy to have the next session pass very well in all respects; yet it is plain some persons are endeavouring to make every thing difficult, by pursuing their old maxim, to make as many people as they can desperate. This being now obvious, I hope those who can hinder it will do it. I can only add, that I will obey your grace's commands without reserve."

"Whitehall, Nov. 12--23. My lord;—I was detained in the country till Saturday last, by excessive floods.

"I had the honour to receive your grace's letter, with one enclosed to my lord keeper on Sunday last, which I immediately sent to his lordship. This morning I am honoured with your grace's letter from the Hague, of the 20th. I heartily wish your grace a prosperous voyage, and a speedy arrival here, where I am sure you will find such a disposition to do every thing that is reasonable, as I never did remember formerly; and they ask nothing, but only not to be exposed, and that their service may



be accepted. I doubt not but your grace's true sense and superior genius will dispel all those clouds that hang about us, and shew the true path to a lasting well-founded settlement, clear of the narrow principles and practice of the heads of both factions.

"I doubt not but your grace has had all the requisite powers sent to you during my absence, and I am sure your grace will manage and improve every thing for the glory of the queen, and the common benefit of the nation."

A similar appeal, conceived almost in the same terms, had been previously made by St. John, in whom Marlborough reposed peculiar confidence.

"I do not hear of any besides my lord Guilford and Mr. Bertie, but what intend to act in the lieutenancy of Oxfordshire, and am confident your grace will make that county reasonable, and your own. The same methods that your grace takes there, would produce the same effects all over England. There are some restless spirits who are foolishly imagined to be heads of a party, who make much noise and have no real strength, that expect the queen, crowned with success abroad, and governing without blemish at home, should court them at the expence of her own authority, and support her administration by the same shifts that a vile and profligate one can only be kept up with. Nothing but unnecessary compliance can give these people strength; and their having that, is the great terror of those who are trusty servants to the queen, and who are entirely attached to your grace and to my lord treasurer. We have had some instances of late, how they would use power; and your grace cannot but know that in the distribution of employments, they have insisted on the scum of their own party.

"If this was only my private sense, I should not presume to trouble your grace with it; but it is the sense, and the discourse too, of every man in England, that wishes the queen's glory and prosperity, and that loves and honours my lord treasurer and your grace. I am too well acquainted with your grace's goodness to suspect you will not pardon me for saying so much, since I have no interest or view of my own that shall come in competition with the queen's



service, and my gratitude and duty to you, who have tied me to be, ever, my lord, your grace's most devoted, faithful, humble servant."

These letters will supersede the necessity of whole pages of comment, and perfectly display the temper and state of the administration. Harley, and the few moderate tories yet in power, were striving to undermine their political antagonists, and to draw the two ministers to their party. The whigs, on the contrary, were not satisfied, but jealous of Marlborough and Godolphin. Each successive point which they gained, was considered only as a prelude to another; and they were eager for an opportunity of forcing the ministers, whose confidence they were well aware they did not possess, to rely on their single efforts for support. Marlborough and Godolphin were equally averse to resign themselves to either party. They were inclined to the tories, though disapproving their violence; but compelled by necessity to identify themselves with the whigs, without whose assistance they could not carry on the government. The queen was disappointed that Marlborough had not rescued her from the bondage of the whigs, and beginning to withdraw from him and the treasurer that confidence and gratitude which she had hitherto entertained for their persons and services. Her alienation was increased by the acrimonious reproaches of the duchess, who, in her zeal for the advancement of the whig interest, over-stepped the bounds, not only of respect, but of prudence, and aggravated the embarrassment of her husband and the treasurer.

In the anxiety of Harley to profit by these feuds, and form an independent interest, he at length forgot his usual caution and awakened the suspicion of Godolphin, whose reliance on his attachment neither the suggestions of the whigs, nor the insinuations of the duchess, had hitherto been able to shake. He communicated his sentiments to his friend, though with a mixture of doubt and hesitation.

"Oct. 18--29. Lady Marlborough told me this morning, and promised to write to you, that Mr. Harley, Mr. St. John, and one or two more of your particular friends, were underhand endeavouring



to bring all the difficulties they could think of upon the public business in the next sessions, and spoke of it to me as taking it for granted, it was what I could not have heard of before. I am apt to think they may have made some steps toward this, which are not justifiable, out of an apprehension that others would have all the merit; but whatever be their motive, the thing is destructive and pernicious. I have had a long letter this very day, full of professions of being guided in these measures, as in all others, by you and me; but at the same time, I doubt so much smoke could not come without some fire."

From implicit confidence in the discernment of his friend, Marlborough seems at length to have become sensible of the petty intrigues and aspiring views of Harley; but still he regarded his cabals with indulgence, and was only anxious to render this discovery the means of repressing the encroachments of the whigs, and maintaining the balance between the two parties.

"*Hague, Nov. 9.* I have had the favour of your's of the 15th, 18th, and 21st, by the express. In one of them I find you have received a letter from Mr. Harley, full of expressions. I beg you will lay hold of the occasion, and when he is with you, that you would acquaint him with the business of Sir Charles Hedges and lord Sunderland, and give him your reasons for the change; for he must not be suffered to go on in the project that lady Marlborough acquainted you with; and by gaining him you will govern the others without taking any pains with them. I have not heard from lady Marlborough, but I believe the thing is true. However, if you take this method, I am very confident when I shall be with you, you will be able to make Mr. Secretary Harley very useful to yourself, and the queen's business; and by it you will enable me to make the others sensible of their error."

The secret cabals of Harley were not, however, to be restrained by the fear of displeasing his two patrons, for he still continued to oppose with success the transfer of the secretaryship. As late as October 18, Godolphin thus wrote to the duchess:

"*Friday night, at eleven.* I can't help making haste to thank you to-night, for the favour of your letters, both of Wednesday



and Thursday in one packet; tho' this has been a day of so much hurry of all kinds, that 'tis but just now I have been able to sit down to write to you. I have written a long letter to lord Marlborough, and enclosed your's in it, tho' it was as thick as it was long, which, with my handiness at making up a packet, gave mine a particularly graceful figure. The uneasiness which Mr. Montgomery complained of lately to you, is too long a story to be written, and must be kept till I have the happiness to see you, which I still hope is not far off. The lodge is a very pretty place, and lord Marlborough, I see in his letter, desires to find or carry you thither very soon. I return you his letter, with my opinion, that it should be sent to Mrs. Morley; for tho' it be no news to her, it may be of use to see he continues of the same mind, and will be so when he comes hither; for which reason, as well as others, I confess I am extremely impatient to have him here. I am glad you did not send him word of lord Sunderland's apprehensions, since there is not the least ground for them, and they would only have made him uneasy with him. I am sorry he and his friends continue so uneasy, since we have no other bottom to stand upon. Nothing shall be omitted by me to make them easier, tho' the queen is very far yet from being sensible of her circumstances in that particular.

“ Our letters to day from Scotland are full of hopes to carry the union. Lord Sunderland is much pleased with this news, and lord Somers much more, which shews me the other would be so too, if he had not uneasiness upon the other account. All Mr. Johnston's friends have behaved themselves well, so I am now as fond of him as you are of his letter.”

In this state of suspense, the presence of Marlborough produced an instantaneous effect. Departing from the Hague, he landed at Margate on the 16th of November, and reached London on the 18th. The recollection of his services, and the burst of popularity which his appearance awakened, gave weight to his personal representations. In his first private audience, the queen again recurred to the compromise which she had before proposed to Godolphin, but without effect. At length dreading,



lest farther hesitation should provoke the whigs, not only to turn their attacks against Harley, but to oppose the measures of government, she reluctantly acquiesced in the removal of Sir Charles Hedges, and the promotion of Sunderland. His appointment was announced only on the 3rd of December, the very day fixed for the meeting of parliament.

This important step being taken, less difficulty remained on inferior points. Several promotions were made in the peerage, in favour of the whigs, among which we particularly notice Mr. Cowper and Sir Thomas Pelham, who were created barons, and lord Wharton and lord Cholmondely, who were raised to earldoms. The same rank was also conferred on Godolphin himself.

Soon afterwards farther changes were made. Sir James Montagu, brother of lord Halifax, was appointed solicitor-general; and lord Stamford, with lord Herbert of Cherbury, and Mr. Pulteney, were constituted commissioners of trade, in the room of viscount Weymouth, Mr. Monkton, and Mr. Prior. In consenting to this arrangement, Marlborough proved that neither political expedience, nor party interest, outweighed his respect for merit. He not only continued to manifest the same friendship toward the disgraced poet, but procured him a pension, as some compensation for the loss of his post, and laboured to sooth his chagrin by marks of personal attention and regard. Indeed Prior, for a considerable period, looked up to his noble patron for advancement, and by his interest endeavoured to obtain first an increase of his pension, and afterwards the post of envoy at the Hague or Brussels.\* But on the decline of Marlborough's favour, and the restoration of his former friends to office, Prior was among the earliest who abandoned the fallen commander, and vied with Harley and St. John in repaying his past kindness with ingratitude.

The queen also removed from the privy council, the chiefs of

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\* Letters from Prior to the duke of Marlborough, in 1707 and 1708.—Marlborough Papers.



the tory party, among whom we particularly notice the duke of Buckingham, the earls of Nottingham, Rochester, and Jersey ; lord Gower, and Sir George Rooke. The administration now therefore assumed a new character, and may be considered as established on a whig basis, Harley being the only tory of any note, who was suffered to retain a place of distinction and responsibility.



## CHAPTER 53.

1706-7.

*Proceedings in parliament—Thanks to the duke of Marlborough from both houses—Removal of the colours, taken at the battle of Ramilies, to Westminster Hall—Extension of the ducal title to the female line, and collateral entail of Blenheim, together with the pension of £.5,000—Letter from the duchess to the queen—Public business—Settlement of the union with Scotland—Conduct of Marlborough in this transaction—Military preparations—Address for the appointment of prince Eugene to the command in Spain.*

**T**HIS triumph over the prejudices of the queen, and the combined efforts of the violent tories, as well as over the secret, but powerful opposition of Harley, stimulated the whigs to exert all their influence in favour of the government, and to continue, with unabating zeal, their support of the war and the political system of Marlborough. They also vied with Godolphin in bestowing due reward on his eminent services. As their party predominated in the house of lords, and was considerable in the commons, the session passed with unusual unanimity, and scarcely any opposition occurred, except on the union with Scotland, which was too much a national and party question to be carried without a vigorous struggle.

The session opened on the 3rd of December, and the speech from the throne was perfectly in unison with the sentiments of the two ministers and the whigs. "I hope," the queen observed, "we are met together at this time, with hearts truly thankful to Almighty God, for the glorious successes with which he has blessed our arms and those of our allies, and with steady and serious resolutions to prosecute the advantages we have gained, till we reap the desired fruits of them in an honourable and durable peace."



After a few remarks on the necessity of establishing a balance of power in Europe, she appealed to the commons to grant such effectual supplies as might enable her to profit by the advantages of this successful campaign. Adverting to the arrangements for the union with Scotland, she recommended dispatch in public affairs, that both friends and enemies might be convinced of their firmness and vigour.

In reply to the speech from the throne, the peers warmly congratulated the queen on the great successes of her arms during this "wonderful year;" particularly on the ever memorable victory gained at Ramilies, under the command of her wise and valiant general, the duke of Marlborough.

Then delicately alluding to the conduct of the emperor, they testified the satisfaction which the country in general derived from the public declaration of the queen and the States, that no negotiation for peace should be undertaken without the concurrence of all the members of the Grand Alliance. They expressed their hope that such an example would inspire them with a noble emulation; and if any had been wanting in time past, that her majesty would find means to apprise them that the only amends which they could make to public liberty was, by redoubling their efforts at so important a juncture. "This," they added, "will be the true way to obtain such a peace as all good men desire, which may secure to your majesty's subjects the protestant succession, and all the advantages of trade and commerce; may restore the whole monarchy of Spain to king Charles the third; may fix such a barrier for the States General (in whose security we must always think the interest of England is engaged), as may be to their just satisfaction, and may procure such terms and conditions for all the allies as may be just, safe, and honourable. Such a peace as may be durable and lasting, by reducing effectually the exorbitant power of a prince, whose restless ambition nothing could satisfy, and who has always despised the obligations of the most sacred leagues and treaties."

The address of the Commons was brief, but, if possible, still more honourable to the duke of Marlborough.



After acknowledging their gratitude for the queen's most gracious speech, they added, "And with all thankfulness to Almighty God, we congratulate your majesty upon the signal victory obtained by your arms and those of your allies, under the command of the duke of Marlborough, at Ramilies; a victory so glorious and great in its consequences, and attended with such continued successes, through the whole course of this year, that no age can equal."

Having testified their resolution of suffering no pretence to divert them from their steady resolution of enabling her majesty to improve, in all cases, the advantages of the campaign, they continued, "their experience of the great care and management shewn in the application of the public aids, encouraged them to assure her, that they would cheerfully give such speedy and effectual supplies as, by the continuance of God's blessing upon her arms, might establish the balance of power in Europe, by a safe, honourable, and lasting peace."

Both houses proved their sincerity, by hastening to redeem the pledge given in their respective addresses. Having examined the estimates, the commons, in less than a week, voted six millions for the ensuing year; and no discordance occurred, except a feeble, but fruitless attempt, to oppose the sanction of the extraordinaries advanced on the faith of parliament. These were declared to have been expended for the preservation of the duke of Savoy, the interest of king Charles the third in Spain, and the safety and honour of the nation.

Alluding to the dispatch which had marked the proceedings of both Houses, the speaker, in presenting the money bills to the queen, pertinently observed, "as the glorious victory, obtained by the duke of Marlborough, at Ramilies, was fought before the enemy was apprized that the confederates had taken the field, so your faithful commons have granted subsidies, before the enemy were apprized that the parliament had assembled."

During these proceedings the duke of Marlborough was greeted with those marks of national gratitude and honour which his services so well deserved. On taking his seat he was welcomed by



the lord keeper, in a speech expressing the thanks of the house, not in the formal style of parliamentary proceedings, but in the language of the heart:

“My lord duke of Marlborough;—I am commanded by this house to give your grace their acknowledgment and thanks for the eminent services you have done since the last session of parliament, to her majesty and your country, together with their confederates in this just and necessary war. Though some former successes against the power of France, while it remained unbroken, gave most reasonable expectation that you would not fail to improve them; yet what your grace has performed this last campaign, has far exceeded all hopes, even of such as were most affectionate and partial to their country’s interest and your glory. The advantages you have gained against the enemy, are of such a nature, so conspicuous in themselves, so undoubtedly owing to your courage and conduct, so sensibly and universally beneficial in their consequences to the whole confederacy, that to attempt to adorn them with the colouring of words, would be vain and inexcusable; and therefore I decline it, the rather because I should certainly offend that great modesty which alone can, and does add lustre to your actions, and which, in your grace’s example has successfully withstood as great trials as that virtue has met with in any instance whatsoever. And I beg leave to say, that if any thing could move your grace to reflect with much satisfaction on your own merit, it would be this, that so august an assembly does, with one voice, praise and thank you: an honour, which a judgment so sure as that of your grace’s, to think rightly of every thing, cannot but prefer to the ostentation of a public triumph.”

The reply of the duke was brief and modest.

“I esteem this a very particular honour, which your lordships are pleased to do me. Nobody in the world can be more sensible of it than I am, nor more desirous to deserve the countenance of your favour and good opinion.”

On the 4th a committee of the Commons also waited on the duke to convey the thanks and congratulations of the lower



house, for his eminent services, and late glorious victory. His reply was given in similar terms to that which he had delivered in the house of peers.

The gratulation of both houses was the prelude to another public recompense. This was a regulation to render permanent in his descendants, the title as well as the pension and territorial property annexed to the ducal honour.

Having lost his only son, and being without hopes of farther issue, the duke was naturally anxious that the rewards which had been granted for his meritorious services, should be extended to his daughters and their posterity. This extension was made in a manner no less gratifying than honourable. On the 17th of December, the house of lords presented an address to the queen, requesting her majesty to perpetuate the memory of the great actions of the duke of Marlborough, by continuing his titles and honours in his posterity, by act of parliament, and soliciting that the queen would please, in virtue of her prerogative, to indicate in what manner they should be so limited.

The queen, in reply, having expressed her resolution to extend the titles and honours of the duke to his daughters and their heirs male, in succession, so as to comprise all his posterity, recommended that the honour and manor of Woodstock, with the house of Blenheim, should always descend with the title. In the course of the deliberation, the duke of Marlborough addressed the house, in terms indicative of his gratitude and satisfaction.

“ My lords ;—I cannot find words sufficient to express the sense I have of the great and distinguishing honour, which the house has been pleased to do me, in their resolution and their application to her majesty. The thoughts of it will be a continual satisfaction to me, and the highest encouragement; and the thankful memory of it must last as long as any posterity of mine.

“ I beg leave to say a word to the house in relation to that part of her majesty’s most gracious answer, which concerns the estate of Woodstock and the house of Blenheim. I did make my humble request to the queen, that those might go along with the titles, and I make the like request to your lordships, that after the



duchess of Marlborough's death, *upon whom they are settled in jointure*, that estate and house may be limited to go always along with the honour."

This request was speedily gratified. The requisite bills being prepared and approved by the Peers, were transmitted to the Commons on the 19th. The ensuing day they were thrice read, for the sake of form, and being passed unanimously, received the royal sanction without delay. The settlement consisted of two acts: the first rendered the honours and dignities of John Duke of Marlborough permanent in his posterity, and annexed the manor of Woodstock, with the house of Blenheim to the ducal title, after the death of the duchess. The second was to entail in perpetuity the annual sum of £.5,000 from the post office, first upon the duchess, and afterwards on his eldest daughter, lady Harriet Godolphin, and her heirs male; and in failure of such issue, successively to the three other daughters and their heirs male: namely, Anne, countess of Sunderland; Elizabeth, countess of Bridgwater; and Mary, marchioness of Mounthermer.\*

The duke appears, in this instance, to have lost the anxiety which he had formerly manifested for the perpetuation of his name; for, instead of the clause, which he had inserted in the draught of his will, binding his representatives in succession to assume the name and arms of Churchill, this act contains no such stipulation. Another singularity is, the confirmation of the settlement made by jointure on the duchess, and the extension of the grant of £.5,000 annually to her during her life.

This provision was suggested by the affection of the duke, who, as he himself observed, had made it his particular request

\* Journals of both houses.—The two acts of parliament are printed in the Statutes at large, for 1706. Their titles are:

"An act for the settling of the honours and dignities of John Duke of Marlborough upon his posterity, and annexing the honour and manor of Woodstock, and house of Blenheim, to go along with the said honours."

"An act for settling upon John Duke of Marlborough, and his posterity, a pension of five thousand pounds per annum, for the more honourable support of their dignities, in like manner as his honours and dignities, and the honour and manor of Woodstock, and house of Blenheim, are already limited and settled."



to the queen, and urged his son in law to propose and support it in the house of lords.\* Among the papers of the duchess, we find her thanks to the queen, written in a cold and formal style, which shews, that either the irritation of their recent dispute was not calmed by this act of munificence, or that the duchess did not deem herself so much indebted to the friendship of the sovereign, as to the intercession of her husband.

“Whether I have or have not the honour to see your majesty, I find there must always be something which obliges me to return you my humble thanks. The concern I have in the settlement made to lord Marlborough’s family, by the act of parliament, makes a necessity of my giving you the trouble of them upon this occasion; and though it is not natural to me to make you so many fine speeches and compliments as some others can do, yet nobody has a heart fuller of the sincerest wishes for your constant happiness and prosperity than your poor forsaken Freeman.”†

During the discussion relative to these grants, the duke experienced from the city of London, the same testimonial of national gratitude as after the battle of Blenheim.

At the request of the city, the standards and colours taken at the battle of Ramilies, were transferred with military pomp from Whitehall, where they had been first deposited, to Guildhall. The procession commenced with a body of horse grenadiers and guards, in the center of whom were twenty-six gentlemen, each bearing a standard. It was closed by the foot guards, who escorted a party of one hundred and twenty-six pikemen, bearing the same number of colours taken from the infantry. As the cavalcade traversed the Park and Mews of St. James’s, the queen

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\* Letter from the duchess to Mr. Hutchinson in 1712.

[Indorsed by the Duchess.]

† “This letter to the queen shews that I did not omit taking any reasonable occasion to please her, even when I saw she was changed to me, for it is certain that she never took any care of me in the settlement; and if I am ever the better for it, it is not owing to her friendship. But whatever the world said of my behaviour to her, I never failed in performing all manner of decencies and faithful services to her, while it was possible for me to do it.”



appeared at one of the windows of the palace, at once to witness the procession, and give it additional honour. Passing through the Strand and the principal avenues, leading to the place of destination, the cavalcade was hailed by innumerable crowds, who beset the streets, and filled the windows and balconies, rending the air with their shouts and acclamations.

At the moment when the triumphal cavalcade had awakened the popular enthusiasm, the duke himself traversed the streets in one of the royal coaches, accompanied by the lord treasurer and the chief officers of the royal household, and attended by a splendid train of coaches filled with the foreign ministers and nobility, and with the principal officers, who had shared the honours which he acquired in the field of Ramilies. At Temple Bar he was received by the city marshal, with the same formalities as are shewn towards the sovereign. With difficulty pursuing his way through the crowded streets, where every eye was eager to behold his person, and every tongue to hail his presence, he was conducted to Vintner's Hall, and partook of a splendid entertainment, given by the lord mayor and magistracy of the city.

The renewal of this public spectacle increased the popularity of the victorious general, and not only silenced the malice of his enemies, but gave additional zeal and energy to the administration of which he was the principal support.

Amidst these scenes of exultation and festivity, the important business of the state was not suffered to languish. The failure of all attempts to secure the protestant succession, by the guaranty of the confederate powers, rendered the ministers doubly anxious to promote that object at home by the union with Scotland. As this was a domestic measure, and principally confided to Godolphin, it belongs rather to the province of the national historian, than to that of the biographer. It is, therefore, sufficient to observe, that Marlborough, though engaged in military and diplomatic transactions, yet took a warm interest in an arrangement which he considered as involving, not merely the actual, but the future prosperity of England, and the permanent tranquillity of Europe. For this purpose he exerted his influence with the



duke of Argyle, lord Mar, and the scottish nobility and gentry, and uniformly pressed Godolphin to employ no one in the administration of that country, who was even suspected of disaffection, but in all cases to regard the paramount interests of England.

A single extract from his correspondence, written at the time when the measure was yet in agitation, strikingly exhibits the warmth of his sentiments, on a subject of such national moment.

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

“ *Helchin, August 9th.* What you say of both parties is so true, that I do, with all my soul, pity you. Care must be taken against the malice of the angry party; and notwithstanding their malicious affectation of crying the church may be ruined by the union, the union must be supported; and I hope the reasonable men of the other party will not oppose the enlarging of the bottom, so that it may be able to support itself. \* \* \* \*

“ I had last night the honour of your's of the 13th, and am very glad to find that the commission has so unanimously agreed. I do, with all my heart, wish the parliament of both nations may do the same, so that her majesty may have the glory of finishing this great work, for which she will not only deserve to be blessed in this, but also in future ages.”

Before the departure of Marlborough, the measure had been matured by Godolphin and the whigs; and the commissioners, who had been already appointed in behalf of the two nations, had proceeded with such address and promptitude, that the difficulties arising from the leaven of jacobitism in Scotland, as well as from the independent character of a high spirited nation, were gradually overcome. The conditions were prepared for the deliberation of the english legislature early in the spring.

It may easily be imagined that an arrangement of this nature called forth all the hostility of the violent tories, who found warm auxiliaries in the jacobites. The arguments of Nottingham, Rochester, and their adherents, were, however, successfully combated by the treasurer and the whig lords, in the house of peers, and in the commons by the ablest of the same party, as well as by the plausible eloquence of Harley and St. John, and the legal



acuteness of Sir Simon Harcourt, who framed the bill of ratification. The combined efforts of the whigs and moderate tories vanquished all opposition, and it was carried through both houses with a vigour and dispatch, which has seldom distinguished any public measure of equal moment. Finally, on the 6th of March it received the sanction of the queen, who addressed the legislature in a speech strongly expressive of her satisfaction, declaring it a peculiar happiness that in her reign so full provision was made for the peace and quiet of her people, and for the security of the national religion, by so firm an establishment of the protestant succession throughout Great Britain.

No national measure more deeply involved the welfare of the whole island; nor were the interests and even prejudices of two nations, once in the highest degree hostile, ever more happily combined.

The act of security was repealed, and the same order of succession, in the protestant line of Hanover, established in both kingdoms. The two legislatures were blended and consolidated, and the share assigned to Scotland in the national representation was so liberal as to make ample amends for the loss of her own independent parliament. Similar address was evinced in arranging the delicate point of a religious establishment; and the permanence of the two distinctions of protestantism, which existed in both countries, was secured by collateral provisions, rendering each system of worship independent and predominant in the respective kingdoms.

On points of trade, the subjects of both countries were admitted to the same privileges; the burthen of taxation was regulated according to the means and revenues of each; and in matters of justice and police, care was equally taken that the prejudices of the scots might not be shocked by the introduction of new laws and regulations, even though superior to their own.\*

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\* Numerous volumes have been written on the Union, which it would be endless to specify. We may, however, refer the curious reader for the secret history of that transaction to the work of De Foe, the Stuart Papers, printed by Macpherson, for the year 1707, and the Lockhart Papers, recently published, which contain many curious particulars of this great event. But the most satisfactory, as well as candid and impartial account, appears in Somerville's History of Queen Anne.



The greatest blow was thus given to the hopes of the Stuart family, which had been struck since the revolution; and it may be recorded as an answer to the numberless accusations and surmises against the principles of Marlborough and Godolphin, that such a measure was accomplished by them, in opposition to the efforts of a powerful combination of tories and jacobites, both in England and Scotland, and under a queen who not only detested the Hanover line, but who was beginning to turn with renewed affection towards the surviving members of her unfortunate family.

Marlborough remained in England as long as the foreign affairs would permit, and assisted at several of the discussions, which arose on the subject of the union. He had the satisfaction to observe the legislative provisions completed before his departure, and quitted England in full confidence that the same harmony which had proved of such advantage in the important transactions of this session, would continue to subsist between the whigs and moderate tories.

Scarcely, however, had he reached the continent, before he received the unwelcome intelligence of a misunderstanding between Harley and the whigs. Fears being justly entertained that advantage would be taken of the interval before the establishment of the union, on the first of May, to evade the duties on import, which were then to be common to both countries, a law was proposed in the lower house to prevent the expected abuse. On the third reading of the bill, Harley introduced a clause, tending to render the provisions more complete by a retro-active effect. This regulation greatly offended the scots in general, who regarded it as an infraction of the union, and was no less obnoxious to the whigs, either from national or personal motives. By the interest of the whole tory party it was, however, carried through the house of commons, but thrown out by the whigs in the lords. Harley still persisted in his design, and to give time for digesting a new regulation, the queen was induced to adopt a suggestion which was made for a temporary recess. Accordingly she repaired to the House on the 8th of April, and announced a pro-



rogation till the 14th. On the resumption of business, the measure was again brought forward, and a new law passed the commons; but as it created great disputes and difference of opinion, it was quietly withdrawn.

Marlborough received notice of this transaction from Harley, St. John, Godolphin, and Sunderland. The two former merely announced the fact, without a comment. Godolphin, though briefly, assigned it to the true cause. "The close," he observes, "of the best sessions of parliament that England ever saw, has been unhappily hindered by a broil between the two houses, which is not yet ended. It would be tedious to trouble you with all the particulars, but it is chiefly imputable, as most other ill accidents, to private animosities." But Sunderland bitterly inveighed against the duplicity of the secretary, in a tone which shews the incurable jealousy reigning between the two parties. "I believe," he says, "you will be surprised at this short prorogation. It is entirely occasioned by him who is the author of all the tricks\* played here. I need not name him, having done it in my last letter to you. I will only say, no man in the service of a government ever did act such a part. I wish those for whom he has acted it, were ever capable of thinking him in the wrong, for I fear it may be, some time or other, too late.

"I don't write so full of professions to you as some do, but I am sure my heart is more sincere."

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\* Meaning Harley, who is often called in the whig pamphlets and ballads, "*the Trickster*."



## CHAPTER 54.

1707.

*Character and victories of Charles the twelfth—His irruption into Saxony—Agitation and suspense of the european powers—Attempts of Louis the fourteenth to obtain his mediation—His complaints against the king of Denmark and the emperor—Attention of Marlborough to the designs and character of the swedish monarch—Communications on the subject, from general Grumbkow and the elector of Hanover—Importuned to visit the swedish camp—Departs for the continent—Obtains the acquiescence of the dutch—Completes the military arrangements for the campaign.*

**T**HE great advantages which the allies had gained in the preceding campaign, were suddenly exposed to imminent danger, by the appearance of a new and extraordinary actor on the theatre of affairs.

Charles the twelfth, king of Sweden, at an age when the mind scarcely begins to display its faculties, or the body its vigour, suddenly rose into distinction, as a hero and a statesman. Attacked at once by the three northern sovereigns, his latent energies were roused into action. The youthful warrior not only repelled the invaders, but turned the tide of war on his enemies, with an energy and success which had not been shewn since the days of Alexander the great, whose enterprising character he both studied and emulated. Gathering strength from exertion, and extending his views in proportion to his success, he first reduced the king of Denmark to sign a dishonourable peace; and then bursting into the russian territories, on the shores of the Baltic, he defeated the czar, Peter, in a series of victories, which assume the character of romance. Turning next into Poland, he dethroned king Augustus, and gave the crown to Stanislaus Letzinski, a nobleman whom accident first offered to his notice.



He next directed his course into Germany, and leading his invincible army into Saxony, the electoral territory of the de-throned monarch, forced him to resign the crown to Stanislaus, to renounce his alliance with Russia, and to grant quarters and accommodations to the army which had effected his humiliation, allowing him only the name and honours of a king. As if meditating new enterprises, he took up his quarters at Alt Ranstadt, and imperiously required the european powers to acknowledge Stanislaus, and to guaranty the treaty of peace concluded with Augustus.

The apparition of this military meteor, and the presence of a numerous and victorious army, attracted the attention of all the states who were engaged in the mighty struggle for the spanish monarchy. It was evident that the accession of so considerable a force would give the preponderance to the party whose cause its chief should espouse. The king of France, in his distress, was anxious to gain the aid of so powerful a coadjutor, and spared neither money nor intrigues to tempt the king of Sweden, either to become the arbiter of peace, or to direct his hostilities against the allies. The antient connection of France and Sweden was recalled to his remembrance; the glory of Gustavus Adolphus was held forth to dazzle his imagination; and attempts were not spared to work on that hereditary jealousy which he entertained of the house of Austria. The allies also felt similar hopes and fears; and the greatest solicitude was evinced by all parties to penetrate the mysterious designs, and conciliate the vain-glorious character of the swedish monarch.

While Charles continued in this commanding attitude, and while he wrought on the hopes or fears of all parties, he brought forward various complaints for real or fancied injuries, from different powers, as well as a series of demands for the reparation of several infractions in the constitution of the germanic empire, of which he considered himself the guarantee, as heir to the crown and fame of Gustavus Adolphus.

The first related to the conduct of Denmark in a contested election for the see of Lubeck. This see being among the



ecclesiastical territories secularised at the reformation, a stipulation was introduced in the peace of Westphalia, that the six next bishops should be chosen from the house of Holstein Gottorp. The disposition was ratified by the treaties of Gluckstadt and Travendahl, and sanctioned by a recess of the diet, as well as by an imperial rescript issued in 1701. It was, however, secretly opposed by the king of Denmark, and a double election took place for the coadjutorship or reversion of the see ; Christian Augustus, prince of Holstein, being chosen by one part of the chapter, and prince Charles of Denmark\* by the other. By the recent death of the bishop, this contest was aggravated into an open rupture. The king of Sweden warmly espoused the cause of his relation, the prince of Holstein, whose pretensions he maintained with his usual arrogance and pertinacity. Appeals were made to the emperor, and to all the powers who were considered as interested in the arrangement ; and the elector of Hanover in particular, not only testified great indignation against the danish court, but even manifested a resolution to join the king of Sweden in enforcing a regulation, which had been guarantied by a solemn treaty, and embodied in the germanic constitution.

This grievance was, however, lost in the more vehement complaints which the swedish monarch advanced against Joseph, both as chief of the empire, and head of the house of Austria.

The first of these complaints was against the infraction of the religious privileges secured to the protestants of Germany, by the introduction of an article into the treaty of Ryswic, which declared the catholic the dominant religion in all places where it had been once re-established after the peace of Westphalia.

The second was for the suppression of the numerous protestant churches in Silesia.

To these, other causes of complaint were added, before Marlborough could accomplish his journey to the swedish camp.

The first was the connivance of the emperor in permitting the

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\* Augustus was administrator to his nephew Charles Frederic, duke of Holstein, then a minor. It has been erroneously supposed that this dispute related to the duchy only.



evasion of 1,500 muscovites, who had sought refuge in the austrian territories, after one of the recent battles with the tzar.

The second regarded an affront offered to the swedish ambassador by count Zobor, an hungarian nobleman, who, at a public entertainment, impudently used an expression derogatory to the king of Sweden. Although the insult was resented on the spot by a blow, and afterwards punished by imprisonment, Charles was not satisfied, but insisted on the delivery of the offender, that he might himself inflict the chastisement due to his injured honour.

The third was the murder of two swedish officers, who had fallen in some popular brawl, while recruiting at Breslau.

The effects arising from these contentions threatened the most serious consequences. The troops of all the sovereigns and states, who were near the scene of danger, were diverted from a co-operation with the allied powers ; and the attention of the emperor in particular, seemed more engrossed by the peril which he apprehended from Sweden, than by the advantages which he hoped to acquire by a vigorous prosecution of the war against France. The complaints on the subject of religion appeared even likely to produce a schism in the empire. Charles not only laboured for the formation of a protestant league, but infused similar sentiments into the king of Prussia ; he also endeavoured to gain the concurrence of the elector of Hanover, whose example was likely to operate on the minor princes and states. The emperor and the catholics, on the other hand, caught the alarm, and active steps were taken for the formation of a counter-alliance, to preserve the catholic faith and interest.

These jarring pretensions and mutual jealousies gave scope to the intrigues of the french monarch. He fomented the dissatisfaction of both parties, made overtures to both, and was ready to join with either, as soon as the combination, had attained sufficient consistency to forward his views. Finding difficulties in opening a negotiation with the emperor, he redoubled his assiduities towards the king of Sweden. He sent to the swedish camp the *Sieur de Ricoux*, a distinguished officer, whom he furnished with a series of instructions, suggesting such arguments



as were likely to weigh with Charles the twelfth. He even solicited his mediation, which he declared the allies would not venture to reject. To give effect to these representations, the agent was authorised to gratify count Piper, the prime minister of Charles, with a sum of 300,000 livres, if he could persuade the king, his master, to hasten a peace by his intervention; and bribes in proportion were offered to the two subordinate ministers, Hermelin and Ciederholm, who were deemed favourable to the french interest.\*

The attention of Marlborough was deeply occupied by the alarming predicament in which the allies were placed. He so vigilantly watched the intrigues of the french court, that from some of his numerous channels of communication, he obtained a copy of the instructions furnished to the sieur de Ricoux. He anxiously endeavoured also to gain an insight into the character and views of the swedish monarch. Among other means employed for this purpose, he recurred to the agency of general Grumbkow, who had been dispatched by the king of Prussia on a mission to the swedish head quarters. The letters written by this adroit and intelligent observer, exhibit a curious picture of the habits of a warrior, who has been no less the wonder of posterity than of his own age.

GENERAL GRUMBKOW TO THE DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH.

*“Berlin, Jan. 11, 1707. My lord duke;—I returned yesterday from Leipsig, and I deem it my duty to give your highness an account of my journey. Last Sunday week I departed from hence, and arrived the Monday at Leipsig. On the next day I waited upon the king at his dinner. I was much surprised at the manner in which the table was served; and I do assure your highness that the fare with which M. de Hompesch regaled you, was divine in comparison with this. On the following day I saw king Augustus at dinner with the king of Sweden: the latter appeared pleased and contented, the other disconcerted and*

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\* Instructions pour le sieur Ricoux, &c. A copy of these instructions is preserved in the curious collection of the Cardonnel Papers.



pensive. The repast continued, according to custom, only a quarter of an hour, during which an unbroken silence was preserved, which I attributed to the consideration that there was only time to swallow some morsels in haste. On Saturday I visited count Piper, and after an hour's conference we sat down to dinner; and as his fare was much worse than that of his royal master, your highness may judge of my wretched situation. Count Piper is rude and boisterous, and has all the manners of a pedant, without his learning. He resembles, in his person and manners, Mr. \* \* \*, excepting that he has not a martial voice. I conversed with him on all subjects, and particularly dwelt on the confidence which your highness reposes in the word of the king his master. He said, that english lord is a brave and intelligent man; the english and the allies are extremely fortunate that he is their general: the king, my master, esteems him infinitely. He then said, that his master was not prodigal of promises, but kept his word most religiously; adding, that those who were not inclined to believe him, need only let him follow his own way.

“ Having insensibly turned the discourse on the great designs of the king, his master, he said, we made war in Poland only to subsist; our design in Saxony is to terminate the war; but for the muscovite, he shall pay *les pots cassés*,\* and we will treat the tzar in a manner which posterity will hardly believe. I secretly wished that he was already in the heart of Muscovy.

“ After dinner he conveyed me in his carriage to the headquarters, and presented me to the king. His majesty was standing in a small apartment, dressed in the swedish fashion. I made my bow, and having received proper instructions, accosted him boldly, that I esteemed myself very fortunate in paying my respects to a sovereign, who was so renowned in Europe for his distinguished actions, valour, and equity. He asked me whence I came, and where I had served. I replied, and mentioned my good fortune in serving three campaigns under your

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\* The english proverb is “ pay the piper.”



highness. He questioned me much, and particularly about your highness and the english troops ; and you will readily believe that I delineated my hero in the most lively and natural colours. Among other particulars, he asked me if your highness yourself led the troops to the charge. I replied, that as all the troops were animated with the same ardour for fighting, your highness was not under the necessity of leading the charge ; but that you were every where, and always in the hottest of the action, and gave your orders with that coolness which excites general admiration. I then related to him that you had been thrown from your horse ; the death of your aid-de-camp, Brinfield, and many other things. He took such pleasure in this recital, that he made me repeat the same thing twice. I also said that your highness always spoke of his majesty with the highest esteem and admiration, and ardently desired to pay your respects. He observed, "that is not likely, but I should be delighted to see a general of whom I have heard so much."

"The conversation continued more than an hour, to the great annoyance of count Piper, who came in three or four times, but the king always turned his back to him. It was at length interrupted by a singular accident. The king leaning upon a small table, it broke, and his majesty fell down upon the floor. The noise of the fall, and the crash of the table brought in count Piper and Hermelin ; and as they entered at the moment while I held the king in my arms, and was assisting him to rise, their frightened countenances induced me to think that in the first moment of surprise they imagined the prussian was in the act of assaulting his serene majesty. The king laughed heartily at the accident, and after a conversation of some minutes, dismissed me with a gracious smile."

"*Berlin, Jan. 31, 1707.* \* \* \* After taking leave of the king of Sweden, I paid a visit to field marshal count de Reinschold. He was sickly, but the weakness of his body made no impression on his mind. He conversed with a precision and vivacity very uncommon ; he seemed to me well informed of public affairs, and



not inclined to France. The king, his master, he observed, instead of dissuading king Augustus, would rather exhort him to furnish troops to the empire; and if ever he concluded a peace with the muscovite, he himself would supply his contingent. He dwelt on the extraordinary manner in which his master made war, saying that he placed great reliance on his cavalry, and was extremely fond of his dragoons, whom he occasionally employed like infantry, adding, that next march, the king would have on foot 2,000 dragoons and 8,000 horse. He farther observed, that the principle of the king's motions was always to undertake what was most difficult, because the enemy were less on their guard, and took less precautions. He related several movements, which appear incredible; such as marching eighty leagues without unsaddling the horses, and feeding them on the thatch of the houses. In a word, I remarked as well from this discourse, as from that of count Piper, that they intend vigorously to attack the muscovites, and expect to dethrone the czar, compelling him to discharge all his foreign officers and troops, and to pay several millions as an indemnification. Should he refuse such conditions, the king is resolved to exterminate the muscovites, and make their country a desert. God grant that he may persist in this diversion, rather than amuse himself with demanding the restitution, as some people assert, of the protestant churches in Silesia. \* \* \* \*

“As to the character of the swedes in general, they are modest, but do not scruple to declare themselves invincible, when the king is at their head. \* \* \* \*

“I have received the honour of your highness's letter of the 28th of December, and read it to the king, my master. His majesty orders me to assure your highness, that he is fully convinced of your good inclinations, but he refers to your own judgment, if he can prudently send away his troops at a time when he cannot penetrate the designs of the king of Sweden, nor foresee the effects which may result from the abdication of king Augustus. He requested your highness's opinion; and convinced as he is of your sincere affection, will listen with pleasure to your



advice, well aware that his interests are indissolubly blended with those of the queen.

“ P. S. Mr. Pratt is arrived from the court of Sweden, and his majesty is satisfied he has nothing to fear from that quarter.” \*

For the same purpose Marlborough maintained an intimate correspondence with the elector of Hanover, from whom he received repeated declarations that the king of Sweden was by no means inclined to favour the cause of France. The other allies were, however, too much alarmed, to be satisfied with indirect assurances, even from so high and respectable a quarter; particularly as reports were hourly circulated, that Charles was on the point of concluding a subsidiary treaty with Louis the Fourteenth; and not only meditated the restoration of the elector of Bavaria, but was preparing to kindle a civil war in the empire, and consolidate the revolution in Hungary. Marlborough, therefore, was importuned by his friends in England and Holland, and above all by the court of Vienna, to visit the swedish monarch, and penetrate his designs.

In this dilemma he recurred to the advice of the elector of Hanover, expressing his readiness to undertake the journey at his recommendation, and requesting information on the best means of gaining the swedish ministers. The elector, in answer, not only intimated his acquiescence, but hinted that an annual pension of £.2,000 should be granted to Piper, and £.1,000 to Hermelin, and the first year paid in advance. If he could not himself undertake the journey, he recommended that this negotiation should be intrusted to the british envoy, Mr. Robinson, the confidential friend of count Piper.†

Considering, however, the shortness of time, and the necessity of maturing the military preparations, Marlborough left London in a state of hesitation.

While he was detained at Margate by contrary winds, we find

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\* Translated from the french originals.

† Letter from the elector to the duke of Marlborough, March 18, 1707, Macpherson, v. 2, p. 90.



several letters proving the perplexity in which he was involved by this critical situation of affairs, and the general reliance placed on his interposition.

As the object of more immediate interest was to induce Charles to suspend his offer of mediation, Marlborough opened a correspondence on that subject through Mr. Robinson.

His first idea was, to conduct the negotiation by the agency of some confidential person, and draughts of letters to the king of Sweden and his ministers were transmitted to the cabinet. The method was approved with some trifling alteration; but the more he reflected on the delicate and arduous task, the more he felt the necessity of a direct and efficient application. He deemed it imprudent to consign to writing instructions of so delicate a nature, as it was necessary to employ. He discovered also that he had not merely to soothe the high spirit of the king of Sweden, but to satisfy the emperor, who considered his dignity as humbled; and the dutch, who apprehended that any engagement with Sweden, or any acknowledgment of Stanislaus, as king of Poland, might eventually implicate them in a new contest. His resolution was finally decided by a declaration of the king of Sweden, that he would treat with no other person except the duke of Marlborough.\* This proposal being warmly approved by the cabinet, he announced his intention, through Mr. Robinson, under the condition of the strictest secrecy; and on his arrival at the Hague, prepared for his journey.

In Holland he first communicated his design privately to the pensionary, and afterwards to the deputies from the provinces of Holland and Friezland, assembled at the Hague, leaving the communication to the other provinces to be made after his return. He gave an account of this delicate transaction to the treasurer, in a confidential letter, dated Hague, April 9--20.

“After four tedious days I got to Helvoetsluys, and with difficulty made these people easy as to my journey to Saxony; but as to the acknowledging of Stanislaus, and the guaranty of the peace,

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\* Ledyard, vol.



they dare not give me any powers, without the consent of the States, and for that the form of the States does require their sending to the provinces, which would require too much time. But the truth is, they are unwilling to come into the acknowledging and guaranty for fear of disobliging the czar.

“ Since my being here I have received letters from Vienna, by which I see they persist in the expedition for Naples, and at the same time they complain of the king of Sweden. I find that the behaviour of the french has given occasion to these people to wish heartily for good success in this campaign.

“ In two conversations I have had with M. de Buys, he has been very plain in telling me that he should think it a very good peace, if we could persuade the duke of Anjou to be contented with Naples and Sicily. I am afraid there are a great many more in Holland of his mind; but as we are very sure, I think, of making this campaign, there may be many alterations before winter.

“ The ambassador of Muscovy has been with me, and made many expressions of the great esteem his master has for her majesty; that he would do every thing to merit her friendship, and as a mark of it, he had resolved to send his only son into England; but he desired nobody but the queen might know it, since he must pass *incognito* through several countries. He is also very desirous of the honour, as he calls it, of the queen's appointing him a house. As it can be of no precedent to any country but their own, and as the expence is so very inconsiderable, I hope her majesty will do it; for it is certain you will not be able to gratify him in any part of his negotiation.

“ I have undertaken this journey to Saxony to comply with the great desire of our friends; but I own to you that the pensioner and Slingeland have shewn me several intercepted letters, which have been deciphered, that shew very plainly that almost all about the king receive french money except count Piper.

“ The agreement for 3,390 foot and 1,125 horse, is almost concluded with the saxon ministers. Mr. Secretary will have a



particular account of it from Mr. Stepney. The 70,000 crowns that are to be given, to put them in a condition to march, must be speedily paid, for the troops can't march till one month after the payment. I have this afternoon received a letter from the king of Spain of the 6th of March, concerning some employments in the Low Countries. He also tells me that he is resolved to go to Barcelona, for some short time, till his presence may be necessary in the army. I have not time to have his letter copied, but by my next you shall have it. I have left orders that the first letters that come from England, should be sent after me, there being now six posts due."



## CHAPTER 55.

1707.

*Journey of Marlborough to the swedish camp at Alt Ranstadt—Visits in his way the elector of Hanover—His interview with count Piper—Audiences of the king of Sweden—Extracts from his correspondence—Interview with Augustus, elector of Saxony—Succeeds in the objects of his mission—Conclusion of his proceedings at Alt Ranstadt—Visits the court of Prussia in his return—Arrival at the Hague—Effects of his success—Congratulations of Godolphin and Harley—Disappointment of the french court—Curious account of his first audience, transmitted by the french envoy, Besenval, to Louis the fourteenth.*

**S**ATISFIED with the partial acquiescence of the dutch, Marlborough hastened his military arrangements, and taking his departure from the Hague on the 20th of April, traversed Osna-burg in his way to Hanover. He reached that capital on Sunday, the 23rd, and spent the remainder of the day in visits of respect to the electoral family, and secret conversations with the elector. At four, the ensuing morning, he resumed his journey, and passed through Halberstadt to Hall, where he was met by count Sinzendorf, Cranenburg, the dutch minister, and the british envoy, Mr. Robinson. After a short, but interesting conference, he proceeded in the evening to the swedish camp, at Alt Ranstadt, accompanied by Mr. Robinson and Cranenburg.

His grace immediately drove to the head quarters of count Piper, with whom he held a conversation of an hour, and from whom he received assurances that the king was highly gratified with his arrival. In this interview he gained the confidence of the minister, acquired considerable insight into the character and views of the monarch, and arranged the mode in which he was to treat on the subjects of his mission. The time of his audience was fixed at ten the ensuing day, after the king had attended



divine service. He then repaired to the quarters assigned him, which were about half a league distant from those of the king.

Early on the 28th count Piper conveyed the duke in his carriage to the royal head-quarters; and he was immediately introduced into the cabinet, by the swedish minister, accompanied by Mr. Robinson, who acted as interpreter. He found the king surrounded by his senators and generals, and was received with becoming marks of regard and attention. Presenting letters of credence from the queen and the prince of Denmark, he made a short compliment in English, which was interpreted by Mr. Robinson.

"I present to your majesty," he observed, "a letter, not from the chancery, but from the heart of the queen, my mistress, and written with her own hand. Had not her sex prevented it, she would have crossed the sea to see a prince admired by the whole universe. I am in this particular more happy than the queen, and I wish I could serve some campaigns under so great a general as your majesty, that I might learn what I yet want to know in the art of war."\*

This flattering address from so illustrious a commander pleased the monarch, whose foible was a passion for military glory. His satisfaction was visible in his countenance, and he returned, through count Piper, an answer unusually gracious.

"The queen of Great Britain's letter and your person are both very acceptable to me, and I shall always have the utmost regard for the interposition of her britannic majesty, and the interests of the Grand Alliance. It is, likewise, much against my will if I have

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\* The authenticity of this speech has been questioned, merely on the ground that it was too adulatory to have been spoken by the duke of Marlborough. But, with the french biographer, I see nothing in it too extravagant to be addressed by a skilful negotiator to so vain-glorious a monarch as Charles the twelfth. I have, therefore, adopted it as genuine, because it is given in the periodical publications of the time, preserved by Lamberti, and above all, repeated by Ledyard, who was then in Saxony, and asserts, that he heard the substance from several officers in the suite of the duke.

Since this note was written, I have discovered an account of this discourse which was transmitted by Besenval, the french envoy at Leipsig, to Louis the fourteenth, and which strikingly corroborates the preceding statement.



been obliged to give the least umbrage to any of the parties engaged in it. But your excellency cannot fail to be convinced, that I had just cause to come into this country with my troops. On the other hand, you may assure the queen, my sister, that my design is to depart from hence, as soon as I have obtained the satisfaction I demand, but not sooner. However, I shall do nothing that can tend to the prejudice of the common cause, in general, or the protestant religion in particular, of which I shall always glory to be a zealous protector."

At the conclusion of this reply, the duke continued the conversation in the french tongue, which the king understood, but did not speak, either from prejudice or timidity. The discourse turned on military and political subjects, and lasted till mid-day, the usual hour of dinner, when the king graciously invited the duke to partake of his repast. At table he was placed on the right hand of the monarch, and count Piper on the left, and the sitting was prolonged more than half an hour beyond the usual time, in honour of so illustrious a guest. On rising from table, Charles again retired with Marlborough into his closet, accompanied by Piper, Hermelin, and Robinson. The conversation was continued with great animation, the king listening to his illustrious visitor with the utmost attention and interest.

In the course of this address the duke entered into a full exposition of the state of affairs, and a discussion equally full on the demands of the king. He justified the principle on which the queen had entered into the war, and enlarged on the dangers to be apprehended, from the usurpations and preponderance of France.

His arguments and manly eloquence wrought so powerfully on the king, that he even went farther than Marlborough had anticipated. He censured the domineering spirit of the french monarch, and dwelt on the mischiefs resulting from the extent of his empire. He even argued that France, although humbled, was not yet brought to listen to reasonable terms, and added, there could be no safety to Europe till she was reduced to the same condition as she was left by the peace of Westphalia. On the subject



of Dunkirk, to which Marlborough adverted, he evinced the same sentiments. The duke observing, that although Dunkirk once belonged to England, yet the queen was not desirous to retain it at a future peace, but thought it necessary that the fortifications should be demolished ; the king perfectly concurred in the remark, adding, that it had proved equally injurious to his own trading subjects, whom he recommended to the indulgence of the queen.

On the delicate point of religion Marlborough evinced consummate address. The king having expressed his anxiety for the protestant interest in general, and particularly his wish to revive the privileges guarantied to the german protestants, by the peace of Westphalia ; Marlborough represented the queen as equally interested in the protestant cause, but deprecated any interference in the religious system of Germany, as tending to create jealousy among the Catholics, and frustrate the object of the Grand Alliance, which was, to preserve the balance of power, and prevent the destruction of religious liberty. He suggested that the proper time and means for furthering such views would occur in the treaty for a general peace, for which the queen was ready in due time to accept his mediation, and would join with Sweden in all measures conducive to their mutual benefit.

After some farther discussion, the king not only acknowledged the weight of his arguments, but even proposed a secret connection with England, for the promotion of the protestant interest. This embarrassing proposal was, however, parried with equal dexterity. Marlborough delicately hinted that it would appear inconsistent with the character of a mediator, which the king of Sweden was desirous to sustain. At the same time he offered to communicate to the queen any proposal which the king might think proper to make.

This discussion embraced the personal demands of the king, respecting his dispute with Denmark on the bishopric of Lubec, in which he appeared to take great interest. It also comprised his complaints against the emperor, on which he dwelt with peculiar emphasis. The affair of



Lubec was referred to a discussion with count Piper and Goertz, minister of Christian Augustus, the candidate supported by Charles. The most difficult point was the dispute with the emperor; but the conciliating eloquence of Marlborough in some degree soothed the irritation of the king, and afforded hopes that an accommodation might be ultimately effected through the mediation of England.

In the course of this discussion the king expressed the greatest esteem for the queen, and declared that he would accept no proposal of mediation, till informed by Marlborough that it was agreeable to her britannic majesty. The conversation continued until the kettle drums announced the hour of prayer, when Charles took leave, and retired to his customary devotions.

Marlborough spent the evening in visits of ceremony to the ministers and generals, and did not fail to pay his respects to the two ladies of count Piper and marshal Renschold, who held assemblies in honour of their illustrious visitor.

The greatest difficulty, which he perhaps experienced during this delicate negotiation, was the conduct to be observed towards the dethroned monarch. On his entry into Saxony, Augustus had sent a nobleman to compliment him, and the ensuing day a messenger appeared with an invitation for an interview at Leipsig. It required all the matured prudence of so able a negotiator to shew proper attention to the sovereign from whom the allies had derived such essential advantage, and yet to avoid exciting the jealousy of the captious prince, by whom he had been expelled from his throne. Marlborough, however, not only managed this interview without giving umbrage to Charles, but employed, with the happiest effect, his influence over Augustus. We give the account of this conference in his own words,

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

“*May 6.* I must now acquaint you that I had an audience of king Augustus at Leipsig, the day before I came away; at which, besides many repeated assurances of his respect for the queen, and of his strict adherence to the interest of the allies, he com-



plained to me of the great hardships and extortions he had suffered from the swedes, and insinuated his desire that the guarantees, at the same time as they accepted the guaranty of his treaty, would take care that he might have some satisfaction for seven millions of crowns, he pretends they have exacted, beyond what the treaty allows. To which I gave him my opinion, that it was no ways advisable for him to offer at any thing at this juncture, that might give the least handle to the king of Sweden to delay his march out of Saxony. You will have heard when the treaty was concluded here, by Mr. Stepney, for the saxon troops, upon the notice I had of it, and the pressing instances the king made me ; I was prevailed with to give Sir G. Wacherbart, who is to command there, a bill on Mr. Sweet for 40,000 crowns, payable at fifteen days sight, to enable them to hasten their march, which he promised should be done before the time appointed by the treaty ; so that I must pray your care in ordering timely remittances for this service. The rest of the king's troops I find are a greater burden to him than he is able to bear, his country being very much exhausted ; so that, at his desire, I have pressed the court of Vienna to take three or four thousand horse into their pay, which they assure me are in a good condition."

Returning from Leipsig, the duke dined at the quarters of count Piper, and the afternoon was spent in a conference with that minister and count Goertz, on the affair of Lubec. On this delicate point Marlborough testified the inclination of the queen to gratify the wishes of the king ; and it was finally referred to a discussion at Hamburg, which was to take place under the mediation of Mr. Robinson, in whose integrity Charles expressed perfect confidence. After this satisfactory arrangement, the duke concluded the evening by supping with field marshal Renschold, where he was met by the courtiers and officers of high rank.

On the 29th he received a final visit from Piper and Ciederholm, the result of which is best related in his own words.

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

" On Friday the 29th past, which was the day I left Alt



Ranstadt, the count came to me, accompanied by M. Ciederholm, the secretary de cabinet, to recapitulate, in the king's name, the essential of all that had passed before, Mr. Robinson being with me at the same time.

“ He began by acquainting me with the great esteem his master had for the queen, and how sensible he was of the obligations he owed her majesty, for the assurances I had brought him of her majesty's friendship, which he would endeavour, by all possible means, to improve, by making such returns as might be most acceptable to her. He was very particular in the king's acknowledgments for the communication he had received by me, of the reasons which induced her majesty to come into the present war : which, as he allowed to be very just, so he wished the like glorious successes might attend her majesty's arms as hitherto, in order to the restoring a due balance of power in Europe, and securing and supporting the protestant religion, wherein he said his master was entirely of the queen's opinion. He added farther, that the king agreed the treaty of Westphalia ought to be the foundation of a future treaty of peace, as to the affairs of Germany ; and that what has been done in derogation thereof by subsequent treaties, especially in point of religion, ought to be redressed and reduced to that standard ; his master being likewise of opinion we ought to go one step farther, by explaining the right of reforming, which by the treaty of Westphalia is reserved to each german prince in his own territory, by virtue whereof, any protestant prince that turns to the romish religion, has a kind of right to oblige his protestant subjects to change their's. This he would have explained in such manner and with such limitations, as the safety of the protestant religion may require.

“ This point of religion was what the king seemed most warmly bent upon ; and it was not without difficulty that I convinced him and count Piper of the necessity of deferring every thing of this nature till we come to treat of a general peace, for fear of weakening the alliance, by creating unreasonable jealousies among such of the allies as are of the romish religion. Hereupon



I took occasion to acquaint count Piper, that as the king and his ministers had a better insight than we could be supposed to have in the affairs of Germany, if his master would, on occasion freely open himself to the queen, her majesty, on her part, would be ready at all times to concur with him, in every thing that might be judged for the mutual interest and benefit of each other; that I should gladly charge myself with laying before the queen whatever his master might think fit to communicate to her majesty; and that with all the secrecy and faithfulness the matter should require. To this, count Piper assured me I might depend upon the queen's being informed of whatever offers should be made to the king, with reference to the peace, that their majesties might take just measures together, against we came to a general treaty.

“Here you will allow the caution he gave me of keeping this under the greatest secrecy; since it may otherwise seem in the eyes of all others concerned, a little too partial in a mediator, as well as inconsistent with his neutrality.”

After this interview, Marlborough dined with count Goertz, in the same illustrious company as before; and in the afternoon was admitted to his audience of leave. On this occasion, Charles evinced, if possible, still higher respect and esteem for his illustrious guest, than on the former; and in particular, testified his satisfaction with the arrangement which had been made on the preceding day, relating to the affairs of Lubec. Their parting was marked by those sentiments which their characters mutually inspired.

At this audience an event occurred, which called forth no less management and dexterity, than the interview with Augustus. When Marlborough was quitting the closet, news arrived that king Stanislaus was in the anti-chamber. A meeting with a sovereign who was not only not acknowledged by England, but the successful rival of Augustus, was an affair of peculiar delicacy. To withhold from him the respect due to his rank, might have produced an unfavourable impression on the mind of the swedish monarch; to acknowledge him might be construed into an instance of disrespect towards Augustus. Charles, by whom this interview was



planned, seems to have felt this delicacy, and desired count Piper to make the proposal to the duke. Marlborough bowed assent, and the king advancing to the door, himself introduced the dependent monarch. The british general paid his respects to Stanislaus without compromising the dignity of his own sovereign; and the countenance and manner of Charles shewed the gratification which he derived from this proof of attention.

Before he took his departure, Marlborough did not neglect to gain an influence with Piper and Hermelin, in whom the king appeared to repose the greatest confidence. Finding them favourably inclined, he adopted the advice of the elector of Hanover, in securing their good will, by the promise of annual pensions, of which he offered a year's advance. Piper, indeed, affected to make some difficulty, but his scruples were overcome by his countess, with whom Marlborough had an interview for the purpose. A pension of £.1,000 a year, was also bestowed on Ciederholm.

The good effects of this well-timed liberality appeared in his interview with the minister, count Piper. He observes, in the conclusion of his letter,

“Count Piper, at my taking leave of him, promised to acquaint me, for the queen's information, with whatever offers might be made to his master from the court of France. Whereupon I assured him he might certainly depend on the like returns from us, the king himself having been pleased to give me particular assurances that he would adhere to no proposals that might be made him in relation to the mediatorship, until he heard from me that the queen thought it seasonable. He also declared his opinion very freely, that the french were not yet reduced to such an ebb as would make them reasonable.

“I shall trouble you,” he adds, “but with one observation more, that is, the uneasiness I perceive in the king of Sweden at the conduct of the court of Vienna. He complains of three particulars, on which he expects satisfaction: the first, for the affront offered to his minister at that court; the next, on account of the two swedish officers killed at Breslaw; and the third, in relation to the musco-



vites on the Rhine, whom he insists to have delivered up to him ; but as for this last article, I hope an expedient may be found, by returning the muscovites to king Augustus, and the swedes engaging at the same time, that upon the czar's releasing the like number of swedes, these shall be set at liberty. I have pressed the ministers at Vienna to endeavour to satisfy the king on these articles, as fearing, otherwise, when he comes to march through Silesia, in his way to Poland, he may make them very uneasy. It is certain the king designed likewise to have insisted on that court's giving satisfaction to the protestants in Silesia, for the usurpation and innovations committed in that province, had I not had the good fortune to convince him, as I told you before, of the unseasonableness of it at present. This is the substance of all that passed between me and the court of Sweden, which I hope will meet with her majesty's approbation, it being very much for the public good and her majesty's service, that we are sure the king has not, nor will have any engagements with the french, so as to disturb us in the prosecution of the war."

At the conclusion of this important negotiation, the duke received a mark of favour, which was not only peculiarly flattering, but highly advantageous. Although Charles, with that jealousy which he always manifested in his military operations, would permit no foreign minister to attend him in the field ; he yet relaxed so far from his general rule as to allow Mr. Jefferys, the secretary of Mr. Robinson, to accompany the army, in the character of a volunteer, by which means a constant communication was maintained with the british commander.\*

In his return, Marlborough complied with the earnest request of the king of Prussia,† by paying a visit at Charlottenburg.

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\* This narrative is principally drawn from some brief letters of Marlborough, written during his continuance in the swedish camp, and from a more detailed account sent to Godolphin after his return to the Hague.—Some information has also been derived from a letter written by Mr. Robinson to the earl of Manchester, and printed in Cole's Memoirs ; and from Ledyard. These authentic sources render it unnecessary to detain the reader with any refutation of the idle and improbable narratives which Voltaire and others have given of this transaction.

† Letter from the king of Prussia to the duke, April 25.



Here his presence was peculiarly necessary, to counteract the petty intrigues of lord Raby, who not only endeavoured to sway the prussian court, but imprudently threw reflections on the conduct of the ministers most attached to England, by representing them as sacrificing the interests of Prussia to gratify the duke of Marlborough. It would have been easy to procure the recall of a minister, who was personally disagreeable to the king and disliked in the court, but it was difficult to fill his place, as well from his connections and interest with the grand chamberlain, as from his rank and diplomatic abilities, and his favour with his sovereign. Marlborough, therefore, overlooked his own complaints, and laboured to restore lord Raby to such a cordiality with those whom he had offended, as might enable him to fulfil the object of his mission; and although he could not obliterate, he suspended the effects of their mutual jealousies. He prevailed also on the king to desist from his instances for the removal of so obnoxious a minister. During the pause of a day, which was the limit of his stay at the prussian court, Marlborough received from the king many proofs of regard, and settled some points of delicacy. He in particular obtained his consent for the restoration of the Upper Palatinate to the elector palatine, and for putting the duke of Mantua to the ban of the empire. "At parting," the duke observes, "he forced on me a diamond ring, valued at 1,000 pounds," an unusual instance of liberality, in a prince by no means extravagant in presents.

Pursuing his journey with his usual diligence, he passed through Hanover, only to acquaint the elector with his success, and reached the Hague on the 8th of May, having accomplished his disagreeable journey and delicate negotiation, within the short space of eighteen days.

This important mission succeeded in every point beyond his expectations. The swedish monarch was highly flattered by the attention of so celebrated a general, and not only repeatedly expressed his regard and admiration for his person, but acknowledged with pleasure and gratitude the conviction he had drawn from the force of his arguments, and the correctness and extent of his information. Marlborough himself, on his part, was



struck with the chivalrous character of the young warrior, and under the rusticity of his manners, and eccentricity of his character, saw much to admire and esteem. In a letter to the duchess he observes :

“ *Hague, April 29--May 10.* I returned to this place last Sunday, by which you will see that I have used such diligence, that I was but eighteen days on the journey. Now that it is over, I am extremely well pleased to have made it, since I am persuaded it will be of some use to the public, and a good deal to the queen. I shall not enter into particulars, having writ at large to lord treasurer.

“ This journey has given me the advantage of seeing four kings,\* three of whom I had never seen. They seem to be all very different in their kinds. If I was obliged to make a choice, it should be the youngest, which is the king of Sweden.”

In a conference held with the deputies of the States General, the day after his return, Marlborough repeated the assurances of friendship and good will which he had received from the king of Sweden. He thus dissipated the alarm which the dutch had conceived of the hostile designs and supposed engagements of the swedish monarch with France, which was hourly fomented by the french emissaries, and had already operated with a sinister effect on the minds of so timid a people.

All his friends in England, and every well-wisher to the Grand Alliance, concurred in applauding his success, and in giving due praise to the ability and judgment, which he had manifested in the negotiation. Godolphin in particular expressed his satisfaction in the unstudied language of friendship.

“ *May 3--14, 1707.* I can never thank you enough for the pains you have taken, in writing so much and so exact a relation of all that has passed ; and I think the kingdom can never thank you enough for having settled all things where you have been, so much to your own satisfaction and to our advantage.”

Harley also expressed similar sentiments, in his usual style of respect and devotion.

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\* The king of Sweden, Augustus, Stanislaus, and the king of Prussia.



"*April 15--26.* Though I am very sorry that your grace has had so much fatigue as in this journey to Saxony, yet I am sure there was no expectation of any success from any other sort of negotiation. Your grace is born to do those great things for your country, which no man else ever did, or can do; and therefore to your greater share of glory there falls out a greater share of fatigue."

"*May 3.* It is a fatiguing journey, but I hope your grace will not receive any detriment or prejudice to your health by it. It is your grace's peculiar felicity to have your noble undertakings crowned with success; and it would be a public calamity that you should suffer in your health while you are serving the public."

"*May 6.* I hope this will find your grace safely returned to the Hague after your troublesome journey. But as you have a zeal for the public, which makes you refuse no trouble to serve your country, so your grace has a felicity and faculty to do that for the honour of the queen and the nation, which nobody else could perform."

But the best eulogium on his conduct was conveyed in the language of his enemies. The king of France contemplated his mission with a mixture of hope and anxiety. He flattered himself that Charles would not readily forego so honourable a mediation; and he expected that the high spirit of Marlborough would not bend to circumstances; but that by recurring to menaces, he would wound the pride of a monarch, who was no less vain of his success than tenacious of his purpose. These sentiments are strongly expressed in two letters, one from the king himself, and the other from Torcy to Besenval, the french envoy to the king of Sweden, which were intercepted in their passage, and transmitted by the duke to Godolphin.

The reply of Besenval not only dissipated these hopes, but detailed, in the most distinct manner, the heads of the discourse held by Marlborough. It was written under the feigned character of a merchant or tradesman, and transmitted under a cover to M. de Monasterolle, with the address "*Pour le Principal,*" which is evidently intended to designate Louis the fourteenth.



It is dated Leipsig, April 28, the day after the audience, and the substance must have been derived from the communications either of Piper or Hermelin, but most probably of the latter.\*

“ A gazette written by a tradesman, who has no share in the secrets of the times, cannot relate what the king of Sweden replied, or caused to be replied, in secret, to the duke of Marlborough, on the propositions, remonstrances, or solicitations which he may have made in the name of the queen, his mistress, or on the part of all the allies ; since the king of Sweden and his ministers are accustomed to observe silence on all such subjects, and since the duke of Marlborough will not readily communicate to any others, but to the parties concerned, the result of his mission. Yet it is allowable to imagine what sort of language the british general must have held at the court of Sweden, particularly as he must have employed different channels to insinuate indirectly, and under the guise of conversation, the principles with which the allies have endeavoured for some time to inspire his swedish majesty. That english lord, who is sense and politeness itself, would doubtless begin by persuading his swedish majesty *that her sex alone prevented queen Anne from waiting on the king in*

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\* This letter was either intercepted in its passage through Germany, or surreptitiously copied by some spy at the court of France, and is one among many proofs of the accurate and extensive intelligence which Marlborough obtained from every court of Europe. The person by whom it was transmitted, and who was actually the principal agent in this correspondence, was Robethon, who, from an humble origin, raised himself to the post of confidential secretary, first to the duke of Zell, and afterwards to the elector of Hanover. For this purpose he was supplied with large sums of money by the duke, and the number and value of his communications prove that these largesses were not ill bestowed. To him Marlborough was also principally indebted for a disclosure of the communications between Louis and the french agents in Saxony ; and his own correspondence, which this year is extremely voluminous, contains an ample detail of the secret proceedings, and even the private sentiments entertained by the different courts of Europe.

From the papers published by Macpherson, we also find Robethon engaged in an active correspondence, as well with the ministers as with the whig leaders in England.

The events of the time gave consequence to so active and intelligent a secretary ; and he was among those confidential servants who accompanied George the first on his accession to the british throne. Growing presumptuous from the royal favour, he interfered in political transactions, and excited the jealousy of Sir Robert Walpole.—Memoirs of Sir Robert Walpole, chapter 15.



*person* ; and that the fame of his great and heroic virtues, of his numerous victories, and of his transcendant genius, both in the art of war and in the science of government, was the motive which induced the duke of Marlborough to quit England, where his important occupations, would otherwise have detained him longer, to visit the bravest and most glorious king in the world, and to avow, in his presence, that all the advantages granted by the grace of God to the arms of the allies against France, in the glorious reign of queen Anne, and under the command of the duke of Marlborough, must yield to the illustrious exploits of his swedish majesty.

“ By the opening of so elegant a discourse, to which the pen of a tradesman is unequal, we may more readily judge of the rest. Besides, the maxims which he would insinuate are not difficult to divine, from the first principles here laid down, which he attempted to establish.

“ After speaking of the preparations for the approaching campaign, he affected to dread the superior forces of the two crowns in the Netherlands, and represented them as the more formidable, because they are under the command of two brave chiefs, the elector of Bavaria and Vendome, who are perfectly in unison.

“ That Louis 14th had concluded the treaty for the neutrality of Italy only to deceive the allies, and that the general propositions and the offer of holding a congress, made through the elector of Bavaria, were merely illusory.

“ That the king of France affects to be too much humbled, in order to separate the allies, by raising mutual jealousies of their respective interests, and draw to his support the sovereigns of the north. With this view he had offered the mediation to the king of Sweden, although he had previously made the same offer to the pope, and lastly to the catholic cantons of Switzerland, and the Venetians. Finding it rejected, he has now recourse to the king of Sweden, hoping that he will either force the allies to accept his mediation, or in case of their refusal, will take revenge for the rejection by force of arms.



“ That the king of France has doubtless endeavoured to cover his secret views, and to touch his serene majesty with compassion for the house of Bavaria, to which the king of Sweden is allied. That he has also excited the princes of the empire to profit by this occasion, and in conjunction with the swedish monarch, to vindicate the infraction of their privileges, against the exorbitant authority exercised by the emperor, as well as to animate the zeal of the king for the protestant religion, persecuted by the emperor, and to irritate his majesty still more against the elector palatine.

“ That the allies well knew that this last commission employed the attention of the colonel, who is now at Leipsig, on the part of the elector of Bavaria, and that the other instructions have been executed during the winter by the secretary of Bonnac, and by another person whom France maintains among the poles.\*

“ That the allies are conscious the king of Sweden will not give any credit to these false representations, and are convinced that he is too wise to be prejudiced unfavourably, and against his own interests ; since France ardently endeavours to create a civil war in the empire, and to gain by the ruin of the germanic body.

“ That it is not the object of England and Holland to lower France too much ; because, if from any motive, commercial or otherwise, the two maritime powers should be at variance, it is their common interest that France should be as powerful as the house of Austria would be, if possessed of the spanish monarchy, as it was before the death of Charles the second. For should Spain support one of the contending parties, France might support the other, and thus maintain the equilibrium of Europe.

“ That this balance is the sole object of the allies, and particularly of England ; and for this reason it was necessary to take from France the power of making offensive war, daily, and alone against all Europe, insulting her neighbours, invading their territories, and rendering the will of her king an universal law.

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\* One of these doubtless alludes to the sieur de Ricoux, whom we have mentioned in the preceding chapter.



“ That the queen is ready to acknowledge king Stanislaus, and to guaranty the peace of Alt Ranstadt, and will use all her efforts to remove the objections of the dutch, against concurring jointly with her majesty in regard to those two points.

“ That her britannic majesty well knows the king of Sweden has no reason to be satisfied with the dutch; perhaps she is not so herself, and does not know what may in future happen; that she relies most on the king's friendship, and desires him to be well convinced of her friendship on all occasions.

“ That the conduct of the emperor in Italy opens the eyes of all the world; while the absolute principles with which the court of Vienna affects to govern the whole empire, are neither consonant to the interest nor to the inclination of England and Holland; but it is not yet time to announce this sentiment. That it is allowed the emperor has given many causes of resentment to the king of Sweden, and that the latter has a right to protect the college of princes, and the protestant religion, unjustly persecuted in Silesia and in the palatinate, as well as to obtain satisfaction for the elector palatine.

“ That the queen intreats the king of Sweden to take no public cognizance of these affairs, until the general peace, and in that case promises to act in concurrence with him for the affairs of the empire, to confine the emperor within just bounds, and to exact full satisfaction, in regard to religion, to the germanic empire, and to his swedish majesty in particular.

“ That if the king of Sweden will permit the allies to make this campaign without interference, by withdrawing his army from Germany, and undertake nothing which may directly or indirectly divert them, the next winter they may listen to propositions of peace; because France may become more weary of war, when she sees the allies resolved to continue it. While the king of Sweden, who is justice itself, is well inclined to support the equilibrium of Europe and the common security; France will not fail to make more equitable propositions for the re-establishment of general tranquillity. That if the king of



Sweden maintains a corps in the empire or on the frontiers, it will create alarm in some, and jealousy in others.

“This is the political rhapsody of an idle tradesman, who loves to exercise his ingenuity, in divining what were the arguments, which perhaps the duke of Marlborough employed at the court of Sweden, to persuade the king not to accept the mediation offered by France.” \*

\* Translated from the intercepted letter in french.



## CHAPTER 56.

1707.

*Plans of Marlborough for the invasion of Provence, and the reduction of Toulon—Overcomes the aversion of the emperor and the duke of Savoy to the enterprise—Project of the imperial court for the conquest of Naples—Disputes with the allies—Fatal defeat of the combined forces in Spain, at the battle of Almanza—Letters from lord Galway—Difficulties relative to the command—Appeal of Charles for reinforcements—Fruitless application to the court of Vienna—Remonstrances of the allies, and counter-justification of the imperial ministers—Joins the army at Anderlecht—Military movements—Unable to bring the enemy to a battle—Correspondence.*

THE satisfaction which Marlborough experienced from the happy result of his journey to Saxony, was considerably abated by intelligence, which announced the fatal defeat of the allied forces at Almanza, and by the perverse and selfish conduct of the court of Vienna.

The extraordinary success of the allied arms in Italy, inspired the court of Vienna with new hopes and new plans, which contributed to increase their misunderstanding with the duke of Savoy, as well as to excite the displeasure of the english cabinet. Hitherto embarrassed by the rebellion in Hungary, and alarmed at the preponderance of the french in Italy, the emperor had strained every nerve to maintain the war, and zealously co-operated in a system, which deeply involved his own safety, as well as that of the allies. But no sooner was Italy liberated, and the frontier on the side of the Tyrol secured from attack, than he began to render the interest of the Grand Alliance subservient to his own. He first cavilled with the duke of Savoy, and resorted to every artifice, to avoid the cession of the provinces which had



been promised as the price of his defection from the Bourbon alliance. He also affected to regard the Milanese as no part of the spanish dominions, and endeavoured to substantiate an eventual claim to the duchy, by conferring it on his brother as a fief of the empire. But, above all, his jealousy was roused by the overtures which Louis had recently made to the maritime powers, to resign Spain and the Indies, together with the Netherlands, in return for the cession of Naples and Sicily to the duke of Anjou. Knowing that this plan was strongly favoured by the dutch government, and dreading that it might be carried into effect, he took the resolution to frustrate it, by an immediate invasion of Naples, where his numerous partisans called for assistance.

On the other hand, the duke of Savoy transferred his apprehensions and jealousy of the french to his late deliverers; and laboured secretly and earnestly for the re-establishment of that system, which had enabled him to hold the balance of power between the houses of Austria and Bourbon. Aware, also, that Austria was no less desirous to rule in Italy than the french, he clamoured for the fulfilment of the promises made under the guaranty of England, and rejected with scorn the evasive expedients of the imperial court. From the same principle he was anxious to prevent the occupation of Naples and Sicily, unless his acquiescence was purchased by an equivalent in Lombardy. He was, at length, gratified by an accommodation effected through the agency of Marlborough, by which he obtained the promise of the emperor to fulfil the treaty of 1703.\* Joseph also renounced his claims to the Milanese, as an imperial fief, and agreed to consider it as part of the spanish dominions.

The great object of the maritime powers was, to employ the combined forces in Italy in an invasion of Provence, with the view of ruining the naval power of France in the Mediterranean, by the capture of Toulon, which was in an ill state of defence. Marlborough was now engaged in arranging the plan of operations, and accumulating the means of attack. With this view, he obtained the consent of the german princes, for the continuance

\* See chapter 17.



of their troops in Italy, and persuaded the dutch not only to furnish pecuniary assistance, but to join their fleet in furtherance of the design.

He found, however, great and unexpected obstacles. Both the emperor and the duke of Savoy were less solicitous for the destruction of the french navy, which they considered as the peculiar object of the maritime powers, than for an attack against Dauphiné and the Lyonnois, which would more effectually contribute to the safety of Italy. Their consent was, however, at length extorted, and preparations were made for the execution of this momentous enterprise, as soon as the return of the season opened the passages of the Alps.

But neither party entered cordially into the design, and the emperor in particular resolved to render it secondary to his own views on Naples. With this intention, he secretly concluded with France, on the 13th of March, a treaty of neutrality for Italy; and for the sake of accomplishing the speedy reduction of the Milanese and Mantuan, permitted the french garrisons to withdraw unmolested. This accommodation was not disclosed until it was too late to prevent its completion; and the consent of the duke of Savoy being extorted, the maritime powers had no other alternative, than to acquiesce in an arrangement of which they foresaw the fatal consequences.

The primary object of the emperor became now apparent, by the orders issued for a detachment of the austrian army to take the route towards Naples. The consequences were also equally felt in every part of the theatre of action. Relieved from the constant drain occasioned by the war in Italy, the king of France not only reduced his army on the side of the Alps, but sent the troops which he could thus spare, as well as those which he drew from the blockaded fortresses in Lombardy, to swell the army on the Upper Rhine, to give new energy to the contest in Spain, and to complete the unexpected successes which had marked the close of the last campaign.

His designs were favoured by the imprudence of the allied generals, and the disputes in the court of Charles, which had



already marred their operations. In conformity with the resolution adopted in the preceding year, lord Galway and Das Minas were anxious to profit by their supposed superiority of force. The news which arrived of the neutrality concluded for Italy, and the march of reinforcements from France, induced them to commence their operations before the gallo-spaniards could receive the expected succours. Unable to obtain intelligence in a country, where every peasant was a spy or an enemy, they collected their troops, and made a hasty attempt to break up the quarters of Berwick, at the very moment when he was joined by part of his reinforcements.

After a fruitless attempt to reduce Villena, they descended into the plains of Almanza, under the walls of which town they found the army of Berwick encamped. They hurried to the attack, on ground highly favourable for the manœuvres of cavalry, in which the enemy were greatly superior. This desperate, but ill-judged effort, was repelled; and the portuguese cavalry being seized with a panic, abandoned the field in the utmost confusion. The foot left without support, were broken on all sides, and the route became complete. Thirteen battalions of infantry, after cutting their way through the hostile lines, took post in a wood, but were surrounded and reduced to surrender. Great part of the baggage and artillery, with an hundred and twenty standards, fell into the hands of the enemy. Galway was severely wounded in the onset of the battle; and the remnant of the army, amounting to scarcely 6,000 men, effected their escape by a disorderly retreat towards Tortosa. This stupendous victory was purchased by the enemy with the loss of only 2,000 men.

A more striking picture of the misfortune cannot be drawn than in the words of the defeated commander.

LORD GALWAY TO LORD SUNDERLAND.

“*Alegre, April 27.* My lord;—Your lordship will have heard by my letters, as well as by Mr. Stanhope’s, that in all the councils held at Valencia this winter, it was resolved we should march to clear this frontier, ruin the enemy’s magazines, and destroy the country between them and us, in case they retired,



thereby to secure this kingdom and our march into Arragon; but that if the enemy did assemble upon this frontier, we should fight them. Accordingly, our forces removed from their garrisons, the 6th instant; we were all joined the 10th. We marched to Yecla, and from thence to Montealegre, the enemy's troops retiring before us. We consumed and destroyed their magazines in both these places. We afterwards marched to Villena; the enemy, in the mean time, joined all their force, and marched to Almanza. All the generals were of opinion to attack them there, our army being then in a better condition than it would be any time during the campaign, for it daily weakened by sickness. So we marched the 25th, and fought the enemy close to Almanza.

"I am under deep concern to be obliged to tell your lordship we were entirely defeated. Both our wings were broke, and let in the enemy's horse, which surrounded our foot, so that none could get off. I received a cut in the forehead in the first charge. The enemy did not pursue their advantage, so that all the baggage got off. Major general Shrimpton, count Dohna, and some other officers got into the mountains with a body of english, dutch, and portuguese foot, where they surrendered the day after the battle, being, I suppose, surrounded by the enemy's horse. I have sent a trumpet to enquire after the prisoners.

"I cannot, my lord, but look upon the affairs of Spain as lost by this bad disaster: our foot, which was our main strength, being gone, and the horse we have left chiefly portuguese, which is not good at all. Most of our english horse that got off were of the two new raised regiments of dragoons, who did not do their duty. All the generals here are of opinion, that we cannot continue in this kingdom, so I have desired Sir George Byng to take on board again the recruits he had just landed at Alicante; and to call at Denia or Valencia for our sick, wounded, and baggage, and have sent all to Tortosa, where we shall march with the remnant of our horse."

On the first receipt of this melancholy intelligence, the attention of Marlborough was employed to obviate the fatal consequences which the defeat was expected to produce, and it became



the subject of immediate deliberation, in a conference which he held the same day with the deputies of the States.

“ At this last conference,” he writes to secretary Harley, “ we had also under consideration what measures were to be taken upon the news from France of the defeat of our army in Spain ; and it was agreed that the court of Vienna should be immediately written to, to dissuade them from the expedition to Naples, and to press them in the most earnest manner to proceed with the greatest vigour on the design of entering France, as the only means left to redress our affairs in Spain. This I have already done, as you will see by the copy of my letter to count Wratislaw. The States have written to the same effect, as I hope the queen will do, by the first return of the post ; and that her majesty will please to order you to speak very seriously to count Gallas, that he may make the same representations.”

This melancholy reverse gave redoubled energy to the feuds which had reigned in the petty court and army of Charles, even in the midst of success. The different parties endeavoured, as on the former occasion, to throw the odium of their misfortune on each other, and appeals and accusations poured in to Marlborough from all quarters. The most vehement of these complainants was the king himself, from whom we find numerous letters, filled with invectives against the british generals, ascribing his misfortune to his want of authority, means, and influence, earnestly soliciting new succours, and requesting the removal of lord Galway, whose fidelity he even questioned.

The effect of this defeat was scarcely less felt in Portugal than in Spain. The court of Lisbon was not only unable to make exertions proportionate to so critical an emergency ; but fears were justly entertained, lest from a sense of weakness, and a desire to relieve themselves from the pressure of a long and tedious war, they should listen to the overtures secretly made by France.

The immediate consequences of the disaster were still more fatal than Marlborough had foreboded. Before a month had elapsed, the bourbon commanders recovered Valencia, Murcia, and Aragon, except the strong holds of Lerida and Tortosa, and



the maritime fortresses of Denia and Alicante. The authority of king Charles was confined to the province of Catalonia, where his collective force did not exceed 10,000 regular troops, and this single campaign appeared likely to terminate the unequal struggle between the two rival candidates for the spanish throne.

But notwithstanding the despondency manifested by the defeated commander, Marlborough saw that the contest was not yet hopeless, though it was difficult to select a general who, with abilities and energy to stem the torrent of misfortune, possessed the temper and address suited to so delicate a situation. He was fully convinced of the integrity of Galway; but he felt the impropriety of continuing him in a post where his fidelity was suspected, and his person disliked, by the sovereign under whom he was appointed to act, particularly as the accusations against him were warmly seconded by Eugene, in the name of the austrian court. In this predicament he concurred in the proposal of lord Godolphin, to offer the command to lord Rivers, who had found means to obtain such flattering recommendations from king Charles. His pretensions being, however, deemed inadmissible, Marlborough next recommended the appointment of general Erle, or some officer of similar rank; and suggested the policy of confiding to the young monarch himself the same authority as the king of Portugal exercised over the forces in his dominions. But in these views he was thwarted by the whigs, who strenuously opposed the removal of lord Galway. He accordingly employed the interposition of the queen to allay the suspicions which still rankled in the mind of Charles, and to restore that cordiality and union, which alone could remedy the misfortune.

The difficulty of chusing a general, who possessed all the requisites for so perplexing a situation, was still less than that of furnishing reinforcements to save the eastern provinces of Spain. England, which had already supplied so large a proportion of force, was unable to increase her contingent; and the dutch, wearied with the contest, were lukewarm in the cause, and seemed to regard the defeat of Almanza less as a misfortune than as an



event, which might relieve them from the burthen of a distant and expensive war.

No other resource remained but in the court of Vienna, who had hitherto left to the maritime powers the maintenance of hostilities in Spain. The strongest appeals were made by the british commander, both to the affection of Joseph, as a brother, and to his interest as the chief of the empire, and head of the house of Austria; but these appeals were counteracted by the perverse and selfish spirit which impelled the austrian cabinet. The means of the emperor were exhausted by the civil war in Hungary, which he was unable to terminate by force, and unwilling to close by concessions, which he deemed a sacrifice of his sovereign rights. He was also in hourly apprehension of an attack from the king of Sweden; yet, at this moment, he was consulting rather his feelings and dignity, than his strength or interest, by meditating plans of aggression, and hoping for the aid of the maritime powers. He had consented also to spare part of his forces for the invasion of Provence; yet, instead of prosecuting that design, with a vigour which might counterbalance the disasters in Spain, his principal attention seemed absorbed in his plans for the acquisition of Naples. In vain Marlborough and the british cabinet represented the danger and impolicy of this ill-timed enterprise. The imperial court pursued their object with a perseverance which seemed to acquire strength from opposition. Every post brought letters from the prince of Salm, Wratislaw, and Sinzendorf, vindicating the measures of their sovereign, and expatiating on the advantages which would accrue, not merely to the emperor, but to the common cause, from the occupation of Naples. One of these epistles we select as a proof of the infatuation which reigned at Vienna.

Count Sinzendorf, by a letter dated May 21st, informs the duke that he could not give a positive answer to his request for immediate reinforcements; but that on the first appearance of the business, he was of opinion the reverse in Spain was an argument for hastening the expedition to Naples; because the army



would march on the 14th, and before the orders of recall could reach them, they would have advanced to the vicinity of Rome, and the austrian partisans in Naples would have already declared themselves.

“As to the affairs of Spain,” he adds, “though I consider them as much deranged, yet they are not entirely ruined. The diversion which you are desirous of making for their advantage, will no longer avail, as that army is not in a situation to march to Madrid. Nevertheless, it will be attempted, and there will be troops enough, if Sweden leaves us in repose. At least the conquest of Naples will in some degree indemnify us for this fatal loss.

“Notwithstanding the defeat, the remains of the army must have retired to Barcelona; and as we are superior by sea, that city can always be provisioned by the fleet, and the enemy will not be able to besiege it, for want of heavy artillery and other necessaries. The king therefore may remain there in safety, until means can be taken to succour him with fresh troops towards the autumn, on the return of the fleet. These troops may be the palatines, in the pay of the two powers; and if the agreement be made in time with the elector, they may be left for the defence of Piemont, and be in better condition when they are conveyed to Spain. His imperial majesty, in that case, may perhaps be induced to detach some regiments, but under the condition that the two powers shall furnish their subsistence, which we cannot provide.

“I can suppose that Valencia and Aragon will be lost before the arrival of those succours; but I ask you if they are not already lost? and you cannot but recollect how often you anticipated that our diversion in Italy would be of no advantage to Spain; since you well knew, that according to your own project, and the nature of the country to be passed, the movements could not commence before the middle of June, at which time the french would either have struck the blow, or suspended it, on account of the excessive heats.

“But the misfortune is, that we are eager to act in conformity



with our wishes, and not according to what is practicable ; and unless taught by a reverse, we never relinquish our eager desires. The examples of Bavaria, Hungary, and Spain, prove this truth, and God grant that Sweden may not afford a similar instance ! The chimerical prospect of a premature peace, draws us on to wish for an accommodation. To that end all things appear feasible. Meanwhile we lose whole months in inactivity, and when from experience things are found to be impossible, we are compelled to take in hand, with risk, that which we might have done with security and ease, if we had acted with resolution and concert at the beginning.

“ I do assure you that, in my opinion, there is no other part to take for the purpose of remedying the affairs of Spain, than that which I propose. Communicate my thoughts to whomsoever you please, but do not haggle, and be convinced that the emperor is not in a situation to maintain the troops in Spain.”

Mortified by these untoward events, and anxious to remedy the effects by his own efforts, Marlborough hastened his arrangements at the Hague, and on the 13th of May reached Brussels. From this place he communicated to Godolphin his reflections on the melancholy situation of affairs.

“ *Brussels, May 15.* Since my last, I have seen several relations of the unfortunate battle given in Spain, and am sorry to tell you the news does no ways mend on our side. The enemy pretend to have taken five english, five dutch, and three portuguese regiments prisoners, with all our cannon and baggage, and 120 colours and standards, which last I think almost impossible. However, we must expect the worst, and begin to take our measures for repairing this great loss. When we come to hear directly from Spain, I fear we shall find our people confine themselves to the preservation of Alicante and Catalonia.


“ The States received the news of this fatal stroke with less concern than I expected. However, it is very likely their deputies may have orders to act here with more caution than the urgency of affairs requires ; and I can't but take notice, that 'tis observed this blow has made so little impression in the great towns in this







# PAIGNS of 1707, and part of 1708.





country, that the generality of the people have rather shewn a satisfaction at it than otherwise, which I don't attribute so much to the inclination they have for the french, as to their aversion to the present government, and the disorders it lies under, to which I do not foresee any proper remedy can be applied during the war. In the mean time it will make us uneasy.

"I do from my heart pity you for all the trouble you are forced to undergo, and should be glad it were in my power to give you any ease.

"Upon Saturday the army will be encamped at Hall, so that by the end of this month I shall be able to guess at what the French intend. The dutch think they are stronger than we are; if they continue of that opinion, we shall do nothing."

At Anderlecht Marlborough found the combined forces assembled, to the amount of 97 battalions and 164 squadrons, and was apprized that the french army of 102 battalions and 168 squadrons, was collected in the vicinity of Mons, under the command of the elector of Bavaria and the duke of Vendome.

It has been generally asserted, that the remarkable inactivity of this campaign in the Netherlands, was owing to the superiority of the french army, which curbed the enterprising spirit of the british commander. It appears, however, that in the early movements, his army was equal, if not superior, in effective force, though the french enumerated more squadrons and battalions; that his troops were in the highest spirits; and that he himself was indignant at suffering the confidence of a victorious army to evaporate in defensive operations. The real causes, therefore, to which we may ascribe the peculiar character of this campaign, are the timid policy of the dutch, and the renewal of that system of controul and restraint which had before palsied his efforts.

Vendome, though anxious to signalise his military reputation, may rather be said to have been awed by the skill of his antagonist; for while he spread rumours of his superior force, which gained credit with the dutch, and while he occasionally assumed an attitude which gave colour to these rumours, he carefully avoided committing the fate of France to the decision of another



battle, though he, as well as the french cabinet, knew that the dutch government would not suffer the british commander to display the same spirit of enterprise, which he had manifested in the preceding campaign.\*

These preliminary considerations are requisite to explain the operations of this campaign, and the correspondence of Marlborough.

On the 21st of May the duke joined the army at Anderlecht. Hearing that the french commanders had publicly declared their intention of offering battle, he approached their lines by moving to Lambeck. From hence we find a letter to the duchess, in which he complains of the violent effects of party spirit, in England, and the exultation shewn by the disaffected on the misfortune in Spain.

“*Lambeck, May 25.* If I were in the place of the lord treasurer, I should take it very unkindly of the city to drink confusion to generals. If it were not for the concern I have for the queen and England, I could wish they had Peterborough and such like favourite generals, and that the lord treasurer and I were at quiet. But I am afraid there must be some time before that will be allowed of; for this ill success in Spain has flung every thing backwards; so that the best resolution we can take is to let the french see we are resolved to keep on the war till we can have a good peace. As to what you desire to know of the strength of the french army, I am afraid they think they are strong enough to hinder us from doing any thing; but I believe they have not so good an opinion of their army, as to venture a battle.”

Receiving intelligence that the enemy had occupied a position behind the Haine, their left supported on Mons, and their right

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\* The anonymous biographer of Marlborough is almost the only writer who has assigned the true cause of this inactivity. He observes, “Not that the duke of Marlborough himself was for sitting still, but the States were so frightened with the invasion of Germany, and the battle of Almanza, that they would not let him stir. Thus his grace was not permitted to make fresh conquests, or to act with his accustomed vigour.”—*Lives of Marlborough and Eugene*, p. 113-114.



extending to St. Pol, he on the 26th advanced to Soignies, that he might be enabled to take advantage of their movement; but notwithstanding their apparent resolution, he considered their advance as a mere bravado; for he observes to lord Godolphin.

“*Soignies, May 26.* The superiority the french persuade themselves to have, has encouraged them to quit their lines. Their camp is very strong, and I believe they will not stay in any place where they may with reason be attacked; for tho’ they have more squadrons and battalions than we, yet I believe we have as many men; and for certain, our troops are better than their’s. We do hope that their strength here, makes them weak both on the Rhine and in Dauphiné; so that we flatter ourselves they can’t be long before they will be obliged to make detachments, and then we may act with more advantage. Being obliged to be on horseback at four o’clock to-morrow morning, I shall give you no farther trouble at this time.”

The Bourbon commanders, however, instead of awaiting the advance of their antagonist, moved laterally into the plains of Fleurus, and extending themselves from Fleurus to Sombreuf, evinced an intention of attacking the great towns of Brabant. On this movement, Marlborough advanced from Soignies, with twelve squadrons of horse, to reconnoitre the enemy; and having called a council of war, obtained the approbation of the dutch deputies to march towards Nivelles and attack them. But, unfortunately, a detachment being sent forward to examine the pass of Ronquieres, through which the army must approach the enemy, brought back a report, that it was occupied by a hostile corps, and from its strength and situation, could not be forced without great loss. This communication being laid before the council, with an exaggerated account that the enemy had considerably increased their disposable force, by draughts from the neighbouring garrisons, a general opinion prevailed, that it would be advisable to remove to their former position, in order to cover Brussels and Louvain, which were then exposed to plunder. To this opinion, Marlborough prudently, though reluctantly yielded, from a conviction that no arguments would con-



quer the apprehensions of those with whom he was associated. Accordingly, he retreated to Beaulieu, from whence he details to lord Godolphin the motives of his conduct.

“ Since my last, the french have not only drawn as many troops as was possible out of their garrisons, in order to make themselves stronger than we ; but they have also abandoned their lines, so that we had it in our power to attack any of their towns. But as we could not have our cannon in less than a fortnight, and that we had not troops enough to make a siege and cover it, we thought it best to make this march, in order to hinder the farther designs of the french, which you will see by the inclosed copy of my letter to the pensioner. The true meaning of my letter to the pensioner is, to let him see that I am not of the opinion to venture a battle, unless the advantages be on our side. This caution of mine is absolutely necessary ; for instead of coming to this camp, I would have marched yesterday to Nivelles, but the deputies would not consent to it, telling me very plainly, that they feared the consequence of that march might be a battle. So that unless I can convince the pensioner that I am not for hazarding, but when we have an advantage, they will give such orders to their deputies, that I shall not have it in my power of doing good, if an advantage should offer itself ; besides, the news which we have from the Rhine will make the dutch, I fear, persist in their opinion of not venturing. I am also apprehensive that M. Vendome, knows from the french partisans in Holland, that the States are against venturing a battle, which encourages him to act as he does ; for he can't but know that our army is better than his, and that if we should beat him, his master must submit to such terms as the allies should think reasonable. I take care not to let the army know that the dutch are not willing to venture, since that must have an ill effect ; and tho' it be a very unpleasant thing not to have full power at the head of an army, yet I do please myself that I shall do some considerable service this campaign ; for I do believe we shall find the elector and M. Vendome grow insolent, by which they will either attack, or give me occasion of attacking them.



"I am sorry to tell you that we have every day instances that the greatest part of this country are much more inclined to 45\* than to king Charles, which is occasioned by the unreasonable behaviour of the dutch."

In the letter to the pensionary, after describing the movements which had taken place, he continues:

"M. Vendome's quarters are at Sombreff, a proper camp for their horse, on which they put their greatest hopes, thinking they have the superiority; but I am very confident our's are much better, and as many, if not more in number. They have more battalions than we, but our's are stronger. Upon the whole, I believe our army is stronger than their's; but considering the circumstances of France, which I take to be much worse than our's, I shall not be for venturing, unless we have the advantage on our side, in order to which, we must lose no time in taking an advantageous camp near them, which will also have the good effect of disheartening their army, and encouraging our own. Besides, it will hinder them from ravaging the country, which otherwise they must do, their army being ill paid."

"I beg you to believe I do not say this in order to venture, for I am very sensible of the many difficulties France labours under; but if we do not act with some vigour, they will be so encouraged, that they will force us to some action, which may be to our disadvantage, which cannot happen, if we keep the army in the heart they are now in, for 'tis impossible to see finer troops."

Still farther to secure the open towns east of the Senne, Marlborough did not linger at Beaulieu; but moving again the 31st, he crossed the Dyle below Louvain, and advanced to the strong position of Meldert, which covered the opening into Brabant, between the Dyle and the Gheets. The french, who had spread rumours of their design to besiege Huy, were satisfied with preventing his advance, and encamped in the vicinity of Gemblours.

His friends in England could not, however, contemplate the awful situation in which he appeared to be placed, without the

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\* Probably the duke of Anjou, or France.



deepest anxiety ; and knowing the magnanimity with which he always exposed his person, they expected every post the intelligence of a battle, which, from the equality of the two armies, and the spirit of the respective commanders, could not fail to be in the highest degree desperate and bloody. Godolphin writes :

“ *May 23--June 3.* I have just now received the favour of your's of the 26th and 30th of May, by which I find the french act otherwise than you expected, and the dutch no otherwise than you expected. I wish you may have an opportunity of as much advantage as you seem to hope for. In the mean time, I am eased at present of a good deal of agitation of mind for the event of an immediate action, which I did not think so remote as it now seems to be ; for whether M. de Vendome has any notice of the States' inclinations or not, I never looked upon him as a man that would care to be cooped up within lines, having so great an army. I wish the duke of Savoy may be so forward as to oblige them to make a detachment very soon ; but if you should have any opportunity, in the mean time, it may be of ill consequence to baulk your own troops, while they are in so good heart. I make no question but you will have every thing in your thoughts, and I hope God will direct you for the best, and keep you in his protection.”

On this also, as on former occasions, the duchess evinced her tender solicitude for his safety, by importuning him not to expose his person. We find an affectionate letter, in which he calms her apprehensions, by assuring her that the french would not venture a battle, although their numbers had been recently increased by the junction of the reinforcements from Italy, which rendered their army superior in strength, though not in courage.

“ *Meldert, June 13.* I have had the happiness of your's of the 27th of the last month, by which I find you were still under the apprehensions of a battle. My former letters, as well as this, ought to put you at ease ; but for the public good, it were to be wished it might be had, for our affairs go very ill in Germany as well as in Spain. For my own part, notwithstanding the noise the french have made, I think they would less care to venture



a battle than our friends ; for if they had a real mind to do it, it must have been decided before this time. In the army, I must do them right, that there is all the desire imaginable to venture their lives for the public good ; but all other sorts of people on this side of the water are so very wise, that I am afraid at last they will bring us to a bad peace. For myself, I am old, and shall not live to see the misfortunes that must happen to Christendom, if the french be suffered to get the better of this war."

Then alluding to the building at Blenheim, he adds, " By the inclosed, which I received but yesterday, though it be of an old date, you will see the country takes notice that the work does not go on as they expected. Say nothing, but burn the letter ; for when it is half built, it may be enough for you and me ; and I do from my heart assure you, that I should be much better pleased to live with you in a cottage, than in all the palaces this world has without you."



## CHAPTER 57.

1707.

*Marlborough remains stationary at Meldert—Remarks on the state of foreign affairs illustrative of his correspondence—Death of the prince of Baden, and appointment of the margrave of Bareith as his successor—Disorganised state of the army—Irruption of Villars into the empire—Attempts to remove the unsuccessful general—Marlborough obtains the transfer of the command to the elector of Hanover—Revival of the disputes between the king of Sweden and the emperor—Final accommodation concluded by the interposition of Marlborough—March of the king of Sweden into Muscovy—Embarrassments derived from the conduct and intrigues of lord Peterborough—Correspondence at Meldert, on these and other transactions.*

THE inactivity of the campaign gives but little interest to the letters of Marlborough on military transactions. On the contrary, his negotiations with foreign powers are of high importance; and the political intrigues which agitated the court and cabinet, form a prominent feature in his correspondence. As, therefore, the few military incidents are completely blended with diplomatic and domestic business, we shall present the letters in a continued series, prefixing such explanations, notices, and details, as appear necessary to connect the whole, and explain particular passages and allusions.

The ill-timed expedition to Naples, was not the only subject of contention with the imperial court; for the arrangements relative to the command of the german army produced delays and difficulties, which operated with a sinister effect, at a time when concert and decision were doubly necessary to retrieve the late disasters.

After a tedious illness the margrave of Baden closed his long and laborious career on the fourth of January. Although his dilatoriness or jealousy had repeatedly marred the splendid



designs of the british commander, his death was peculiarly unfortunate, at so critical a period as the opening of the campaign; for his high rank and eminent services gave him a degree of consideration in the empire, which it was difficult to supply. By a concordate among the German States, it had been stipulated that the direction of the army should be alternately vested in a catholic and a protestant; and, accordingly, after some delay, the choice fell on the margrave of Bareith, a prince of the house of Brandenburg.\* The new general was, however, more aged and inactive than his predecessor, and far inferior in influence and military skill. The petty states and princes taking advantage of the embarrassments arising from the change, withheld or withdrew their contingents; and the army was reduced to such a weak and disorganised condition, that the french were encouraged to depart from the defensive system which they had lately maintained on the Rhine. On the 22nd of May, Villars attacked and forced the lines of Stolhoffen, destroyed the magazines, and ruined the dikes and sluices. Leaving a body of cavalry on the Lauter, he followed the margrave to Gemund, and after levying contributions, and spreading terror on every side, pushed his predatory parties as far as the plains of Hochstedt.

The diet, which was then sitting at Ratisbon, was seized with a panic, and the most earnest appeals were made to the court of Vienna for protection against the impending danger. The two circles of Suabia, and Franconia, as well as several of the imperial towns, even evinced a disposition to accept the neutrality which was offered by France.

Active measures were therefore adopted to awe the bavarians, and collect the contingents of the circles; but the most obvious expedient was, to remove the margrave from a situation to which he had proved himself incompetent. Marlborough turned his attention to the elector of Hanover, as the most proper person to succeed in the command; not only from a wish to throw lustre on the house next in succession to the british throne, but with the

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\* Barre Histoire de l'Empire, t. 10, p. 510.



hope that a prince, in the prime of life, would retrieve the military honour of the germans. The greatest difficulty, however, occurred in effecting this change; for the elector, though ambitious of military fame, was unwilling to accept a command, where the want of force, and the deficiency of money and supplies, as well as the jarring interests of the German States, afforded but little prospect of success. On the other hand, the margrave of Bareith laboured to avert the disgrace of a forced resignation, by attempting to interest the prussian court in his cause, and ascribing his misfortune to the lamentable deficiency of his army. The emperor also was unwilling to transfer the command to another protestant, and hoped to secure the direction of the war on the Rhine, by associating with the margrave one of his own generals of distinguished skill and activity. For this purpose he sent general Heister, who had signalised himself in the hungarian war, and issued orders for the army to make a retrograde march through the mountains of Wirtemberg, with a view to join the troops from Westphalia and the northern circles, and compel Villars to retrace his steps towards the Rhine.

The delay in the nomination of a new general augmented the fear and confusion which reigned throughout the empire, and aggravated the dissatisfaction which the impolitic conduct of the imperial cabinet had already excited in England and Holland. It likewise suspended the operations of the german army, till a great portion of the summer had elapsed. At length the sense of common danger operated on the fears of the German States; and even the catholic princes, with the electors Palatine and Mentz at their head, concurred in urging the elector of Hanover to accept the command. But still the selfish views of the court of Vienna obstructed a definitive arrangement; and it was not till the season was considerably advanced, that Marlborough had the satisfaction of attaining an object for which he had so long laboured in vain.

Other causes of disquietude continued to arise in the intercourse with the court of Vienna. Though apprehensive of an attack from the king of Sweden, and though dreading his co-operation



with the insurgents in Hungary, the emperor was so far transported by the impulse of personal resentment, as to listen to a project of the czar, for deposing Stanislaus, and giving a new king to Poland. To forward this chimerical scheme, Peter the great had offered the crown to prince Eugene, whose illustrious birth and military fame were calculated to captivate a chivalrous people, and whose influence was likely to sway the decision of his own sovereign.

The prince himself was too prudent to give countenance to this chimerical project;\* but the emperor did not so easily recede from a design, which he conceived likely to mortify and embarrass the king of Sweden. After in vain attempting to gain the concurrence of the allies, he declined announcing his refusal to the czar, until the long pending negotiation at Alt Ranstadt was nearly brought to a conclusion.†

Although the swedish monarch had yielded to the instances of Marlborough, in agreeing to conclude an arrangement with the emperor, and had even appeared inclined to recede from his demands, relative to the protestant religion in Silesia; yet his haughty tone and hostile threats of entering the austrian dominions, deeply wounded the pride of the imperial court, and the dispute continued in a state of suspense. Appeals, on both sides, were made to the british chief, and his interposition was employed in soothing the contending parties, and endeavouring to restore cordiality. Above all, he laboured to impress the imperial court with a due sense of their weakness, and enforced the necessity of yielding, in points of formality and minor importance, to a monarch who held in his hands the fate of Germany. At length he succeeded in inducing the emperor again to depute his minister, count Wratislaw, to the swedish head quarters; and the king to give ear to a proposal for a final settlement. When, however, Wratislaw arrived at Alt Ranstadt, Charles refused to admit him to his presence, either from motives of pride, or from resent-

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\* Letter from Eugene to Marlborough, Milan, May 11, 1707.

† Count Wratislaw to the duke of Marlborough, Vienna, May 23, 1707.



ment for the attention which the emperor had shewn to the chimerical proposal of the czar. Instead of the demands relative to the affair of count Zobor, the massacre of the swedish officers at Breslau, and the escape of the muscovites, which were now deemed the only points in dispute, a new series of complaints was brought forward, and urged in a manner the most ungracious, towards the first sovereign in Europe. Charles required the emperor to ratify, without delay, the election of the prince of Holstein, as bishop of Lubec, and insisted on an immediate acquittance for the contingent, which Sweden had neglected to furnish as a member of the empire, as well as an exemption during the continuance of his war with Russia. He also claimed the sequestration of the county of Hadelen, and the maintenance of the swedish troops, in their intended passage through Silesia. At the instances of the silesian protestants, he renewed his demands relative to the restoration of their religious privileges, and even sent four regiments of horse, to take free quarters, for the protection of their worship.

These new and unexpected pretensions, as well as the aggravating mode in which they were urged, created the highest indignation in the breast of the emperor, and he resented with peculiar warmth the forcible interference in favour of the silesian protestants, which he regarded as a premeditated act of hostility. He importuned the british and dutch plenipotentiaries \* to consider this aggression as a breach of the public peace; and would probably have been driven to act with the rashness of desperation, had not Marlborough soothed his wounded feelings, and pledged himself that the swedish monarch would enter into no engagement with France. The british commander even found it necessary to check the vindictive spirit of Charles, by mixing firmness with conciliation, and hinting that England and Holland, though anxious for an accommodation, yet could not suffer the constitution of the empire to be violated, nor the dominions of

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\* Mr. Robinson to the duke of Marlborough, August 31, 1707.



the emperor to be endangered. By his discreet, yet dignified intervention, he thus soothed, without offending the haughty swede, and at length effected an accommodation.

Charles accepted an apology for the escape of the muscovites, on the condition that a similar number of his own captive troops should be liberated. The town of Breslau paid a compensation of 4,000 crowns to the representatives of the officer who was killed; count Zobor was delivered up; but in virtue of a tacit promise, he was afterwards restored to liberty. In regard to the bishopric of Lubec, the same compliance was shewn to the wishes of the king. Marlborough induced the british and dutch governments to answer for the renunciation of prince Charles, and to guaranty the succession in the house of Holstein; and the emperor at once saved his own honour and satisfied the pride of the swedish monarch by summoning the deputies of the silesian protestants to Vienna, and voluntarily confirming their privileges.

Both parties were satisfied with this accommodation, and grateful to the able negotiator by whom it was effected. The pride of Charles was soothed by the indulgence shewn to his wishes, on points which he had particularly at heart; and even the emperor did not deem his sacrifices ill repaid by the removal of a danger, which might have produced a revolution in his hungarian dominions, and kindled a civil war in Germany; and he repeatedly acknowledged that the intervention and influence of Marlborough had saved him from farther humiliations. On the first of September, the long pending transaction was completed. Charles received the ratification of the treaty on the 12th, and on the 25th his whole army passed the Oder, in his advance towards the Vistula. The danger which had threatened the dissolution of the Grand Alliance, was thus happily averted; and the prince, who had held in his hands the fate of Europe, and raised the admiration of the world, led his veteran army to perish in the wilds of Muscovy, and himself became a fugitive and a suppliant in a distant and barbarous land.

In the midst of the important negotiations with the court of Vienna, other points of minor importance occupied the attention



of the british commander. We have already adverted to the difficulty which he had experienced in influencing the court of Berlin; but at this period an incident occurred which afforded an opportunity of gaining additional credit with the prussian monarch. On the death of the duchess of Nemours, the succession to the principality of Neuchatel and the county of Vallengin was contested by numerous claimants. The most considerable, however, were the king of Prussia and the duke of Orleans. In the actual situation of France, the claims of a french prince admitted but little chance of success, in opposition to the interest of the house of Brandenburg, which, at the instigation of Marlborough, were warmly espoused by the maritime powers and the emperor. The pretensions of the king were therefore solemnly acknowledged by the States of the country, as well as by the swiss diet; and before the close of the year, he was formally invested with a sovereignty, which was more flattering to his vanity, than advantageous to his interests.

In the course of the correspondence, we find the name of Peterborough recur in a manner, which shews the disquietude occasioned by his conduct, in the midst of the weighty affairs which pressed on the consideration of the british ministry. Excluded from the direction of the war in Spain, and recalled by his own sovereign, he sought the gratification of his restless and intriguing spirit, in wandering from court to court, and interfering, without authority, in military and political transactions.

Again quitting Spain, he repaired to Turin, where he hoped to renew that confidence which he had acquired in his former visit, with the duke of Savoy and prince Eugene; and as he was discountenanced by his own government, he endeavoured to acquire consideration by the nominal credentials which he had obtained from the king of Spain. He also intruded himself into all deliberations, and affected to correspond with the secretary of state, in the same tone as if accredited by his sovereign. We trace his unaccountable behaviour, in an extract from a letter of Mr. Chetwynd, the british envoy.

TO LORD SUNDERLAND.

*“Turin, May 4.* As soon as his lordship had left this place,



his royal highness was pleased to send for me, to inform me of all that had passed between them, which he did with great confidence, shewing, through all his discourse, a great respect for the queen. His royal highness told me, that his lordship, after having communicated to him a sort of credential from the king of Spain, began to expose his commission, which was a project for penetrating into Roussillon, &c., which his royal highness perceiving, did not give him time to conclude, but told him that the projects of the campaign being already settled with the queen and the rest of the allies, he would not enter into any new measures which might be contrary to those projects. And farther, that he would not treat with his lordship as a subject of the queen, till he had justified himself in England of what he seems to be accused; and then advised him, as a friend, to lay aside all thoughts of any thing else, but making the best haste he could to lay himself at the queen's feet; which, after a great deal of reasoning, all which tended to his lordship's justification, he promised his royal highness that he would do as he advised him. He went from hence in that resolution, which, I hope, for his own sake, he will put in execution."

We next find him at Vienna, acting a similar part, and by his affected zeal for the expedition to Naples, acquiring temporary favour. He even so far ingratiated himself with the imperial ministers, that he was requested by count Wratislaw to repair to the swedish camp, with the view of acquiring more distinct information, respecting the intentions of the king, than could be gained by a mere diplomatic agent. The degree of interest which he soon inspired, will appear from a letter written by Wratislaw to the duke of Marlborough.

"*Vienna, July 2.* \* \* \* \* \* I am very much vexed to observe in the printed account, that the english are inclined to support lord Galway. To you I can speak with freedom; and if I know any thing of affairs in England, believe me the lord treasurer will be ruined, if he supports lord Galway, and it will afford fine sport for lord Rochester and his party, should the



ministry of England impute to the king of Spain the loss of that fatal battle. It is more natural to confess the truth, and to allow that lord Galway and Das Minas, either from incapacity or some other reason, are the cause of the misfortune ; for otherwise, it will appear inconsistent, to support in England a french general at the head of an english army, who is become the abomination of the king and the spaniards.

“ Lord Peterborough is on the eve of his departure to visit you. He has shewn himself sufficiently humble, although his ardour has occasionally transported him beyond the limits of moderation. I have persuaded him not to publish his manifesto, before he converses with you ; and if the court does not persecute him, he will not do it. I believe it will be dangerous to offend him, as he is an englishman, and has been supplanted by a frenchman, who has been the cause of this irreparable loss. When you have spoken to him, you will probably be more satisfied with him than you imagine ; for prince Eugene has written to me, that his lordship thinks like a general, although he does not always express himself with propriety ; and it is likewise true, that he predicted the misfortunes which have come to pass. Moreover, attempts have been made to persuade me, that you are no longer the same friend to me as you used to be. I am convinced I have nothing to reproach myself with on your account, and I am inclined to serve you with the same attachment. Difference of opinion on the affairs of the world ought not to affect our personal regard, and time will best decide which of us is in the right. You know my disinterestedness, and that I do not desire any thing for myself ; but I protest that I shall always feel a sensible pleasure in giving you proofs of my esteem and veneration.”

After acquiring such favour at Vienna, Peterborough anticipated the most welcome reception from the hero of the north, to whom he imagined that his high reputation as a soldier, would prove an infallible recommendation. But in this hope he was grievously disappointed ; for the stern and inflexible temper of Charles was proof against those blandishments which had been



seldom exerted without effect, on persons of a different character. His adventure is well described by Besenval, the french agent at Leipsig, in one of his intercepted communications.

“ My lord Peterborough departed last week to return to England. Some days after his arrival, having come to Leipsig in a carriage, to the quarters of the chancery, to pay his respects to the king of Sweden, they would not suffer him to enter the apartment, where that prince had shut himself up with count Piper. He did not conceal his chagrin at this disappointment ; and while he amused himself with conversing in a parlour, he was informed that the king of Sweden was going out. He ran to present himself to that prince ; but found him gone, and mounting the horse of a groom, he made so much diligence, that joining him as he was going out of the village, he told him, he was come to have the honour of paying his respects to him, and that his design had been to follow him for that purpose, to his head quarters of Alt Ranstadt. “ The weakness of my horse,” he added, “ obliges me to take the liberty of requesting your majesty not to go so fast, a liberty I would not have taken, if I were mounted on the smallest of the horses with which your majesty’s stables are filled.” The king laughed, and listened to him afterwards, all the way to Alt Ranstadt, as he understood enough of french to comprehend what his lordship said.

“ M. Hermelin told me, that my lord Peterborough, not being content with explaining his ideas in discourse, had written them down, and given them in the form of a memorial to the chancery. He added, that they were contrary to those of the english and dutch ministers, because they tended to engage the king of Sweden to intermeddle in the affairs of Europe, in quality of arbitrator, by the facility which he would find in it from all quarters, the english being so little in a condition to support the war, that they would be obliged, the ensuing year, to solicit peace, if France could preserve the advantages which she had gained this campaign.

“ This lord, who is bold, and has been treated as a madman, by



those among the swedish ministers, who are suspected of being pensioners of England, has sought opportunities of speaking to the king, their master, and has found one, as you may have seen by what goes above, and I hope he has not failed to profit by it. I do not know, however, whether his too great vivacity, and the ill offices of some swedish ministers, may not have discredited his opinions."

From the swedish camp we find a long and singular letter written by lord Peterborough to the duke. It deserves more particular notice, because it is filled with professions of attachment, and offers of service, at the very moment when he was secretly labouring to frustrate the plans of his former patron, for restoring peace between the emperor and the king of Sweden.

"*Ranstadt, near Leipsig, July 22.* However unfit for a journey, I was resolved to make the utmost diligence to your grace; but hearing upon the road that her majesty had resolved upon my lord Rivers's return with the forces appointed for the service of his catholic majesty, I concluded that general had given the queen and the ministers sufficient information as to the affairs of Spain.

"Not knowing that your grace had sent passports for me to Cologne, as I have since been informed, I take the road by Bohemia, Dresden, and Hanover, the persons and circumstances in those countries giving sufficient curiosity; believing I might inform myself so as to be able to give your grace fuller accounts than letters can afford, all accesses being cut off from the germans. Count Wratislaw was desirous of what lights I could get in a court, where private persons have the advantage of ministers, especially if they will put on a blue coat and a black cravat.

"Mr. Robinson, at Leipsig, has all the good qualities a minister can have, and is a man of great integrity. I fear he is apt to confide too much upon the least favourable appearances, and therefore, at present, seems persuaded that the swedes will pass Silesia without halting, in order to pursue a regular war with the muscovites, having accepted the queen's mediation relating



to the disputes with the emperor. It is somewhat strange the king will not admit count Wratislaw into his presence, which makes me doubt a longer stay in Silesia than some imagine. From Hanover I shall wait on your grace in the army. \* \* \* \* \*

“To what relates to myself, I am sure I shall give your grace satisfaction as to all my actions, and shew how little I deserved any hardships. I have always depended upon your impartiality, but demonstration is the best security. If I have not done my duty, I desire no favour; if I have served well, I hope I may meet with a suitable protection, at least justification, as to all absurdities raised to my prejudice. I should be glad to have it from the queen, and I have waited with great patience to that end. If not, my lord, I can give it myself at any time; and cannot doubt but that the queen will permit me to employ myself elsewhere, if her majesty has no occasion for my services.

“I cannot but think Mr. Stanhope’s politics have proved very fatal, having produced our misfortunes, and prevented the greatest successes. If my poor thoughts had taken place, her majesty’s fleet had had the honour of the conquest of Naples, instead of complaining of the attempt, which could not but succeed; and that force which has now prevailed, had been employed against France. The addition of my lord Rivers’s forces at Valencia, did but procure our defeat, which was certain in the measures they took. I hope our good fortune is but delayed, and heartily wish your grace may finish this war with the same glory with which you have hitherto maintained it.”

Discovering, at length, that the camp of Alt Ranstadt was as unpromising a theatre as Turin, Peterborough directed his course to Hanover, where the bickerings of the electoral family with the british court seemed to afford ample scope for intrigue. He was honoured with unusual marks of favour, and gained the attention of the electress Sophia, by flattering her inclination to visit England; but his cabals awakened the displeasure of the elector, and he had the mortification to discover, that he could not acquire the consideration to which he aspired abroad, while he continued in disgrace with his own sovereign.



His last expedient was, therefore, to conciliate Marlborough, whose character he had alternately lauded and censured. Accordingly, he repaired to the confederate camp in the Netherlands, under the plea of justifying his conduct to the commander, by whose interest he had obtained his appointment, and with whose friendship he had once been honoured. The result of their interview, and his subsequent proceedings, will appear in the correspondence.

After these explanatory remarks, we resume the correspondence.

TO THE DUCHESS.

“ *Meldert, June 6.* I find by your last letter, that lord Halifax is not well pleased with lord Rivers, which I am not surprised at. However, remember when he is dissatisfied, you will find that the whigs will be of his side, for partiality will show itself when party is concerned. I have received a letter from lord Rivers, with one enclosed from king Charles. As the whole letter concerns lord Rivers, I send him a copy of it by this post, tho’ I no ways doubt his having seen it before it was sealed. God knows what is to be done for the recovery of the great disorders that are now in Spain; for by what lord Rivers says, it is too plain king Charles apprehends that lord Galway betrays him, which can never enter into my head; however, if they believe it, it will poison all the undertakings on that side.

“ Your kind expressions in your’s of the 16th have given me infinite pleasure, and it is true what you say of Woodstock, that it is very much at my heart, especially when we are in prosperity, for then my whole thoughts are of retiring with you to that place. But if every thing does not go to our own desire, we must not set our hearts too much upon that place, for I see very plainly, that whilst I live, if there be troubles, I must have my share of them. This day makes your humble servant fifty-seven. On all accounts I could wish myself younger; but for none so much as that I might have it more in my power to make myself more agreeable to you, whom I love with all my soul.”

To add to the indignation which the british cabinet felt at the conduct of Austria, in consulting its impotent resentment against



Sweden, and still more in sacrificing the cause of Spain to its selfish views on Naples, some rumours appear at this period to have reached the lord treasurer, of a design, on the part of the emperor, to conclude a more general neutrality for Italy, which involved the relinquishment of the expedition against Toulon. In the height of his indignation, he proposed to forestal the design of the imperial court, by making overtures to France, through the agency of the elector of Bavaria. He expresses this opinion in a letter to the duke, dated

“*May 17--28.* It was but yesterday that I troubled you with two letters ; however, I have so many thoughts concerning the obstinate proceedings of the court of Vienna, after all the obligations they have to the allies, that I cannot help observing to you, that in case, by the answer you expect from the prince of Salm, you should find reason to be confirmed in M. Robethon’s suspicions, of their being inclined to a neutrality for Italy, which I look upon as a separate peace, I cannot see any good objection why it might not be worth your considering with the pensioner, whether measures might not be taken to be beforehand with them.

“ I am sensible this matter is very nice, but I mention it only upon supposing you are thoroughly satisfied of their intentions ; and then I should think, by restoring the elector of Bavaria to his country, which would be no small mortification at Vienna, he might be induced to prevail with France, rather to gratify England and Holland in the terms of the peace, than the house of Austria.

“ And upon this supposition, taking it for granted that they will put themselves quite out of the war, and stick to their acquisitions in Italy, and apply themselves to reduce Hungary, I must own very freely, I do not see how the rest of the allies can carry on the war without great disadvantage ; nor can I hope the dutch would be long afterwards, before they followed that example ; though, at the same time, I agree France is in so ill circumstances at home, that they must necessarily sink if the allies would but hold together. And this consideration makes the *contretems* of the imperial court so much the more unfortunate, and the more



grievous to the whole alliance. When all this is said, if the duke of Savoy can or will go on, notwithstanding this detachment for Naples, I shall not quite despair but the project may succeed; yet, in all events, I think we ought at least to be very watchful of the steps of these gentlemen, and take every occasion, great and little, to let them see we are very far from being satisfied with all their late behaviour.

“ I ought to ask you a great many pardons for persecuting you with such repeated trouble upon this subject. I am sure it gives me a great deal of trouble myself, and I wish there may be no occasion of my having given it you.

“ The greatest objection I can find myself against what I have here hinted is, your telling the pensioner that we are capable, in any case, of receding from the preliminaries settled with Holland. But I make you judge of that, as of all the rest; and if you please, when you have read my letter yourself, though you should never think of it again, I shall be very well contented.

“ It is with the same submission that I trouble you with the inclosed reply, which I made to count Wratislaw's letter, of which he sent you a copy. You may seal and send it forward to him if you think proper, and if not, you may please to burn it.

“ Our last french letters brag that they will venture a battle in Flanders. I think it is what we ought to wish for; but, at the same time, one cannot help being in a great deal of pain, till we know their intentions more certainly, and that you are not like to be much exposed.”

“ *June 1--12.* \* \* \* \* I think your letter to count Piper\* is as right as is possible, and I hope you will approve as well the queen's letter to the king of Sweden, of which Mr. Secretary Harley said he would send you a copy by the last post. If these letters come in time, or are in themselves sufficient to prevail with the king of Sweden, I think we are very lucky; for in case they do not, the court of Vienna seems to me neither to do one thing

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\* This letter is printed in Ledyard, v. 2, p. 105, and contains an exhortation to the king of Sweden to conclude an accommodation with the emperor.



nor to have one thought, that is not directly opposite to the interest of the allies ; and by all the copies of the letters you send me, it is not only plain that they persist with more obstinacy than ever in sending their detachment to Naples, but it seems to me as plain, that if the king of Sweden be uneasy to them, they will encourage the chimerical proposal to prince Eugene, and send for him and all his troops in Italy to support it, leaving the expedition against France to take care of itself. I take these consequences to be extremely probable, and that nothing can hinder them, unless you will let them plainly understand, that such proceedings as these will oblige the allies to break with them, and abandon the house of Austria to the mercy of France.

“ What you say of lord Galway is certainly right ; and considering the unjust impressions of the king of Spain in his prejudice, he cannot be of use there. But who can ? Every body that is there desires to leave the service, and come home ; and I know nobody to send but lord Rivers, who, perhaps, will not care to go neither, without troops from hence ; and we neither have them ; nor, if we had them, would it be of any use to send them, as you will see by the enclosed from M. Montandre.

“ There is nothing thought so essential here as to preserve Catalonia this winter, if it be any way possible ; and it having been fully considered this night at the cabinet council, Mr. Secretary Harley has orders to write to you by the messenger, to see if you can, either by count Wratislaw or Zinzendorf, bring this to be agreed with at the court of Vienna, which is at this time so unpopular here, that our two dukes,\* last Sunday night, would have been contented, I think, to have broke with them ; and the least unreasonable of the two would be satisfied with nothing less than a joint complaint and representation from England and Holland together, at their unaccountable conduct. But if they will be easy in sending troops to Spain, that matter will be set right again.

“ I find by the letters from Turin that lord Peterborough is

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\* The dukes of Somerset and Devonshire.



returned thither again, though he had formally taken his leave of the duke of Savoy. He has written a very angry letter to my lord Sunderland, in which he says he is coming very soon to your camp ; and you seem to be so much more in his favour than any body else, that I cannot but impute it to my lady's good offices, for last winter's visits to her."

Fortunately for the interests of the Grand Alliance, the views of Marlborough were too enlarged to enter into the resentment of his friend. Though disapproving the perverse and selfish spirit which actuated the imperial cabinet, he contemplated their conduct with the eyes of a statesman, and would not consent to sacrifice the public welfare, to the feelings of personal resentment, however justly founded. He therefore combated the opinions of Godolphin, by arguing that the emperor would not persist in pursuing a line of conduct, which was so contrary to his own interest ; and that it was necessary to connive at these selfish projects, for the sake of the common cause.

" *Meldert, June 9.* By your's of the 17th, I see you are very apprehensive of the court of Vienna's making peace. I think them extremely to blame in every thought they have, but such a proceeding would be direct madness. I think they have many projects more at heart than that of Toulon ; but till I am cheated, I must rely upon what prince Eugene promises, which is, that he will do his best ; so that I do not apprehend a neutrality. But I very much fear that count Wratislaw and the other ministers may persuade the emperor to such a behaviour as may force the king of Sweden into war, which I think would be destruction to themselves, as well as to their friends. I have said all that is possible for me to do to the court of Vienna, and have this morning sent your letter to count Wratislaw.

" Yesterday the count de la Motte joined the duke of Vendome's army, so that I think they have now all that is possible for them to have ; and notwithstanding the noise they have made of being in the plains of Fleurus, they have always been in very strong camps. They may in their next march, if they please, go into the plains of Fleurus, and then, if the deputies would allow



of it, we might have a decisive action ; but by what I can learn, they are no ways inclined to it."

" *Meldert, June 13.* I had yesterday your's of the 27th, with the inclosed letters that you had received from Alicante and Lisbon. I have also received a copy of a letter from general Erle to lord Rivers, by which, and what the king of Spain says to me in his letter of the 3rd of May from Barcelona, I find lord Galway in very bad circumstances. For my own part, I think him incapable of being guilty ; but if there be no confidence, the consequences must be fatal. I send copies of my letters from prince Eugene and the king of Spain to lord Sunderland, it being in his province, as also my answers ; so that if her majesty would have me write any thing more, I might have her pleasure.

" The count Maffei, \* who is now with me, presses very much that more powder might be sent to the fleet, assuring me that there is none to be bought in Italy ; he also desired me, in his master's name, to let you know that all the money he had, or could borrow, he has employed for the project. He begs that the second £. 50,000 might be sent, so that they might not fail for want of money ; and if they should be so unfortunate as not to succeed, you might then stop it from his subsidy. As this is the most likely project to make this campaign end well, if possible, they should have no excuse.

" As to myself, I am sure you are so kind as to believe that I will be careful of taking the first opportunity of doing good, as far as in me lies, but you know I am not entirely master ; however, I will not despair of doing service. By the express from prince Eugene, I received the enclosed from lord Peterborough, and if he does not change his mind, I am like to be happy in his company. Whatever his project may be, you shall be sure to know. I suppose the queen's intentions are, that he should return for England, and not stay on this side the water. I shall not pretend to give him much advice, but shall govern myself by

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\* Minister of the duke of Savoy.



what you shall write me ; for I believe I may have your answer before I shall see him."

" *Meldert, June 16.* I had this morning your's of the 30th of the last month, with the order of battle, by which it appears that the enemies were very much stronger than lord Galway, which makes it very strange, that by choice, they should go to attack them in a plain.

" I have sent the queen's letter to Mr. Robinson. I hope it may have a good effect, but I believe nothing can hinder the king of Sweden from mortifying the emperor, by staying in some of his hereditary countries, and I am afraid it will fall upon Silesia ; but though he is angry to the last degree, I dare say he will not declare war, since that cannot but turn to the advantage of France.

" You are very much in the right to make no answer to general Erle's letter till you hear from lord Galway. I know his presence in England is wanted for the board of ordnance. However, I think him the properest man you can leave in Spain, for he has never disobliged king Charles, and I think is of a temper to please him ; and I confess I think there is the same reason that the king of Spain and his general should command in Spain, as there was for the king of Portugal and his general in Portugal. This is my opinion only to you and her majesty, and if this should be thought reasonable, then Erle will be proper to be left, for I take it for granted, that my lord Galway neither can nor will stay.

" You will see by the letters I send Mr. Secretary Harley, that the saxon troops are desired for the Rhine, and that the emperor would give the command of the army on the Rhine to the elector of Hanover. I believe he will refuse it ; so that army will be without any commander for at least one month longer."

FROM LORD GODOLPHIN.

" *Windsor, Sunday, June 15--26.* One letter of last post from the Hague, tells us, the count de Noyelles has written a letter to the States, in which he is pleased to take great liberties with my lord Galway. We think it pretty hard here, at the same time,



that he who has been the visible occasion of our misfortunes in Spain, for two years successively, should have the confidence to lay the blame at the doors of others, who have suffered so much, and at so great an expence. And as most people are forward to think and say that nothing can succeed, while lord Galway is with the king of Spain, so here we shall enter into no expence, with much satisfaction, as long as we find the king continues under the same ill influence against us.

“As yet nothing has gone right for us, nor do I much like Mr. Robinson’s last letter from Leipsig; but whatever uneasiness happens to the court of Vienna, they deserve it richly, who would not, in all this time, send a general to the Rhine, though they have been pressed to do it, to my knowledge, ever since last Christmas.

“I reckon the duchess of Nemours’s death engages us to assist the king of Prussia, as far as we can, in his pretensions to Neufchatel; but I am sorry it comes to bear at this time, for fear it may put him upon recalling his troops from Italy to take possession. I hope you will endeavour to prevent this consequence of it.”

FROM LORD SUNDERLAND.

“*Whitehall, June 10--21.* \* \* \* \* What you say in relation to lord Galway is very right, that nothing should be done hastily in a matter of that consequence; but the account that colonel Wrede has brought, sets that matter in quite another light, and I am afraid there is too much partiality in lieutenant-general Erle, to lay much weight upon what he writes to lord Rivers. As for king Charles, it is plain lord Galway is very ill with him; but I am afraid that will be the case, in a month’s time, of any body else that may be sent, if they do their duty. When I have said this, I don’t pretend to say, or judge, what is right or proper to be done with such a court as that of Barcelona.”

TO THE DUCHESS.

“*Meldert, June 20.* I have had the happiness of your kind letter of the first of this month from St. Alban’s. From my soul I wish I were with you, but every day gives me less prospect of



that happiness. Your reasoning for not venturing at this time, agrees exactly with that of the dutch; for my own part, I beseech God Almighty to put into my heart what is right. I am very apprehensive of the consequences on both sides, so that I am resolved not to let slip any favourable occasion; but will not undertake, unless others be of the same opinion.

“ I have received a letter from general Erle, by which, and by every thing that comes from that country, I find there is such a contempt and anger against lord Galway, that it will be impossible for him to continue with any satisfaction to himself, or advantage to the public; but if this be not the opinion of your friends,\* I desire what I say may go for nothing. The being too much in the sun this day has made my head ache, so that I must end with assuring you, with the truth of my heart, of being entirely your's.

FROM LORD GODOLPHIN.

“ *Friday, June 13--24.* Not having any thing from you since my last, nor likely to have before this post, I shall only trouble you with some farther reflections on the affairs of king Charles.

“ I find lord Halifax, lord Somers, and their friends are pretty indifferent as to lord Rivers, and unconcerned whether he is to return or not. But they are very uneasy to think of recalling lord Galway, though sensible he must be useless; for they carry that matter so much farther, as to think all these misunderstandings are industriously fomented by count de Noyelles, whom they take to be the principal occasion and contriver of lord Galway's misfortunes; for which reason they seem to think, unless he be called home either before, or at the same time, with lord Galway, it will look as if he had been in the right, in all he had suggested to the king of Spain, and all the reflections which belong to that matter, must light upon lord Galway and England.

“ Now I know no remedy so probable for these difficulties, as

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\* The whigs.



that, if any troops go to Spain from Italy, the emperor might order some proper person to take the command of the whole, and count Noyelles and Galway be both recalled."

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

"*Meldert, June 23.* I received yesterday your's of the 1st and 3rd by the messenger. What you write of the court of Vienna is certainly right; but by the abstract I sent you by the last post, as well as by other letters, I am convinced they have no intelligence with France. Notwithstanding that, I have writ very plainly to them already, that if, upon any account whatsoever, the project concerted for the entry of France should miscarry, they must expect that all the fatal consequences would, with justice, be laid at their door. However, I shall obey your commands in writing, and at the same time propose to them the sending the greatest part of their detachment of Naples to the relief of king Charles in Catalonia. I hope you have not as yet told the count de Gallas that the queen would be contented to pay them. If you have not, I beg you will not let him nor Sir Philip Meadows\* know any more, than that the queen, as a mark of her zeal for the public good, and the particular concern she has for the person of king Charles, would be contented to allow a subsidy, towards the support of such troops as the emperor should send from that detachment of Naples. I am particular as to that detachment, so that they may not pretend to send any of their troops which are to enter France; for when that expedition is over, I should be in hopes that we might be able to spare the king from that army the 7,000 palatines, which are paid by England and Holland. That expence would not fall upon the queen alone, as I am afraid any other would do. For the dutch have so much mind to peace, and so just a pretence to poverty, that it was with great difficulty I was able to persuade them to come into one half of the expence of the regiment of Bothmar. That regiment, and the saxons make together, 5,400 men. The money that is saved by the regiments of foot, will more than pay the queen's part."

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\* British minister at Vienna.



“ *Meldert, June 23.* Believing it might be reasonable for you to shew my long letter to some that may have a much better opinion of lord Rivers than I have, I send you my opinion as to the command in Spain, apart, so that it may be known to none but yourself and her majesty. As I have already told you, that it is impracticable for lord Galway to continue in that service, and as you approve of the reasoning in Montandre’s letter, the number of the queen’s subjects in Spain will be too few for the command of lord Rivers; so that the best for the service would be to give the command to general Erle, and leave no other officers with him, but what may be suitable to the number of men. And as the troops of necessity that go from Italy, must be all foreigners, I think the chief command should be left to the king and his generals, and that general Erle should have directions to concern himself only with the queen’s subjects, and be obedient to whatever the king should command. At the same time, I think he should be encouraged by having the commission of general of the foot. The train of artillery might be very much lessened, so that you might be the better able to give subsidies for german troops that shall go thither. I should think that you might in confidence tell lord Rivers, that it is impossible to send from England such supplies as are necessary for the support of king Charles, but by the consent and assistance of the parliament; so that if they shall in the winter resolve on such a supply as shall enable the queen, she will then desire him to take the command.”

FROM LORD GODOLPHIN.

“ *Windsor, June 16--27.* \* \* \* \* I never did once imagine that the emperor had a thought of making separate terms with France; but yet all his behaviour has been so unaccountable, as to put the rest of the allies under the same difficulties as if he had acted by directions from Versailles.

“ For what relates to Spain, my own opinion agrees exactly with what you write, in your private letter to myself; and in that matter, there will be no difficulty with the queen. But, as I have told you, in my former letter, some of our friends here will be



unwilling to bring home lord Galway, while count de Noyelles stays with the king of Spain; so the true way of making all this easy will be, for the emperor to send a good general with the troops from Italy. The very best would be the count de Thaun,\* who went to Naples with the detachment.

“The queen will be very careful not to let the duke of Newcastle, or any body else, make you uneasy about governments. That of Tinmouth waits your orders; that of New York will be made vacant, whenever you propose a proper man; that of New England is also like to be vacant very soon, there being great clamours depending this time against col. Dudley, the present governor.”

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\* He is more commonly known by the name of Daun, and was the father of the celebrated austrian commander, in the seven years' war.



## CHAPTER 58.

1707.

*Intrigues and feuds in the cabinet—Resentment of the whigs at the favour shewn by the queen to the tories, in the disposition of church preferment—Their consequent bickerings with Marlborough and Godolphin—Misunderstanding between Marlborough and Halifax—Imprudent conduct of admiral Churchill—Threatened accusation against him in parliament—Decline of the influence which the duchess had hitherto enjoyed with the queen—Rise and intrigues of Mrs. Masham—Cabals of Harley—Altercations between the duchess and the queen, on the subject of Mrs. Masham—Independent, but impolitic conduct of Marlborough and the treasurer—They offend both the queen and the whigs—Continuation of the correspondence from Meldert.*

**W**HILE Marlborough was employed in superintending the operations of foreign policy, and the details of the camp, the intrigues in the court and cabinet no less seriously engaged his attention, and furnished still greater cause of perplexity.

Notwithstanding the success which attended the perseverance of the whigs, in procuring the appointment of Sunderland, their victory was not complete. It was of the highest consequence to favour their party, in the disposition of church preferment, not only as the means of increasing their interest in parliament, but of securing the influence attached to the clerical character in public opinion. On this point, however, the queen was still more tenacious than on questions of state policy. Zealously attached to the doctrines of the high church, she was anxious to fill the ecclesiastical dignities with persons of congenial sentiments, and to exclude those of contrary principles, whom she regarded as little better than infidels. Jealous of the favour which the two ministers had recently shewn towards the whigs, she withdrew from them that confidence which she had evinced on



former occasions, and consulted only her own partialities, or the recommendations of her secret advisers, in the disposition of ecclesiastical preferment.

Two instances of this kind form a prominent feature in the correspondence of the year. The first was her refusal to nominate Dr. Potter to the Regius Professorship of divinity, in the university of Oxford. Although this learned divine had been warmly recommended by Marlborough himself; yet his attachment to the doctrines of the revolution was a sufficient demerit with the sovereign; and she designated for the appointment Dr. Smalridge, who, to equal talents and learning, added the merit of a zealous devotion to the tenets of the high church, and the tory maxims of policy.

The second and most prominent instance was in the designation to the two sees of Exeter and Chester, which became vacant at the close of the preceding year. Without waiting the recommendation of the ministers, or rather to prevent their interference, she promised these two dignities to Sir William Dawes and Dr. Blackall, who were no less distinguished for their tory zeal than for their merit and learning; and to evade the remonstrances of Marlborough, she concealed her intentions until he had taken his departure from England.

Such striking proofs of favour to the opposite party, awakened the indignation of the whigs; and, by their instigation, Marlborough and Godolphin were involved in a new contention with the queen, which lasted during the whole year. The effects even recoiled on the two ministers themselves; for when their remonstrances failed in inducing her to desist from her purpose, the junta relapsed into the same suspicions of their good faith, as they had manifested on former occasions, and recurred, as before, to importunities, complaints, and threats.

This political discordance with the whigs in general, gave rise to a misunderstanding between Halifax and Marlborough in particular. We have already adverted to the increasing importunities of the whig chief, for some post, which he could hold with the situation of auditor



of the exchequer. He had indeed been gratified with the appointment of ambassador to the court of Hanover, in the preceding year, and was afterwards engaged in negotiating the treaty of barrier. But this employment being temporary, only increased his anxiety to move in a diplomatic sphere, and he aspired to the situation of joint plenipotentiary, for the conclusion of peace. Marlborough, however, disliking his temper, endeavoured to elude his demand, by offering the appointment to lord Somers ; and on his refusal, he recommended lord Townshend, hoping by this choice, at once to conciliate the whigs, and to prevent the nomination of a colleague, with whom he could not cordially act. Halifax was grievously mortified at this slight, and expresses his chagrin in a letter to the duchess.

“ *March 28.* Madam ;—I am extremely concerned that the contrary winds keep my lord Marlborough on this side of the water ; but I am at present under so great a mortification, that I think nobody but myself would trouble themselves about the public. Your grace has been so obliging to me, that I cannot forbear any longer from unburthening my heart to you.

“ I was the last man in England to think myself qualified for any foreign business, when last year I was put upon going to Hanover, as a service particularly acceptable to the queen. I knew how ungrateful and difficult a task I undertook ; yet at the desire of lord Marlborough and lord treasurer, I submitted, and went uneasily, but successfully through it. It happened while I was in Holland, that a treaty for securing our succession, and a barrier for the States was set on foot ; and, by lord Marlborough’s orders, I was employed in that, and had many conferences with the ministers upon it, and letters from them since, which, by the directions of lord treasurer and lord Marlborough, I answered ; and by their commands, against my own inclinations, entered into that negotiation, and took upon me the ungrateful part of opposing the unreasonable pretensions of the dutch. Afterwards, lord Marlborough desired me to persuade lord Somers to join with him in treating of peace, when the time should come. I



did it very zealously, as lord Sunderland can witness, but could not prevail. And after that, when perhaps your grace will think I might have expected, at least, to be asked the question, I heard, in a very extraordinary manner, that lord Townshend was named.

“ I have told your grace a short, but melancholy story, by which, I think it appears, I have been treated with great contempt or unkindness, as will be judged both at home and abroad, at a time that I am not conscious myself of having deserved either from lord Marlborough.

“ Madam, I will make no other reflections, and forbear saying any more upon a subject so afflicting to me. I beg your grace will not imagine me so vain, as to be much disturbed for missing the most expensive, most troublesome, and most dangerous commission in the world ; but I own I am almost distracted to find I can no way get any share of lord Marlborough’s esteem and friendship. I have done all I could to merit them, and for that intention I hope your grace will pity me and forgive me.” \*

The offended peer soon found an opportunity, of which he did not fail to profit, to shew his resentment for this slight.

We have already alluded to the tory principles of admiral Churchill, and the zeal with which he was supposed to have inflamed the queen and prince of Denmark against the whigs. His conduct naturally excited their resentment, and they expressed their resolution of directing an accusation against him in parliament. The complaints which had arisen on the mismanagement of the navy, afforded an opportunity of selecting him as the person who possessed the highest influence in the council of the lord high admiral, and to whom many of the recent losses, sustained by the trading part of the community, were attributed. The duke was naturally anxious to spare the feelings and character of a brother, and not only appealed to the whigs in

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\* As this letter is without the date of the year, I first considered it as written in March 1708, when the appointment of lord Townshend took place. But the detention of the duke of Marlborough at Harwich, by contrary winds, and the mention of the embassy to Hanover in the preceding year, combine to fix the date of the letter in March 1707.



general, but particularly addressed himself to lord Halifax, who was one of the principal movers of the accusation. Although he wrote in a style of unusual humility and condescension, the offended peer disdained to give any reply. This contemptuous treatment weighed on the mind of the duke, and drew from him the strongest expressions of regret and indignation, in his letters both to the duchess and Godolphin.

The duchess, who had invariably censured the conduct and principles of her brother in law, espoused the cause of the whigs, and by her reproaches and interference, aggravated the disquietude of her husband.

Admiral Churchill, at the same time, imprudently increased the odium against him, by imitating the example of the tories, in stigmatizing the conduct of the war in Spain, and the character of lord Galway. He was even accused of joining at a public dinner, in a sarcastic toast, which was then current, reflecting on the military talents of the unfortunate commander. Another act of imprudence was, his demur in taking the usual oaths, which were rendered necessary, by the appointment of a new board of admiralty, into which Walpole and other zealous whigs were introduced. This hesitation was construed, and perhaps not unjustly, into a proof of his attachment to the exiled family.

At the same time, a private cabal was forming in the household of the queen, which no less embarrassed, and still more deeply affected the duke, both in his public and private capacity.

From the account of the domestic transactions in the preceding year, it appears that the great credit which the duchess of Marlborough had at first attained with the queen, had continued to decline. The external appearances of friendship and confidence were still preserved; because the queen was a perfect mistress of dissimulation, and because the spirit of the duchess was too lofty, even to suspect that the empire which she possessed over her royal mistress could be undermined. In this she resembled most favourites, who neglect to maintain their power, by the means employed to acquire it, and overlook appearances, which seem trifling only to themselves. Nothing, in



fact, could perhaps have shaken her interest, but an inferior agent, in whom she placed the most implicit confidence, and on whose situation and abilities she looked down with indifference, if not contempt.

Averse to the restraint of constant attendance, the duchess had endeavoured to lighten the fatigues of her envied, but not enviable situation, by placing about the person of her royal mistress, as one of the bed chamber women, Mrs. Abigail Hill,\* an humble relation, whom she had rescued from penury, and whose family she had maintained and patronised. Considering this dependant as too lowly in situation, and too confined in abilities to create jealousy, she little imagined that a person whose post was held only by her protection, and who was bound to her by the ties both of gratitude and affinity, would attempt to form an interest against her benefactress. For a time, her cousin answered all her expectations, and seemed a faithful and vigilant observer of the transactions at court, and the feelings and conduct of the queen. The duchess therefore relaxed still more in her attendance; and proud of her husband's splendid services, she gradually became more presumptuous and domineering.

Mrs. Hill had not, however, long filled her confidential office, before she likewise aspired to a higher degree of consideration; and the state of the cabinet and parties, offered a temptation which overcame her sense of gratitude. The violent bickerings which continually arose between the queen and the duchess did not escape the vigilant eye of a daily attendant. By the confidential complaints which frequently burst from the queen, Mrs. Hill found herself growing into consequence; and her rising influence was perceived by the candidates for court favour, almost before it was known to herself.

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\* Mr. Hill was an eminent Turkey merchant; but, becoming a bankrupt, his numerous family was reduced to the greatest straits. Some letters from Mrs. Hill, the mother of Mrs. Masham, are preserved in the Marlborough papers, which convey the warmest expressions of gratitude for the favours of the duchess, and shew that she obtained places and establishments for all the children. Abigail was so reduced, as to enter into the service of lady Rivers, wife of Sir John Rivers, bart., of Chafford, in Kent, as I was informed by the late James Rivers, esq. She was raised from her humble situation by the duchess.



Besides that suppleness of temper natural to dependants rising into favour, which formed so advantageous a contrast with the overbearing and provoking conduct of her patroness, the political principles of Mrs. Hill were in unison with those of the queen. She was deeply imbued with the maxims of the high church party, and was classed among those who were adverse to the house of Hanover, if not partisans of the Stuarts. Such a congeniality of character and sentiment, joined to the most flattering humility of demeanour, and a watchful observance of her royal mistress's wishes, made a rapid progress in the affections of Anne, whose character was turned to the familiar and romantic friendship which her station forbade, and who, at this period, peculiarly felt the want of an adviser and confidant.

The bed chamber woman found a skilful counsellor and abettor in Secretary Harley, to whom she was related in the same degree by her father, as to the duchess by her mother; and by whom she and her family had been likewise assisted. Their relationship produced intimacy; and in the secret intrigues which Harley was equally meditating against his patrons, he naturally courted the aid of so useful an auxiliary. Mrs. Hill, therefore, was easily estranged from her benefactress, and became the channel of a constant communication between the queen and the secretary, more dangerous, as it was less suspected.

Harley was, perhaps, of all men, the best calculated to win his way through the crooked paths of political intrigue. He had hitherto figured as a whig or tory, as it suited his interests; and under the guise of moderation, had gradually acquired a considerable body of adherents, to whom his parliamentary talents gave strength and consistency. He was supple, plausible, and insinuating, adroit in flattery, and profuse in his professions of duty and attachment. To these qualities he joined uncommon discernment of character, a cool and calculating head, a spirit of profound dissimulation, and an exterior of familiarity, courtesy, and candour, which deceived the most suspicious.

Owing his political consideration principally to the countenance of Marlborough, he loaded him with declarations of respect, zeal,



and duty, and professed to emulate his principles of moderation and independence. By this affectation of attachment, he won on his open and unsuspecting temper; and we find from the correspondence, that at the very moment when he was accused of duplicity, Marlborough himself became a pledge for his sincerity, and even advised the treasurer to employ his interposition with the queen. Knowing the tory partialities of his royal mistress, her growing aversion to the duchess, and her anxiety for peace, to free herself from the power of the whigs, Harley skilfully formed his attacks against the chiefs of the ministry. By the intercourse with the queen, which he enjoyed in virtue of his office, and still more through the channel of Mrs. Hill, he found means to inflame her indignation against the duchess, to work on that high sense of prerogative, which she had imbibed from her father, and to represent the treasurer and general, as favouring the efforts of the whigs for engrossing all the offices of state, and reducing her to a degree of dependance unworthy of a sovereign.\* These insinuations were too much in unison with her feelings to fail of the desired effect, and the secret cabals of Harley in the preceding year, had encouraged her to resist the attempts of that party for the appointment of Sunderland. At the same time, the artful secretary fomented the discontent of the whigs against Marlborough and Godolphin, by insinuating that the two ministers were lukewarm in their cause, and the only obstacles to their admission into power.

The confidential friends of the duchess, among whom was Mr. Maynwaring, had made repeated representations on the rising influence and secret views of Mrs. Hill. But for a considerable time, they remonstrated without effect; for the duchess was

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\* These facts are usually considered as depending on the authority of the duchess alone; and, therefore, have been often questioned; but we find them also stated in a letter from Mr. Vernon to the duke of Shrewsbury, dated Feb. 10, 1708, and even avowed and justified by the tory advocates of Harley. His insinuations and charges against the Marlborough family, and the measures which he adopted to promote a negotiation for peace, are stated no less strongly by the author of "The Other Side of the Question," than by the duchess herself, p. 324.



rejoiced at the relief which she had gained from restraint, and could not be convinced of the danger arising from the machinations of her own dependant. At length, the conduct of the queen, combined with the evident favour of Harley and Mrs. Hill, dissipated the cloud which had hitherto obscured her judgment, and she communicated her apprehensions to Godolphin and the duke.

It is, indeed, singular, that the intrigue had escaped the matured sagacity of Godolphin, until it was become notorious; and that Marlborough, to whom the secrets of all the courts in Europe were known, should have been ignorant of a cabal in his own, in which he was himself so deeply interested. It is still more extraordinary, that after he was acquainted with the influence of the rising favourite, he should think so lightly of its consequences, as to suppose that it might be checked by a mere remonstrance. In reply to the first communication from the duchess, he says, "I should think you might speak to her with some caution, which might do good; for she certainly is grateful, and will mind what you say."\*

In conformity with this advice, the duchess not only remonstrated with Mrs. Hill, but assailed the queen with reproaches, and accused her of suffering her political antipathies to be inflamed by the insinuations of a dependant, who conversed only with jacobites, and disaffected tories. To these accusations, which were urged both in conversation and writing, the queen replied in a style of affected humility, and real sarcasm, denying, with the utmost solemnity, the charge advanced against Mrs. Hill.

"*Friday, five o'clock, July 18.* I give my dear Mrs. Freeman many thanks for her letter, which I received this morning, as I must always do for every thing that comes from her, not doubting but what you say, is sincerely meant in kindness to me. But I have so often been unfortunate in what I have said to you, that I think the less I say to your last letter the better; therefore, I shall

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\* Meldert, June 2, 1707.



only, in the first place, beg your pardon once more, for what I said the other day, which I find you take ill; and say something in answer to your explanation of the suspicions you seemed to have concerning your cousin Hill, who is very far from being an occasion of feeding Mrs. Morley in her passion, as you are pleased to call it; she never meddling with any thing.

“ I believe others that have been in her station in former times, have been tattling and very impertinent, but she is not at all of that temper; and as for the company she keeps, it is with her as with most other people. I fancy that their lot in the world makes them move with some, out of civility, rather than choice; and I really believe, for one that is so much in the way of company, she has less acquaintance than any one upon earth. I hope, since in some part of your letter, you seem to give credit to a thing, because I said it was so, you will be as just in what I have said now, about Hill; for I would not have any one hardly thought of by my dear Mrs. Freeman, for your poor unfortunate, but ever faithful Morley's notions or actions.”

The concealed sarcasm conveyed in this epistle, wounded the feelings of the duchess. She applied to herself the reflection on those who, in a similar situation, had been guilty “ of tattling and impertinence,” and gave utterance to her resentment in a style still more acrimonious than before.

The doubts of all parties, were, however, soon turned into certainty, by the discovery that Mrs. Hill had secretly contracted a marriage with Mr. Masham, whom the duchess had likewise protected, and placed in the royal household. This match, concluded without her privity, and, as she soon afterwards discovered, solemnized in the presence of the queen and Dr. Arbuthnott, was a thunderstroke of evidence. It proved, not only that Mrs. Masham had forgotten her obligations, but that she possessed the highest degree of confidence. At the moment when this fact transpired, Godolphin also obtained unequivocal proof of Harley's machinations with both whigs and tories, and of his private intercourse with Mrs. Masham.



In this crisis, the duchess, instead of attempting to conciliate her royal mistress, and to regain her favour, by renewing her former attentions, assailed her with bitter reproaches, which were the more revolting, because partly just. On the first intelligence of the marriage, she burst into the royal presence, and expostulated with the queen for concealing a secret which nearly regarded her as a relation. The mortifying replies of the queen, who warmly vindicated the silence of her favourite, by imputing it to fear of offending, rather inflamed than soothed her resentment; and, from this period, their correspondence exhibits a tone of dissembling humility on one hand, and on the other, of acrimonious reproach. By the interposition of Godolphin,\* however, Mrs. Masham was induced, at length, to make an overture of reconciliation; though the interview which ensued, shewed that the breach was irreparable.

Marlborough and Godolphin acted with dignity, but without that decision and address which the emergency required. They neither resolved to join cordially with the whigs, and by their assistance to crush the rising cabal; nor did they yield to the prevailing passion of the queen, and coalesce with the tories. They continued to maintain their moderate, but imprudent principle to be swayed by neither party; and endeavoured to alarm the queen with threats of resignation, which had been too often repeated to produce the desired effect. The progress of their feelings and opinion will best appear from the correspondence.

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\* In the account of her Conduct, p. 245. the duchess does not allude to the interference of Godolphin; but in a letter to Mr. Hutchinson, which was written soon after the accession of George the first, she expressly mentions the apology of Mrs. Masham, as produced by his representations to the queen.

"Lord Godolphin," she says, "also took an opportunity of speaking to the queen on this matter, and when he gave me an account of all that had passed betwixt them, in relation to it, I remember he told me, that he had convinced the queen, indeed, that Mrs. Masham was in the wrong; but that she shewed she was very desirous to have had her in the right. The effect of this was, that Mrs. Masham condescended at last to write to me, to desire me to appoint a time when she might wait upon me, which accordingly I did, &c."

From the narrative of the duchess to Mr. Hutchinson, copied from her original draught, and corrected with her own hand.



## TO THE DUCHESS.

“*Meldert, June 23.* I have had the pleasure of receiving your's of the 3rd from St. Alban's, and that of the 6th from St. James's, by which I find something is doing, by way of promotions in the church, that makes the whigs uneasy. I do assure you I am very sorry for it, but you know I have very little to say in those matters. You know how often I spoke about Dr. Potter, and I do not hear that it is as yet done; tho' the consequence is, that if he has not the professor's place, I will never more meddle with any thing that may concern Oxford.”

“*Meldert, June 26.* Tho' the post is not to go till to-morrow, and I hope to have the happiness of hearing from you before that time, yet I would not lose this hour, which I have to myself, of assuring you that you are always in my thoughts, and if it were not for the happiness I propose to myself, of living some part of the remainder of my life quietly with you, I could not bear with patience the trouble I struggle with at this time. The weather is so very hot, and the dust so very great, that I have this hour to myself, the officers not caring to be abroad till the hour of orders obliges them to it. It is most certain, that when I was in Spain,\* in the month of August, I was not more sensible of the heat than I am at this minute. If you have the same weather, it must make all sorts of fruit very good; and as this is the third year of the trees at Woodstock, if possible, I should wish that you might, or somebody you can rely on, taste the fruit of every tree, so that what is not good might be changed. On this matter you must advise with Mr. Wise, as also what plan may be proper for the ice-house; for that should be built this summer, so that it might have time to dry. The hot weather makes me think of these things, for the most agreeable of all presents is that of ice.”

## TO LORD SUNDERLAND.

“*Meldert, June 27.* Nobody can have a better opinion than I have of lord Galway; but when I consider the court and king

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\* This must allude to his journey to or from Tangier, where he served as a volunteer.—  
See p. 4, v. 1.



of Spain, I think it would be the most barbarous thing in the world to impose upon lord Galway to stay ; for I am very confident he had rather beg his bread ; I am sure I would. About ten days hence, I hope we may hear something good from the duke of Savoy ; for as to the affairs of Germany, I expect nothing but confusion. However, I have sent the order to the saxons to march to the Rhine, as you will have seen by my letter to the elector of Mayence. As to our affairs here, we begin to think ourselves as strong as the enemy, which most certainly we are, and our foot infinitely better than their's ; so that I hope in a little time, every body will consent to venture, and that God will bless us with success. I might be trusted with full powers, for I protest to you, that I would not venture unless the probability were on our side ; for the inclinations in Holland are so strong for peace, that should we have the least disadvantage, they would act very extravagantly. I must own to you that every country we have to do with, in my opinion, acts so very contrary to the public good, that it makes me quite weary of serving. However, till the end of this war, I see a necessity of my serving ; after which, I hope for yours and our friends leave of living the little remainder of my life in quiet. I am, with all my heart, &c."

" *June 27.* You may assure 255 that no man living is more desirous of a good peace than I am. The emperor is in the wrong in almost every thing he does ; but what she writes concerning his having correspondence with France, is certainly not so. The people in Holland, which seem to be favourable to Peterborough, are of all the worst in that country. I hear by my last letters from Italy, that he is gone to Vienna, to solicit troops for king Charles ; but his mind changes so often, that there is not much weight to be laid upon his motions, nor have I answered any of his letters, not knowing where to send them. I am glad to hear that the duke of Shrewsbury is easier than the last year. I do not think he can ever be of much use, but it is much better to have mankind pleased than angry ; for a great many that can do no good, have it always in their power to do hurt. What you say concerning the uneasiness between the queen and the



lord treasurer; if that continues, destruction must be the consequence, as the circumstances of our affairs are abroad, as well as at home. I am sure, to the best of my understanding, and with the hazard of my life, I will always endeavour to serve the queen. But if she inclines more to be governed by the notions of Mr. Harley than those of Mr. Montgomery, I would sooner lose my life than persuade him to continue, in such circumstances, in the service of the queen. This is only to yourself; but you may depend upon it, that if ever I be advised with, this will be my opinion. All that I know concerning lord Peterborough is, that he would do any thing to get the payment of an arrear of about 3,000 pounds."

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

"*Meldert, June 27.* I have, since my last, had the favour of your's of the 8th and 10th, and am very glad to find you are so near an end of your scotch business; for what you are obliged to leave to the british parliament, I am not in much pain; for I think there must happen so many things on this side of the water, that of consequence I think will make the sessions either easy or uneasy; and as I can't but hope that God will bless the project of entering France, as well as this army, with some success this campaign, I will flatter myself that her majesty will have a very easy sessions. That which gives me the greatest trouble is, what you say concerning the queen; for if Mrs. Morley's prejudice to some people is so unalterable, and that she will be disposing of the preferments now vacant, to such as will tear to pieces her friends and servants, that must create distraction. But you know my opinion was, and is yet, that you ought to take with you Mr. Secretary Harley, and to let the queen see, with all the freedom and plainness imaginable, her true interest; and when she is sensible of that, there will be no more difficulty; if there should, you will have performed your duty, and God's will be done. For my own part, I see in almost every country, they act so extremely against their own interest, that I fear we have deserved to be punished. I will endeavour to serve to the best of my understanding, and then shall submit with much resignation to the



pleasure of God, whose mercies and protection I am very sensible of. And as I do freely venture my life in gratitude for the favours I have received from the queen, so I do hope and beg that you will take a proper time of letting the queen know my heart and firm resolution, with her leave, that as soon as the war is at an end, I might be master of myself, by which I might have both time and quietness to reconcile myself to God, which ought to be the end of every honest man."

TO THE DUCHESS.

"*Meldert, July 4.* By your's of the 13th, I find 162 \* is gone into the country in great delight, which I am very sorry for; for it is most certain, that whatever pleases him, can't be for the service of the queen. If I were ever capable of giving advice, it would be rashness to do it at this distance; but I believe nothing can cure this matter, if I guess right, but lord treasurer's giving himself the trouble of writing very plainly what he thinks is wrong, and send it to the queen, without offering to quit, or expecting any answer; but, as in duty bound, to leave it to her consideration. I should hope this would do it; but if it should not, the last and only thing must be, that the solicitor-general speak very freely to Mr. Harley. \* \* \* \*

"As to what lord Sunderland says concerning the king of Spain, that nobody will please him that does their duty, I am of his mind, and I have also as good an opinion of lord Galway as any body can have; but that is no argument for lord Galway's stay; for as it is, it will be impossible for those two † to serve together; but as I am resolved to meddle as little as possible, pray say nothing of this."

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

"*Meldert, July 4.* Since my last I have had the favour of your's of the 13th, old style, with the inclosed letters of Mr. Methuen and Montandre. I agree with you, that the alliance with Portugal should be maintained, if possible; but by Mr.

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\* Probably the archbishop of York.

† The count de Noyelles and lord Galway.



Methuen's letter, I fear it will be very difficult. However, there ought to be care taken that the fault should not be on our side. I own to you, that I am a good deal of the mind of Montandre, by which I am confirmed in the opinion, that the war in Catalonia must be carried on by troops from Italy, and not by the queen's subjects, by which you may save money, and the service be better done; and by that, the king and his general will naturally have the command, which is itself very reasonable. I hear the court of Vienna has had a copy of my letter to count Piper, and that they dislike two expressions; \* the one where I mention the court of Vienna, and the other, the treaty of Italy. If I hear any thing from them of it, I shall let them know the truth, that I meant the letter for their service. If they take it ill after that, it will not give me much trouble.

"I have received letters from Turin of the 15th of the last month, by which I see they will not begin their operations till about the 25th. I shall not be at ease till I hear they are in France; for the fear of the king of Sweden is so great at Vienna, that God knows what orders may go from thence. I send to Mr. Secretary Harley a letter from the elector of Hanover's minister at the Hague, and my answer. You will see by it, that the elector desires that M. Bothmar's regiment of dragoons, which is paid by the queen and Holland, might go with him into Germany. It was by no means proper for me to give him the answer; but I should think if it serves with him in Germany, it would be very unreasonable for the queen and Holland to pay it. I have writ the same thing to the pensioner, but have desired him not to make use of my name. Besides, if we allow of this, we may be sure,

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\* The two passages which displeased the court of Vienna, in the duke's letter to count Piper, were these: "All this you will easily conceive gives us a great deal of uneasiness; but may I frankly own to you, that the new instances of dissatisfaction which the court of Vienna has so lately given the king, is a greater trouble to me than the latter of these accidents."

"We caused the army to be assembled immediately, as did likewise the enemy on their side; for taking advantage of the treaty of Italy, they have drawn so many troops from those posts, that they are come out of their lines with a pretty large superiority."—Ledyard, vol. 2, p. 196.



either this campaign or the next, he will press to have more of his troops.

“ I have had letters of the 22nd of the last month from Vienna this morning, by which I see they have resolved to send count Wratislaw once more to the king of Sweden, and if possible, to give him satisfaction. If they had done this sooner, it would have been better, but I am glad he goes. I have this morning received your two letters from Windsor, of the 15th and 16th of the last month. As to what you say concerning Neufchatel, I have said so much to the king, of the positive orders her majesty has given to her ministers, for their acting in whatever way he shall think proper, that I am sure he is satisfied ; so that you need apprehend no ill consequences by the death of the duchess of Nemours. The king of Prussia is so zealous for the entering France, that he has already desired that some of his troops may take possession of the principality of Orange.

“ Tho’ my letter is already too long, yet I must answer your desire of knowing how long the enemy and we may continue in our camps. I believe, with some difficulty, we might stay in our’s till the end of this month ; but I have been some time endeavouring to persuade the dutch deputies that I might take the camp of Genappe ; when I can prevail, you will hear of my being there. The reason of their backwardness is, that they apprehend that might engage the two armies to some action, which they are willing to avoid, till we hear some good news from Italy.”

TO LORD SUNDERLAND.

“ *Meldert, July 7.* My lord ;—I have but too many reasons to think that the dutch would be glad of pretences to excuse the earnest desire they have of a peace. I now send a letter to Mr. Secretary Harley, which I have received from the States General, in order to have her majesty’s commands. There can be no question of the great advantage it would be to the allies, if the emperor could put an end to the war in Hungary. But I do very much fear the advantages the french have had in the beginning of this campaign, as also the king of Sweden’s being still in the empire, has heartened the hungarians to that degree, that whatever inclina-



tions the emperor may be brought to for peace, it would be of little use in this conjuncture ; so that, in my opinion, I can see no use in taking such measures as this letter seems to desire, but that of using the emperor very harshly, and by it, shewing to France that the continuance of the war must be with great difficulty. For it is not possible that England and Holland can speak to the emperor as is desired, but that it must be known in France.

“ I have not acquainted any body, either in England or Holland, what my thoughts are of this matter, which makes me beg you will communicate them to nobody but lord Halifax and lord Somers ; and pray assure them that I shall govern myself agreeably to their opinions, so that you must take care of the directions I must receive from Mr. Harley. The dutch deputies will not own to me that they have any other orders or directions, but that of being cautious not to venture any thing, till they hear what is done in Provence. But I have reason to believe that they have more positive orders from the States ; and let the success be good or bad in Provence, I believe they will continue of the mind they are now in ; since it is the daily discourse in this army, as well as in Holland, why should they venture, since they have already in their hands what will be a sufficient security to them ? If an occasion offer, I no ways doubt but God will both incline us to make use of it, and bless us with success, which will not only be the endeavours, but daily prayers of, &c.”

FROM LORD GODOLPHIN.

“ *Windsor, June 24 - July 5.* I am sorry to find you have your doubts on the affair of Toulon. I confess I have had mine a good while, and the more, because I see them upon all occasions so pressing for money beforehand. But I knew no remedy ; they were not to be refused, and we must trust them, if we are deceived. Upon that, and many other accounts, I am like to pass my time but indifferently next winter ; especially, since the queen's proceedings in some things will give the whigs a handle to be uneasy, and to tear every thing to peices, if they cannot have their own terms. And Mr. Harley does so hate and fear lord Somers, lord



Sunderland, and lord Wharton, that he omits no occasion of filling the queen's head with their projects and designs; and if Mr. Montgomery should take him with him upon any occasion of that kind, he would either say nothing, or would argue against what the other says, as he did upon some subjects, some months since, when Mr. Freeman himself was present.

"Lady Marlborough went to Woodstock very early this morning.

"Since I had written thus far, I have seen the queen, who desired me to tell you that she would write to you in a post or two, as soon as her hand was a little stronger. I suppose the occasion of her letter will be upon my having read to her some expressions in your letter of the 27th, which she calls splenetic. However, I think this use may be made of it, to say in your answer what you think proper upon the state of the queen's affairs."

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

"*Meldert, July 11.* \* \* \* \* Since you think it will be of no use to take Mr. Harley with you to the queen, you must find some way of speaking plainly to him; for if he continues in doing ill offices upon all occasions to lord Somers, lord Sunderland, and lord Wharton, it will at last have so much effect upon the queen, whose inclinations are already that way, it must occasion that no measures will be followed. If Mrs. Morley writes to me, I shall be sure to send you a copy of my answer.

"You have so much business, that I am afraid you have forgot to settle with Mr. Bridges the allowance out of the poundage, which I desired for Mr. St. John.\* I beg the favour of your doing it."

TO THE DUCHESS.

"*Meldert, July 11.* As I believe I shall stay in this camp the greatest part of this month, and if we can find forage, longer, I shall make use of this time in beginning to take the waters of Spa next Wednesday; and as I am obliged to be abroad every day, I

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\* The duke of Marlborough had requested lord Godolphin to increase the emoluments of Mr. St. John, as secretary at war, by augmenting the poundage, and did not desist from his instances till he succeeded.



shall content myself with one bottle. I wish you could take them with me, for besides the satisfaction I should have, I am very confident they are better here than they can be in England. I cannot express to you the joy I have when your letters are kind, as that of the 23rd of the last month was; I received it last night. And as I find you intend to return from Woodstock in a week, I shall be impatient to hear you approve of what has been done. Your expression of the ice-house, that it can't be of use this three years, is a very melancholy prospect to me, who am turned on the ill side of fifty-seven.

“ I am very sorry that you think you have reason to believe that Mr. Harley takes all occasions of doing hurt to England. If lord treasurer can't find a remedy, and that before the next winter, I should think his wisest and honestest way should be, to tell the queen very plainly which way he thinks her business may be carried on; and if that be not agreeable, that she would lose no time in knowing of Mr. Harley what his scheme is, and follow that; so that lord treasurer might not be answerable for what might happen. If this were said plainly to the queen and Mr. Harley, I am very confident the latter would not dare undertake the business, and then every thing might go quietly.

“ Mr. Montgomery writes me word, that upon reading some part of my letter of the 27th of the last month to Mrs. Morley, she thought what I said proceeded from the spleen; but, if I may be believed, my resolution is taken, though, at the same time, if I could see that my life could do her any good, I would venture it a thousand times for her service; but when a peace is made, I can't but think it very reasonable for me to dispose of the little time I may have to live.”

FROM LORD GODOLPHIN.

“ *Windsor, June 27--July 8.* Not having any letters from you since my last, nor from Lisbon, this serves chiefly to cover the inclosed letter from the queen. My next will be from London, her majesty going thither for two days in the beginning of the week, to accompany the prince, who is to qualify himself as well as myself, for renewing our offices of admiral and treasurer of Great Britain.



This will necessitate some other renewals, as in the prince's council, and the officers of the exchequer, which may occasion brangles and disputes next winter, of which there will be no need; for I never saw more preparation for uneasiness in my life.

“The queen has indulged her own inclination in the choice of some persons to succeed the bishops, which gives the greatest offence to the whigs that can be; and though the whigs were, from other things, in a disposition to lay more weight upon it, than in truth the thing itself ought to bear, yet it must be allowed, taking all circumstances together, to be a very great *contretems*. And, indeed, Mr. Montgomery is particularly sensible of the load it gives him; but at the same time, he sees plainly, that the queen has gone so far in this matter, even against his warning, as really to be no more able than willing to retract this wrong step.

“One of the measures, which I fear is laid down by the whigs, is, to disturb your brother George, as soon as ever they have an opportunity. He is sensible of this, and seemed to have thoughts of preventing any thing of this nature, by not *renewing* upon the occasion I hinted before. He spoke to me; and though I am of opinion it would be right for himself, and every body else, I entered no farther into it, than to say that was an affair in which I thought nobody could advise so well as one's self. I am sorry to have nothing but such disagreeable subjects to entertain you with. Lady M. is at Woodstock, but I hope she will be here again next week.”

“*Windsor, June 30--July 11.* There being now two posts wanting from you, and no other foreign letters since my last, in which was one inclosed from the queen, I shall therefore only trouble you now with what relates to England, though that be a very disagreeable subject.

“By all the conversation I have had since my last, I have a good deal of reason to be confirmed in the great uneasiness of the whigs, as well as of the consequences of it; and though I will not neglect any thing that is possible to prevent the inconveniences that threaten, yet the difficulties one meets with are such, and particularly in the unwillingness of the queen to do



any thing that is good and necessary for Mrs. Morley, that unless I may hope for Mr. Freeman's assistance, even before the winter, there must be the greatest confusion imaginable in all the affairs of the parliament."

"*Sunday, July 8--19.* By the bishop of Norwich's being made bishop of Ely, there are now three bishoprics vacant ; and I have so little hopes of their being well filled, that I am resolved to use all my endeavours to keep them vacant, till I can have Mr. Freeman's assistance, in those spiritual affairs, which seem to grow worse and worse, ever since I saw you last, with the queen and me, and another person, who, I doubt not, has not much changed his mind in those matters, though he won't own any thing like that to Mr. Montgomery."

"*July 10--21.* After I had written thus far, I received the favour of two letters from you, of the 13th and 16th of June, in one of which is inclosed a copy of a letter from my lord Peterborough.

"You seem to desire my advice what you may answer to his proposal. I cannot imagine first, what he will propose, or, indeed, that he can propose any thing practicable ; but I observe, he laments the emperor's persisting in sending the detachment to Naples, when you cannot but remember it was his own proposal last winter, to the duke of Savoy and to prince Eugene ; and, perhaps, the expectation he gave them of the queen's concurrence in that project, was the ground of their engaging in that unfortunate design. As to his coming into England, I must own myself, to have been of a different opinion from my friends on that point. I always thought that when his power was taken from him, and all his commissions recalled, he would do less hurt abroad than at home, and so I think still it will be found ; but I don't at all wonder you should like him better any where than with you.

"I think what you say of Erle's staying, and the king of Spain's commanding, are both very right ; and, I believe, as soon as our next Lisbon letters arrive, the queen will take the resolution of allowing lord Galway to return ; but if Erle be to stay there, I



doubt it will be necessary for you yourself to write to him on that subject, for I don't think any body else has credit enough with him to make him do it willingly, as we must do to serve well."

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

"*Meldert, July 18.* Having this safe opportunity by brigadier Macartney, I shall write with more freedom than I durst do by the post. I am very sorry to tell you, but it is most certainly true, that if the king of France would offer the same conditions as he did the last winter, they would be thought by the dutch sufficient for the beginning of a treaty; but the king of France seems positively resolved that the duke of Anjou must have Spain and the Indies. It is as certain, that the dutch will never more this war venture any thing that may be decisive, being of opinion, that they have already enough in their possession for their security, and that France will assist them in disposing of this possession, as they shall think best for their security; and you may be assured, that every step they make for engaging the queen in joining with them, to shew the world that the emperor is in the wrong, is for no other end, but to excuse themselves when they appear for peace.

"The queen's letter from the king of Sweden is very discouraging; however, I am persuaded he does not make these wrong steps, intending to favour France, so that I can see no inconveniency in my writing, when you have corrected it, such a sort of letter as I have sent you; for if we can engage him, we may yet have a good peace.

"As to the elector of Hanover, I think in the offer that has been made him, he acts more like a merchant than a generous man; so that I am apt to think we shall get very little advantage by it.

"When my brother spoke to you about his renewing, I could wish you had encouraged him in his resolution of being quit; for it would be very disagreeable to me to have him receive a mortification; for I can't be unconcerned in that matter, after the contempt of lord Halifax, not answering my letter I meant with all the kindness imaginable. I shall not be surprised at the hard



usage any for whom I am concerned, shall meet with. I can't, on this occasion, hinder saying so much to you, whose quiet I wish as much as my own; but I fear neither of us can have any, till we are at Woodstock, so that I could wish some practicable scheme could be made, by which her majesty might be well served, and we both out of the ministry.

"The inclosed, is a copy of my letter to the queen,\* I writ by Macartney; if it gives you any ease, I am happy; but I own to you, I am very desponding. I am afraid there is too much conversation between the queen and Mr. Harley. You on the place can best judge what may be proper to be done in it, but methinks one or both should be spoke too."

TO THE DUCHESS.

"*Meldert, July 21.* I received yesterday your's of the 28th, from Woodstock, as also that of the 30th and 3rd, from Windsor. My head is so full of things that are displeasing, that I am at this time a very improper judge of what would be best for the work at Woodstock; for really I begin to despair of having any quietness there, or any where else. What you say of Mr. Prior† has given me uneasiness; but when you shall know the reason why any consideration was had for him, you will rather pity than reproach me; but as I am taking my measures so as to be out of the power of being censured and troubled, I am resolved to be ill-used for a little time longer. I see by your's of the 30th that I am to be mortified by the prosecution of my brother George. I have deserved better from the whigs; but since they are grown so indifferent as not to care what mortifications the court may receive this winter, I shall not expect favour. My greatest concern is for the queen, and for the lord treasurer. England will take care of itself, and not be ruined, because a few men are not pleased. They will see their error when it is too

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\* This letter is missing.

† This passage will shew the violence of party spirit, when it is considered, that some petty favour shewn by the duke to Prior, independent of political considerations, was sufficient to provoke displeasure.



late. I should be glad you would let me know the conversation \* that has been between you and the queen, and if it were before or after the letter sent me by Mr. Montgomery, which I answered by Macartney. The union you mention between the lord treasurer, yourself, and me, for the good of the queen and England; can there be a difficulty in that union? But I will own to you my apprehensions are, that some body or other, I know not who, has got so much credit with the queen, that they will be able to persuade her to do more hurt to herself, than we can do good. Till I hear again from you, I shall say no more on this subject."

"*Meldert, July 11--22.* \* \* \* \* I have sent to lord treasurer a copy of my letter to the queen, tho' I own to you I am desponding as to the good it may do; however, I have done my duty, and God's will be done. By my letter you will see that I have endeavoured to do the whigs the best office I can; but I shall think it a very ill return, if they fall upon my brother George. I do with all my heart wish he would be so wise as to quit his place; but I hope nobody that I have a concern for, will appear against him. After the usage I had from lord Halifax, I am concerned but for very few; therefore, if there should be occasion, pray say, as from yourself, two words to lord Sunderland; for it would be very uneasy to me to have reason to take any thing ill of him, and it is impossible for me to be unconcerned in this matter. I expect no more than what I would do, if he had a brother attacked. This, and many other things, shews there is no happiness but in retirement."

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\* Alluding probably to one of her violent altercations with the queen.



## CHAPTER 59.

1707.

*Successful result of the expedition against Naples—Reviving cordiality between the british and imperial courts—Secret views of the dutch for a peace with France—Displeasure of the british cabinet—Proposal of Godolphin and the whigs to form a separate union with the rest of the allies, and to pledge themselves for the prosecution of the war, until the monarchy of Spain was restored to the house of Austria—Prudent sentiments of Marlborough on this subject—Correspondence—Situation of the court of Hanover, and coldness between the electoral family and the queen—Intrigues of the tories with the electress Sophia—Mutual explanations of Marlborough and the elector—Apparent restoration of harmony.*

**I**N the camp of Meldert, Marlborough was acquainted with the result of the enterprise against Naples.

General Daun, the brave defender of Turin, in the middle of May, led a body of 9,000 men across the Appenines, traversed the papal dominions, and reaching the neapolitan frontier on the 24th, was welcomed by the acclamations of the people, who cordially expressed their abhorrence of the Bourbon government. On the approach of the imperialists to the capital, the duke of Escalona, the spanish viceroy, withdrew, to escape the popular fury; while the magistrates advanced to Aversa, and delivering the keys of the city, pledged their allegiance to king Charles. The new government was generally acknowledged; and Gaieta being taken by storm on the 30th of September, the conquest of the whole kingdom was completed before the close of the year, by the reduction of the petty, though strong holds, in the mountainous district of Calabria.

This enterprise being happily accomplished, Marlborough flattered himself that the emperor would detach reinforcements from Naples, for the succour of Charles in Spain. In this hope



he was not wholly disappointed ; for although some contention arose between the two imperial brothers, relative to the government of Naples, the emperor seemed as if disposed to make amends for his past errors, by a zealous support of the common cause. The correspondence between Wratislaw and Marlborough, which had been suspended, was resumed ; and in the letters both of the general and the treasurer, we trace symptoms of returning cordiality.

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

“ *Meldert, July 25.* I have had the favour of your's of the 6th from Windsor, but have not time to give an answer by the next post.

“ The enclosed letter from count Wratislaw I received this morning ; I think it a more reasonable letter than I have seen from that court a great while. I shall not give my answer till I have your's, lord Somers's, lord Halifax's, and lord Sunderland's thoughts of what may be proper to answer.

“ I hope to-morrow we may have the good news confirmed of the duke of Savoy's being in Provence. You will, by this post, have an account in print, of the reception of the germans at Naples. Pray make my excuse to lord Sunderland, that I can't answer his of the 8th, by this post. I send Sir J. Norris's letter, that you may see what he desires concerning the bills of exchange.”

COUNT WRATISLAW TO THE DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH.

[Inclosed in the preceding letter.]

“ *July 13.* Count Lescheraine delivered to me, the day before yesterday, your highness's letter of the 18th past, by which I see your obliging complaints on my silence ; and which induce me to hope that I am not quite so ill with you as I have been made to believe. It is true, that at the time of the new misfortune in Germany, and of the battle in Spain, I kept silence for some posts. For with regard to the first, I could not resolve to make my apology, by charging my master, and accusing his first minister ; and for the second, I wished to avoid charging your generals, and blaming the orders of England ; since these kinds of complaints



are always useless, and for the most part injurious. However, in process of time, I have done both one and the other; and I flatter myself that you have assented to my opinion.

“ At present the invasion of Provence is much advanced, or has failed, and you will now be convinced that this court has no concealed views, but concurs in every thing in its power to please the allies. I think, however, that we shall pass the mountains, but I much doubt that we can maintain ourselves in France during the winter. In addition to the excessive expence for the transport of provisions, we risk our army, in the sole view of pleasing England, and endeavouring to ruin the french marine. This is the only reasonable object to be hoped for from this expedition, of which I also know the importance, if England would avail herself of it, for the continuation of the war.

“ I wished much to converse with you a couple of days, and would have met you in Saxony, had you not declined an interview, under the plea that it would have given umbrage to the king of Sweden; and yet, perhaps, our conversation would not have been entirely useless; for certainly the allies must understand each other better than they have hitherto done. They ought to adopt resolutions which are practicable, and not such as are merely agreeable to their wishes; for the inclination which the maritime powers have shewn to abridge the war by extraordinary expedients, has in general retarded the peace which we all desire.

“ First it is necessary to consider whether the war in Spain is to be regarded as a diversion, or as a principal object. According to my scanty knowledge, I am entirely for making it a diversion, because it is too difficult and chargeable to be rendered offensive; whereas, if we wished, we might subjugate all the italian islands with the greatest facility. I do not mean by this to say that Spain ought not to be the principal object of the war itself; but that in obtaining what we may obtain, namely, Italy, we may the more easily acquire the rest at the conclusion of peace; particularly, if we press France on her own ground.

“ For my part, I would send all the portuguese in Catalonia



into their own country ; and joining with them 6,000 auxiliaries, would leave them to make war according to their own good pleasure. In Catalonia I would not have more than 12,000 infantry, and 4,000 allied horse, who, being in a central position, may alarm Valencia and Aragon ; and in case of necessity, may even make an irruption into Roussillon. I have said 12,000 infantry and 4,000 allied horse ; for the troops of king Charles would suffice for the garrisons, and this body ought to be under the orders of the king, and at his entire disposition. Neither his catholic majesty nor we know what remains of the allied troops since the battle of Almanza, so that I can make no calculation on that subject.

“ On the affairs of Italy I cannot yet speak, for that depends on the progress of this campaign. If we can maintain ourselves during the winter in Provence, and the neighbourhood of Toulon, it will, in my opinion, be necessary to reinforce that army with as many troops as we can draw from all sides. But if we are obliged to retire from France into Piemont, then we must put ourselves on the defensive in Italy. A squadron in the Mediterranean is always necessary and very useful ; and the fleet on the coasts of England having troops for a descent, will secure the interior, and at the same time alarm the coasts of France and Andalusia.

“ It is pretended in England that the troops which the emperor may send into Spain, ought to be maintained by us. You know what I have said on that subject in my preceding letters ; and if these disputes be continued, we shall never do any thing. It ought to be remembered, that when the archduke was demanded of us, we were reproached in the same manner, for making a difficulty to send him ; because nothing was then asked for this war, but his person only.” \*

The latter part of this letter relates to the negotiation with Sweden, and displays the facilities which the emperor had shewn to the demands of the king, and his hopes of a satisfactory result,

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\* Translated from the original in the french tongue.



mixed with expressions of regret, that the maritime powers had been restrained by the advice of the elector of Hanover, from taking a decisive part against a monarch, who had insulted the head of the empire, and suspended the progress of the war.

THE DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

“ *Meldert, July 27.* Being obliged to be abroad almost the whole day of the last post, I could not answer your's of the 6th as I ought.

“ You may be assured that I shall not send the letter to the king of Sweden, but as corrected and approved by yourself and friends; but by what I have from thence, I am in hopes there will be no occasion of writing. If there should, I believe we must do it without acquainting the pensioner, because it is certain that the dutch will never agree to have the preliminaries sent; for I am afraid they are of opinion they will never be obtained from France. However, I am of your opinion, that England must never depart from them. You will see by my last letter to Mr. Secretary Harley, that I shall delay the answer to the States; for by what is writ from Vienna of the behaviour of the hungarians, I think even the dutch will be of opinion, that this is not a proper time for pressing the emperor.

“ You have done very well in sending the memorial of Portugal to Holland; for by it you will gain time, and at last you will be answered with the impossibility of their helping, and their hopes of the queen's generosity in helping the king of Portugal. Would it not be a good expedient to gain more time, as soon as you have the States' answer to the memorial, to send lord Galway to Portugal, by which you may amuse that court? for whatever expence you make in that country, I look upon it as money flung into the sea, for they have neither officers nor good inclinations; but by this method you may keep them in hopes till the next spring.

“ I cannot but think it extremely for the queen's service, that you continue firm in the resolution of paying no more regiments in Catalonia, than there may be english soldiers to complete; and whatever spaniards or other foreign troops, England would be



at the expence of, that ought to be by subsidy, and not regular pay; and there ought to be care taken that the clothing which is there, upon account of private regiments, should not be given to other people; for that expence at last will fall upon the queen.

“The copy of count Wratislaw’s letter, which I sent you by the last post, agrees extremely with the notion I have for the scheme of the next campaign; for should Toulon not be taken, the war must be continued; but if that should succeed, I should then hope France would be forced to give such conditions as England should think reasonable. I do assure you I am so weary of all this matter, that nothing can make me happy but being in quiet at Woodstock.

“I received last night the inclosed letters from prince Eugene and Sir Cloudesley Shovel. I am extremely glad to find they have resolved to attack Toulon in the first place. If they succeed, it will be the greatest misfortune could have happened to France. The last two lines in prince Eugene’s letter should not be seen but by few. You must not be too much alarmed at his expression; for it is his way to think every thing difficult, till he comes to put it in execution, but then he acts with so much vigour, that he makes amends for all his despondency. Tho’ he writes in this manner to me, I am sure to the officers of the army his discourse is the contrary. I would not stay for the post, but send this by colonel Britton, so that her majesty might have this good news as soon as possible. With my humble duty, I beg you will assure her of my hearty congratulation and prayers that she may ever be happy.” \* \* \*

Amidst the awful suspense in which all parties were held, respecting the fate of the expedition against Toulon, the dutch appear to have manifested, more strongly than usual, those inclinations for peace, which they had already repeatedly expressed. Deeming themselves secure of a barrier, by the conquests of the preceding year, they felt less interest for the success of the war in other quarters, than anxiety for such an arrangement with France as might enable them to attain their darling object. Their conduct excited great displeasure in England, and gave additional



strength to the reviving confidence between the british and imperial courts. In fact, this selfish and limited policy turned against the republic, those feelings of resentment, which Godolphin and the whigs had conceived against the emperor ; and we find the treasurer proposing a separate union with the rest of the allies, to deter the States from tampering with France. He even conveyed a hint that the queen would assist in procuring a general declaration for continuing the war, till the monarchy of Spain was restored to the house of Austria. In these sentiments the whigs expressed their concurrence.

The duke of Marlborough, however, contemplated the conduct of the dutch with more indulgent eyes ; and firmly, though delicately, opposed suggestions which tended to create a breach with the republic. But the meditated defection of the States, and the new zeal manifested by the court of Vienna, induced him to give a more vigorous tone than he had hitherto assumed, to his negotiations with the king of Sweden ; and he encouraged the disposition of his colleagues to conciliate the court of Vienna. The views and projects to which these sentiments gave birth, will be fully developed in the correspondence.

FROM LORD GODOLPHIN.

“*Windsor, July 13--24.* I am to acknowledge the favour of your's of the 18th with M. Zinzendorf's letter, and the answer the queen is to have from Vienna, concerning the transporting to Spain some of the troops from Naples. I take the substance of that answer to be, that if Naples be reduced, the emperor will not only send, but maintain them while they are in Spain ; and if not, he will still send them, if the allies will maintain them there. I wish either of these ways may be taken ; since it is now neither reasonable, nor hardly possible, to send troops to Catalonia from hence ; nor is Mr. Methuen of opinion, as, perhaps, he may tell you himself, in the inclosed, that it is like to be of much use to send any more troops to Portugal itself. He says, nothing will prevail with them to enter Spain again ; and the most that can be expected from those people is, a frontier war. This being the casé, all that seems necessary for us is, to support them, so as to



keep them firm to our alliance ; by which means we shall continue to have the convenience of their ports, which we cannot well do without, while the war against Spain subsists, and can be supported by the allies from Italy, which I hope it may, and cheaper than hitherto from hence.

“ All this shews the necessity of getting as many troops as we can, and as soon as we can, from that side ; for I am so far from being of opinion with the States, that the queen’s advantages in this year ought to incline the allies to accept the proposals of the king of France in the last, that to this moment I think he is every day more and more pressed ; and that if the States will stand firm, they will yet find the effects of it before the end of the year. But in case they do not, or will not see their own interest in this point, it is my humble opinion, with submission to better judgments, that the queen must speak very plainly to them, and let them see that if ever they make any step towards France, but with the participation and consent of England, they must expect the last resentment from her majesty upon such a proceeding.

“ This is, at present, but my own private opinion upon what you have written in your’s of the 18th ; but as soon as I have an opportunity of doing it, I will send you the thoughts of our friends, as well as my own, upon this subject, which I take to be extremely nice, and of the greatest consequence.

“ In the mean time, give me leave to add, from myself, that in case we succeed at Toulon, I believe we may have reason from the dutch ; and in case we do not succeed, we shall stand more in need of it than before. I submit it to your thoughts, whether we should not endeavour, without loss of time, to make farther and stricter alliances with the emperor, the king of Prussia, the elector of Hanover, and the rest of the allies, for going on with the war, and not hearing of peace but by general consent. The greatest obstruction I can foresee to this is, the king of Sweden, because of his antipathy to the emperor. But if those differences were capable of being accommodated, and that king satisfied, that objection would not be so strong. And when, as you say,



the dutch are satisfied with the possession of what they have now, and the assistance of France to secure them in that possession; I leave you to judge what the whigs will say to that, and how they will be persuaded, either to go on with the war, only for the advantage of the dutch, or, indeed, to submit to those advantages by the means of peace, without expressing the last resentment at these proceedings of the States.

“ I am glad Britton is with you, for several reasons; because he can give you a full account of all that has passed in Spain, and most exactly of all that relates to lord Peterborough and his proceedings, which may be of use to you to be informed of, before he comes to you.

“ Mr. Freeman’s letter to the queen was as right and as full as is possible, and was no more than is extremely necessary, and it will be as necessary to continue in the same style upon all occasions, both before and after you return.”

“ *Windsor, July 17-28.* Since my last we have no foreign letters; two posts will be due to-morrow, but we cannot expect them, as the winds have been. In the mean time I continue to hope for good news from Italy, being more persuaded in my mind than you seem to be, that they will act in earnest on that side; and, indeed, if they do not, it is next to impossible for the allies to continue together as they do, this winter. But if the affair of Toulon succeed, I should think we are in a better way than ever to have reason from France; and, therefore, our chief concern at present ought, in my opinion, to be, what measures to take, and how to deal with the dutch, in case the affair of Toulon should not turn as we wish it. By the picture which you have lately made of them, and which I must be so just to myself as to say, I always suspected and expected, it seems to me, that no time ought to be lost, in the queen’s endeavouring to make use of the influence of England, to strengthen and augment the alliance, to receive as many into the fraternity as can possibly be procured, and that the foundation of the whole should be, never to admit the inclinations of the States to peace, but in general to declare against it, except as in the letter to the king of Sweden,



corrected and altered, as it was sent back from thence. Perhaps it may be thought and said, that this is visionary and impossible, but what will parliament say? Parliament nor England will not lie down and die, because the dutch find their account in peace, but rather incline to think, so strengthened, as I have been wishing, that they may yet get the better of both France and Holland together. And if the latter be once convinced, as I think they ought to be, and, perhaps, the sooner the better, that the queen and England are capable of coming to this resolution, I cannot help being of opinion, they will think more than once before they give them a just provocation to do it."

"*Windsor, July 21--Aug. 1.* The wind continuing contrary, we have now three posts due, so your trouble will be short at this time, since I have nothing to add to my last letters, but that since I sent them I find that lord Halifax, lord Somers, and lord Sunderland, are certainly of my opinion, as to the measures which England ought to take with the dutch; and that the sooner this is explained to them the better. They agree that this ought not to depend upon the event of Toulon; for as good success there will make the affair less difficult, so disappointment will make it yet more necessary, and consequently that we ought to try it in all events. There may be some niceties to be observed in the method of doing this, but I forbear troubling you with any of my thoughts, as to the method of doing it, till I have your's as to the thing itself."

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

"*Meldert, August 1.* I am very impatient to hear from count Wratislaw; for Mr. Robinson's letter of the 19th from Leipsig, speaks very doubtfully of the reception that count may have. If it be possible the king of Sweden should use the emperor hardly after the advances the latter has made, I agree entirely with you, that we must take such vigorous measures as may put a stop to his proceedings; but it must not be sooner than the end of this campaign. But I own to you, that I can't persuade myself that he will make such a step as must necessarily give so great an



advantage to the king of France, for I am sure he earnestly desires the continuance of the war.

“ This bearer is a member of parliament ; he comes from Spain, and seems to be a very modest man ; but as much as he cares to speak, he is of the same opinion with all that I have seen, which, in short, is, that lord Galway is neither an officer or zealous. They all say that he has also grown very proud and passionate, which you know is very different from the temper he formerly had. I will not pretend to judge how right it may be, to let the friendship and opinion of the whigs govern in this matter ; but I am very certain the opinion king Charles and all the officers have of him (tho’ unjust), will make it impracticable for him to do any thing that is great or good.

“ I have sent brigadier Palmes to the duke of Savoy and prince Eugene, with orders to stay there till they can judge how the campaign will end on that side, and then to have their thoughts on a project for the next campaign. I have acquainted them with my opinion. I expect him back about the middle of September, so that I may have your’s and our friends thoughts, before I settle any part of it, with the court of Vienna and the States General.

“ I have had the favour of your’s of the 13th, which is in answer to mine of the 18th, N. S. I am glad, for the sake of the queen and England, that you are of opinion that the war in Spain ought to be carried on by subsidies, which may get foreign troops ; for her majesty’s subjects can never come in time, nor, indeed, be kept in good order in that country, for want of recruits. If we succeed at Toulon, when that place is in the hands of the allies, besides the ruin it must be to his naval stores, it will make it very difficult for the king of France to support the next campaign, which I hope will encourage the dutch to have no thoughts but of war.

“ I allow all your reasonings to be very right concerning England, Holland, and parliament, and that war must be continued ; but no reasoning or success can prevail with the States to think any thing reasonable, but what tends to their own particular interest. However, during war it would be dangerous to make any alliances in which the dutch were not concerned.



“ I have this morning received a letter from the pensioner, who is very much alarmed at the proceedings of the king of Sweden. Whatever does happen, I am very confident we shall hurt ourselves, if we make a noise till the end of this campaign.

“ You will have received the considerations of the court of Vienna, as to sending troops for the support of the king of Spain. I have received a copy from count Sinzendorf, but shall make no other answer, but that we must see the success of the expedition into Provence, before we can judge what may be *faissible* for the relief of king Charles ; by this I shall gain time for the return of brigadier Palmes. I intend to write to the pensioner, that the dutch may give the same answer.”

FROM LORD GODOLPHIN.

“ *Windsor, July 25--August 5.* The queen approves of your thoughts of sending brigadier Palmes to the duke of Savoy for the reasons you give, and at his return it will certainly be the most proper time to speak to the States and the pensionary ; for you will please to consider, that sooner or later there seems to be an absolute necessity of doing something of this kind. England had entirely swallowed the advantages hoped for against France this summer ; and since it is now likely to pass over without any endeavours or attempts of that kind, the parliament will certainly enter into the reasons and causes of this proceeding, and will not probably be very well satisfied, unless they find there has been some expostulation upon it with the States, and some better regulations made. And if this should have been wholly neglected, or but too long delayed, it would certainly give the greatest handle imaginable against the war.

“ I thank you for the copy of count Wratislaw's letter, which I cannot think so reasonable throughout, as you seem to do. All that he says of what is past, is entirely unreasonable, and particularly his doubts whether England would make the right use of success at Toulon, by continuing the war. And when he talks of their having ventured and exposed their army only to gratify England, had they ever had Italy or an army, but for the extraordinary efforts and expence of England ? and is it now thought too much to do what is really the most solid advantage



to themselves, only because it is particularly grateful to England. I confess this is a little harsh to my ear.

“As to the future views, I approve them very much, and shall endeavour, as far as I can, to make them practicable; but I see by your last letter from Sir Philip Meadows, the court of Vienna affects still to have the palatine troops sent to the king of Spain from the duke of Savoy's army, which cannot be done by any means, if the enterprise succeeds at Toulon; for, in that case, even by count Wratislaw's own scheme, the duke of Savoy's army ought to be strengthened and augmented, so as that they may winter in France. It is true, indeed, if we should be baffled there, and be obliged to retire, so great an army on that side would not be necessary, and then the palatines might go to Spain; but, at present, I think we ought to insist still upon having some of the troops from Naples, as most at hand, and because of the remoteness of the place, very difficult to be made use of this year, any other way than by transporting them to Catalonia by sea.

“Count Wratislaw touches on one thing in his letter, against which I beg leave to precaution you in time; and that is, the thought of sending for prince Eugene to the Rhine the latter end of this campaign. Now the affairs of the Rhine for this year seem to be at an end, by the troops detached from Villars's army, and I believe the elector of Hanover would like to have that command another year. Besides, I do really not think him sincere in dropping that expression to you; for if they had prince Eugene at Vienna, they would not think of sending him to the Rhine, but rather make use of him to bridle the king of Sweden. Upon the whole, I think it might be right to answer him, that, in general, his views are likely to be approved; and that if the emperor has any doubt whether England would make use of the success we hope for at Toulon, not to continue the war, his imperial majesty has but to make it his request to all the allies not to make peace till the monarchy of Spain be restored to the house of Austria, and he will soon see if England will not be ready to join with him in procuring such a declaration from them. And perhaps this would not give a very improper rise for



what will be necessary to be said to the States upon the subject of the former part of this letter.

“ If count Zinzendorf comes to you, as I hear, he may be of great use in concerting all these things against the return of brigadier Palmes, which I wish might be sooner than the middle of September; both because before that time the siege of Toulon must be over one way or other, and also, because after that time, to speak very plainly, it will be no more than absolutely necessary that you should make haste into England, to look after our affairs at home.

“ I agree with all you say concerning Spain and Portugal, but if they are likely to be pressed in Autumn, as the french brag, we must be at some extraordinary expence to keep them firm to our alliance. At present I think we are on very good terms with them.

“ Mr. Robinson's last letters give us but a very doubtful account of the matters depending between the emperor and the king of Sweden, notwithstanding all the advances made by the former. I hear that my lord Peterborough has been with him, and don't doubt but from thence he will go to Berlin and Hanover, before he comes to you, by which time he will be furnished with sufficient matter for a whole week's conversation.

“ Since I had finished this letter, I have shewn it to the queen for her approbation. She commanded me to remember her very kindly to you, but did not say the least word of her having received a letter from you.

“ I had almost forgot to observe one thing to you upon what you write, that subsidies would be better than a regular pay for the troops to be sent from Naples to Spain. This is certainly true, if any honesty remained in the world, but as the case now stands, if that method be taken, the subsidies will be sent to Vienna, and the troops, I doubt, will starve in Spain.”

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

“ *Meldert, August 4.* By the last post I had not time for



copying the enclosed from lord Peterborough.\* His motions have been so uncertain, that I have writ but one letter in answer to four of his, which I sent to Sir Philip Meadows, who writes me word, that it came after the earl was gone; but that he should send it to Hanover, believing it might meet him there. By one expression in his letter, I believe his justification is meant to be printed. I should think it for his service, as well as the quiet of the queen's business, that nothing of this kind should be printed. If he gives me occasion, I shall put him in mind of the english saying, "*little said is soon mended*;" but I know he will govern himself, and I had much rather it should be so, than your humble servant have any thing to do in it.

"I do not hear the elector of Hanover has yet declared any time for his going to the army on the Rhine; so that for this campaign we must not, I am afraid, expect any other thing but obliging M. Villars to keep on the other side of the Rhine, so that they may detach the greatest part of their army for Provence. I hope to-morrow we may have the good news of the duke of Savoy's being at Toulon the 23rd of the last month.

"Having wrote thus far, I have the favour of your's of the 17th, by which I see you want two mails from Holland, in which letters you will find us full of hopes of success of the project of Toulon; but if that should not succeed, you will find no hearts left in Holland. You must see this month of August pass, before you will be well able to judge what measures may be proper to be taken.

"I am sorry for the uneasiness your cold gives you, and so with all my heart wish you might never have any other uneasiness, but what of necessity you must undergo for the good of the public. I have been uneasy in my head ever since I left off the Spa waters; but if the siege of Toulon goes prosperously, I shall be cured of all diseases but old age."

TO THE DUCHESS.

"Meldert, August 4. Since my last we have had so much

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\* This is the letter which is already printed in Chapter 57.



rain, that I can hardly stir out of my quarter, the dirt being up to the horses' bellies, which is very extraordinary in this month. However, I think we must stay here till we hear what success the duke of Savoy has at Toulon. By a letter I have received from lord Peterborough, he should be at this time at Hanover, where, no doubt, he will be a great favourite with the electress Sophia; I do not think his humour will be agreeable to the elector. I send a copy of his letter to Mr. Montgomery.

"I did last winter desire the queen's favour in giving her picture to comte Wratislaw, which she was pleased to promise, so that I thought it had been at Vienna. But by the last post I received a letter from the emperor's resident, that Sir Godfrey Kneller says he can't begin the picture till he has a warrant from lord chamberlain. Pray give my duty to the queen, and that I desire she would be pleased to give lord Kent her orders; for Wratislaw has set his heart on the honour of her picture, and Sir Godfrey might order it so that her majesty need not have the trouble of sitting but once. But the next year I must beg the favour of the queen that she will allow Sir Godfrey to come three or four times to draw her's and the prince's pictures for Blenheim; if I am ever to enjoy quietness, it must be there, so that I would have nothing in my sight but my friends.

"Having writ thus far, I have received your's of the 18th, by which I find there were two dutch posts due. What 73 tells you is a melancholy prospect; but when thoughts are carried any where else, they are dangerous; so that of two evils you must chuse the least. I am more concerned at what you say of the queen, since that is what may hurt immediately the elector of Hanover. But as to 50, I hope it is at a great distance; and I will own to you, that the little gratitude or sense the english have of their peculiar happiness, makes me less concerned; but I would venture a good deal to make the queen happy, for I am persuaded she means very honestly."

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

"*Genappe, August 11.* I had not time by the last post to answer that part of your letters of the 17th and 21st of the last



month, in which you say that it is not only your own opinion, but also that of lord Halifax, lord Somers, and lord Sunderland, that there should be no time lost in taking measures; and at the same time, letting the dutch know the firm resolution of the queen and England, never to think of peace till they can bring France to those preliminaries agreed to last winter. I think this is very rightly judged, but the execution will be very difficult; for as the preliminaries were never in form brought to the States, so you may be sure they will pretend to know nothing of them.

“ By what I hear from Leipsig, I believe the fate of Toulon will be decided before the negotiation of count Wratislaw will be finished. When I told you that I approved of the greatest part of count Wratislaw's letter, I did not mean his reasoning upon what was passed; for my humour is to look forward, so that I meant as to the managing of the war for the next campaign. You may be in the right to wish prince Eugene to continue where he is; but if himself and the emperor shall think fit to have him in Germany, it would be very harsh in the allies to oppose it. But I shall be better able to speak on this subject after the return of Palmes, which cannot be till the middle of September.

“ By the last post I sent you the last resolution of the States, by which you will see their great caution. I cannot forbear giving you my opinion as to what you say of the parliament settling the management of the war with the States. It is a matter I think 31 and all his friends would be extremely glad of, and, therefore, I think it should be avoided; for it is certain that there can be no good end of such an inquiry, and although I cannot prevail with them to do what is good for themselves, yet they will trust me with much more power than they will ever be brought to do by treaty.”

In many of the letters between Marlborough and Godolphin, as well as in those from the duchess to the queen, we find frequent allusions to the court of Hanover, and to the discordant views and sentiments of the electoral family.

The electress Sophia was highly anxious to accept the invitation to England, which had already formed the subject of a discussion



in parliament; and notwithstanding her repeated disavowals, both public and private, she always contemplated the prospect of visiting a country, where she was regarded as the presumptive heiress to the crown, with a degree of eagerness which increased with age. She even frequently declared that she should die content, if she could only live to have inscribed on her tomb, "Sophia, queen of Great Britain." At all events she considered herself as intitled to a pension sufficiently ample to give consequence to her rank and pretensions. She, therefore, readily listened to all who flattered her ruling passion, and, at this moment, was secretly caballing with the tories, who, to embarrass the government, proposed to bring the subject of the invitation again into discussion. She was, at the same time, displeased with the whigs, and in her resentment for their opposition to her wishes, forgot the services which they had rendered at the Revolution, and the zeal which they had manifested in promoting the protestant succession.

The elector was too prudent and high-minded to countenance these petty cabals; but from aversion to parade, and a love of œconomy, he contributed to the coldness which reigned between the two courts, by declining the formalities which custom had introduced in the intercourse of princes. Thus, when it was thought proper to invest the electoral prince with the order of the garter, to raise him to the english peerage, under the title of duke of Cambridge, and to compliment him by the mission of a regular ambassador on the birth of his son; the elector received these marks of distinction with a degree of coldness which bore the appearance of aversion, and did not hesitate to express his contempt, for what he called baubles and trifles. The dissatisfaction arising from this source, was increased by the reports and complaints of Mrs. Howe, the lady of the british minister, who, in her correspondence with the duchess of Marlborough, expatiated on the froward and mysterious conduct of the electoral court, and represented every trifling omission of ceremony as a deliberate insult, and a proof of indifference to the succession. The electoral prince partook neither of the eagerness of his



grandmother to anticipate her expected honours, nor of the stern contempt with which his father regarded the established forms of princely intercourse. On the contrary, he seized every occasion to manifest his respect to the queen, and his regard to the nation over whom he was destined to reign; but he was too confined both in means and influence to be an object of attention to any of the parties, who were striving to ingratiate themselves with the future sovereign.

The tories did not fail to profit by the situation of the electoral family, and the dissatisfaction which reigned between the two courts. At first they employed the agency of Sir Rowland Gwynn, an english gentleman who resided at Hanover; and when he was dismissed for his intrigues, by order of the elector, they recurred to Mr. Scott, a dependent of the electoral family, who visited England under the plea of domestic business. By his channel they conveyed assurances of their attachment, accused the whigs of treachery to the protestant cause, and wrought on the passion which the electress felt to visit the british dominions.

By the agency of Robethon the duke of Marlborough was speedily acquainted with these machinations, as well as with the sentiment of displeasure which they exerted in the mind of the elector.

ROBETHON TO CARDONNEL.\*

“*Hanover, Aug. 2.* \* \* \* \* \* My lord Peterborough has been here three days; he was indulged with a court carriage and six horses to convey him to Herenhausen, where he dined and supped every day. He has warmly declaimed against lord Galway. He appears to be extravagantly swedish, and an enemy of the emperor.

“Our Mr. Scott, who has demanded permission of his electoral highness to go to London for his domestic affairs, has been intriguing there with the high tories; and he has written to the elector a letter of ten pages, which I have read, tending to advise him to give his assent to the invitation of the electress, and assuring him that if he will permit him to forward it, he will take care that

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\* Translated from the french original.



the business shall pass in the next session. He pretends that the great body of the nation desire it; that the Tories, who have proposed it, are the true friends of this house; that the Whigs are devoted to the court; and for this reason, they oppose the invitation of the successor: and that these same people, among whom he reckons Lord Halifax, would engage his electoral highness to take the command on the Rhine, in order to expose his reputation, and to receive an affront. But he has been told that his highness would not go, unless my Lord Duke would give him a good detachment, which he could do without risk. He has written four letters to the elector, full of invectives against my Lord Duke. His highness was so irritated at this proceeding, that he wrote to him, with his own hand, forbidding him to meddle in any business, on pain of being dismissed from his service.\* His highness ordered M. de Schutz to communicate the copy of this letter to Lords Godolphin, Sunderland, and Halifax, in order to make this fellow known to them. I am directed to acquaint you with all this, and to beg you to apprise my Lord Duke of it. Hitherto I have been the dupe of this man, and therefore it is just that I should labour to prevent others from being so too."

On this occasion Marlborough acted with his usual candour and frankness, by acquainting the elector with the reports circulated by Mrs. Howe, and experienced a similar return. From the correspondence we find that this explanation prevented an open breach between the two courts, and restrained the intrigues of those who laboured to set them at variance.

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

"*Meldert, Aug. 8.* I find by your's of the 21st, that you want four packets from Holland; and as the wind is, I fear they are still on this side. The news we have this morning from Paris is much better than what we received by the last post. The Duke of Vendome has detached 12 battalions and 9 squadrons, but continues still in his camp. I hope this detachment will encourage the deputies, so as that I may make the march I have been proposing

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\* A translation of the elector's letter is printed in Macpherson, v. 2, p. 93.



to them for these last six weeks. If they allow of it, my next will be from another camp. You will, by Mr. Walpole's \* letter, have an account of all our affairs in Catalonia; however, I trouble you with a copy of the letter from lieut.-general Erle. The other two papers, I have not had time to have them copied; they should not be shewn to many; by that from Hanover the queen may see the obligations she has to some of her subjects. Tho' the elector has behaved himself in this business as I always thought he would, you may depend on it that Mr. Scott does nothing but by the direction of the electress, and I dare say you will see this matter attempted in the winter. The other is from Besenval, the french minister, to Torcy. By a letter Mr. Cardonnel has received from lord Peterborough, he should be here this evening or to-morrow.

"I here inclose the resolution of the States, given me this day by the deputies of the army. It is an answer to my having pressed them to get fuller powers. It would do them hurt with the States, if they should know they have shewn me the whole resolution, so that I beg it may be communicated only to lord Halifax, lord Somers, and lord Sunderland. You will see by the reasoning of this resolution, the humor they are in. I should be glad to know what your opinions are of the use I ought to make of this."

FROM LORD GODOLPHIN.

"*Windsor, Aug. 4--15.* I received yesterday the favour of your's of the 4th and 8th of August, with the several papers inclosed. The copy of my lord Peterborough's letter is a perfect picture of himself, and some paragraphs of it are very well explained by the letter intercepted from Besenval. But you having by this time had enough of the original, I shall say no more of it now, but that I hope you have advised him not to be so troublesome, as his own temper and inclination would naturally lead him to.

"I think it very probable that he may have entered into all

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\* Horace, afterwards lord Walpole, brother of Sir Robert, who was secretary to general Stanhope in Spain.



the views of the elector of Hanover, and join with these people in that and in other things when he comes hither, unless your lessons have power enough to hinder him from it.

“ I thank you for the letter you sent me from Hanover, because I hope it will do some good with the queen ; I am sure it ought to do so. Mr. Secretary Harley will have orders from the queen to let the elector of Hanover’s minister know that the person \* mentioned in that letter ought to be recalled immediately.

“ I have communicated to lord Halifax and to lord Sunderland the resolution of the States, inclosed in your’s of the 8th from Meldert. Their construction of it is, that you are more at liberty than you have been ; and your letters, received to-day, of the 11th from Genappe, seem to confirm that construction. We agree that this month of August must pass, and the fate of Toulon be over, before any just measures can properly be taken, as to what ought to be said to the States.”

“ *August 5--16.* \* \* \* \* I am much afraid our affairs grow every day worse and worse with the king of Sweden, not that I really think he is in any engagement with France ; but his own natural unreasonableness, and his uncertainty is like to have the same effect. And I doubt lord Peterborough has done all he could to make mischief there, as well as in other places where he has passed ; and unless he be gone from you before this comes to your hands, a little good advice from you will have more weight than from any body to hinder him from hurting himself, and being very troublesome to others.”

The disavowal of Scott, and the communications made to the queen, contributed to soften her prejudices against the elector ; and before the close of the year, Mr. Howe was commissioned to convey assurances, which announced the restoration of harmony between the two courts.

FROM MR. HOWE.

“ *Hanover, Dec. 26, N. S.* The morning after my arrival I had an audience of the elector, and when I had made the queen’s

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\* Mr. Scott.



compliments to him, I came upon the business of England, which he entered into with me, in the openest and fairest manner that could be expected. He bid me assure the queen, that he should never think of any other interest in England but her's, and that whatever interest he had there, he thought very secure in her majesty's; nor would he hearken to, or give any encouragement to the projects of those who have only their own private views. His electoral highness told me, that as to Scott, he was wholly ignorant of his behaviour in England, and that as soon as he was acquainted with it, which was indeed by Scott's own letters, he sent for him away, and ordered M. Schutz to let him know how much he was displeased at his proceedings. M. de Bernsdorf has assured me since, that the elector had once resolved to turn him out of his service, but that he thought the fellow would then go into England, and still carry on his intrigues, which might have occasioned a jealousy that his electoral highness had done it with that design.

"I have seen Scott at court, who has been to see me at my house, and I think I have not seen a greater alteration in any body's countenance; for from that height of insolence he used to carry himself, he looks quite dashed, like a guilty knave that is discovered in all his vice. I hope this has set the elector himself very right in every thing, and that it will make him put a stop to the proceedings of the electress."



## CHAPTER 60.

1707.

*Marlbrough moves to Genappe and compels the enemy to quit their position at Gemblours—Advance of the confederates to Nivelles, and preparations for a battle—Continued retreat of the french, and march of Marlborough to Soignies—Correspondence from the camp of Soignies—Visit of lord Peterborough—Continuation of the correspondence.*

**I**N the camp of Meldert Marlborough had been detained six weeks, by the caution of the dutch deputies, who opposed his design of marching on Genappe, which must have forced the enemy to risk a battle, or retire from their strong position at Gemblours.

At length, on the intelligence that Vendome had detached thirteen battalions and twelve squadrons to Provence, he obtained their consent to the projected movement. The heavy baggage was sent to the rear; the troops at Brussels were ordered to Waterloo, to cover the march; and those at Louvain, to the abbey of Florival, where four bridges had been thrown across the Dyle. On the 10th, in the afternoon, the passage of the river was effected, the duke of Wirtemberg being detached with fourteen squadrons towards Pieterbois, to observe the enemy, and afterwards to form the rear guard. The troops reached the heights of Wavre on the dawn of the 11th. Having made a short halt, they again proceeded, and after a forced march of seven leagues, encamped with their right at Promelle, and their left on the Dyle, the head-quarters being established at Genappe.

During this movement two letters occur :

TO SECRETARY HARLEY.

“ *Genappe, August 11.* Yesterday I decamped from Meldert. At nine I gave orders for some heavy baggage to march towards



Brussels, and the artillery to pass the Dyle at St. Joris-Wert. At three the army struck their tents, and began their march at four towards Florival, where we likewise passed the Dyle, and continued our march all night to this camp, from whence we might with less disadvantage have attacked the enemy in their camp at Gemblours, had they continued there. But having notice about eight at night of our march, they immediately gave orders for decamping, and marched about midnight towards Gosseliers, and are supposed to have taken the camp at Pieton.

“ You will receive a large volume from Mr. Robinson of my negotiation with the swedish ministers, who consent that her majesty and the States should procure the consent of the several princes pretending to the territory of Hadelen, that the emperor transfer the sequestration to the king of Sweden, which may bring these princes to demand an equivalent, as in the affair of Eutin; but the article about the protestant religion in Silesia, will admit greater difficulties. There is little appearance of bringing the swedes to any reasonable terms.”

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.\*

“ *Genappe, Aug. 4--15.* \* \* \* \* I had writ thus far in our old camp. The march I made last night and this day has had the effect I always assured the deputies it would have. As soon as the duke of Vendome had the assurance of my being marched, he immediately gave orders for decamping, and accordingly began to march at twelve o'clock last night, knowing very well, that if he had staid till I had been in this camp, he could not have marched without an action. I hope this will convince our friends in Holland, as it has done our deputies, that if they had consented to my making this march six weeks ago, as I pressed to do, the french would have then made, as they now have, a shameful march, by which both armies see very plainly, that they will not venture to fight. We have nothing since my last from Provence; and I am so very sleepy, not having shut my eyes last night, that I shall give you no farther trouble.”

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\* The former part of this letter is printed in the preceding chapter.



On the retreat of the enemy, Marlborough moved directly to Nivelles, where he arrived on the same evening; and learning that Vendôme was advancing to Seneff, he prepared with alacrity for an engagement the ensuing day. Count Tilly was detached at the head of forty squadrons and 5,000 grenadiers, with orders to post himself between the two camps, and harass their rear guard, in case they should attempt to march, before the main army could arrive. But the french commanders were not anxious to risk the event of a battle. The approach of the confederates to Nivelles became again the signal for retreat, and they effected their purpose with such rapidity, that they gained the inclosures which skirt the plain of Mariemont, without any effectual obstruction from the allied detachment. They then continued their progress to the position of St. Denis, behind the rivulet which falls into the Haine, in the vicinity of Mons.

Uncertain of their design, Marlborough detached parties to watch their movements, and an aid-de-camp of Overkirk ascending the height of Great Roeux, descried them in full march towards the Haine. Calculating that they intended to occupy the strong camp of Cambron, Marlborough reluctantly allowed his troops to halt a day, for the sake of recovering from their fatigue. On the 14th, at six in the morning, he directed his march to Soignies; but his progress being retarded by a heavy rain, the heads of his columns did not reach the intended camp till late in the evening, and the rear was unable to join before the ensuing morning. The french, meanwhile, evinced the same caution as on the former occasion. After passing the night under arms, they broke up from St. Denis, and continued their retreat by Cambron to Chievres, from whence a single march would place them within the protection of their lines.

As the hasty retreat of the enemy precluded all hope of an action, so a succession of heavy rains detained the two armies above a fortnight in their respective camps, greatly to the mortification of the british general, who confidently expected to retrieve the time which he had been compelled to waste, since the commencement of the campaign.



But although the caution of the enemy, and the opposition of the deputies had frustrated his views, his skill and activity called forth the admiration of all competent judges, and of none more than Eugene, who sincerely sympathised in his disappointment.

“*Turin, August 19.* What your highness has done since you had the power of marching against the enemy, evidently proves that this campaign would have been as glorious as the last, if you had not been restrained by the great circumspection of the dutch deputies, who, ignorant of our profession, follow the opinion of their generals, who know nothing but defensive warfare.”

In a letter to Godolphin, Marlborough recapitulates the incidents of his march.

“*Soignies, August 15.* I was in hopes this might have given you an account of some action ; for on Friday we marched to Nivelles, and camped about half a league from Seneff, where the french army was encamped. We came too late for attacking them that evening. As soon as it was dark, they began to make their retreat, without making the least noise, not touching either drum or trumpet ; so that the count de Tilly, whom I had detached with 40 squadrons and 5,000 grenadiers to attack their rear guard, in case they should march, knew nothing of their marching till day light ; so that their rear guard was got into the inclosures before he could join them, so that there was very little done. Our loss was three officers and some few soldiers. I believe their's was also very inconsiderable ; but by these four days march they have lost very considerably by desertion ; for we gave them no rest, so that they were two days without bread. They were in one continued march from Friday night, from Seneff, till Sunday 12 o'clock, to Cambron ; so that they may now have their bread from Mons. This army is also very much fatigued, so that I shall be obliged to take three or four days rest in this camp, and then I shall march towards Ath.

“ M. Vendome's avoiding twice to fight within these four days, I hope will convince our friends, as well as enemies, that his orders are not to venture. The consternation that has been



amongst their common soldiers ought to assure us of victory, if we can ever engage them ; but as they will not venture, they are now in a country where they may march from one strong camp to another, and so end the campaign, which I fear they will do.

“ I have this morning had the favour of your's of the 27th, by which I see you think this may be a proper time to attempt on the coast of France. The season is very much advanced ; but if you have any fixed project settled with the officer that is to command, if you would let me know it, you may depend upon having three or four battalions as you desire ; for tho' the dutch should not be willing, I would take upon myself for so inconsiderable a number. But should you not be almost sure of success, I should not think it advisable for you to run into such an expence as unavoidably this must be. But if you are sure that the people will join with you, and that they can be supported this winter, it ought not to be neglected. If I could have persuaded, the elector of Hanover had been at the army before now.

“ Count Dohna \* has been some days with me, and his account differs very much from that of the english officers concerning lord Galway.

“ My lord Peterborough has been here ever since Friday, and I believe thinks of staying some days longer. He assures me that he shall be able to convince yourself and lord Sunderland that many stories have been made of him, in which there is no truth, and that he hopes to justify himself in every particular to the queen's satisfaction ; that his intentions are to be employed by the queen, as she shall judge best ; and that if she does not make use of him, that he may have her leave to serve elsewhere.

“ He has very obliging letters from the king of Spain ; and the duke of Savoy has a kindness for him.”

During the visit of lord Peterborough, which Marlborough here announces, the justifications and complaints with which he had filled his letters while absent, were repeated even to satiety.

After a stay of ten days he took his departure, apparently

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\* Count Dohna was the principal officer taken prisoner at the battle of Almanza.



gratified with the polite and hospitable reception which he had experienced, and soothed by the judicious advice of his former patron. At his request, Marlborough gave him a letter of recommendation to Godolphin, but cautiously abstained from a general approbation of his conduct, and referred him to the queen and ministry, to whom he transmitted his written justification. The correspondence will spare the necessity of entering farther into the particulars of this visit.

## TO THE DUCHESS.

“*Soignies, August 15.* Since my last we have had one continued rain, so that neither the enemy nor we can stir out of our camps. I have at this time my winter clothes, and a fire in my chamber, but, what is worse, the ill weather hinders me from going abroad, so that lord Peterborough has the opportunity of very long conversations; what is said one day, the next destroys, so that I have desired him to put his thoughts in writing. My lord Peterborough has shewn me several obliging letters of the king of Spain to himself, which I can't but wonder at, after what he has writ against him. He does also assure me that he is some thousand pounds the worse for the service, having lost two equipages, upon the whole, he swears. And I believe his estate is very much in debt.”

## TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

“*Soignies, August 18.* I have this morning had the favour of your's of the 31st and 1st of last month. I think your thought of the Venetians is very good, but I very much question your bringing it to bear in any reasonable time; for that of landing in France, I gave you the trouble of my thoughts by the last post. I should have sent you the inclosed copies of the king of Spain's letters some time since, but by a mistake they were forgot. I also send you a copy of what I have received this morning from count Wratislaw, it giving more hopes of an accommodation than his last. But I am afraid at last he will find that the swedes presume so much on the favourable conjuncture, that they will be very unreasonable. It is not to be expressed the rains we have



had, and that continue still, so that if the safety of the common cause depended upon our marching, neither the enemy nor we could stir out of our camps ; for it is with the greatest difficulty that the generals get to my quarters for orders. All the comfort we have is, that the enemy do at least suffer as much as we.

“ Sinzerling has acquainted me this day with the assurances he has had from her majesty, of her assisting the king his master ; and pressed me at the same time that troops might be immediately sent. I have endeavoured to let him see that till we have more certainty of the expedition of Provence, nothing could be done ; but, in the mean time, he ought to press the court of Vienna to have those troops in Naples ready to be transported, if that should be for the service.

“ Lord Peterborough has said all that is possible to me, but says nothing of leaving the army. By what he tells me, he thinks he has demonstration to convince you, that he has been injured in every thing that has been reported to his disadvantage.”

“ *Soignies, August 20.* \* My lord ;—As I have had the favour of lord Peterborough’s company ten days, he has not only shewn me, but left with me the copies of several letters, and resolutions of councils of war, to demonstrate the falsity of several facts maliciously reported of him. He has given me the enclosed paper of what he hears is reported against him. My having been so constantly abroad makes me ignorant, not only as to this paper, but also what other facts may be laid to his charge ; but as he is resolved to acquaint you and lord Sunderland with every thing, in order the queen may have a true information, I shall say no more, but that as far as I am capable of judging, I verily think he has acted with great zeal.

“ I am, ever,

“ My lord,

“ Your most obedient, humble servant,

“ MARLBOROUGH.”

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\* This is the ostensible letter of recommendation, of which Peterborough was the bearer.



“ *Soignies, Aug. 22.* If we had had any tolerable weather we had staid but one night in this camp, but as the rains continue, God only knows when we shall be able to get out of it.

“ Lord Peterborough left us on Saturday. I have endeavoured to let him see, that for his own sake, he ought to clear the objections against him, in order to which, I have given him a letter for yourself; and he has promised me, that he will acquaint you and lord Sunderland with all he has to say. At the same time I must acquaint you, that by what I am told of his discourses, he will not be governed; but I have said so much to him, that I hope you will have it in your power to make him easy, which may prevent much mischief, as he will most certainly run into the notion of Hanover, and all other things that may be cross. The opinion of the elector of Hanover, should be made as public as possible; for I very much fear that this very next winter, the queen may receive mortification on that subject.

“ I see by your's of the 5th, which I received last night, that you are of the opinion that the chief command should be left to the king of Spain and his generals. I think the best argument that can be given in Portugal is, that her majesty being resolved to leave only a lieutenant-general in Spain, they ought to do the same, by which that matter would be settled. But as for the number of troops that should go from Italy, I can know no certainty till the return of brigadier Palmes.

“ I believe it is very true that the king of Sweden has no engagement with France; but his unaccountable obstinacy, and the little knowledge he has of the affairs of Christendom, may make him take engagements this winter; especially, if it be true what is writ from Paris, of the duke of Savoy's having attacked the retrenchment, and being repulsed with considerable loss. The inclosed from count Wratislaw is what I have received since my last, and is the only one which gives me some hopes of an accommodation. My trumpet is this minute returned from the french army, and says they have no news from Toulon, since the 9th, so that the duke of Savoy's being repulsed is false.



## TO THE DUCHESS.

“*Soignies, August 22.* I do assure you I did not mean the whigs when I spoke of ingratitude, but I meant it in general to England ; and if you will do me justice, you must believe that I have done all the good offices that are possible, at this distance. I do not say this to make my court to the whigs, but that I am persuaded it was good for my country, and for the service of the queen ; for I do really believe that the tories will do all they can to mortify the queen and England ; for I am now both at an age and humour, that I would not be bound to make my court to either party, for all that this world could give me. Besides, I am so disheartened, that when I shall have done my duty, I shall submit to Providence ; but, as a friend, I will foretell you the unavoidable consequence, if the whigs mortify the lord treasurer, that he will be disheartened, and Mr. Harley have the power and credit of doing what he pleases. This I know will hurt both the queen and England, but I see no remedy.”

“*Soignies, August 25.* Since your's, in which you desire I should look on the seals, I have done it for two or three posts, and I am very confident they have not been touched. As long as you are careful to send them to Mr. Secretary Harley, you may be sure they will come safe. The continued ill weather we have had, which keeps us in this camp, gives me the spleen, for it is not in this place I would stay.

“ If lord Peterborough should, when he comes to England, at any time write to you, pray be careful what answer you make, for sooner or later it will be in print.

“ Most of your letters being full of fears for this winter, I can't forbear assuring you, that I would not only wish prosperity and quietness to the queen, but I would take pains and venture any hazard to make her business go well ; so that for God's sake, if you think I can contribute, let me know it. For I can assure you, that if we have not success at Toulon, there will be this winter a great deal of uneasiness in most of the foreign courts ; so that should we, at the same time, have divisions in England,



how could the war be carried on with vigour this next campaign, which must be done to bring France to reason?"

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

"*Soignies, August 25.* I send you inclosed a copy of the pensioner's letter with my answer, that on the descent, and the oaths to be given this country, as well as the barrier. I should be glad to be directed what I might say farther on those points. It is near six weeks since I have had any thing directly from Provence, and what we have by the way of Paris can't be relied on. If we should not succeed at Toulon, I find by all my letters from Holland, that they shall be very much disheartened; so that our friends fear they will not be able to make them act with vigour. But I hope the contrary, if the king of Sweden gives no disturbance; so that I could wish your thoughts might be employed to see if you can't find some proposition that might be made to him, to bring him more into the interest of the allies.

"Having writ thus far, I this minute received your's of the 8th. What you say of prince Eugene, we can have no just thoughts of, till the return of Mr. Palmes. I have this morning received letters of the 20th, 24th, and 29th of the last month, from Mr. Chetwynd, and others from the army in Provence; and I am sorry to tell you, that I observe by all of them, that there is not that friendship and reliance between the duke of Savoy and prince Eugene as should be wished, for making so great a design succeed. I beg this may be known to nobody but yourself and the queen, hoping God may reconcile them, and make them act for the best.

"By my letter I received this morning of the 17th from Mr. Robinson, he thinks the king of Sweden is resolved not to be reconciled to the emperor. I do not send his letter, not doubting but he writes the same thing to Mr. Secretary Harley. The desire you have that the States should enter into stricter measures with the czar, may be right, if the emperor and king of Sweden should not agree; but the inclosed I send of count Wratislaw of the 17th from Leipsig, gives great hopes. I have also a letter from count Rechteren of the 10th from Vienna, that assures me the



emperor has agreed as to the point of religion, desired in favour of the silesians by the king of Sweden.

“ I have received another letter from general Erle ; he presses very much to come home. He should either be made easy in that service, or have leave to return. If you shall see it practicable, and for the service, to make a descent this year, I would recommend Withers rather than Ingolsby : for the first is very brave and diligent, and will make no other demands than what are absolutely necessary ; the other will be desiring a train of artillery, and such expences as you will not be able to comply with ; but upon the whole, if we do not succeed in Provence, it will not be reasonable to attempt the landing of men this year. A very little time will clear this matter ; for I reckon brigadier Palmes was with the duke of Savoy about ten days ago, so that I may hear from him in a week.”

TO THE DUCHESS.

“ *Soignies, August 29.* I have had your's of the 10th, and your note of the 12th, with Vanbrugh's letter, by which I see the hall and saloon must be left for next year. As our business of this year goes, I am afraid it will be time enough, especially if the news we have from France be true, which says that the french made a sally on the duke of Savoy on the 15th, by which we suffered very much.

“ If you have good reason for what you write of the kindness and esteem the queen has for Mrs. Masham and Mr. Harley, my opinion should be, that the lord treasurer and I should tell her majesty what is good for herself ; and if that will not prevail, to be quiet, and let Mr. Harley and Mrs. Masham do what they please ; for I own I am quite tired, and if the queen can be safe, I shall be glad. I hope lord treasurer will be of my mind, and then we shall be much happier than by being in a perpetual struggle ; for if lord treasurer and I have lost the confidence of the queen, it would be the greatest folly in the world in us, to act so as the world may think as they now do, that it is in our power to do every thing, by which we shall not only be made uneasy, but lose our reputation both at home and



abroad. I shall always be ready to sacrifice my life for the quiet and safety of the queen, but I will not be imposed upon by any body that has power with her ; for as I have served her with all my heart, and all the sincerity imaginable, I think I deserve the indulgence of being quiet in my old age."

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

"*Soignies, August 24.* \* \* \* \* The weather beginning to be good, \* I intend to make the cannon and baggage march tomorrow, and the army the next day. I believe the french will march from Cambron before I pass the Dender ; for it is very plain they will avoid the coming to action. I shall take care as soon as I can for the exchange of Macartney ; but I beg that none of the prisoners in England may have any encouragement, for the french do not use us well, pretending to govern absolutely in the exchange of prisoners, by making their choice ; for at this minute they act as if they were our masters."

The treasurer, who had looked with anxiety to the military operations of his friend, in the hope that a successful engagement would allay the domestic feuds, participated in his mortification. To make amends for the disappointment, he recurred to his favourite scheme of a descent on the french coast ; and suggested a subsidiary alliance with the venetians, for the purpose of increasing the disposable force in Italy. The close of the letter, in which he imparts these plans, merits particular attention ; because it conveys his opinion on a proposal made by Harley, to arrest lord Peterborough, and bring him to a public trial for his conduct.

"*Windsor, August 15--26.* I am to acknowledge the favour of your letters from Soignies, of the 15th and of the 18th, with the several letters and papers inclosed, which I shall be sure to keep very carefully, according to your directions.

"By your's of the 15th the french seem to have very narrowly escaped your hand, and I doubt the very ill weather, and the country in which they now are, will secure them from falling any

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\* The former part of the letter being political is inserted in chapter 62.



more this year into the same dangers. This I reckon will put you in a condition of more easily sparing three or four regiments for our descent, in case the season of the year and other circumstances will admit of our putting it in execution.

“It is impossible to be sure that any attempt of this kind shall succeed, but all the assurances from those parts are very encouraging to it; besides that, we know all the force of France is at this time moving towards Provence, and their people, on this side, left both unguarded, and also in many places organized, for fear of revolts. With your assistance, I see we might be able to have about 6,000 foot and about 1,000 horse and dragoons, which, if they were well on the other side, I should think might be sufficient, with a good man at their head, to make themselves masters of Rochfort and Xaintes, which opens to them the provinces of Xaintonges and Angoumois, where the protestants are the most numerous, and the people said to be the best disposed of any. But all this will turn upon having a proper person at the head, and in a great measure also, upon success at Toulon, which I hope is in a good way; tho’ all the french accounts endeavour to fright us very much with their good posture there, and the great preparations they are making to disappoint the duke of Savoy’s design upon that place.

“I am glad you have no other objection to the venetian troops, but your doubt of their not coming in time; for they are certainly nearer at hand than any others whatever, except those which the emperor has in Italy already. I am very glad to find by Sir Philip Meadows’s last letters, that he is in hopes the imperial court will be early in letting us have some of the troops from Naples, for strengthening the duke of Savoy’s army, which I take to be equally useful to us, as if they let us have them for Catalonia.

“I doubt the elector of Hanover will not be willing to let the saxon troops, now upon the Rhine, advance towards Italy, because he is so pressing to have others from you; but I think it is very plain there will be no farther occasion for them this year where they now are, unless the elector would shew more diligence



and vigour than his motions hitherto seem to promise, or indeed, than the season of the year seems now to admit of.

“ I inclose to you a letter I had lately from Mr. Secretary Harley, which I desire you not to lose, that you may see his thoughts concerning lord Peterborough. I must own to you, at the same time, that if one could imagine there were the least truth in what lord Peterborough has taken so much pains to profess to you, my own opinion would be, not to make him desperate, till he had first given clear demonstration. It was impossible for him not to be troublesome; but, in this, as in all other things, I can submit to better judgments, and I incline to think that the opinion of lords Halifax, Somers, and Sunderland, would, *in this particular*, be the same that Mr. Secretary Harley seems to have.

“ I have written to my lord Manchester by this post in my lord Sunderland’s absence, that he would lose no time in proposing to the venetians to come into the great alliance, upon promising subsidies for ten or twelve thousand men, to join the duke of Savoy, and giving them assurances of taking care of their interests at the general peace; and that no peace shall be made without their participation.”

The letter from secretary Harley to lord Godolphin, to which allusion is here made, is too singular to be omitted, particularly when we consider the situation of the secretary, and his subsequent approbation of Peterborough’s conduct.

“ *Wednesday, August 13.* Your lordship will see what Mr. Robinson writes to me apart, in answer to my queries about lord Peterborough. I confess it is none of my business, and therefore I beg your lordship’s pardon, if my zeal run before my discretion, when I offer to your lordship’s consideration what should be done with lord Peterborough as soon as he arrives. Should he not give an account in writing of his proceedings, and that being represented to the committee, if not to the council, and if it appears he has acted contrary to his instructions, ought he not to be committed? It is true he will be admitted to bail, but he may be tried by a common jury for a misdemeanor. I need not



specify the reasons for it, they seem to be obvious. It is better to find him work to clear himself, than leave him leisure to do mischief. I must again beg pardon for offering my thoughts, to which I have no motive but the honour of the queen, and the service of her ministers."

In the next letter we find Godolphin reverting to the feuds in the cabinet, and the embarrassments arising from the influence of Mrs. Masham and Harley.

"*Windsor, August 16--27.* Mr. Hare came hither yesterday, and finding he resolved to return to you by the very next packet boat, I have a mind to mention some particular things to you, by a safe hand, which I should not care to venture by the post.

"I reckon one great occasion of Mrs. Morley's obstinacy, and of the uneasiness she gives herself and others, especially about the clergy, proceeds from an inclination of talking more freely than usual to Mrs. Masham; and this is laid hold of and improved by Mr. Secretary Harley, upon all such matters, if not upon others, to insinuate his notions, which, in these affairs, you know by your own experience, from the conversation we had together before you left England, are as wrong as possible. I am apt also to think he makes use of the same person, to improve all the ill offices to the whigs, which both he and that person are as naturally inclined to, as the queen is to receive the impressions of them.

"Now this must needs do a great deal of mischief, and I am afraid we shall find the effects of it in the winter, if a timely remedy be not put to it, which I think cannot be done but by you and me speaking very plainly at the same time to Mrs. Morley, both of Mr. Harley and a great many things, and settling a rule for preventing, before it is too late, all the uneasinesses for the future. But how this will be done in time I cannot see, unless your affairs on that side will allow of your being here some time before the meeting of the parliament; and to satisfy you of how great importance it is, that you should be here before that time, is the chief reason of my giving you this trouble."

"*Windsor, Aug. 22--Sept. 2.* I have the favour of your's of



the 22nd and 25th, and am very sorry you have had so much bad weather: we have had our share of that, and therefore I hope you have your's of the fine weather we have here at this time.

"I have not yet heard of lord Peterborough, though our letters from the Hague tell us he was to come over in the last packet boat; but whatever he shall say, it cannot be relied on. He will be governed by his animosities or his interest. I cannot answer which of them will prevail."



## CHAPTER 61.

1707.

*Movement of Marlborough from Soignies to Ath and Helchin, and retreat of the french to the vicinity of Lille—Failure of the enterprise against Toulon—Retreat of the combined forces into Piemont, and capture of Susa—Disputes between the courts of Vienna and Turin—Correspondence on that subject, on the domestic affairs of England, on the plan for the succeeding campaign, and on the proposal for Eugene to command in Spain.*

THE rains having at length ceased, Marlborough quitted Soignies on the first of September, and directing his march upon Ath, passed the Dender, with the view of turning the hostile position at Chievies. But the enemy, instead of awaiting his approach, fell back to the Scheld, in order to avail themselves of the protection afforded by their great fortresses. The fatigues of this arduous march did not prevent the duke from transmitting the detail of his movements, nor from giving his opinion on the suggestions, contained in the letter from Godolphin, dated August, 15--27.

“ *Ath, Sept. 1.* You will know by the letters of this day, upon our marching hither, the enemy decamped in great haste, and I believe our march to-morrow will oblige them to pass the Scheld. The deputies are convinced, that if we had made the march to Genappe two months ago, when I pressed for it, the duke of Vendome would have been obliged to retire as he now does.

“ I know nothing of the duke of Savoy’s quitting the siege of Toulon, but what I am told by the duke of Vendome’s trumpet, who says it was on the 22nd. I believe this will naturally put a stop to the descent you intended; and if you have good reason for a descent, as your’s of the 15th seems to think, it is most certain



that early in the year, when they have the whole summer before them, is a much properer time.

“What Mr. Secretary Harley says in his letter concerning lord Peterborough may be right; but I think as you do, that you must take no step in that matter but in conjunction with lord Somers, lord Halifax, and lord Sunderland, and, if possible, with lord Wharton also, or he will play you tricks. By what I have heard lord Peterborough say, I believe he thinks he can justify himself in every particular; but I should think it is impossible to justify the application of the money; for whenever you have those accounts, I believe you will find the greatest confusion imaginable, so that I think Mr. Bridges should make himself master of that account as soon as possible.

“Upon this ill news from Provence, I am already pressed by M. de Quiros that immediate orders might be given for sending troops to king Charles. Till I know what the duke of Savoy's and prince Eugene's projects may be, by Mr. Palmes, who, I believe, might leave them as soon as they marched from Toulon, I shall not be able to give any answer. In the mean time I should be glad to know what your thoughts in England are, as to that point. The enclosed from count Wratislaw\* I received this morning; you will see it gives more reason for hopes than Mr. Robinson's letters.”

Resuming his march on the fifth, Marlborough crossed the Scheld above Oudenard, and encamped at Petteghem, from whence he thus announces his movements.

“Sept. 5. Since my last we have made three marches in order to pass the Scheld which we have done this morning. We shall stay in this camp to-morrow, and the next day march to Helchin, by which we shall oblige the enemy to eat up their own country, which I am afraid is all the hurt we are likely to do them; for I am very confident they will be careful not to give occasion for action.”

Advancing on the 7th along the tongue of land bounded by the

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\* Alluding to the successful progress of the negotiation with the king of Sweden.



Scheld and the Lys, Marlborough established his left at Helchin, where he took up his head quarters, and extended his right to Belleghem. This bold and decisive movement alarmed the enemy, and, as he had foreseen, they immediately crossed the Scheld and withdrew to the strong post of Pont à Tressin, which was covered by a series of new lines, formed behind the Marque, and protected by the cannon of Lille.

During his continuance in the stationary camp at Helchin, Marlborough received the first intelligence of the unfortunate failure before Toulon, and the retreat of the combined forces into Piemont.

To the success of this momentous enterprise, which had held all Europe in anxious suspense, the british ministry had confidently looked, as a compensation for the misfortune in Spain, and as the means of extorting from France a peace no less honourable than secure. Their exertions were commensurate with the magnitude of the object. The cares of Marlborough were long called forth in providing ample means of aggression ; and no resource was omitted to stimulate the zeal of the two powers employed in the execution. But it was beyond human foresight to calculate on the effects of jarring interests and passions, or to devise expedients for combining contradictory elements in one uniform and consistent plan. By importunities, threats, and largesses, the concurrence of the courts of Vienna and Turin had indeed been extorted ; but no efforts could soothe their jealousies or obviate their contentions. The first and most prominent obstacle arose from the suspicion fostered by the imperial court against that of England, and the fears they entertained, lest the destruction of the french marine in the Mediterranean would be the prelude to a separate peace between France and the maritime powers. Similar jealousies existed between the courts of Turin and Vienna, and the interest which the duke of Savoy appeared to manifest in the enterprise, was a sufficient reason for the aversion with which it was regarded by the emperor. The rivalry which reigned in the cabinet extended its influence to the field, and created the same disunion



between the duke of Savoy and prince Eugene, in their capacity of generals, as between the duke and the emperor in their capacity of sovereigns. As early as June we find the duke expressing his indignation at the obstacles and mortifications which he endured, and declaring, that were it not from respect for the queen of England, he would instantly quit the alliance. On the other hand, the imperial court were not sparing of their censures and insinuations. They expatiated on his selfish and encroaching policy, and ascribed his opposition to the enterprise against Naples, to a secret wish of preserving that crown for his son in law, the duke of Anjou. Eugene also, not only re-echoed the accusations of his court, and incessantly dwelt on the danger and difficulties of the design in which he was unwillingly engaged; but treated the complaints of the duke of Savoy with regard to his want of authority, as proofs of an intention to avert from himself the blame of a failure, which he considered as inevitable.

The effects of these disputes were felt at every step of this ill-fated enterprise. In addition to the diminution of force, occasioned by the detachment for the invasion of Naples, no recruits appeared to fill up the vacancies in the austrian ranks, and day after day was spent in combating objections and obviating delays. An enterprise commenced under such auspices, afforded but a faint prospect of success.

The 25,000 auxiliaries in the pay of the maritime powers were united with the troops of Savoy and Austria, and a fleet of forty sail, under the command of admiral Shovel, hovered on the coast to maintain the communications by sea, and to co-operate in the intended attack. It was not till towards the latter end of June that the army was in a condition to move, and after the necessary garrisons were drafted for the protection of Italy, the whole collective force did not exceed 35,000 men. They scaled the Col di Tende, forced the passage of the Var, and traversing the rugged country bordering the Mediterranean, reached the camp of La Valette, in the vicinity of Toulon, on the 26th of July, the fleet at the same time appearing before the mouth of the harbour.

The garrison of Toulon scarcely exceeded 8,000 men, the works



were in ill condition, and the new defences, which had been projected to resist the peril of the moment, were yet incomplete. The troops, elated at the sight of the goal, which appeared to bound their enterprise, anxiously expected the orders for an immediate assault, and such an effort would doubtless have been crowned with success. The expectation of all was raised to the highest pitch, when the two commanders ascended the heights, to survey the town and works, and the presence of the admiral indicated the ready co-operation of the fleet. But a sudden damp seized the spirits of the soldiery when orders were given, which announced the abandonment of an assault, and the preparations for regular approaches. As the infantry did not exceed 23,000, it was obviously impossible to invest the town, and cut off the communication with the interior ; but the confederate commanders were too far engaged to retreat with honour. Orders were issued to bring the heavy cannon from the fleet, and on the 30th of July general Rehbinder, with 3,000 men, occupied the commanding heights of St. Catharine. But the time which had been wasted in deliberations and disputes, enabled the french court to mature their measures of resistance. Marshal Tessé, to whom the command in Provence was entrusted, was hourly joined by reinforcements from the most distant quarters, whose advance was facilitated by all the means which the country afforded ; and the efforts of the government were seconded by the sacrifices and exertions of the nobility and people. Before the allies were prepared to commence a siege, he approached with 20 fresh battalions, and occupied an entrenched camp, on the opposite side of the town, while a second force was collecting of troops drawn from Catalonia and Roussillon ; and detachments from the Netherlands and the Rhine successively arrived to swell the numbers engaged in the defence. On the 18th of August, the force of the enemy amounted to no less than 70 battalions.

In these circumstances the enterprise became hopeless. After some successful attacks of posts, the allies were embarrassed by the want of supplies, and menaced by the force gathering around them. Having no alternative but to abandon their design, they



relinquished their posts, re-embarked the cannon and stores, and on the 22nd commenced their retreat. After a toilsome march of ten days, they arrived at the Var, unmolested by the enemy; and on the 14th of September, again traversing the Col di Teude, reached the point, from whence they had commenced their expedition, with a force diminished to half its number. Eugene himself announced this disgraceful retreat to Marlborough, in a style and tone, which shewed how little interest the imperial court had taken in the success of the enterprise.

“*La Vallette, August 20.* The siege of Toulon is every day more and more impossible, on account of the enemy's force and situation, and the strength of their artillery. By the inclosed plan, your highness will see their camp flanked on the right by the town, with more than 130 pieces of artillery, exclusive of the fire from the two ships moved into the harbour; - and on the left covered by inaccessible rocks, while the cannon shot of the place reaches even to the mountains.

“They had originally 40\* battalions, and a regiment of dragoons. They have been since reinforced by 72 or 73 battalions, and about 40 squadrons, which threaten our flanks under Medavi. I know not from whence troops from all quarters daily join them. The contrary winds prevent our receiving any intelligence from the fleet, and hinder the galliots and boats from advancing, altho' they have only a hundred paces to traverse; and altho' since the capture of Fort Louis, they might have bombarded the harbour and town without risk. For three days we have bombarded the town by land, with a few mortars. Marshal Tessé declares that the dukes of Burgundy and Berry are speedily expected, that the duke of Berwick will be here to-morrow, and that by the 24th, their force will be increased to 164 battalions, and a considerable corps of cavalry. It is certain that a reinforcement of foot is marching from Roussillon, under M. d'Arene. We are embarking the sick, wounded, and artillery, that we may march without incumbrance.

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\* This estimate is exaggerated by prince Eugene, to extenuate the failure; for we learn from the prince of Hesse, that on their arrival before Toulon, this french force consisted of only twenty battalions; and that Tessé did not join with twenty more till three days after.



Medavi threatens to occupy the posts in our rear; but I believe he will think twice before he risks an action. I have to-day concerted measures with the admiral, and we have agreed to finish our arrangements at the Var, with the hope that brigadier Palmes will be there, and that I shall know your highness's intention, and what has been projected in England and Holland. This country needs a speedy remedy, and it is necessary that the allies should take just measures, without throwing the burthen from one to the other. I hope also to receive news from Vienna; for to form a project, one must be acquainted with every thing. If I could speak with your highness, it would perhaps be more advantageous for the public good, and I should have the pleasure of assuring you, &c." \*

It is needless to make any farther comments on this unfortunate expedition; because the facts speak for themselves. The misunderstanding which had manifested itself between the two courts, and two commanders, in the course of the enterprise, broke forth with redoubled violence on its failure. Complaints and recriminations re-echoed on every side; and the result not only frustrated the sanguine hopes of Marlborough, but convinced him that the two courts could never be again brought to unite, for the attainment of a common object, nor the two generals be associated in any future command.

The only fruit of a campaign which occasioned such sacrifices, and created such expectations, was the capture of Susa, which was reduced by the instigation of the duke of Savoy, who was anxious to close the avenues into Piemont, and open a way into Dauphiné. After this exploit, which occurred in the beginning of October, the imperialists retired into Lombardy, the palatines marched to embark for Catalonia, and the hessians took the route towards Germany. These movements sufficiently indicated the abandonment of offensive operations on the side of Italy.†

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\* Translated from the original in french.

† Letters from Mr. Chetwynd, the british envoy, to the duke of Marlborough and lord Sunderland—From the duke of Savoy, prince Eugene, the prince of Hesse, general Rehender, and count Wratislaw to the duke; and from the Journal of the baron de St. Hippolite.



The failure of this enterprise created equal alarm and embarrassment both in England and abroad. The whole attention of the british cabinet was employed to counteract the dangerous consequences which it was expected to produce; and under the first impulse of disappointment, we find several interesting letters from Godolphin, conveying suggestions for the plan of the ensuing campaign. From the experience of the preceding year, he argued that no effort could be expected from the dutch and germans; and urged the necessity of maintaining the defensive in Italy, Germany, and even in the Netherlands, while the principal efforts were made in Spain, and on the coast of France. For this purpose, he proposed to collect troops from all quarters, particularly from the venetians, and princes of the empire; and even urged that an attempt should be made to obtain subsidiary forces from the king of Sweden, whose army he conceived would become burthensome to his finances, in consequence of his accommodation with the emperor. Above all, he pressed Marlborough to obtain from the court of Vienna considerable detachments from the army in Naples, and to send them with such succours as could be drawn from Italy, under the command of Eugene, to give a new impulse to the affairs of the allies in Spain. This measure he contended would be extremely popular in England, and consequently receive the cordial support of parliament; and he suggested every argument of gratitude or policy, which he conceived likely to weigh with the court of Vienna.

Collaterally with these suggestions, he urged the necessity of Marlborough's speedy return to England, and recommended him to solicit the mission of Zinzendorf or Wratislaw from Vienna, that he might arrange the projects for the ensuing campaign at the Hague, without prolonging his stay on the continent.\*

The views of Marlborough were, however, turned to more practicable schemes; and his opinion on these and other subjects

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\* Letters from lord Godolphin, July 28--August 8, July 31, August 7--18, and August 12--23.



is sufficiently manifested in his letters, intermingled with reflections on the domestic policy of England.

TO THE DUCHESS.

"*Helchin, Sept. 8.* By the last post I was so tired, and received your's so late, that I had neither time nor force to answer it. I am sorry for what you write concerning my brother George. It is certain he is a very indiscreet tory, and has so little judgment, that he is capable of any indiscretion; but I am very sure he would not say or do any thing, that he thought might prejudice the queen or her government.

"I am very glad to find by your's, that the queen has it in her thoughts to give the white staff to the duke of Devonshire;\* for I think him a very honest man, and that he will prove a very useful one."

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

"*Helchin, Sept. 8.* Your two last letters of the 16th and 19th, by the post and Mr. Hare, I have received. By both I see you had not received the ill news from Toulon. What you write concerning the queen, Mr. Harley, and Mrs. Masham, is of that consequence, that I think no time should be lost, in putting a stop to that management, or else to let them have it entirely in their own hands. I did mention this to you in a former letter, but have had no answer. I do not see any thing to the contrary, but that the campaign in this country might be finished by the end of October; and I believe the elector of Hanover will be desirous to have a meeting, for settling the operations of the next campaign. As yet I have heard nothing from himself, but his general here has told me that he believed it would be desired.

"The danger Mr. Stepney is in, gives me a good deal of trouble, for I am afraid it will be very difficult to find a proper person to fill his place; for it must be one that is capable of the business of Flanders as well as that of Holland; but whilst there are any hopes of his life, I beg nobody may be spoke to. If I knew any

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\* William Cavendish, first duke of Devonshire, who took so active a part in the Revolution, died on the 18th of August 1707, and his place of lord high steward was given to his son, who inherited both his estates and patriotic principles.



body proper for this station, I would take the liberty of naming him; but as I know none, I hope you will think of somebody that has dexterity, and no pride. For if the queen be not very well served in this country, she will quickly feel the ill effects; for not only the people in this country, but the dutch also, must be pleased, which is a pretty hard task.

"The weather is so very fine that I have begged of lady Marlborough to make a visit to Woodstock, and if your business will permit of it, I should be glad you would see it, tho' but for one day. If I could fly, I would be there; but my fate is to row in this galley. If I can ever be so happy as to be free, I shall then endeavour to end my days in quiet, which is much more longed for, than I can express.

"I open my letter to send you the inclosed, which I have received this minute. Prince Eugene's letter should not be seen by any body but the queen."

The first of these inclosures was from count Wratislaw, announcing the conclusion of the treaty with the king of Sweden, and attributing the success principally to the support of England and Holland. He launched also into bitter invectives against the duke of Savoy. "Your highness," he concludes, "sees how the duke acts, and if our allies will let him go on, and will continue their confidence in him, to our exclusion, they will repent of it another day. You see also the sentiments of prince Eugene, with regard to next year. By the first post I will send you a paper in cypher, and beg that some person of fidelity may be intrusted with decyphering it, for the secret is of much importance."

The letter from prince Eugene was written to count Wratislaw, during the siege of Toulon, and is interesting, because it displays the interminable misunderstanding with the duke of Savoy, and announces the failure which soon afterwards took place.

"*La Vallette, August 4.* \* \* \* \* I believe this will find you returned from your journey: I wish it happy. It is very cruel that conjunctures should oblige one to commit such meannesses, but there is no remedy. What you write to the duke of Marlborough is just. With regard to myself, I will go



wherever they wish me, if I have an army; and I declare that I will no longer be a subaltern, except to my masters, unless conjunctures should oblige me to pass the winter in this country, of which I am very doubtful.

“The duke of Savoy, with his usual policy, seeing the great difficulties, not to say impossibilities, of this operation, throws it entirely on me, in order not to disgust England and Holland, who press him extremely, without listening to any reason. He does it with the more cunning, because he praises me on my capacity, and says I can do what I will. He answers them, on every thing, that they must address themselves to me, that he is much inclined to this operation, that he knows the consequence of it, but that he can do nothing, which I do not deem proper.

“They are all enraged with me, and think that I wish not to risk the troops. I answer clearly, that I am accustomed to act according to the rules and reasons of war, every one knowing that I readily hazard, when I have the least appearance of succeeding; and that, from complaisance for England, and for a little envoy\* who is here, I shall not advise a thing, if I see it impossible; but, that if in spite of all, the allies and the duke will have it so, the troops of the emperor will not abandon them, and that I will omit nothing to succeed.

“This is the state in which we are. By the journal and my relation, you will see the detail. It is the most difficult operation I have seen in my life. We are working at batteries; we will see the effect of them before we decide on a bombardment or a siege, at least this is my sentiment.

“I do not doubt that strong detachments will arrive on all sides, the enemy having repassed the Rhine in Germany, being retired into quarters of refreshment in Spain, and the armies of Flanders inactive.”

THE DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

“*Helchin*, Sept. 12. I find by your's of the 22nd, which I

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\* Mr. Chetwynd.



received last Friday, that you had not then received the ill news from Toulon.

“ By the letter I have received from Mr. Secretary Harley, as well as by what you say of lord Peterborough, I find that he had not been with the queen, nor any body in her service, which I wonder at; for he told me he would, in the first place, wait upon you and lord Sunderland. He is very capable of pushing his animosities so far as to hurt himself, and give a good deal of trouble to others, which were to be wished might have been avoided, especially this winter.

“ What you say of the oaths of fidelity\* is very reasonable; but by the pensioner's letters they are of another opinion, so that I believe they will not allow the oaths to be given. God knows what is best to be done in that matter; but I am afraid the business of the barrier, which is next to impossible to be settled, will occasion very great uneasiness between England and Holland. I can very easily keep it off till my return to the Hague, but then I must be instructed.

“ Don Quiros and M. Sinzerling have been with me. I have wrote by Sinzerling to the elector palatine, to know what number of his troops, paid by England and Holland, he will consent should go for Spain. As soon as I have an answer, you shall have it. I believe Holland will consent that those troops should be sent to Catalonia, and the truth is, we have no others that can go. By what we hear from France, they are sending back the duke of Berwick with the troops that came from Spain, and 4,000 men more; and as they say, orders for attacking Gerona.

“ Now that the agreement is signed between the emperor and king of Sweden, I beg you will be careful of making any step with the muscovite ambassador that may give offence to the swedes; for should they return into the empire during the war, it would oblige us to make an ill peace with France.

“ You will see by the copy of the letter I sent you by the last,

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\* Alluding to the oaths of fidelity, which were proposed to be administered to the inhabitants of the conquered provinces.



of prince Eugene, that he and the duke of Savoy cannot serve any more in the same army ; and the elector of Hanover being in possession of the command in the empire, I see no place where he can serve but in Spain, in which place I am afraid we cannot succeed. I long for the coming of Palmes, that I might know what the duke of Savoy and prince Eugene intend for the remainder of this campaign, and their thoughts for the next. It is now very plain that the french having no troops in Italy, enables them to be strong in all other places ; so that we must think of strengthening the army on the Rhine and in this country, or the next year we shall be beaten in one, if not in both places. God knows how we shall be able to do this ; but if we cannot, we shall run great hazard, notwithstanding the catalan regiments which lord Galway has raised, and which I hope your orders will put an end to.

“ I could wish for the queen’s service and the good of the common cause, that you would do all that is in your power for the raising those regiments of foot, which were taken at Almanza, by which you may have in the Spring a body of foot to employ in a descent, if practicable. I should think the raising of these regiments very difficult, but that I am persuaded that the greatest part of the officers are at liberty, or vacant. When you shall resolve to take this method, I shall then press the States to do the same thing.

“ *Helchin, Sept. 15.* Since my last I have had the favour of your two letters of the 25th and 29th. I think your thoughts for the affairs of Spain, and retrieving our misfortune at Toulon by strengthening the army in Italy by the venetians, if possible, are very right ; but I am afraid you will find those people more backward. You will see by the inclosed, that the king of France promises the elector, that he shall have, the next campaign, an army strong enough for regaining Brabant.

“ I am not concerned for what may happen here the next campaign, in comparison of the apprehensions I have for the queen’s business this winter in England. If that goes well, I hope we may be able to struggle with the french in this country.



“ I am sorry to see you are of opinion that lord Galway will not care to go to Portugal ; for there he might do service, and where he is, I think it is impossible.

“ I think it might be for the queen’s service and the public good, to endeavour to persuade the States to make an augmentation for carrying on the war with more vigour, or we shall never come to a good peace. Whatever you say to Vriberg, must at the same time be said at the Hague.

“ The french intending this day to forage at Templeuve, I marched thither with 20,000 foot, and 5,000 horse. Upon their having notice, they did not suffer their foragers nor escort to leave their camp ; but suffered me to forage the whole country, though I was three leagues from my own camp, and not a league from their’s ; but they will venture nothing this year.

“ You will see a letter I sent lady Marlborough, which I received by the last post from lord Peterborough. By that you will see that he intends to be in good temper ; but I confess I cannot understand the meaning of his not waiting upon the queen, and that there is no notice taken of it. In my poor opinion, you should resolve to be pleased, or to be very angry.”

“ *Helchin, Sept. 19.* The inclosed is a copy of a letter I have received from count Wratislaw, and all in cypher. I am afraid his characters are very just. However, his project, in my opinion, is very dangerous at this time ; but I have not, nor shall give any answer to it, till I hear from you.

“ As to your desire of prince Eugene’s going to Spain, I think he can serve no where else ; for I dare say he will not serve under the elector of Hanover, nor can he serve with the duke of Savoy. I shall incline to think, as Sir Edward Seymour said in the house of commons, that he never knew admiral or general that had ships or troops enough.

“ I am of opinion that the war will be decided in this country by a battle early in the next campaign, for they see that no success in any other part of the world can get them peace ; so that I am persuaded they will have a very great struggle here at the opening of the field. However, I shall endeavour to govern



myself agreeably to what you think will please in England. If you have any particular place, in which you think great service might be done, by a descent, that ought to be known to none but England and Holland, and I think might very easily be accommodated with the service of this country, for a descent can't be put in practice till the beginning of July, and before that time I dare say we shall have decided the business here; for if we have not a battle before that time, we may ship the troops to Ostend, which will not give so much notice to France as if they were shipped from England."

The letter from count Wratislaw, which accompanied the preceding, conveyed an additional proof of the perverseness of the imperial court, in continuing their endeavours to alienate the maritime powers from the duke of Savoy.

"The last post I gave your highness notice of my arrival at Vienna, and that the ratification of the treaty was in the hands of the king of Sweden; so that I flatter myself his army will pass thro' Silesia without stopping, altho' his march, in consequence of the excesses which the officers encourage the soldiers to commit, will cost us immense sums, and will diminish our finances to such a degree, as to shackle the efforts of the ensuing campaign.

"Your highness may be persuaded that this court will faithfully execute the treaty recently concluded. Nevertheless, we cannot flatter ourselves that Sweden will leave us in repose; and I beg leave to recall to your recollection, what I had the honour of representing to you in my last letter from Leipsic, of the 3rd of August, being always of opinion, that we ought to arm Denmark during the winter, that we may be able to dispose of her troops in the Spring as we think best. The maritime powers ought not to spare some hundred thousand crowns, which will be well expended, if we should be delivered from the embarrassing apprehensions, which have so much disquieted us during this campaign.

"I conjure you then to finish the treaty before you return to England, for which the States seem well inclined; and the



english ministers will be responsible to the public, should they continue to persuade themselves of the good dispositions of the king of Sweden towards the common cause.

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“The retreat of our army from before Toulon justifies the court of Vienna, and proves it to have been more correct in its predictions than that of England, which was so urgent for the invasion of Provence, an enterprise shewn by experience to have been impracticable. I have long intreated your highness that such approbation and facility should not have been given in England to the projects of the duke of Savoy. What is past, sufficiently shews his intentions. You see, at present, that all his views are directed to create misunderstandings between the court of Vienna and the maritime powers, in order to render himself master of your opinions, and ruin the credit of the emperor. He insinuates, through the means of lord Peterborough and others, that it is the interest of the maritime powers to procure for him the Milanese, for the purpose of establishing a third power in Italy, which being more attentive to œconomy than to the house of Austria, would prove a balance to France in that quarter. This poison, however subtle and insinuating, is too apparent to deceive persons so enlightened as you, and who reflect on the conduct of the duke of Savoy in all times. For doubtless he will make the same insinuations to France, under the pretext of limiting the power of the house of Austria, and thus render the interests of both parties subservient to his own views, which are only for his own aggrandizement. Whatsoever may be said to the contrary, you will never have an ally more sure and more necessary than the house of Austria; while the duke of Savoy, whatever accession of power he may obtain, will always be a mercenary, and will never act against France, except under new and advantageous conditions. Whereas, if he is retained in a situation less considerable than that to which he aspires, he will always be necessitated to join the allies, or see his territory become the theatre of war. I do not affirm that we ought not to conciliate the duke of Savoy, and must grant what we have promised; but, at the same time, distrust his personal conduct and advice, and



not be the dupes of his suggestions, as we have been this year. Far from placing the same confidence in him as we have lately done, we ought to place our confidence in each other, and mutually communicate what insinuations may be made on his part."

After expatiating on the necessity of forming a plan for the next campaign, he hints at the conquest of Sicily, and adds, that it should be promptly undertaken, lest France should have time to repair its shattered marine, and render the enterprise more difficult. The english fleet, he observed, might winter either at Palermo or Messina, and thus at once cover Naples, and deliver Barcelona from the danger of a siege, as well as open the Mediterranean for the passage of succours to Spain. He complained that this design had not been sufficiently promoted in England; that no attention had been paid to form a regular plan for conducting the military operations in Spain, or for sending immediate succours; and that even no answer had been given to their proposals, except that nothing could be settled, till the result of the expedition against Toulon was known. And as the news of its ill success had not then reached England, and the fleet had returned to Lisbon, there could, he urged, be no time for subsidiary treaties with the german princes, and no troops could be dispatched to Spain.

"I have long," he adds, "declared that the emperor is incapable of sending his troops into Spain, and defraying the expences of the war; for how can it be supposed possible that his imperial majesty can do so, when the rebels ravage on one side his hereditary countries, and the swedes ruin Silesia? It is quite chimerical to dictate to us terms of peace with the rebels, which can never be carried into effect; for experience evidently proves that Ragotski has rejected all conditions, even the most advantageous, which were proposed to him last year; and I entreat you, prince, to consider this as a certain truth, and not suffer yourself to be amused on that subject, by any person whatever.

"In the present state of our affairs we cannot cede Tran-



silvania to him, without placing ourselves in a much worse situation, since the loss of Transilvania will inevitably draw us into a war with the turks, and without that cession Ragotski will never enter into an accommodation.

“To prove, however, the anxiety of the emperor to assist his brother, he is willing to exceed his powers, and has ordered prince Eugene to send to Barcelona 2,000 foot and 1,000 horse, provided admiral Shovel will engage for the expence of the transport, and the maritime powers will provide for their future subsistence. In a word, this is all which the allies have a right to expect from the court of Vienna, for the assistance of Spain. For we are not in a situation to charge ourselves with more expences; and the business of Sweden, besides a thousand reasons, will not permit us to spare more of our own troops.”

After touching on the difficulties in regard to the appointment of a commander for the imperial troops in Spain, the inactivity of the Low Countries, and the progress which the french had made on the Rhine, he continues, “these considerations induce me to apprehend that the parliament will be more agitated than ever, and that our enemies in England will use their best efforts to gain the superiority to our detriment. It is, therefore, more than ever necessary, in so alarming a crisis, that the conduct of both sides should be extremely prudent. On our part, we must not impute the ill success of this campaign to the counsels of the english ministry, in order not to discredit them with the nation; while on your part you ought not to render us odious to a people, from whom we must draw the means of continuing the war.

He concluded with proposing that prince Eugene, or some other minister from the court of Vienna, should have a personal interview with Marlborough, to arrange the plan of future operations.

FROM LORD GODOLPHIN.

“*Windsor, Sept. 9.* I am very much afraid the miscarriage of Toulon is owing to the little good understanding betwixt those



two princes, or rather, in truth, betwixt the imperial court and the duke of Savoy ; for which reason I think little or nothing can be hoped from them in this year, nor I doubt in the next neither, unless measures are taken this winter, to remove and cure the jealousies between the emperor and the duke of Savoy. This makes me repeat once more to you the necessity of count Wratislaw's meeting you at the Hague, at the end of the campaign, that both this thing, which is extremely essential, and also prince Eugene's going into Spain, may be there concerted and settled. The latter of these will be a very popular thing in England, and very much contribute to obtain the necessary subsidies in parliament.

“I am the more particular upon what relates to Spain and Italy, because those places being most remote, the necessary measures for carrying on the war there ought to be adjusted, in the first place ; because else there will want time to put them in execution. Spain cannot be supported this winter without prince Eugene and some troops from Italy ; and Italy cannot be made useful next year to the common cause, but by putting the duke of Savoy at the head of an army, to act offensively against France, and by giving him the view and assurance of it immediately.”

After proposing to procure from the king of Sweden a body of troops to serve under the elector of Hanover, he adds, “as to Flanders, I am sorry to find you think there will be a necessity of augmenting that army. I doubt it will prove no small difficulty here to keep it upon the foot it now stands, considering how little fruit the dutch have suffered it to yield us this summer. Nor how they are like to be persuaded to any augmentation on their part, can I see much ground to hope. What you say of their aversion to let king Charles's own subjects take the oath of fidelity to their sovereign, and of their renewing at this time their instances about settling their barrier, seem to me as if they sought rather for a handle to be cross, than really to join heartily with us in prosecuting the war. If they had, as they have not, any just pretension to the sovereignty of any part of Flanders hereafter, upon a peace, the taking the oath of fidelity to king Charles in the mean time, till such stipulation be made, does not interfere



with that pretension ; and as to their barrier, I continue of opinion that England never will, nor can admit, that Ostend should be in their possession, but in the possession of king Charles. That being granted, I think we might agree with them in the other desires they make as to their barrier, provided they will agree with us in an augmentation of their forces, and a vigorous prosecution of the war the next year. But for all these things poor Mr. Stepney will be extremely much wanted, for his condition is thought desperate by most people here ; and if it were possible for him to recover, it would be impossible for him to assist in these things, which come to bear immediately, and will continue all this winter to require a man in that station of the best sense and integrity. If you can spare Cadogan till spring, I believe he is the most sufficient for this service. But you are the best judge of the whole, as well as of this particular.

“ I doubt the season is too far spent for you to think of any siege, otherwise Ypres or Nieuport would open a way to Dunkirk next year, and consequently give a pleasing prospect to our people.

“ By our letters from Lisbon of the 3rd, I find they will expect more regiments from us for the defence of their frontier, or take a handle from the want of them to make up with France and Spain. I think, therefore, we must send them two or three regiments more by this convoy.

“ By the next post the queen tells me she will give me an answer to your letter.”

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

“ *Helchin, Sept. 22.* The winds have been so contrary that I believe this may come at the same time with what I wrote by Mr. Hill. Since that, I have received the inclosed letters concerning the march of the palatines for Catalonia. I have sent copies of them also to the pensioner, desiring him to lose no time in returning an answer, and that I should take upon me, in the queen's name, so that the troops might be immediately sent ; but I fear the States will not willingly promise what is desired by the elector.

“ I have not yet seen brigadier Palmes, but expect him daily.



I hope he will bring prince Eugene's consent to serve in Spain, since you say it is what is desired in England. If there be need of it, I shall be sure to press him. Besides, as the commands are now settled; he can serve no where but in Spain or Hungary.

"The king of Sweden will certainly not come into the grand alliance, since that would put him out of all hopes of his mediatorship, with which we must continue to flatter him. For the troops of king Augustus, it is just that they should be entertained by the emperor and empire, but I fear they are not able to comply with the expence; however, they ought to be pressed by England and Holland.

"It were to be wished that we could please the portuguese, without sending any more troops, since they must be useless."



## CHAPTER 62.

1707.

*Domestic affairs—Pertinacity of the queen in the nomination of the two tory bishops—Resentment of the whigs—Their jealousy of Marlborough and Godolphin—Continuation of the correspondence.*

WHILE the perplexing state of affairs abroad, and the embarrassments arising from the failure of the enterprise against Toulon called forth all the exertions of Marlborough, he experienced additional disquietude from the continued feuds in the cabinet, and the increasing jealousy of the whigs. He was now fully sensible of the secret cabals of Harley and Mrs. Masham, and their rapid advances in the favour of the queen; but he was convinced that the influence of Harley was too powerful to be eradicated, and either from the remains of former confidence, or from a reliance on his asseverations, he still flattered himself that he might venture to employ, as heretofore, his interest and services.

This apparent indecision, and the inflexible determination of the queen to persevere in the appointment of the two bishops, inflamed the resentment of the whigs; and they recurred, as before, to threats of a separation of interests, and parliamentary hostility. Their determination was announced by lord Sunderland, in a letter, which is now lost, but of which the substance may be collected from the correspondence of the duke.

TO LORD SUNDERLAND.

“*Meldert, July 27--August 7.* I had not by the last post time to acknowledge the favour of your's of the 8th. As to the affairs of the church, I have done what in me is, so God's will be done. I am very much obliged to you for your friendly and sincere



manner of letting me know what must happen next winter, if the queen is not governed by her friends in the matter of the bishops. I do with all my heart wish every thing may be as you desire, for the sake of the queen and England ; but I am very sensible there is no content except in a quiet life.

“ The inclosed is from Sir Cloudesley Shovel, which will give you an account of the duke of Savoy’s passing the Var. I have sent lord treasurer a copy of my letter to prince Eugene, by which you will see they intend the siege of Toulon as the first place, which is certainly right ; for the other sieges would have lost time. If this expedition succeeds, we may live to see happy days, or, as the dutch are so weary of war, we must have an ill peace. The business of Hungary is as wrong as possible ; but I cannot but hope the king of Sweden will at last do well, for he is certainly no friend to France. May you and your’s be happy, is the hearty wish and prayer of, &c.”

The perplexity which these threats created, and the disappointment which Marlborough himself felt, in the failure of his efforts to vanquish the opposition of the queen, may be traced in the subsequent letters.

TO THE DUCHESS.

“ *July 27.* I have a letter from lord Sunderland in which he lets me see the ill consequences that must happen, if the queen cannot be prevailed with in the affairs of the church. It is pretty hard to me to give him an honest answer, since it would lay too great a weight upon the queen. If other things go well, that will be done as they wish ; but I am rather despairing than otherwise. I have done what I can, and let what will happen, I hope to have nothing to reproach myself with, and then God’s will be done.”

FROM LORD SUNDERLAND.

“ *Whitehall, August 5--16.* I give you many thanks for your kind letter of the 27th of July, and assure you what I wrote to you last, concerning the affair of the church, was sincerely meant for the service of the queen, your grace, and lord treasurer. I will only say one thing more on this occasion ; that there are so



many uneasy things preparing by the common enemy against next sessions, and by the management of the court, so little confidence between them and the only people that either will or can support them, that I own I have terrible apprehensions of the consequences.

"I can't help taking notice, upon this occasion, of the letter from Hanover,\* which you sent inclosed to the lord treasurer. That letter does really set that matter in so true a light, that one would be astonished at the blindness of the queen, or any about her, considering how much they apprehend that foolish thing. But really if the queen does go on a little longer in the way she is at present, mankind will be quite uneasy, and will think of Sir Miles Wharton's old saying, "not to anger two courts at once." I only mention these things, as what are sincerely my apprehensions, but hope you and lord treasurer will be able to prevent the mischief which seems hanging over us all.

"I am very well pleased with the resolution of the States, which you sent to the lord treasurer, for I think it leaves it entirely in the power of the deputies; and the march your grace has lately made shews it is so.

"I send inclosed a letter writ by lord treasurer's direction to lord Galway. I think it essentially agrees with your thoughts of that matter; and, indeed, as lord Rivers has ordered it, it is impossible the poor man should venture there with any satisfaction to himself, or so as to be of any use.

"I am very much afraid of the king of Sweden, by the accounts the last letters give us, tho' one can hardly bring oneself to think he is in measures with France."

TO LORD SUNDERLAND, IN REPLY.

"*Soignies, August 22.* I have had the favour of your's of the 5th, and am sorry for the apprehensions you have for the next winter. As for myself, I have done what I can at this distance. I do not say this to make my court, for really I am weary of struggling, but to do myself justice to you; for I writ † the

\* Alluding to the invitation.

† To the queen.



very next post after I received your's, and sent the copy of my letter to my lord treasurer ; but I am as yet ignorant of the effect it has had. I think what you say as to lord Galway is so very right, that I hope he will approve of it, for his own sake and that of the public. I intended to have staid but one night in this camp, but the continual rains are such, that God knows when I shall be able to march."

FROM LORD SUNDERLAND.

" *Althorpe, August 30--September 10.* I have the honour of your's of the 22nd, since which, we have the melancholy news of our disappointment at Toulon. The greatest apprehension I have from it is, the effect it may have upon Holland ; that makes it the more necessary for England to shew a spirit upon this occasion, if there should be that humour amongst them in Holland. For I am confident that people will be of the side of England in this, whenever they are spoken plainly to, notwithstanding Buys and his friends, who I take to be the Harley of Holland.

" I should be very sorry your grace should be weary of struggling, as you say you are ; but if so, what must the whigs be, at least of struggling upon the foot they have hitherto done ?"

REPLY OF THE DUKE.

" *Helchin, Sept. 19.* I received yesterday the favour of your's of the 30th of the last month, from Althorpe. I agree entirely with you, that the success the french have had, is very discouraging ; and if care be not taken, in the manner you mention, the consequences may be dangerous with Holland ; for I have received very desponding letters from those parts. Either we were in the wrong in the beginning of the war, or we have reason to continue it with vigour, or content ourselves with losing our liberties ; for the french are very insolent in success, notwithstanding their great desire of peace. If the allies continue firm this winter, I am of opinion the enemy will at the entrance of the next campaign venture a battle in this country, since they see that success in any other part of the world cannot give them peace.

" You may be sure that I long extremely for quietness ; but, at the same time, I am very sensible, that during this war I must



continue in the galley. My greatest uneasiness is, what I hear from England; and my concern for the lord treasurer is such, that, as a friend, I could wish he would take the resolution of retiring; for by the letters I receive, he will unavoidably be mortified, and, consequently, not be able to serve England with the success he has done hitherto. I do, with all my heart, wish England prosperity; but if that cannot be, it would be some ease that it was not in the hands of lord treasurer. If you are of my opinion, I shall ever acknowledge it as a mark of your kindness to me, if you advise him to make this step; for I am much more concerned for him than for myself."

## TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

"*Soignies, August 29.* I am a good deal concerned at a letter I received by the last post from lady Marlborough, in which she tells me that Mr. Harley has the entire confidence of the queen. If she has good reason for this opinion, I can't but think there should be no time lost in speaking plainly to her majesty, in letting her know what you and I think is her interest. If she be of another opinion, I think you and I should honestly let her know, that we shall not be able to carry her business on with success, so that she might have time to take her measures with such as will be able to serve her. I shall always be ready to sacrifice myself for the prosperity of the queen; but I will not be thought to have credit, when her business is managed in a way which in my opinion must be her ruin. I beg you will let me know your thoughts on this matter, and what you think may be proper to be done; for tho' I am weary of all sorts of business, I know her meaning is so sincerely honest, that I would undergo any trouble or hazard, that you think may do good. On the other side, if I can't do good, nothing can make me so happy as a quiet life."

By the reply of Godolphin, we find that this letter was shewn to the queen, and instead of producing the expected effect, drew from her a justification of her conduct, and a vehement exculpation of Harley, in the same manner as she had exculpated Mrs. Masham to the duchess.



“ *Windsor August 25--September 5.* I have the favour of your's of the 29th, with the papers enclosed. I keep them all by me, and if at any time you want any of the papers you send me, I can readily find them.

“ Though I have written fully to you by Mr. Hare about the queen, and though I am not very willing at any time to say much upon that subject by the post; yet desiring in your's of the 29th, to know my thoughts upon what lady Marlborough had written to you, I am under a necessity of endeavouring to make you comprehend as well as I can, that both Mr. Montgomery and Mrs. Freeman have thought it best to read to Mrs. Morley your last letter to me, all except one word, which was the name of a person not fit to be mentioned. They did very well foresee this would certainly have the consequence of making yet more uneasiness in Mrs. Morley towards Mrs. Freeman, but did hope it might be of so much use another way as to overbalance that. Whether their thoughts will prove right, in the latter of these, I cannot tell; but in the former, I am very sure they have not been mistaken, and I believe you will soon be of the same mind in that matter, by a letter I am told you will have from the queen as soon as this. And I cannot but think it is of so much consequence, that the queen should not be countenanced and encouraged in complaints of lady Marlborough, that you will take great care, in your answer, of that particular. I will only add, that when you write yourself any thing to me, which you would not have the queen know, it ought to be in a letter apart. I am so much distracted with doubt and apprehensions concerning Toulon, that I cannot say any thing to the purpose, about that matter, or the consequences of it. But as the wind is, I believe we shall have another post to-morrow.

“ I have not seen lord Peterborough, nor has he yet waited upon the queen. In my lord Sunderland's absence, he made his application to Mr. Secretary Harley, who is rather worse disposed towards him, if possible, than his colleague. Several letters and answers have passed between them, which all tend, I think, rather to increase the misunderstandings, than to lessen them. He has



sent me your letter, with his answer to some objections he states in it. I must own I think his answers to those objections, stated by himself, are frivolous enough. I believe I shall see him to-morrow or next day at Quainton Place, where I am told he is to be."

FROM THE QUEEN.

"I had the satisfaction of receiving your's of the 25th last Wednesday, for which I give you many thanks, and for your kindness in telling me your mind so freely; and I beg you would continue to do so upon all occasions. But as to what you say, that I must put my business into Mr. Harley's hands, or follow the lord treasurer's measures, I should be glad you would explain yourself a little more on that. For I know no measures the lord treasurer has, but what were laid down when you were here, and I do not know I have broken any of them; for I cannot think my having nominated Sir William Dawes and Dr. Blackhall to be bishops, is any breach, they being worthy men; and all the clamour that is raised against them proceeds only from the malice of the whigs, which you would see very plainly, if you were here. I know this is otherwise represented to you, and I believe you have been told, as I have, that these two persons were recommended to me by Mr. Harley, which is so far from being true, that he knew nothing of it, till it was the talk of the town; I do assure you these men were my own choice. They are certainly very fit for the station I design them; and, indeed, I think myself obliged to fill the bishop's bench with those that will be a credit to it, and to the church, and not always to take the recommendations of 29,\* who all the world knows is governed by 26;† and now that I have said all this, in answer to your's of the 25th, I must give some answer to a long letter, the lord treasurer read to me, which he received by the last post from you. In that I find lady Marlborough has said, that I had an entire confidence in Mr. Harley. I know so much of my own inclination, that I am sure I have a very good opinion of Mr. Harley, and will never

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\* Probably the archbishop of Canterbury.

† The junta, or one of the whig chiefs.



change it without I see cause ; but I wonder how lady Marlborough could say such a thing, when she has been so often assured from me, that I relied entirely on none but Mr. Freeman and Mr. Montgomery. You seem much concerned at this thing that lady Marlborough said, and upon that, tell the lord treasurer that Mr. Freeman and Mr. Montgomery should tell their minds freely to me. It is what I desire of all things, for I can't see any other measures to be taken, than what have been already laid down ; and I am sure I have no thoughts of altering them. I can think but of one thing to be added, which is, a resolution to encourage all those, who have not been in opposition, that will concur in my service, whether they be whigs or tories, which is a thing I wish might be put in practice, believing it might do a great deal of good, and I am sure it is not for my service to disoblige any body.

“ I cannot end this without begging you will once more be so kind as to tell me your mind freely in every thing. I will desire the same favour of Mr. Montgomery, and when I know both your thoughts, I will give you my poor opinion. In the mean time continue your justice to me, and be assured I will be to my last moment, most sincerely your humble servant.”

The appeal of the queen produced a reply from Marlborough, in a tone of more than usual earnestness, corroborating his former sentiments.

“ *September* 15. Madam ;—I have had the honour of your majesty's of the 25th of the last month, by which I find mine of the 29th to lord treasurer was read to you. I beg the justice of you to believe, that I am no ways concerned for the power that the whigs may have with you, but the great concern that I must always have for your quiet and safety ; for if you are served to your satisfaction and security, I am very indifferent who the persons are. And as you desire that I would speak freely, I do protest in the presence of God Almighty, that I am persuaded that if you continue in the mind, that I think you now are, and will not suffer those that have the honour to serve you, to manage your affairs agreeably to the circumstances of the times, your business must



inevitably run into confusion; and, consequently, make it impossible for my lord treasurer to serve; for if he is thought to have the power, when he has not, both parties will be angry with him, though both would admire him and be his friends, if he were out of the service. If I were with your majesty, I believe I could let you see the trouble and distraction you are like to be in this winter, which you must prevent, before the meeting of parliament, or it will be too late.

“ I find the duke of Savoy, prince Eugene, the elector of Hanover, and the emperor, are all desirous that you would be pleased to allow me to continue so long on this side the water, as might be necessary for concerting the operations of the next campaign. This will make it impossible for me to be in England before the meeting of the parliament; and should I come at this time, it might create jealousies on this side the water. But as I prefer your quiet and service above all other considerations, if your majesty thinks my being with you, for one day or two, may be of any use, I am ready to obey. If I come in a yacht, one man of war should be ordered to Ostend, and not be told what it is for; for I would endeavour to be back with the army, before the french should know I am gone for England. What I now propose will make so much noise, that I beg you will be pleased to advise with my lord treasurer, before you send me your commands.

“ It is impossible for me to finish this letter without assuring your majesty of what I know of lady Marlborough, that nobody could serve you with more zeal and true affection than she has done for many years; and I must do her judgment that right, as to say, that she has foreseen some things which I thought would never have happened; I mean concerning the behaviour of some\* in your service. I pray God to direct you in all things for your own good, and that of all Europe, that your own affairs may prosper and be glorious, as they have been for some years, and I shall

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\* Alluding to Mrs. Masham.



then enjoy all the happiness and quiet that this world can give me."

The subsequent letters refer to the same subject, and are filled with complaints on the unpleasant situation of the two ministers; being without influence with the sovereign, and yet exposed to the jealousy of those whom they were labouring to serve.

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

"*Sept. 15.* I inclose a copy of my letter to the queen, and I leave it to your discretion to deliver it or burn it; and I think I am obliged, let the consequence be never so fatal to the friendship and love I have for you, to tell you my opinion freely, that if the whigs continue in that unreasonable humour of being angry with you, whenever the queen does not do what they like;\* for the truth is, they are jealous that you and I have inclination to try once more the tories. You and I know how false this is. However, if the queen will be governed by Mr. Harley, they will have just reason given them to be angry; and if you and I continue in business, all England will believe what is done is by our advice, which will give power to the whigs to mortify whom they please; so that I think you must speak very freely to the whigs and the queen, and if they will not approve your measures, have nothing to do with either; and if we were well out of this war, we should then be happy."

TO THE DUCHESS.

"*Helchin, Sept. 15.* I have received your's of the 25th and 26th of the last month, and by the inclosed letter you sent of the queen's, I am afraid that nothing can go well this winter. I am confirmed in this thought, by what lady Sunderland writes, as from her lord. I will make no reflections, but I own to you,

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\* Something omitted in the original, though the sense may be supplied from the context.



that I think the expressions are very hard, when I consider what pains lord treasurer and I take.

“ I have sent a letter to lord treasurer for the queen, and a copy of my letter, and have left it to his discretion of burning or delivering it. For my own part, I am out of heart, and wonder at the courage of lord treasurer ; for were I used, as I do not doubt but I shall, as he is by the whigs, who threaten to abandon him, whenever the queen displeases, I would not continue in business for all this world could give me ; and I believe they would be the first that would have reason to repent. I do not send you a copy of my letter, being sure lord treasurer will shew it you. I did desire your opinion as to his quitting, but you have never made me any answer ; for as I would serve the queen with the hazard of my life, so my friendship to him obliges me to wish, that he would venture nothing, since every body pretends to be angry.

“ I send you back lady Sunderland's letter, that you may read it once more ; for I think it is plain, they believe that lord treasurer and I have a mind to bring in the tories, which is *very obliging*.”

“ *Helchin, Sept. 19.* I have received your's of the 30th and 2nd. I have received no letter from 267\* since that you sent me ; and you may be sure I shall never mention Mrs. Masham either in letter or discourse. I am so weary of all this sort of management, that I think it is the greatest folly in the world to think any struggling can do good, when both sides have a mind to be angry. When I say this, I know I must go on in the command I have here, as long as the war lasts, but I would have nothing to do any where else ; for really what I hear from England, gives me great disturbance, and sometimes vexes me so, that I am not the same man. If you, the lord treasurer, and I, were out of business, I should be more capable of doing my duty here.”

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\* Probably the queen.



“ I find by some of your letters, that you think I may have credit with the queen ; but I do assure you I have not, and I will give you one instance, that Smalridge has been able to hinder the disposing of the professorship. I see this, but that must not alter my doing the best service I can ; I would be esteemed, but I am not ambitious of having power.”

FROM LORD GODOLPHIN.

“ *Windsor, Sept. 12--21.* My last acknowledged the favour of your's of the 12th and 15th from Helchin, and there is now but one post due this day, and we shall not have that before these letters go.

“ I believe you will have an answer by this post from the queen : whether it will be inclosed in this I cannot tell. By a long conversation between Mrs. Morley and Mr. Montgomery, of which I have had some account, I find they both agree that for you and England to see one another \* before the natural time might be liable to many great inconveniencies ; and those, in the nature of them so uncertain, that no human precaution is sufficient to prevent the ill consequences that may happen from those uncertainties. Besides that, to say the plain truth, in case one should run that venture, one cannot at this time depend upon the fruit of it with any certainty, I having lately spoken very fully upon all those subjects, of which Mrs. Freeman's head and heart seem to be so full. And though there has yet appeared but very little encouragement to think the arguments used upon that occasion are like to prevail ; yet one may conclude in this case, as the Scripture does, in the very words of our Saviour, “ *If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded, though one rose from the dead.*” Mr. Hare can explain this sentence to you, if there be need of it.

“ I have troubled you so much in my three or four last letters upon the subject of our affairs abroad, that I shall not repeat any thing, but that it seems indispensable to have a congress of the

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\* These expressions are used to conceal the cipher.



ministers of all the allies, at your return to the Hague, for a thorough concert of all that is to be done next year. The time will not allow you to give yourself the trouble of going to the elector of Hanover, or any body else. The sooner this concert can be made, the better; for we shall never be able to get our parliament to enter upon the particulars of the war, next year, till we are able to communicate some scheme for it, from abroad, which will be encouraging and agreeable to them. I am very sensible that in other years the encouragement to our allies has often proceeded from their votes, in the first week of the parliament; but our misfortunes and disappointments in this year, will make that very difficult at present, even though we could obtain those things to be done, which are necessary to put them in good humour."

TO THE DUCHESS.

"*Helchin, Sept. 29.* Tho' I have wrote a long letter this day by the post, I would not lose this safe opportunity by Mr. Lumley. I am so extremely concerned for the quiet and safety of lord treasurer, that I can't be at ease till I know what resolution he has taken. If he stays in his place, and does not entirely govern the queen, he will be duped by Mr. Harley; and if he does, what is certainly best for himself, quit, he will do great hurt both to the business at home and abroad. However, there is nothing else left to make the queen sensible of the danger she is running into; and if that will not do, we must leave it to Providence. I do with all my heart pity the queen, being very sure she does not know the fatal step she is going to make."

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

"*Helchin, Sept. 29.* I have had the favour of your's of the 12th; I have also received the letter you mentioned from the queen. I am sure lady Marlborough must have acquainted you with it. You being on the place must judge infinitely better than I can; but by what I hear from England, I think every thing



must go ill, and therefore I continue of the opinion, that unless the queen will be pleased to be guided by you, or that lords Somers, Halifax, and Sunderland, will make it their business to persuade you to have patience some time longer: if neither of these two things happen, I hope you will take such measures, that it may appear very plainly to England, that you do not approve of the measures now taken. The words in your letter I think I understand, so that I shall not speak to Dr. Hare; but since one from the dead can't gain belief, pray be careful of the living, for I am convinced that the queen will not be guided, till she see that the advice she now follows has brought her affairs into confusion. Nothing shall dishearten me from endeavouring to do all the good I can here abroad. Our prospect is by no means good; but I think in the beginning of the next week to go for two days to the Hague, in order to hearten and take measures with them so that I might not be obliged to stay long at the Hague when the campaign is done, tho' I am persuaded my being in England this winter will be of very little use to the public. But I shall have the satisfaction of being with you and lady Marlborough notwithstanding."

"*Helchin, Sept. 29.* The uneasiness of the whigs and the obstinacy of the queen, must unavoidably give an opportunity to the tories of shewing their malice. I am a good deal concerned for the mischief this must do, both at home and abroad; but I am satisfied it will be impossible for you and me to influence the queen to any thing that is right, till she has tried this scheme of Mr. Secretary Harley and his friends. What it is, God knows, but that there is one I am sure. If there is any thing in the world can hinder her from running this hazard, it must be her knowing you will quit. For myself, I would not for any thing this world could give me, act otherwise than to shew that I have no concern left, but the wishing you may do right. If you stay in your place, though you are no ways consenting, yet all that shall be amiss you must be answerable for; and on the other side, I am



very sensible that if you do quit, the business both at home and abroad must very much suffer. For whatever the queen and these new schemers may think, the allies will expect nothing good from England, when they shall see that you and I have lost our credit, after having served with so great success. I hope your answer to this will let me know your positive resolution, so that I might govern myself; for whilst you are in, I shall send my opinion."

As the campaign was now drawing to a close, and as both the queen and treasurer disapproved Marlborough's temporary journey to England, it became necessary to accelerate the arrangements for the ensuing year, that his departure from the continent might not be retarded.

For this purpose, he first visited the Hague, to confer with the ministers of the States; and after a short stay at the camp, on his return repaired to Frankfurt, to settle the necessary plans with the elector of Hanover, and with count Wratlaw, who was deputed thither on the part of the emperor.

During this interval his correspondence displays the same character, and the domestic broils occupied more of his attention than the foreign transactions.

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.  
 "Michea, Oct. 3. I shall go to-morrow towards the Hague, where I intend to stay but two days at most, being resolved to return to this camp. I have thought as well as I can, how to leave the business of this country, at my return to England, and I think it must be to Cadogan; so that if the queen please, I shall appoint the States General, and the council of state of this country, that in the absence of Mr. Steyne, he is charged with the care of her majesty's business. My journey this time to the



## CHAPTER 63.

1707.

*Journey of Marlborough to the Hague, to arrange the plans of the ensuing campaign—Distributes his troops into quarters—Meets the elector of Hanover and count Wratislaw at Frankfort—Increasing difficulties with the queen—Cabals and letters of Harley—Return of Marlborough to the Hague—Correspondence with Godolphin on the feuds in the cabinet, and their future conduct.*

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For this purpose, he first visited the Hague, to confer with the ministers of the States ; and after a short stay at the camp, on his return, repaired to Frankfort, to settle the necessary plans with the elector of Hanover, and with count Wratislaw, who was deputed thither on the part of the emperor.

During this interval his correspondence displays the same character, and the domestic broils occupied more of his attention than the foreign transactions.

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

“ *Helchin, Oct. 3.* I shall go to-morrow towards the Hague, where I intend to stay but two days at most, being resolved to return to this camp. I have thought, as well as I can, how to leave the business of this country, at my return to England, and I think it must be to Cadogan ; so that if the queen pleases, I shall acquaint the States General, and the council of state of this country, that in the absence of Mr. Stepney, he is charged with the care of her majesty's business. My journey this time to the



Hague, will not only enable me to take measures for the operations on the Rhine, for the next campaign, but also make my stay much shorter at the end of the campaign.

“ You will have known by the last letters from France, that the king has given orders, as they write, for an augmentation of 30 regiments of foot and 20 of horse. This added to the superiority they had the last campaign in Germany, Flanders, and Spain, as also the advantage they probably will have of having some of their troops from Spain, must give a very melancholy prospect for the next year’s service, if we are not willing and able to make a considerable augmentation. I shall endeavour to make them sensible of this at the Hague, tho’ I am aware their expence is already so great, that tho’ they should have the will, I fear they have not the power. You shall be sure to know by the next post from the Hague, in what humour I find them ; and if there should be a necessity of my going to Frankfort, I shall do it, so as not to delay my coming for England ; for if I do go, I will return to this army before they separate, so that I desire the yachts may be in Holland by the end of October, old style.”

Marlborough leaving Helchin on the 4th of October, reached the Hague at nine in the morning, on the 6th, and without a moment’s delay visited the pensionary and secretary to the council of state, with whom he deliberated on the objects of his journey. In the afternoon he held a conference with the deputies of the States, and communicated the orders which he had received from the queen, to repair to Frankfort, for the purpose of settling with the elector of Hanover, and count Wratislaw, the operations of the next campaign. The same afternoon he held another conference with the deputies, and obtained the concurrence of the dutch government in all the plans, which he thought proper to submit to their consideration. During his short stay at the Hague, we find some interesting communications both on foreign and domestic affairs.

“ *Hague, October 7.* Since coming here I have had two conferences with the deputies of the States ; they are very desirous I should meet the elector of Hanover, for taking measures with



him for the next year's campaign, and at the same time to press that the emperor, and empire, might take the 6,000 saxon horse into their service. I shall so order it, that my going to Mentz shall not delay my return to England; for I intend to return to the army before they separate. I leave this place this evening, and hope to be with the army on Sunday night, and stay with them till the Saturday following, when I shall leave them encamped, where they shall continue till my return, which I intend shall be by the 28th or 29th of this month. In two days after my return, I intend to send them to their garrisons, after which, I am afraid it will be necessary for me to be at Brussels for some few days. By what I have now done, I hope my stay at the Hague need not be above six days. I am the more particular, that you may know when to expect me in England, which I think may be about the 7th of November.

“ Having this safe opportunity by col. Pendergrass, I must acquaint you, that I see very plainly, that the dutch will not only not augment their troops, but will act the next year as they have done this last, which is so disheartening, that I do wish with all my heart, it were possible for me to be excused from being at the head of their troops. I am very impatient to hear the certainty of what you will do; for that shall govern me. I shall say no more, since you will see my mind by the inclosed copy of what I wrote to the queen.

“ Brigadier Palmes came to me yesterday. He hopes to be in a condition to pass with the next packet boat. He will give you an account of all that the duke of Savoy and prince Eugene have said to him.”

TO THE DUCHESS.

“ *Hague, October 7.* I thank you for your's of the 16th, as also the copy \* you sent me. God's will must be done. I have thought as well as I can, and have prepared myself for the worst.

“ I return to-morrow for the army, and as it is thought necessary for me to go to Mentz or Frankfort, I shall begin

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\* Probably a copy of one of her letters to the queen, or of one of the queen's replies.



that journey about ten days hence, and return again to the army, before they go to their winter quarters; so that this journey will not delay my coming for England, as I intended, in the first week in November. I have had so little time to myself here, that I shall not trouble you with a longer letter, but refer you to what I wrote to lord treasurer. He will let you see what I wrote to the queen, in answer to two letters I have received."

TO LORD SUNDERLAND.

"*Hague, October 7.* My lord;—I had the favour of your's of the 19th last night, and am very glad of this safe opportunity, by colonel Pendergrass, to return you my thanks and thoughts. I believe the last year no argument could have prevailed with the queen to have had a thought of parting with me and the lord treasurer; but I have good reason to think that is much altered. However, I believe when it is very plain, that I and the lord treasurer are in earnest, I am a good deal of your opinion, that the queen will not part with us; so that I think there should be no time lost in trying this experiment. If it does not do, at least the lord treasurer and I shall have nothing to reproach ourselves with, and shall be blessed with a quiet life, which in my opinion is preferable to all this world can give. I do from my soul wish so well to the queen, that I hope those that shall succeed may be more lucky in giving content than we have been; but I am sure they can never be more sincere, though we could not cure jealousies."

REPLY OF LORD SUNDERLAND.

"*Newmarket, October 8--19.* I must now return you my thanks for the favour of your kind letter by Mr. Pendergrass. I am fully convinced that things are not so well as they were last year between the queen, and your grace, and the lord treasurer. But I must beg on this occasion to say, that if you and the lord treasurer would have believed what some of your friends and servants have told you, in relation to Mr. Secretary Harley, this had never happened. But be that as it will, without looking back to what is past, I am sure it is high time to try to retrieve them, before they are past recovery; and I can't but believe, as you say, that



when it is very plain that you and the lord treasurer are in earnest, the queen will not part with you; since what is insisted on is so reasonable in itself, as well as what has been promised over and over. I am ashamed to trouble you in so many letters with this over and over; and, indeed, I should not do it, but for the apprehension I have of the inevitable confusion that must attend the queen, and all that have to do with her, if this obstinacy continues. For as to myself, I am very easy, having resolved, as an honest man, whatever happens, to act upon the same principles and with the same people I have always acted."

In the afternoon of the 7th Marlborough departed to Antwerp, from which place we find a letter to Godolphin.

"*Antwerp, Oct. 8.* I received this afternoon your's of the 23rd, by which I see you are desirous I should come for England. Your two letters of the 12th and 16th, as well as that of the queen, telling me that your opinions were, that it would make too much noise, made me take the measures I now have done at the Hague, to meet the elector of Hanover, and one\* from the emperor, at Mentz, the 20th of this month. Accordingly I have wrote letters to all the courts of Germany; so that it will be impossible for me to put the journey off; but since the queen is desirous I should come, I will order it so as to be with you by the first of November, if the wind gives leave. I am afraid my presence will be but of very little use, but if the queen and you be of another opinion, the parliament ought then to be put off for a fortnight. And if the intelligence I have from England be true, their meeting is no ways to be wished, till the queen is pleased to take a firm resolution of what she will do; for if the whigs will not support, and the tories will be malicious, what must be the consequence but ruin. But if any body has a good scheme, which is like to succeed, the sooner they meet the better.

"I find my thoughts are very different from those of the queen. My comfort is, that a little time will convince her I am much more concerned for her quiet and good, than I am for my own

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\* Either count Wratislaw or count Sinzendorf.



life. Whilst I am thought to have a share in the ministry, I must tell my mind freely, when I see destruction at hand. When I have nothing to do, I shall not displease, and shall always be ready to help, whenever I shall think my service can be of use."

On the 10th he reached the camp, and inspected the movements of the troops, preparatory to the arrangements of winter quarters. The same evening the intended garrisons for Menin, Courtray, and Oudenard, commenced their march, and the ensuing day the army moved to Pettighem, with an intention to traverse the Scheld. The passage being however delayed by heavy rains, till the 13th, they proceeded through Ghent to Westrem, and finally pitched their camp at Asch. Here they remained stationary a few days, and followed the example of the enemy, in breaking up for their winter quarters, which were nearly the same as the preceding year.

Before the separation took place, Marlborough had commenced his journey, and his correspondence with his friends in England shews the progress of his negotiations, as well as the state of domestic affairs.

TO THE DUCHESS.

"*Helchin, October 10.* I having had opportunities of writing four letters to you this week; and my head aching, and none of your's to answer, will be an excuse for this short letter. I leave this camp to-morrow, and shall certainly have the spleen to see the poor soldiers march in dirt up to the knees, for we have had a very great deal of rain. I shall write to you once more before I leave the army, after which my letters will come irregularly, till my return from Germany. I hope to make the journey in fourteen days."

"*Westrem, October 13.* I have had your's from Woodstock of the 25th. I wish you may find the building advanced as you are told; but by what is writ to me, I believe you will not. I have been a good deal out of order these four or five days; however, I intend to begin my journey on Saturday, so that I may be in England, since it is desired, by the first of November. I pray God I may be able to do any good, when I shall be there. I



have no heart nor spirits left, and would give a good deal to avoid this troublesome journey.\* We have had, and have still very ill weather, which will make the roads intolerable. I am very much afraid I shall not have the pleasure of receiving many of your letters till my return; however, I will take the best care I can to have them follow me, so that I beg you will be regular in writing, and I will take all opportunities of doing the same.

"I have often had the spleen, but never with so much reason as now, finding almost every body disheartened, I mean on this side the water; and if we have at the same time uneasinesses in England, how is it possible to struggle. The english I am afraid do not know their happiness, I mean in comparison with other countries; but if they oblige the queen to a peace, as the circumstances of affairs are now abroad, they will be sensible in a very little time of their error. For my own part, it will give me ease, and the pleasure of being with you, which is what I most earnestly desire."

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

"*Westrem, October 13.* If you have so ill weather as we have here, Newmarket must be very disagreeable. I was not well when we began our march on Tuesday, and these three ill days have made me more uneasy; however, I am resolved to begin my journey next Saturday, that I may return to the Hague, so as I may be in England by the first of November. You know that Mr. Craggs keeps company with the tories, which makes me send you his inclosed letter, † which I desire may be shewn to the queen; for if the whigs will not oppose these measures, I beg that parliament may be put off for some little time, but you and the queen can judge much better than I can. But my zeal is such, that I can't forbear sending my opinion; for if the tories succeed, it will not be in any body's power to do service. I found every body so desponding, that should parliament not begin with their usual vigour, it must give great advantage to France, especially

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\* To Frankfort.

† This relates to the proposed invitation of the princess Sophia to England.



should they shew any inclination for peace. And should they succeed in their invitation, the dutch would think themselves undone, for they put their trust entirely on the sincerity of the queen, for the news of the invitation was got to the Hague, so that I know the pensioner thinks it will disturb all business, which will encourage in their country the partisans of France. I intend to-morrow to make use of the queen's leave, in making the inclosed promotions."

"*Frankfort, October 27.* I was resolved to have left this place on Monday last, but the two electors were so very pressing that I would stay for the arrival of count Wratislaw, that I could not refuse. He is not yet come, but they say he will be here this night. I have taken my measures to begin my journey on Saturday, and hope to be at the Hague by the 3rd of the next month; so that with a fair wind, I may yet have the happiness of being with you by the 1st of November, old style. The two electors are very zealous that the emperor and the empire may entertain the 6,000 saxon horse, which would be a very necessary augmentation for this army. I have promised to press count Wratislaw that the court of Vienna may do their part, which it is said ought to be one half of the expence. I believe I shall have good words, but I am afraid it may end there; however, I shall be very plain with him. The elector of Hanover tells me very positively, that if the empire do not put their army in a better condition than it is at this time, he will not return to it the next campaign. I can be very sensible of the uneasiness he is like to meet with, by what I suffer in Flanders.

"What I am going to say does not proceed from the spleen, but really from the vexation I have in my mind, which makes me less capable of serving with success, as I have done hitherto; so that if I can't prevail to have prince Eugene sent to Catalonia, I should think the next best thing for the service will be, that he commands in chief in the empire, and that the elector of Hanover takes upon him the command I have in Flanders; for if things go as I think they will, both in England and Holland, nothing shall prevail with me to lose that reputation I have hazarded



for this war. Till I have had an opportunity of acquainting the queen, and having her leave, I shall let nobody know of this intention of mine but the pensioner, who is an honest man, and so much my friend, that he will say nothing of it, till he has my leave.

“ I send you the duke of Savoy’s letter and project, as also my answer ; so that in what I have been wanting, the lords of the cabinet may advise her majesty. The States having, by an express, given me power to assure the landgrave of Hesse, that they will satisfy him for his arrears, if he will consent to leave his troops one year longer in Italy, I shall this afternoon send an express to Cassel, and press him, in the name of her majesty, as well as that of the States General ; but I fear he has already sent his orders from the Hague. You shall know what effect my letter to the landgrave has had.”

Meanwhile, Godolphin, in conformity with the advice imparted in the preceding letters, in his own name, and in that of Marlborough, expostulated with Harley ; and not only required from him a categorical answer, whether he would continue to support the system on which they had hitherto acted, but specifically charged him with influencing the queen in the choice of the two bishops.

Harley received these accusations with an affectation of humility and surprise, and replied in the language of injured innocence. As to the first point, he professed his sole and decided attachment to Godolphin and Marlborough, and after hinting at the malice of the whigs, who delighted to wound in the dark, and to ruin by misrepresentations the characters of those whom they did not approve, he made a tender of his resignation, whenever he should be deemed a burthen to the service. His answer to the question, whether he would continue to concur in the measures of the treasurer and general, can only be given in his own singular words.

“ It has always been my temper to go along with the company, and if they should say Harrow on the Hill or Maidenhead was the nearest way to Windsor, I would go along with them and never dispute it, if that would give content ; and that I might not be



forced to swear it was so." He then professes his sincerity and devotion to his two patrons, and continues, "I am satisfied to a demonstration there can be no other centre of union but the queen, by the ministration of your lordship and the duke of Marlborough, and there the bulk of the nation will fix themselves if they be suffered. All other expedients are very wretched things, and will end but ill; and I dread the thoughts of running from the extreme of one faction to another, which is the natural consequence of party tyranny, and renders the government like a door, which turns both ways upon the hinges, to let in each party as it grows triumphant; and in truth it is the real parent and nurse of our factions here. It is time to relieve your lordship's patience, and beg pardon for this tedious letter, and withal to desire leave to assure your lordship, that you have not a more faithful servant, nor a truer or more zealous friend than myself, to the utmost of my capacity, &c."

He wrote in the same style to Marlborough:

"*September 16--27.* I have desired my lord treasurer to ask leave for me to go into the country, which I hope to do this day se'nnight. I entreat your grace will permit me now, upon my taking leave, to assure you I never have writ any thing to you, but what I really thought and intended. For near two years, I have seen the storm coming upon me, and now I find I am to be sacrificed to sly insinuations, and groundless jealousies. I have the satisfaction, not only of my own mind, but my enemies and friends witness for me, that I have served your grace and my lord treasurer, with the nicest honour, and by the strictest rules of friendship; that I have sacrificed every thing to this, the world knows, and that what credit I have with the clergy or laity, has been all employed to no other end but the service of both your lordships.

"I have not interposed in, or contradicted directly or indirectly, by myself or any other, the putting in or putting out any person, or meddled with any measures which are taken; for I have avoided knowing them. And yet I am now first charged in



general, and when I desired that particulars might be told me, nothing is specified but the two nominated bishops. I must therefore say the same to your grace, I did when it was mentioned to me yesterday, that I never knew those two persons, I never spoke of them, nor ever thought of them, or directly or indirectly ever recommended them to the queen, or to, or by any other person. And, my lord, I must do myself this justice, that I am above telling a solemn lie; that I scorn the baseness of it; and that if I had known or recommended those persons, I would not have been so mean as to deny it, but would have owned it, and given my reasons for it. And now, my lord, since I am going into the country, and perhaps Sunday next may put an end to any farther opportunity of my troubling your grace with letters; I beg leave to assure your grace, that I shall always preserve an entire duty and service for your grace. And I will add but this, that if there be any uneasiness in the queen to comply with any proposals, I heartily wish that the true reason of it may be found out; for as I have no hand in it, nor any friend or acquaintance of mine that I know of, so I believe that half the pains which are taken to accuse and asperse the innocent, would discover the true cause, and provide the remedy. I shall trouble your grace no more upon this subject. I humbly beseech you to forgive what is extorted by the undeserved misrepresentations made of him, who has neither in thought, word, or deed, contradicted the title of being, with the utmost sincerity,\*

“My lord,

“Your grace’s most humble,

“And most obedient servant,

“R. HARLEY.”

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\* Contrary to my custom, I have inserted these extracts from the letters of Harley, which I discovered in the Hardwicke Collection, notwithstanding they are already printed in the Hardwicke State Papers, and Somerville’s Queen Anne; because they convey an indubitable proof of political duplicity which has seldom been paralleled. That I may not be accused of partiality to the great man whose life I have undertaken to write, I shall merely give the comment of the able historian of queen Anne.

“The part which Mr. Harley was now acting exhibits a scene of dissimulation and dupli-



These asseverations, however solemn and plausible, did not dissipate the suspicions of the two ministers, although from the correspondence it appears, that they continued in a state of doubt and hesitation, ignorant of his real schemes, and yet conscious that he was secretly caballing to their detriment.

Marlborough, in particular, seems to have been deeply affected by the ingratitude of a minister, whom he had cherished and promoted, and so discouraged by the decline of that influence which he had hitherto enjoyed, that he determined to carry into effect the resolution he had already announced, of withdrawing from public life. But as the affair drew to a crisis, Godolphin relapsed into his former hesitation. He appears to have been vanquished by the earnest solicitations of the queen, and fascinated by the professions of Harley; and the last letter which he wrote to his friend, is an attempt to weaken the impression which his complaints had previously made.

“*Newmarket, Oct. 7--18.* I am to acknowledge from this place the favour of your's of the 8th from Antwerp, by an officer whom I don't know, with the inclosed to the queen, which I delivered to her last night; also that of the 10th from Helchin, and of the 13th from Westrem, with the letters and papers inclosed. I am extremely sorry to find by them that you complain of want of health, at the same time you are to take a great journey, in this ill weather, which is the same with us as with you, and makes the queen very apprehensive of a fit of the gout coming upon her here. I saw her very uneasy last night, but they send me word this morning she is a little better; and if she is able, she designs to go to London on the 10th.

“I am very much troubled to find our letters of the 23rd of September did not reach you before you left the Hague, and had

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city, for which, neither his sympathy with the sovereign, nor the unjustifiable conduct of the junta to her, nor the goodness of the end which he had in view, supposing that to be admitted, can afford any apology. He not only maintained the external profession of respect for the duke of Marlborough and lord Godolphin, but continued in his private correspondence to give them the most solemn assurances of his affectionate attachment to their persons, while he was using every art to undermine their influence with the queen.” *Somerville's Queen Anne*, p. 268, *Note*.



settled with them your journey to the Rhine; for it is most certain that must have had a better effect, after you could have been able to have encouraged them from hence; and it is as certain, that your coming over in time, would have contributed to that encouragement more than any thing else can. It is very true, both the queen and my letters were against your coming for a day or two only, while the armies were in the field; for that could not but have made a great noise, and have exposed all things to great hazard, without allowing time enough here, for your coming to have been of any effect. But when the armies were, or might have been separated, when you had opportunity of giving, at the Hague, the reasons for your coming over, that must needs have been of the greatest use here; and if it had succeeded, would have enabled you to have adjusted every thing on that side, much more to the advantage of the common cause. But there is an end of that now, and it remains only to be considered, whether the parliament can be deferred a fortnight, without doing more hurt than good. I confess I think it puts us under a great deal of difficulty; and I doubt the parliament cannot be put off, without discouraging our friends, retarding all our preparations, and encouraging the opposing party, already grown insolent, from our ill success abroad this year.

“On the other side, nothing is fixed here to make the parliament succeed, nor can I do any thing so shameful as to abandon the queen, but upon a joint measure with Mr. Freeman, who now cannot be here till after that thing comes to bear; and the resolution must be taken, one way or other, upon the whole matter. I can come to no other conclusion, but that it will still be best for you to hasten hither as soon as you can. Accidents may happen to delay the proceedings of the parliament, so that nothing very material may be decided finally before you come.

“In several of your letters to Mrs. Morley, I find you often repeat, *that the rashness of some people's schemes may prove fatal*. But there is really no such thing as a scheme, or any thing like it from any body else; nor has the queen as yet any thought of taking a scheme, but from Mr. Freeman and Mr. Montgomery.



The misfortune is, that the queen happens to be entangled in a promise\* that is extremely inconvenient, and upon which so much weight is laid, and such inferences made, that to effect this promise would be destruction; and at the same time, she is uneasy with every body that endeavours to shew the consequences which attend it.

“10 at night. This afternoon the queen told me she hoped to write to you herself by this post, but just now she sent me the inclosed,† which I send you, because it is less trouble to me, than to write the substance of it by candle-light.”

These cabals in the cabinet, and the declining favour of Godolphin and Marlborough, did not escape the penetration of the dutch government, and increased that desire which the States had already manifested for peace. But no mortifications could damp the zeal of the two friends for the true interest of their country; for we find Godolphin engaged in a correspondence with the leading men in Holland, the object of which was, to stimulate them to new exertions, and to evince the necessity of prosecuting the war with unabated vigour, and on the same principles on which it was begun.

FROM LORD GODOLPHIN.

“Newmarket, Oct. 9--20. I have but just time to acknowledge your's of the 11th. I did not want the letter you inclosed from Slingelandt, to know their humour in Holland for peace. I have letters almost every post from Buys. I send you the last, because I have not time to copy it. Pray keep it, and when you see him, if you ask him, I believe he will shew you my answer, which is, in short, to repeat, that if they will proceed to settle their state of war, they may have such terms as will satisfy and secure their allies; whereas, any other method will create jealousies and distinctions among the allies, and oblige all sides to continue their expences. I need not, therefore, trouble you with any thing more, to guide you in your behaviour, when you come to the

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\* About the two bishops.

† Unfortunately this and many other letters, between the queen and the duke, are lost.



Hague, especially since Mr. Secretary Harley's letter to you upon that point is so plain and so full ; I think it was dated 4-15. In a word, after the advantages with which God has blessed the arms of the allies, England will not be satisfied, nor think themselves safe, with less terms than those mentioned in the letter to Buys.

" I cannot say enough to you, nor have I time for your expressions of kindness to myself. I am apt to think that matter\* may remain as it is, till your coming over, which I wish may be with the soonest, but not much longer."

" *October 24--Nov. 4.* The wind being westerly, I must still continue to write, though I long extremely to see you here ; for till you come, I doubt nothing will go right, whatever it does then. I labour as much as I can, and try every way that can be thought of, to prevent the queen's spoiling every thing. But I am much afraid it will be too late, unless Mr. Freeman helps to make a solemn treaty, from which there is to be no departure upon any terms whatsoever, without which, it will be next to impossible for Mr. Montgomery to continue where he is ; and the consequences of that I need not enlarge upon to you.

" Mr. Secretary Harley came to town the night before the parliament met. They chose the same speaker yesterday, without any obstruction, and he is to be presented to the queen the 30th, at which time I am afraid there will be a necessity for her to speak, though if it could be without too much murmuring, I would rather her speech were deferred till you come."

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

" *Hague, Nov. 4.* A little after my arrival here last night, I received five packets from England. The convoy is also come, and I am using all the diligence I can, to dispatch what of necessity must be done before I leave this place. Count Wratislaw and Quiros being here, with powers from the emperor and the king of Spain, will create so much business, that should I stay a month, I should not have one day to myself. I have declared

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\* Their resignation.



to them, as well as to the States, that I shall be obliged to make use of the first fair wind after this next Tuesday. The wind being now very contrary, I may probably be with you as soon as this letter, which I beg with my duty you will let the queen know is the reason of my not doing myself the honour of answering her's of the 14th.

“I send you inclosed my letter to the landgrave of Hesse, his answer, and the States' letter to me on that subject. I also send you the letters I have received by two expresses from Turin. You will be pleased to acquaint her majesty with the contents, and such as may be proper, with her leave, may be communicated to the cabinet council. I shall do my utmost to persuade the landgrave's minister, that his master's troops may continue one year longer in Italy. I do not see by prince Eugene's letter, that he has any thoughts of going to Italy; and by what I find by count Wratislaw, I am afraid the court of Vienna are desirous of keeping him in Germany.

“The pensioner has promised me to second my endeavours with count Wratislaw, that the prince may be sent. He tells me that the king of France has given the necessary orders for an augmentation of threescore thousand men, which I believe is not in his power; however, it has a very ill effect here. I have many things to say, but shall give you no farther trouble at this time, being resolved of being with you as soon as possible.”

“*Hague, Nov. 8.* I had ordered my business so that I might have sailed this day, having sent my servants on board yesterday, and ordered the yacht to Helvoet Sluys, where they are now, with the men of war, so that we might go to sea with the first opportunity. But the wind is not only contrary, but also blows very hard, so that God knows when I shall be able to be with you; but you may be assured that I will not lose one hour, when the wind will allow my going to sea.

“I have this morning had the favour of your's of the 24th, and am much troubled to see that the queen continues making



you uneasy. I am afraid you do me too much honour in thinking that my presence is necessary; but you may depend that I shall be governed by you, in doing what you think may do good; but I must confess that by what I see abroad, as well as at home, it looks as if it were resolved by destiny, that nothing should go well this winter. My last letter I hear is blown back; and as the wind is, it is impossible for this to go, so that I may be as soon with you as this."

TO THE DUCHESS.

"*Hague, Nov. 8.* I was in hopes not to have writ, but to have been at sea this night, having sent my servants on board the yacht yesterday. But the wind being as contrary as possible, and blowing a storm, I have continued in this place, but shall not send for my servants back, being resolved to make use of the first wind that will allow of my going to sea, having finished what I was to do here, and very desirous of being with you. I am afraid my friends will then see that I am not of much use, but I shall be governed. I am sorry to tell you that the inclinations the dutch have for peace will occasion their hurting themselves and their friends, as much as our unhappy differences in England. I am to thank you for your's of the 24th, which I received this morning. What you say of Mrs. Masham is very odd; and if you think she is a good weathercock, it is high time to leave off struggling; for believe me, nothing is worth rowing for against wind and tide, at least you will think so when you come to my age. I have been to wait upon Mrs. Burnett, and have ordered her a yacht.

"*Hague, Nov. 11.* I find my lord treasurer very desirous of my being with him. I have no opinion of my being able to do any good; but uncertainty is the worst of all conditions, for death itself is easier than the fear of it. If you were truly sensible of the great desire I have of ending my days quietly with you, I flatter myself your good nature would be contented to bear many inconveniences, and to let the rest of the world



govern itself after its own method. This is the third I have writ since my being here, and the post-master tells me, that not only those, but some of mine from Frankfort, are still on this side; so that I shall not make this longer, than by assuring you of my being, with all my heart and soul,

“Your’s.”



## CHAPTER 64.

1707--8.

*Return of Marlborough—Parliamentary proceedings—Coalition of the whigs and tories—Debates on the state of the nation—Censures against the admiralty and George Churchill—Scrutiny into the affairs of Spain, and the conduct of the earl of Peterborough—Speech of Marlborough—Celebrated address to the queen, against the conclusion of peace, till the whole monarchy of Spain was restored to the house of Austria—Reconciliation of the ministry and the whigs, and compromise with the queen, on the disposition of ecclesiastical preferments—Termination of the discussion in both houses—Conduct of Harley on the discovery of his cabals—Suspected of conniving at the treasonable practices of Gregg, one of the clerks in his office—Fruitless attempts of Marlborough and Godolphin to obtain his dismissal—Meeting of the cabinet council in the absence of the two ministers—Refusal of the other members to enter into any deliberation—Agitation of the public mind—Discontent of the parliament, and threatened suspension of the supplies—Resignation of Harley and his adherents—Consequent changes in the administration—Ascendancy of the whigs.*

**M**ARLBOROUGH arrived in England on the seventh of November, old style, and had the mortification to find the feuds in the cabinet more dangerous and violent than they had appeared, even in the representations of his friends.

The whigs, indignant at the disappointment of their hopes, had realised their threats of a separation of interests, and had actually formed, if not a coalition, at least a secret understanding with the violent tories. Godolphin stood alone, exposed to the obloquy of both parties, and loaded at the same time with the displeasure of the queen. The administration, which in the preceding session of parliament had appeared so united and prosperous, was become a disjointed and ill-assorted mass, and exhibited all the symptoms of approaching dissolution.

The inactivity of the campaign in the Netherlands, the fatal



defeat at Almanza, the failure of the enterprise against Toulon, and the want of some brilliant exploit, to satisfy the eager expectations of the people, afforded ample scope to that party spirit, which is inherent in our constitution, and which, at this particular period, was the more inflamed, because it had been long repressed by an unusual series of military successes. Every operation of the war became the theme of malignant insinuation, or open invective ; and the unfortunate events in Spain furnished a prominent subject of reproach.

With the disasters in Spain was connected a vehement controversy on the conduct and merits of the earl of Peterborough, which greatly aggravated the perplexities arising from the distracted situation of foreign and domestic affairs.

We have already traced the wanderings of this eccentric peer from court to court, and his incessant, though fruitless endeavours to regain his lost consequence. Having dissipated a considerable part of his fortune, in his short, though brilliant career, he laid before the ministry a strong claim for pecuniary remuneration. Instead, however, of the compliance which he expected, he was charged with a counter demand of much larger extent, on the part of government, for neglecting to furnish a regular account of the vast sums entrusted to his disposition, which he had distributed with his usual caprice, sometimes withholding from the court of Barcelona even the necessary supplies, and sometimes lavishing his largesses, with an unsparing hand. Disgusted in temper, and impoverished in circumstances, he at length returned to England, to urge his pretensions in person, and to claim from the gratitude of his country that justice which he considered as withheld, by a parsimonious and selfish administration. Consulting only the dictates of wounded pride, he at first declined waiting on the great officers of the crown ; and even deferred the customary testimony of respect towards the sovereign, until he found his conduct arraigned, and charges of mismanagement insinuated against him. He then demanded access to the royal presence ; but received from lord Sunderland, as secretary of state, a notification, that the queen could not grant him an audience,



until he had given a satisfactory explanation on three points which were laid to his charge. First, why he did not, in the preceding campaign, march to Madrid, with the army under his command? Secondly, why he did not fulfil his instructions, in advancing to the king of Spain the supplies intrusted to his disposition? and thirdly, why he retired to Italy, without orders, and borrowed large sums of money on disadvantageous terms?

Still more incensed by this repulse, Peterborough openly joined the opposition; and appealed from the cabinet to the nation, by employing Dr. Friend, an eminent physician, to draw up a vindication of his conduct. In this publication, the most confidential documents and secret instructions were introduced, and he was exhibited as another Alexander or Cæsar, by whose chivalrous exploits kingdoms had been overrun; and to whose unmerited disgrace all the late misfortunes in the peninsula were attributable. Public sympathy threw a lustre over his character, and aided the efforts of every party in opposition to bring him into notice. Indeed, no time was ever more favourable for the investigation which he courted, nor could any subject afford a wider scope to popular eloquence and popular obloquy.

In this temper and state of parties the parliament resumed its functions on the 30th of October, and the earliest discussions displayed that spirit of discord, which reigned alike in the cabinet and the nation.

In consequence of the union, the same ceremonies took place as on the meeting of a new parliament. Mr. Smith, the sitting speaker, was re-chosen, and the scottish members were introduced, with the usual formalities of a new election.

On the 10th of November the queen addressed the two houses in a speech, extenuating the failures of the campaign, and recommending vigour and unanimity, as the best means for restoring the prosperity of the Grand Alliance, and obtaining a safe and honourable peace.

On the report of the speech, the commons unanimously voted an address of thanks. After lamenting that the wise designs of the queen, for the advantage of the nation, and the good of the



common cause, had not produced the desired effect, they assured her majesty, that no disappointment should discourage them from enabling her to reduce, in conjunction with her allies, the whole spanish monarchy to the obedience of the lawful sovereign king Charles.

But in the house of lords, which had hitherto displayed less tendency to factious opposition, and more energy in support of the war, the strongest symptoms of discontent appeared. Before the usual motion for an address, Wharton made a violent speech on the decay of trade, and the scarcity of money. He was followed by Somers, who expatiated on the ill state and mismanagement of the navy, and the great losses of the merchants for want of convoys. The earl of Stamford endeavoured to repress these invectives, by recommending an address in the usual form ; but this suggestion was strenuously resisted by the whig lords, as well as by the tory chiefs, Rochester and Nottingham ; and the tide of opposition proving too powerful to be stemmed, the motion was suffered to fall.

These topics were resumed with increasing virulence on the twelfth. On this occasion the whigs repeated their accusations, and an order was unanimously passed for the whole house, in a committee, to enquire into the state of the nation, in regard to the fleet and trade. Such was the curiosity excited by this question, that the queen herself attended on the 19th, the day appointed for the discussion.

The attack was opened by a petition subscribed by two hundred merchants of London, detailing their losses by sea, and bitterly censuring the neglect and mismanagement of the navy. Wharton, who had presented the petition, commenced the debate, and set the example to his colleagues, by his open complaints against the admiralty in general, and his indirect insinuations against admiral Churchill in particular.

The leading whig peers adopted the same strain of argument ; but the tories, instead of confining themselves to the original heads of accusation, laboured to direct the attack against the ministry collectively, and argued that the public grievances were



not to be removed by partial remedies, but by a radical change of administration.

The whigs, who had calculated on the co-operation of the tories, were displeased with their zeal, and hoped to divert the ferment, which they had raised, by recurring to the original topics of discussion. Among other expedients, lord Halifax moved for the appointment of a committee, to receive proposals for encouraging trade and privateering in the West Indies. In this suggestion the ministry concurred, from a similar motive, and the lord treasurer himself seconding the proposal, it was carried unanimously. A future day was then appointed for the prosecution of the inquiry.

Marlborough having taken the usual oaths, on the 10th of November, was present at both these debates, and witnessed with regret the hostile attack, which the whigs had so long threatened against his brother. Although he cautiously avoided entering into the discussion, his feelings were deeply wounded by the severe reflections of the whigs; and at the close of the debate, he warmly expostulated with Wharton, who had particularly distinguished himself by the bitterness of his invectives.\*

The scrutiny was afterwards continued; but on the 15th of December another topic was added, at the instigation of the tories, by a motion for a committee, to enquire into the conduct of the war in Spain, and the cause of the failure in the expedition against Toulon.

Lord Peterborough was now brought forward, and Rochester, who took the lead, expressed his surprise that a commander who had been sent abroad, with so many commissions and characters, should have been divested of all, and yet no examination instituted into his conduct on his return. He was warmly seconded by Nottingham and Haversham. But the whigs maintained a cautious reserve, and even Halifax contented himself with ambiguous expressions of approbation, by alluding to the printed account of Dr. Friend, and observing that the high achievements

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\* Tindal, vol. 16, p. 489.



which it commemorated, were only to be equalled by those related in Quintus Curtius.\*

Peterborough spoke in more brief and modest terms than usual, expressing a hope that he should be permitted to vindicate his character at some future time; and asserting that he had declined pressing his justification, not to interrupt the public business. The result, however, was a motion for papers and documents, particularly for the orders and instructions sent to lord Galway, lord Peterborough, and lord Rivers; a statement of the sums of money, with the disposition of which they had been respectively intrusted; and also of the number of troops at the battle of Almanza, and what account had been taken of lord Peterborough's proceedings since his return. The ensuing days were chiefly occupied with motions for papers and reports, and other preparations for the grand inquiry.

During these dissensions the commons had voted a considerable supply, and the queen repaired to the house of lords, to thank the parliament for their promptitude and zeal. She concluded by requesting an augmentation of forces in Spain, Portugal, and Italy, and announced her resolution to encourage and favour those only, who were willing and desirous to bring the war to a safe and honourable conclusion. A committee was accordingly appointed, to draw up an address of thanks for her majesty's most gracious speech, consisting principally of whigs.

The ensuing day being fixed for the resumption of the important debate on the state of the nation, the public expectation was raised to so high a pitch, that the lobbies were crowded at an early hour, and even the queen herself again attended *incognita*. The new-drawn address being reported by the duke of Bolton, chairman of the committee, was unanimously approved. It commended the spirit and resolution manifested by the queen, for the vigorous prosecution of the war in Spain, Portugal, and Italy, and for strengthening the duke of Savoy, who had deserved so well of the whole confederacy. After expressing their hopes that her example would incite all the allies to a noble imitation, they

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\* Vernon to the duke of Shrewsbury.



added, "Your majesty's favour will always be the highest encouragement to your subjects ; but the zeal we have for the preservation of your majesty's person and government, and the duty we owe to our country, always has, and ever will oblige us, to do all that lies in our power for supporting your majesty in this just war, till it be brought to a safe and happy conclusion."

The lord treasurer and principal officers of the household were then, as usual, commissioned to receive the pleasure of the sovereign, with regard to the presentation of this address. On their departure the House was put into a committee, to resume the debate on the state of the nation, and the management of the war in Spain.

This was the opportunity which was taken to bring forward the question so long threatened, on the conduct of lord Peterborough. Rochester again opened the discussion, by applauding his courage and skill ; and after enumerating his services, observed, that as it was the usual custom to thank or call to account, any person who had been employed abroad, in so eminent a post, he suggested the necessity of a similar proceeding in the present case. Halifax supported Rochester, by enlarging on the justice of a general examination ; and added, that such an inquiry was most anxiously desired by the noble earl himself. Several peers followed in the debate, some throwing out the severest reflections on Galway, and others stigmatizing him as a foreigner. The policy of prosecuting the war in Spain, till the whole monarchy should be recovered, was strongly and repeatedly urged. Peterborough himself exclaimed, "We should give the queen nineteen shillings in the pound, rather than make peace on any other terms ;" and added, with an affectation of disinterested zeal, "If necessary, I will return to Spain, and serve even under the earl of Galway !"

Rochester seized this opportunity to enforce the darling principle of his party against an offensive war in the Netherlands. He observed, "We seem to neglect the principal business, and to mind only accessories. I cannot forget the saying of a great general, the old duke of Schomberg, 'that to attack France in 'the Netherlands, is taking a bull by the horns.' I therefore propose, that we should remain on the defensive in that quarter,



and send from our army fifteen or twenty thousand men into Catalonia."\* He was followed by Nottingham, who bitterly complained that Spain, the principal object of the war, was almost abandoned.

These reflections on the conduct of Marlborough, were too obvious to pass unnoticed. He rose, and with great warmth exposed the insidious proposition of Rochester, and represented the necessity of increasing, instead of lessening the forces in the Netherlands. "The first reason," he observed, "which induces me to object to this proposal is, that in Spain most of the enemy's strong places may be kept with one battalion in each; whereas, the strong fortresses in Brabant, which I have reduced, require twenty times that number for their preservation; secondly, if our army in the Netherlands be weakened, and the french gain any considerable advantage there, the discontented party in Holland, who are not a few, and who bear with impatience the great charges of the war, will not fail to cry aloud for peace."

Here he was tauntingly interrupted by Rochester, who expressed his wonder that the noble peer, who had ever been conspicuous for calmness and moderation, should now lose his natural temper. He insisted on the absolute necessity of succouring Spain, and requested his grace to oblige their lordships, by apprizing them how they might obtain troops to send thither, for that purpose. "The obligation," he added, "will be the greater

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\* We find some sensible remarks on this insidious motion, in a letter from Maynwaring to the duchess.

"There is nothing that one reflects upon more naturally, after this glorious conquest, than the vile attempt that was made last winter to draw the forces out of Flanders, to which I remember your grace was a witness in the house of lords. Of all the attempts that I have known to serve the king of France, that was the plainest, and yet the best laid, with respect to the fools among ourselves, who were sure to be caught with any thing that looked like carrying on the spanish war. \* \* \* \* \*

"If one can wound an enemy at the heart, it is ridiculous to think of cutting his finger; and that I take to be the case with France now. We are going into its very vitals, and tearing up by the roots that trunk of power, that with its branches had almost overshadowed Europe. For which reason, the duke of Marlborough never can forgive those men that would, by lessening his army, have taken from him the means of doing this great service to his country, but will certainly be as good a whig as your grace next winter, which I wish, for many reasons, and for none more than that I am sure it will please you extremely."



as lord Peterborough has reported the opinion of prince Eugene, that the germans would rather be decimated than sent into Spain."

Marlborough repelled this sarcasm with becoming dignity. He acknowledged his warmth, but apologised, by observing that the subject was too important to be agitated without concern. He continued:

"Although it is improper to disclose secret projects, in so numerous an assembly, because the enemy will not fail to be informed of them; yet I am authorized by the queen to gratify your lordships, by the assurance that measures have been already concerted with the emperor, for forming an army of forty thousand men, under the command of the duke of Savoy, and for sending succours to king Charles. It is also to be hoped that prince Eugene may be induced to take the command in Spain, in which case the germans will gladly follow him. The only difficulty which may be objected to this scheme is, the usual tardiness of the court of Vienna; and it must be admitted, that if the seven thousand recruits, which the emperor promised for Piedmont, had arrived in time, the enterprise against Toulon would probably have been attended with success. But I dare engage my word, that for the future his imperial majesty will punctually perform his promises."

This dignified reply was so explicit and satisfactory, that even Rochester could start no plausible objection; but with an affectation of candour, observed, "Had we known sooner how well all things had been managed, this debate might have been spared."

The secondary question on the conduct and merits of Peterborough was now completely superseded, and Marlborough had scarcely ceased speaking, before lord Somers moved a resolution, in which he expressed his conviction, that all would agree; namely, "that no peace could be reasonable or safe, either for her majesty or her allies, if Spain and the West Indies were suffered to continue in the power of the house of Bourbon."

No objection being expressed, lord Wharton, after adverting to the communication made by the duke of Marlborough, proposed an address of thanks to the queen, for her care, as well as for her



instances with the emperor to send a considerable force to Spain, under the command of prince Eugene. Lastly, lord Halifax moved a resolution, pressing "that her majesty would be pleased to continue her solicitations with the emperor, for this end, as well as for reinforcing the duke of Savoy, and strengthening the army on the Rhine."

These several resolutions were sanctioned by the house, and to embody them in the usual form, a committee was appointed, in which the names of Marlborough, Godolphin, and Peterborough were introduced, and in which no tory was admitted, except the earl of Rochester. An address was accordingly presented to the house founded on these resolutions, and the concurrence of the commons obtained.

This measure originated with the whigs, was carried by their influence, and evidently intended as a disavowal of the objections urged by Rochester, against an offensive war in the Netherlands. It is, however, singular, that these resolutions, which announced a principle, hitherto not so distinctly avowed, were carried in the absence of the lord treasurer. Whether the motion was made with the approbation of Marlborough and Godolphin cannot be discovered; but it is certain, that when passed, it obtained their sanction; for the queen returned an answer, expressing her perfect concurrence in the united opinion of the two houses, that no peace could be safe or honourable, unless the whole monarchy of Spain was restored to the house of Austria. \*

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\* It is very singular that this sudden alteration of the address, and the manner in which it was proposed and carried, in the absence of the lord treasurer, should have escaped the notice of all our historians. I was fortunately enabled to discover the particulars of the transaction, from a curious letter written by Mr. Vernon to the duke of Shrewsbury, December 20th, and from a careful examination of the Lords' Journals, for Dec. 19th, 1707.

The political cause of this sudden alteration in the address, without a single dissenting voice, is still mysterious, and not easy to be developed. Vernon seems to impute it to the reconciliation between the two ministers and the whigs; and bishop Hare, in a letter to the duchess in 1710, attributes it solely to the whigs, and states it to have been intended as a mortification to Godolphin.

After representing the fact as it occurred, we must leave the decision to those who may discover more distinct and positive information.



The same questions were agitated in the lower house; but the management of the war in Spain, and the conduct of Peterborough occupied less attention than the complaints against the admiralty. Many of the members being themselves merchants, and affected by the losses at sea, it was imagined that the severest censures would be passed against admiral Churchill, who was represented as the cause of the naval disasters, and accused not only of negligence, but even of fraud and malice.

After a long and attentive investigation of different petitions and reports, a motion was made, that the petitioners had proved all their allegations, to the satisfaction of the committee. Admiral Churchill strenuously opposed it, and ably justified his own conduct as well as that of the council. He contended, that the petitioners, though they had proved their losses, had not substantiated their charges against the admiralty; he enlarged on the injustice of deciding on so momentous a question, from partial evidence; and obtained a suspension of the vote, till the admiralty could produce their justification, which they were actually preparing. \*

During this discussion, however, a material change took place in the temper and views of parties. The successful efforts of the whigs convinced the ministers that they were formidable antagonists, and that their junction with the tories might convulse the state, and dissolve the whole system of foreign and domestic policy. They therefore found it necessary to regain the confidence of their former supporters; and especially to convince them that the obstacles which they had experienced in the cabinet, and the partialities which had given them such disgust, were derived from other quarters. A sense of mutual interest, seems, therefore, to have produced a new and temporary reconciliation.

The queen was not ignorant of this accommodation, and foreseeing that the accumulated strength of the whigs and ministry would lead to a new attack against her tory partialities, she submitted to some condescensions which mark her alarm.

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\* Vernon to the duke of Shrewsbury, Dec. 9, and 13.



Assurances were given to the whigs, that although she had too far engaged herself to recede from her promises, with regard to the two tory bishops, she would promote no more of that party in future, to the higher offices of the church. This assurance she gave personally in the cabinet council; and the dukes of Devonshire and Somerset were authorised to communicate it to the whig leaders in the house of commons. She even so far conquered her natural bias, as to bestow the see of Norwich on Dr. Trimmel, the tutor and friend of lord Sunderland, and to confer the office of Regius Professor, at Oxford, on Dr. Potter, who was recommended by Marlborough, to the exclusion of Smalridge, and to the great displeasure of the university.

The effects of this accommodation were speedily apparent in the house of commons. The whigs became lukewarm in their charges; and the tories suspecting that the attack against the admiralty, was merely to promote the advancement of lord Orford to the management of the navy, would not give their aid in promoting the objects of their political rivals. Besides these motives, which actuated the great mass of both parties, many individuals were unwilling to offend the queen, by an attack against her husband, or Marlborough, by an accusation against his brother. Accordingly, the complaints and debates, which had so deeply agitated the nation, at the commencement of the session, ended in a resolution, merely recommending the queen to appoint an additional number of cruisers, for the better security of trade.

The house of lords, in which the whig interest was predominant, did not so readily desist from their charges against the admiralty board. In an address, which was drawn up on the 25th of February, they entered into a brief review of the whole examination; and amidst warm expressions of respect for the person and character of the prince, they directed the most acrimonious accusations against the influence of admiral Churchill, though without mentioning his name. They represented him as making "the worst use imaginable" of the confidence reposed in him, by the lord high admiral, of screening himself under his protection, and of insulting the legislature, by a vindication which



conveyed not the slightest assurance of future amendment. They concluded with expressing a hope “that seamen would be encouraged, trade protected, discipline restored, and a new spirit and vigour put into the whole administration of the navy.”\*

This ebullition of spleen was, however, confined to the affairs of the admiralty; for the scrutiny into the conduct of the war in Spain terminated no less favourably.

In subsequent debates the earl of Peterborough was again brought forward, and a regular investigation made into his conduct. The letters from king Charles, and the complaints which had been advanced against him, were submitted to parliament, and drew forth, on his part, volumes of memorials and justifications, with crowds of witnesses. This investigation having rendered the affairs of Spain and Portugal the subject of general interest, the opposition deserted the cause of Peterborough, to direct their invectives against the misconduct of the generals, and the deficiency of the british troops, in the battle of Almanza. The much debated matter began at length to weary the public attention, and was finally regarded as a mere chicane of opposition. A statement was produced by government, to account for the deficiency of the troops; and though great, it appeared to be owing to the circumstances of the war, not to intentional neglect. After the usual proposals and amendments, an address was passed, thanking the queen for taking measures to retrieve the affairs of Spain, and providing foreign troops for that service. This decision terminated the enquiry for a moment, and relieved Marlborough and the ministry from embarrassments of no ordinary magnitude.†

The reconciliation between the ministers and the whigs, was the prelude to the downfall of Harley; and no change in the course of a long political life, was more deeply felt, or more reluctantly sanctioned, by the duke of Marlborough.

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\* Journals of the Lords, Feb. 25.

† Journals of Lords and Commons—Chandler’s Debates—Letters from Mr. Vernon to the duke of Shrewsbury—Burnet—Tindal—Conduct of the Duchess of Marlborough—and Other Side of the Question.



Abhorrent of party connections, and always dreading the violent spirit of the whigs, his fear of becoming the mere instrument of their projects, overcame his sense of their influence, as well as his conviction of the imperious necessity, which compelled him to form a cordial union, with those who alone concurred in his principles of foreign policy. He was also restrained by a profound respect and gratitude for the queen, and an unwillingness to wound her feelings, or shock her prejudices, even in cases where her own interest and honour were concerned. Lastly, with a high opinion of the integrity, as well as the abilities of Harley, it was not without an arduous struggle, that he could be induced wholly to withdraw his confidence from a minister, whom he had protected and trusted, and to whose professions he listened, even at the moment when repeated proofs occurred, to justify a suspicion of his duplicity. Circumstances, however, rapidly accumulated, which furnished indirect, but convincing proofs of his secret intercourse with the queen, by the agency of Mrs. Masham ; and of his schemes to form a party and an administration of his own, either by restoring the preponderance of the tories, or by creating a schism among those who supported the government.

Harley saw the indecision of the two ministers, and their dread of being domineered by the party with whom they were associated. Hoping thereby to take advantage of their embarrassment, he requested an interview with both, on the plea of clearing himself from the aspersions under which he laboured. The meeting accordingly took place,\* and produced, if any, but a temporary effect ; for the dispute was brought to a crisis, by various incidents, which at once awakened the suspicions of the ministers, and diminished the credit of the secretary, in the house of commons.

A clerk in his office, of the name of Gregg, whom he had employed in Scotland and elsewhere, as a spy, had formed a secret correspondence with Chamillard, the french secretary of state, for

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\* Letters between Harley and Godolphin, Dec. 5.—Somerville's Queen Anne, p. 627.



the purpose of communicating the secrets of the english cabinet. This correspondence was carried on through the medium of Tallard's letters, which were sent to the secretary's office, to be read, before they were transmitted to France. Gregg had not long been engaged in this treasonable intercourse, before one of these packets was intercepted, and found to contain the copy of a letter, which the queen was to write to the emperor, requesting him to send prince Eugene into Spain. So exact was his intelligence, that the additions made by Godolphin to the original draft of the secretary, were specifically distinguished.

In consequence of this discovery, Gregg was arrested on the 30th of December, and after an examination, in which he acknowledged his guilt, was brought to a public trial at the Old Bailey, and convicted on his own confession. The circumstances of the transaction, as well as his dependance on Harley, appear to have given some colour to the accusation previously advanced against the secretary, of a correspondence with the french court, which Marlborough had indignantly repelled.

Another circumstance, which occurred at the same time, also contributed to affect the credit of Harley. Vallière and Bera, two smugglers, whom he had employed to procure intelligence, between Calais and Boulogne, had profited by his protection and confidence, to convey information to the enemy. They were likewise arrested; and although their treasonable practices were perhaps only the usual deceptions of such agents, yet at the moment, the discovery made considerable impression on the public mind, and was not without its influence on Marlborough and Godolphin.

These discoveries gave weight to a variety of indirect hints, which the ministers had before overlooked, of Harley's machinations with the queen and their enemies; and, at the same time, the consciousness of the critical situation in which he stood, forced the secretary to become more active in his intrigues, and to employ his efforts in widening the breach between the ministers and the whigs. In particular he seems to have recurred to the interposition of Buckingham, to



effect a coalition between the moderate of both parties, and instigated the queen to send messages to the leading tories, exhorting them to vindicate her dignity against the encroachments of the whigs. Mutual fears and jealousies brought the affair to a crisis. Before the close of January, Harley received, from the attorney general, a formal notice that he had fallen under the displeasure of Godolphin. He instantly appealed to Marlborough, as to his patron and protector. In a confidential interview, Marlborough frankly acquainted him with the motives of the coldness, which he had experienced, both from himself and the treasurer, and even descended to particulars. Harley, however, was not disconcerted, but again appealed to Godolphin, treated the charges against him as artful misrepresentations, and concluded with those professions of innocence and zeal for their service, which he had so often employed. The brief and indignant answer of Godolphin proved that his professions had now lost their weight, and cut off all hopes of a reconciliation.

“I have received your letter, and am very sorry for what has happened, to lose the good opinion I had so much inclination to have of you; but I cannot help seeing, nor believing my senses. I am very far from having deserved it of you. God forgive you.”\*

Having at length taken their reluctant resolution, the two ministers found, in their attempts to remove their dangerous rival, a mortifying proof of his interest with their royal mistress. In vain they laid their complaints before the queen, and insisted on his dismissal. She appeared to have forgot their deserts; and however necessary their services were, at this period, to the safety and honour of the country, she evinced a determination not to abandon her confidential adviser.

At this juncture the whigs became sensible of their injustice to the two ministers, and felt that the fate of their party, as well as that of the general and treasurer, depended on the disgrace of the obnoxious minister. The whole body conveyed to Marl-

\* Hardwicke Papers—Somerville's Queen Anne, p. 628, where this as well as the preceding letter is printed.



borough an assurance of their unanimous and zealous support ; and to prove their resolution of pushing their hostility against Harley, a committee of seven whig lords was appointed to examine Gregg and the two smugglers, with regard to their treacherous correspondence. For this purpose, Gregg received a respite, to give time for his examination, and to draw from him a farther confession, by the prospect of a pardon.

These circumstances discouraged neither the queen nor Harley. She persisted in her purpose, and reports of a plan for a new ministry were circulated, with a design of intimidation. A decisive step was therefore necessary ; and no alternative remained, but to bend to the interest of Harley, or resign their posts. Accordingly both Marlborough and Godolphin joined in announcing their resolution, and stating that the queen should no longer consider them as her servants, if Harley was not dismissed. The letter of Godolphin is not extant, but that of Marlborough is still preserved.

“ Madam ;—Since all the faithful services I have endeavoured to do you, and the unwearied pains I have taken for these ten days, to satisfy and convince your majesty’s own mind, have not been able to give you any such impressions of the false and treacherous proceedings of Mr. Secretary Harley to lord treasurer and myself, but that your majesty is pleased to countenance and to support him, to the ruin of your own business at home ; I am very much afraid it will be attended with the sorrow and amazement of all Europe, as soon as the noise of it gets abroad. And I find myself obliged to have so much regard to my own honour and reputation, as not to be every day made a sacrifice to falsehood and treachery, but most humbly to acquaint your majesty that no consideration can make me serve any longer with that man. And I beseech your majesty to look upon me, from this moment, as forced out of your service, as long as you think fit to continue him in it.

“ No heart is fuller of duty to your majesty than mine ; nobody has more sincere wishes for your prosperity, nor shall more constantly pray for your majesty’s long life, and for your happi-



ness both here and hereafter. I am always with the greatest respect, and the truest zeal for your service, &c." \*

Still, however, the queen persisted in her resolution, and encouraged Harley to maintain his post. On the 9th of February, a meeting of the cabinet council was summoned, as usual, and the customary notice sent to the two ministers. Resolving not again to sit at the same board with the secretary, they waited on the queen, and respectfully repeated their determination. She appeared little concerned at the proposed resignation of lord Godolphin, but was much affected with the declaration of Marlborough, and employed the most earnest intreaties to dissuade him from his purpose. The fate of England and of Europe hung on his decision, but he proved the warmth of his friendship and the consistency of his character; and did not belie his repeated asseverations, that he would stand or fall with Godolphin. He firmly and manfully resisted her instances, and retired from her presence, with firmness and respect.

This disappointment, however, did not intimidate the queen. The cabinet council assembled, at the appointed time, and after she had taken her seat, Harley proceeded to open the business of the meeting, which related to the affairs of his department. The members at first appeared as if absorbed in reflection: half-smothered murmurs were then heard, and the secretary paused. A momentary silence ensuing, the members turned to each other, with looks of surprise and uneasiness, till the duke of Somerset arose, and with warmth, exclaimed, "I do not see how we can deliberate, when the commander in chief and the lord treasurer are absent." On this unexpected observation, which plainly expressed the sense of the meeting, Harley was still more disconcerted, and the queen remained silent. The observation being repeated, the queen broke up the unfinished deliberation, and

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\* The draft of this letter is written in the hand of Marlborough, except a trifling alteration by Godolphin, which is introduced in the text. The original runs thus, "*that your majesty is pleased to countenance and support him, to the ruin of your own business, and of your faithful servants at home, which may be attended with the sorrow and amazement, &c.*"



withdrew with evident emotions of anger, alarm, and disappointment. \*

The result could not long be concealed, and the agitation of the public mind became extreme. Expressions of concern and dissatisfaction were heard in both houses of parliament; and the commons in particular, suffered a bill of supply to lie on their table, though ordered for that day. The prospect of the treasurer's resignation excited similar discontent among the monied men in the city, by whom his abilities and integrity were best appreciated.

Still, however, with her characteristic pertinacity, Anne did not abandon her purpose. But Harley was conscious, that with the load of suspicion under which he laboured, detested by the whigs, and not cordially supported, even by the whole body of tories, he could not conduct the government against the current of public opinion. He therefore entreated the queen to accept his resignation, and his instances were seconded by the prince of Denmark, who dreaded a convulsion in the state. Her resolution was swayed by these alarming symptoms, and the representations of her husband. The next day she summoned the duke of Marlborough into her presence; and after some bitter expostulations, which spoke her anger and mortification, she informed him that Harley should retire from her service.

Accordingly on the 11th of February, Harley formally resigned the seals. His place was transferred to Mr. Boyle, a zealous whig; and the office of chancellor of the exchequer was restored to Mr. Smith, who held it, with that of speaker, during the short remainder of the session. The resignation of Harley was followed by those of St. John, Mansell, and Harcourt; and the posts of comptroller of the household, and secretary at war, were transferred to earl Cholmondeley, and Mr. Robert Walpole, who had gained the esteem and confidence of Marlborough, by his diligence and zeal in office. The queen, however, was too deeply

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\* Conduct of the Duchess, p. 253.—Burnet, v. 5, p. 373.



mortified, to accept the recommendation of Godolphin in favour of Sir James Montagu, brother of lord Halifax, for the office of attorney general; and this post, though so necessary to the public administration of justice, continued vacant till the close of the year.

Meanwhile the examination of Gregg had proceeded, and though the criminal continued to acknowledge his own guilt, he repeatedly and solemnly declared that Harley was innocent of the slightest connivance in his treasonable practices. As his confession threw no new light on the transaction, he was deemed unworthy of the royal mercy, and instances were made for his execution. The queen at first refused to consent, and appeared extremely agitated on the slightest allusion to the conduct of the criminal, as it affected Harley.\* But as a pardon would have fixed a stigma on the disgraced minister, and as the behaviour of the criminal was highly insolent, she at length gave her sanction, and a dying confession published in his name, and at his request, strongly asserted his own guilt and contrition, and at the same time vindicated the innocence of his principal.

On the 18th of March a report from the committee of lords was published. Although the examination had produced no new fact, to disprove the asseverations of the criminal; yet as it shewed that Harley had been guilty of culpable negligence, in suffering papers of the highest importance and secrecy, to remain open to the inspection of the common clerks in his office, it left an unfavourable and indelible impression on his official character, in the public mind, though it appeared to produce no change in the sentiments of the queen.

A letter from Mrs. Burnet to the duchess is here introduced, to shew the opinion of the whigs, and the burst of zeal and attachment, which the crisis called forth from their party.

*“Tuesday morning.* Had I not been prevented, I had yesterday wrote, to wish your grace joy of the late victory, which I hope, if it please God, will have as happy effects as any the

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\* Letter from Godolphin to the duke of Marlborough.



duke of Marlborough ever got. I should have done it before the success, since I was well satisfied the resolution was right, be the event what it would ; for 'tis not to be expressed with what indignation it was generally received, that the lord treasurer and the duke of Marlborough should be put one moment in the balance with Mr. Harley and his party, who in all respects have appeared so far inferior to what they were ever thought to be, though I am confidently told that Mr. Harley would have undertook the weight, if the queen would have ventured.

“ The danger the duke of Marlborough was in of being taken once in Holland by the french, did not more plainly shew the love and esteem that country had for him, than this accident has shewed, that however displeased some may be, for particular matters, yet that they have an esteem and sense of the great obligations we are under, and the merit of the lord treasurer and the duke of Marlborough. Had this affair hung longer in suspense, most, if not all the whigs of consideration would have laid down their places ; and not only the bishop of Salisbury, but most of the other bishops would have come and offered lord treasurer and the duke of Marlborough all the service in their power, and have been ready to join in any thing to shew their regard to the duke and lord treasurer. And this I don't say now, when it may look like making a court after a victory, but what was their thoughts when the worst was feared. With respect to things beyond sea, I am glad it came to so short an issue ; and I ought to add, out of the regard I have to the queen's character, which cannot but suffer in this preposterous struggle, but also for the honour of lord treasurer and the duke of Marlborough, it had been better it had lasted a few days longer, that people might have had opportunities to have shewed their zeal for them, and to have more firmly united all honest men that mean well together, and discovered who were so. For I am told, that the most humoursome of the whigs, in the house of commons, were ready to offer their service, and all, in general, shewed anger or contempt at the arrogance of Mr. Harley.

“ I will add no more to this letter, but what I pray for, that the



lord treasurer and the duke of Marlborough may make the best use of the great advantages this has given them, and improve the good understanding and confidence this has laid the foundation of, with all wise and honest men that love the queen; for I am sure they are the only friends that can be relied on. 'Tis presumption in me to give any advice; but some things are so plainly for their service, that whoever loves them cannot but see it, and consequently cannot but wish, at least, they may do them."

THE dismission of Harley and his adherents was rendered popular by an invasion from France, which was preparing at the moment when the change was in agitation. The court of St. Germans had long endeavoured to persuade the king of France to invade England, for the purpose of establishing the young pretender on the throne of his ancestors. But although they exaggerated the number of their adherents, and expatiated on the internal divisions of Great Britain, Louis had not hitherto listened to their applications, either because he found sufficient employment for his forces, in other quarters, or because an unsuccessful attempt might ruin the interest of the Stuarts. At this period, however, circumstances seemed to favour the long meditated project; and the humbled state of the French monarch induced him to make a desperate effort, in order to create, at least a diversion, in the country on which the fate of the war depended. The recent disagreement between the ministers and the principal whigs, the influence of the Tories among the country gentlemen and clergy, the number of those who were really devoted to the Stuart line, the clamours excited against the burdens of the war,



## CHAPTER 65.

1708.

*Projected invasion of England in favour of the pretender—Zeal and activity of Marlborough and Godolphin, in discovering and defeating the attempt—Spirited and loyal conduct of the parliament and nation—Addresses of both houses, and reply of the queen—Ascendancy of the whigs, and change in the character of the administration—Design of the duchess of Marlborough to retire from court—Extorts a promise from the queen to confer her offices on her two daughters—Their increasing misunderstanding, and its effect on public affairs.*

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The recent disagreement between the ministers and the principal whigs, the influence of the tories among the country gentlemen and clergy, the number of those who were really devoted to the Stuart line, the clamours excited against the burthens of the war,



and the cry of peace which began to be raised in every quarter, proved an increase of disaffection towards the government, which was readily mistaken by the exiled prince, for a proof of attachment to his cause: this opinion was also corroborated by the number of every rank and station, who had carried on, or affected to carry on, a secret correspondence with his emissaries.

It was, however, in Scotland, where the principal leaven of disaffection existed. The warlike clans of the highlands, secluded among their mountains, nurtured in their prejudices, inured to danger and hardship, and passively obedient to their feudal lords, fostered an ardent and zealous attachment to the descendants of their antient kings; and this attachment derived new force from the events which had recently occurred. In the first part of the reign of Anne, the scots had succeeded in extorting the act of security, which was calculated to render them a separate and independent nation on her death; and, therefore, they witnessed, with indignation and horror, the union of the two countries, which destroyed their darling hopes, by not only incorporating them with a people against whom they still felt all their antient rivalry, but even by settling the eventual transfer of their crown to a foreign family. These prejudices were heightened by the alarms wilfully spread among them, that the union with England would be no less detrimental to their commerce and landed property, than to their freedom. Besides, the nobility were degraded in their own opinion and in that of the public, by the dissolution of the scottish parliament, and their partial exclusion from the british house of lords. It was impossible, therefore, to satisfy all the great families; and while the dukes of Queensbury and Argyle, the earls of Seaford and Stair, and other nobles, supported the connection with England, the disaffected found active and zealous chiefs, in the dukes of Hamilton and Athol, and the lords Buchan, Errol, and Marischal. In consequence of these elements of disaffection, the opposition to the union rose almost into open rebellion, and the articles were publicly burnt in several towns.

Calculating, therefore, on the timidity of the queen, and her known dislike of the Hanover line, on the former correspondence



of Marlborough and Godolphin with the exiled family, on the promises held forth by many among the tories, and on the zealous support of the english jacobites, as well as the recent schism of the whigs, the disaffected hoped to produce a new revolution, and to secure at least the reversion of the crown to the lineal descendant of their former sovereigns. Hence they importuned the court of St. Germain for a military force to call this latent spirit into action; and their applications were earnestly submitted to the french cabinet. Accordingly agents were dispatched into Scotland, and transmitted the most gratifying intelligence of the general spirit manifested by the bulk of the nation. They dwelt on the scanty force, which was employed to maintain the public tranquillity, both in Scotland and in the North of England, and described the facility of seizing the principal fortresses, and the public treasure. They represented the delay which must ensue, before assistance could be obtained from abroad, without the previous consent of parliament; and argued that a prompt and decisive effort would be attended with certain success.

These representations produced the desired effect. The expedition was fitted out at Dunkirk, and consisted of 8 sail of the line, 24 frigates, and 66 long boats, with numerous transports, conveying twelve battalions, 13,000 stand of arms, and a store of military accoutrements. The command was intrusted to the chevalier de Forbin, a distinguished naval officer; and the young pretender, who had just attained his twentieth year, accompanied the expedition, under the name of the chevalier de St. George. He was furnished with services of gold plate, liveries and uniforms, and with every requisite for a splendid court. Anticipating the functions of sovereignty, he created a master of the scottish mint, and even issued orders for the regulation of a new coinage.\* He was loaded with the presents and contributions of the roman court, and obtained the blessing of the pope on his colours and standards, which were decorated with the royal motto, "Dieu et mon droit," and other appropriate inscriptions.

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\* Lockhart's Memoirs.



These preparations, however, did not escape the vigilance of the english government. Marlborough received early intelligence of the design, from his friends in Holland, as well as from his spies in France; and the active zeal which he evinced as commander in chief, are proved by a confidential letter to general Cadogan, whom he had left as temporary agent with the dutch government, and in whose diligence and fidelity he reposed implicit confidence.

“*St. James's, Feb. 17.* Upon what you writ the last post to Mr. Cardonnel, and the advice come from other parts, of the preparations making at Dunkirk, her majesty has thought fit, that upon receipt of this, you forthwith repair to Flanders, and by all possible means inform yourself of the enemy's designs, giving notice of what you can learn, by every opportunity, and if you find it requisite, by frequent expresses, both by Ostend and the Brill. Her majesty does likewise think fit, in case there be any good grounds, to believe the enemy have formed a design of landing in these parts, or in North Britain, that there be a proportionable number of her majesty's foot forces, not only kept in readiness to embark immediately, but does farther recommend it to your care, if the enemy should embark with an intention of landing in Great Britain, before you have any other orders from hence, that then you put her majesty's troops on ship board with all possible speed, either at Ostend or in Zealand, and come yourself with them, to the first convenient port you can make. And you are, in what relates to the particular troops, to be made choice of on this occasion, to concert with, and observe the directions of lieutenant-general Lumley, to whom I likewise write on this subject, as I do to M. de Overkirk, desiring them withal, as I do to you, that it may be kept as secret as the service will allow. And if the States have any men of war in Zealand, or ready in their ports, you are to apply to them, for their assistance herein.”

In conformity with these instructions, Cadogan obtained from the dutch government a promise of immediate assistance in troops



and ships ; and repairing to Brussels, concerted with Overkirk the mode and means of transport, as well as of supplying the void left in the garrisons by the intended drafts. At Ghent he consulted the commander in chief, general Lumley, and obtained orders for the immediate march of ten battalions. Proceeding next to Ostend, he made every preparation for the transport of the troops to England, on the first notice that the french were actually embarked, on board the fleet prepared at Dunkirk, for the expedition.

In England the war department displayed the vigorous impulse of Marlborough. Drafts were made from the horse and foot guards, and several regiments of infantry were ordered to join the earl of Leven, commander in chief in Scotland, who had taken possession of the castle of Edinburgh. Others were collected on the north-east coast of Ireland, to be ready for immediate embarkation.

The admiralty also exonerated themselves from the stigma under which they had recently laboured, by their vigour and promptitude. Without diminishing the convoy for the Lisbon fleet, which consisted of no less than twelve english and five dutch men of war, they fitted out two squadrons of 23 british and 3 dutch men of war, which sailed from Deal, under the command of Sir George Byng and lord Darnley, and appeared off the coast in the vicinity of Dunkirk.

In the midst of these preparations the customary notice was submitted to parliament. On the 4th of March, Mr. Boyle, secretary of state, imparted to the house of commons, by order of the queen, the intelligence received from general Cadogan, relative to the french preparations at Dunkirk. He stated that the pretended prince of Wales was arrived with 15 battalions, ready to embark, that the duke of Berwick was expected, and that the object of the expedition was Scotland, where they had many friends, and hoped to surprise the castle of Edinburgh. He at the same time announced the preparations at Ostend, and gave notice that the States General were anxious and willing to



assist the queen, with their whole disposable force, by land and sea.\*

These reports of a projected invasion, which had been hitherto slightly treated by the tories, and represented as a mere political trick to excite alarm, were received with the deepest sensation by the commons. All party distinctions seemed to be forgotten, in the general anxiety to rally round the throne. An address of thanks was instantly drawn up, and being approved, was conveyed to the upper house by lord Hertford, who returned with the unanimous sanction of the peers.

After thanking the queen for her communications, and gratefully acknowledging the zeal of the dutch, the two houses expressed their resolution to assist her majesty with their lives and fortunes, in the maintenance of her undoubted right to the crown, against the pretended prince of Wales, and all her enemies, both at home and abroad. They praised the zeal and activity which had been manifested, both in the naval and military departments, and requested her majesty, not only to execute the laws against papists and non-jurors, but to secure the arms and persons of those who were suspected. At the close of their address, they expressed sentiments worthy of the british nation.

“As we doubt not, but by the blessing of God upon the continuance of your majesty’s care, your enemies will be put to confusion, so we readily embrace this opportunity to shew to your majesty and the whole world, that no attempts of this kind shall deter us from supporting your majesty, in the vigorous prosecution of the present war against France, until the monarchy of Spain be restored to the house of Austria, and your majesty have the glory to complete the recovery of the liberties of Europe.”

The two houses proved that these loyal declarations were not empty professions. They passed a bill, requiring all persons to take the oath of abjuration, under pain of being treated as convicted recusants, suspended the Habeas Corpus act, and proclaimed the pretender and his adherents traitors and rebels.

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\* Mr. Vernon to the duke of Shrewsbury, March 4.



They consented that the 5,000 men, who were ready for embarkation at Ostend, should be immediately brought from the coast of Flanders, and voted supplies commensurate with the exigency of the moment.

The activity of government corresponded with the zeal of the legislature. Many avowed or suspected jacobites were arrested, and after a short confinement in different places, conveyed to London. Among the most distinguished was the duke of Hamilton,\* who had repaired to England, under the plea of domestic business, and was taken into custody by a state messenger, in his passage through Lancashire. He was permitted to remain some days at a seat in Staffordshire, and finally transferred to the tower.

In the midst of the general suspense and anxiety, the troops from abroad landed at Tynemouth, and with the forces collected in the country, prepared to advance, by rapid marches, to the scene of danger. But long before they could reach their destination, the storm, which had menaced the british shores was dissipated, by the vigilance and enterprise of the navy.

The unexpected apparition of a powerful squadron before Dunkirk confounded the french court, who had fondly imagined that the departure of the Lisbon fleet had left the coasts defenceless. Fear and indecision succeeded to hope and confidence, and after a considerable delay, occupied by orders and counter orders, advantage was taken of a gale, which drove the english fleet off its station, to give the signal for sailing. Their destination was, however, suspected, and when they reached the Frith of Forth, they were astonished to find Sir George Byng, with his squadron, waiting their arrival. Discouraged by the appearance of this superior force, and disappointed of the expected co-operation from the rebels, they changed their plan, and beat round the north of Scotland, to land at Inverness, where they expected an insurrection in their favour, among the highland clans. But they were driven out to sea by tempestuous winds, and after

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\* The best account of this proceeding is found in Lockhart's State Papers, v. 1, p. 217.



becoming the sport of the elements for the space of a month, deemed themselves fortunate in effecting their return to Dunkirk, though with the loss of 4,000 men, from hardship and sickness. One of the ships, the Salisbury, was captured, having on board lord Griffin, the two sons of the earl of Middleton, and colonel Warcope, who were committed to the Tower. The vigilance of government prevented the adherents of the pretender from exciting disturbances; and the only effect produced by the attempt was, a temporary run on the bank of England, which was obviated by the prudence of the lord treasurer, and the liberal assistance of the nobility and monied men, among whom we distinguish the names of Marlborough, Somerset, Newcastle, and Godolphin, as well as of the principal merchants in the city.\*

On the defeat of the intended invasion, the services of Marlborough and Godolphin received due praise from the nation at large, one for his judicious disposition of the military force, and the other for the vigour and wisdom of the internal government.

The spirited address presented by the commons to the queen, conveys full testimony to their merits, and a censure no less strong on "those persons, who by endeavouring to create divisions and animosities, lessen the just esteem which your majesty entertains for those who have so eminently, and in so distinguished a manner, commanded your armies, and managed your treasure, to the honour and glory of your majesty abroad, and the entire satisfaction of your people at home."

The language of the peers, on the contrary, manifested the spirit of jealousy and suspicion, which the whig chiefs still fostered against the general and treasurer, and proved that they were no less eager to recommend the merits of their own party to the royal notice, than to concur in the applause of the nation. After congratulating the queen on the disappointment of the enemy, and professing their zeal and loyalty, they held up to her

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\* Tindal, and the other historians—History of Europe for 1708—Lockhart's Papers, v. 1, which contain much interesting information on this subject—Journals of the Lords and Commons.



detestation, those who had recently endeavoured to misrepresent the actions of her best and most faithful subjects, and conjured her to exclude them in future from her presence. They concluded with expressing their opinion, that her majesty should principally depend upon, and encourage those who had been, ever since the revolution, most steady and firm to the interest of the late king, and of her majesty, during her happy reign.

The reply of the queen is conveyed in language which she had never before employed, and was ill in unison with her private sentiments. Instead of the cautious silence, which she had hitherto maintained, respecting the Revolution, or its abettors, she now adopted the style in which she had been addressed. After deprecating party distinctions, she declared her obligation "to place her chief dependence on those who had given such repeated proofs of the greatest warmth and concern, for the support of the Revolution, the security of her own person, and of the protestant succession."

In the speech with which she closed the session, she assumed a still more decisive tone. After thanking the parliament for their liberal and timely supplies, she observed, "I take these to be such undeniable proofs of your zeal and affection to my service, as must convince every body of your doing me the justice to believe, that all which is dear to you is perfectly safe under my government, and must be irrecoverably lost, if ever the designs of *a popish pretender, bred up in the principles of the most arbitrary government, should take place.*" \*

Such expressions sufficiently shew the fear which the queen conceived of the whigs, as well as the necessity she felt of yielding to the impulse of public opinion; and may serve as a proof of the change, which recent events had produced in the character of the administration. This memorable answer closed the business of the session; for the parliament was prorogued the same day, and on the 15th of April dissolved, a short time before it would have expired, by the lapse of three years.

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\* Journals.



We cannot close our narrative of these transactions, without advertg to an incident, which seems to have arisen out of the struggle for the dismissal of Harley; and which, though of minor importance in itself, materially affected the feelings and interest of the duke of Marlborough.

Mortified at the increasing influence, which Mrs. Masham appeared to enjoy, the duchess continually persecuted the queen with her reproaches and remonstrances, both in person and by letter. \* Finding that her ill-judged efforts, instead of lessening, increased the affection of the queen for the new favourite, she adopted the resolution of withdrawing from court. She waited on her royal mistress, a few days before the dismissal of Harley, and after a preamble, which was frequently interrupted by the violence of her emotions, she added, "As lord Marlborough is now about to be forced from your majesty's service, I cannot, in honour, remain any longer at court." She then expatiated, as usual, on her own services, and on the friendship which the queen had condescended to entertain for her; and as a recompence, concluded with requesting permission to resign her offices in favour of her two elder daughters, who from their rank, alliance, and character, were well calculated to merit such a favour.

After listening with seeming embarrassment to this long appeal, the queen evaded compliance, by affecting much kindness, and repeating, "you and I must never part." The duchess, however, was not diverted from her purpose, and renewed her solicitations, that if circumstances should render her retreat necessary, her majesty would comply with this request. The queen, pressed by her importunities, and intimidated by the presence of a person, whom she equally feared and disliked, renewed the declaration, "that they should never part." But added, "should that even be the case, she would transfer the offices to two of her daughters; and did not hesitate to bind that promise

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\* One of these indecorous altercations is recorded by the duchess in her Conduct, p. 244.



by a solemn asseveration. The duchess took her leave, kissing the queen's hand ; and after the duke and Godolphin had succeeded in extorting the dismissal of Harley, the queen yielded to her continued applications, by confirming, in writing, the promise which had been verbally given. Still, however, the duchess had reason to feel that her attendance was unwelcome ; and on the departure of her husband to the continent, she wrote a letter, expressing her resolution not to incommode the queen by her presence ; but artfully recalled to recollection the promise which she had before extorted. \*

“ *March 31.* Madam ;—Upon lord Marlborough's going into Holland, I believe your majesty will neither be surprised nor displeased, to hear I am gone into the country, since by your very hard and uncommon usage of me, you have convinced all sorts of people, as well as myself, that nothing would be so uneasy to you as my near attendance. Upon this account, I thought it might not be improper, at my going into the country, to acquaint your majesty, that even while lord Marlborough continues in your service, as well as when he finds himself obliged to leave it, if your majesty thinks fit to dispose of my employments, according to the solemn assurances you have been pleased to give me, you shall meet with all the submission and acknowledgments imaginable.” †

It is needless to expatiate on the disgust, which this ill-timed application, and imprudent importunity produced. The queen and the duchess never met, without sullen silence, or bitter reproaches ; and never wrote without ironical apologies, or contemptuous taunts. The effects of these female jars, arising from offended dignity on one hand, and disappointed ambition on the other, may be traced throughout the series of correspondence, and produced the most sinister effects on the administration of public affairs, by the perplexities into which they perpetually threw both the treasurer and general.

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\* From a narrative manuscript of the duchess, beginning “ Some days before my lord Marlborough, &c.”—*Conduct*, p. 254.

† From a copy in the hand-writing of the duchess.



## CHAPTER 66.

1708.

*Arrival of Marlborough at the Hague—Meets Eugene—Political and military arrangements—Plan of the campaign—Continuation of the feuds in the british cabinet, relative to the promotion of lord Somers—Instances for Marlborough's return to England—Obstacles to the intended plan of operations—Journey of Marlborough to Hanover, to obviate the objections of the elector—His return to the Hague—Querulous complaints of his friends, on his refusal to revisit England—Correspondence on this subject.*

**H**OWEVER anxious to mature the preparations for the ensuing campaign, and to join Eugene, who was impatiently expecting him at the Hague, Marlborough could not quit England, until the danger of invasion had ceased. He therefore took his departure on the 29th of March, O. S., before the close of the session, and after a speedy passage, reached the coast of Holland. He proceeded without delay, in an open boat, to the Brill, and on the morning of the second of April, appeared at the Hague.

TO SECRETARY BOYLE.

“ You will have heard by last post how well I was in making my passage hither, the next night after I left London. Since my arrival, my time has been wholly taken up in concerting with the prince of Savoy, and the generals and ministers. Yesterday we had a conference with the States General, when the prince communicated to us two projects, for the operations on the Rhine, and Moselle. The latter seems to be most relished; but to put it in execution, the prince requires 80,000 men for the army in the Low Countries, which you may believe the States are not inclined to give. I must own, that according to the present juncture, we should be in a situation to act offensively on this



side, that we may have an eye at the same time to our affairs in England, to deter the enemy from the thoughts of another invasion, which they might be inclined to, if we should weaken ourselves too much in Flanders. But the States are of opinion that the best way of hindering it, would be to keep a good squadron constantly before Dunkirk.

“The prince has insinuated to me, that he should be glad if I could accompany him to Hanover, to concert with the elector; but I shall excuse myself, that I may get five or six days to come over, and inform the queen fully of the measures that shall have been taken, to which end I keep the yacht and convoy on this side.”

With Eugene Marlborough entered into a confidential communication, on the state of foreign affairs, and the views of his sovereign. In these preliminary discussions, two points, in particular, occupied his attention, namely the demands of the emperor, for the levy money of the troops, whom he had engaged to furnish; and the claims of the duke of Savoy on the austrian court.

On the first head, Marlborough referred the discussion to the treasurer and the british cabinet, from a reluctance to acquiesce in demands, which he deemed exorbitant, and an unwillingness to offend the emperor, by a direct refusal.

The adjustment of the second point was still more delicate; for the duke of Savoy, on one hand, demanded the immediate fulfilment of the treaty, concluded in 1703, by which he was to receive part of the Montferrat, forfeited by the duke of Mantua, while the emperor delayed the investiture, under the pretence that the cession of the said territory would infringe the rights of the house of Lorraine. Marlborough was particularly anxious to effect an accommodation, because the success of the campaign in Italy depended on the union of the two courts; and because his friends in England, especially the treasurer, made the conduct of the emperor, the theme of perpetual invective, and censured him for continuing to rely on a prince, whose engagements had been so seldom fulfilled. With this view, Marlborough dispatched



general Palmes to Vienna and Turin ; but his principal hopes of success rested on the mediation and influence of Eugene.

The result of their amicable negotiation was highly satisfactory. From Eugene he received assurances, that the emperor was gratified by the resolution of parliament to continue the war, till the whole monarchy of Spain was restored to the house of Austria, and would faithfully redeem the pledges he had repeatedly given, in exerting his whole strength to promote the objects of the Grand Alliance. That the army on the Rhine should be increased to the amount of 20,000 men, with every requisite for action, by the middle of May ; and that a succour of 12,000 men should be furnished for the service of Italy, to be placed under the sole direction of the duke of Savoy. That although he could not comply with the instances of the queen and parliament, by sending Eugene into Spain, he would dispatch a considerable body of his troops to Catalonia, and consign the command to count Staremberg, one of his most able generals. Finally, that he would assist in the formation of an army on the Moselle, which, under the direction of Eugene, should act in any quarter, where it could be employed with the best effect. The prince also pledged himself for the compliance of his imperial master, with the demands of the duke of Savoy.

After accomplishing these arrangements, Marlborough and Eugene proceeded to mature the plan for the campaign, of which they had previously concerted the outlines, as appears from a letter of Eugene to the duke, dated St. Laurent, August 31, 1707.

“ I have received your highness's letter of July 30th, by brigadier Palmes. He departs, informed of the state of affairs here, and of my opinion respecting the war in this country, and in other parts. But should it be resolved to remain here on the defensive, we ought to have a body, which may be withdrawn to form a second army on the Moselle, with some detachments from our other armies, and to act in Germany or Flanders, according as circumstances require. Above all things, magazines and artillery must be provided, without which, the troops will be useless. In this case, the army in Spain must be put in a condition to want no succours, and to support itself. I entreat you to take care that none may discover these designs. In the project for this country,



I only speak of the valleys of Barcelonetta and Aosta; but if we could take Susa before winter, an army might act by Mont Cenis, or perhaps by Mont Genevre, which is the only passage practicable for artillery.

“ This project appears vast; but if two armies were ready in May, it would not be impossible, particularly if those who were charged with the execution were not obliged to govern themselves according to the ridiculous judgments of the ignorant, as in such enterprises we attempt all that is possible; and yet the success is always uncertain. Those who have commanded armies know this by fatal experience.

“ I end with the affairs of Spain. The king presses me continually for succours from Vienna, of which he is in want. I am overwhelmed with projects, which are referred to Holland and England, and of which general Palmes has no knowledge. It is now September. Neither fleet or troops have any orders; for what Lescheraine has communicated amounts to nothing. I wish, therefore, to know what is intended, that I may apprise the king; and what measures are to be taken, for on those depend also the dispositions for the ensuing campaign.”\*

In arranging this extensive design, the two generals admitted to their deliberations pensionary Heinsius, of whose secrecy and zeal they were well assured. With him they settled two projects, one real, the other ostensible. The purport of the ostensible project was, to form two armies, one in the Netherlands, under Marlborough, the other on the Moselle, under Eugene, as if they intended to resume the design of penetrating through Lorraine, which had been baffled in 1705. The real project was, to unite these two armies by a rapid march, and give battle to the french in the Netherlands, before they could be joined by reinforcements drawn from distant quarters. The army on the Moselle was to be principally formed of imperialists, palatines, saxons, and hessians, who had before served on the Upper Rhine; and, consequently, the german army which had hitherto acted with little effect, was to be reduced to the defensive.

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\* Translation from the original french.



The ostensible project was communicated to the deputies of the States, on the 12th of April, and the two generals earnestly recommended the preparatory measures, requisite for the execution of their secret plan. Several other conferences were successively held, to mature their arrangements, and the acquiescence of the dutch government was at length obtained.

This disposition of force was more necessary, in consequence of the intentions manifested by the french, to recover their losses in the Netherlands. For this purpose they had drawn troops from the most distant parts, even from Spain and Italy; and the choice of the generals indicated the quarter which was to be the prominent theatre of action. For the command in Dauphiné was given to marshal Villars; that on the Upper Rhine to the elector of Bavaria, and marshal Berwick; and the direction of the war in the Netherlands was entrusted to the duke of Burgundy, who was expected to reap the laurels of victory under the skilful guidance of Vendome.

While Marlborough was employed in arranging military operations, the increasing feuds in the british court called forth his serious attention; for he had scarcely reached the Hague before the disputes, which had raged in the preceding year, broke out with redoubled fury. It was evident that the forced accommodation, which had recently taken place with the whigs, would only prove the germ of new contentions.

The appointments of Cowper and Sunderland, and the nomination of Boyle, in the room of Harley, had not sufficiently gratified the ambition of the rising party; and they now endeavoured to force the rest of their chiefs into the royal service. They first brought forward lord Somers, whose mildness of character, and steady attachment to the principles of the Revolution, had won the respect, even of his rivals, and who was personally esteemed both by Marlborough and Godolphin.

Somers had hitherto announced a resolution never to accept any office of state, while Harley continued in the administration; and that objection being now removed, the preceding changes were considered as propitious to his promotion, which was made



by the whigs an indispensable condition of their support. They hoped this object would encounter the less obstruction, from the general estimation in which Somers was held, as well as from the particular regard entertained for him by the two ministers. Before the departure of Marlborough, the lord treasurer, with his usual delicacy, was endeavouring to render the change palatable to the queen; and Somers was designated for the office of president of the council, which was held by the earl of Pembroke, in conjunction with the viceroyalty of Ireland. The treasurer found, however, so much repugnance on her part, and so much impatience on the side of the whigs, that he wrote in the most pressing terms, to hasten the temporary return of Marlborough to England, as soon as his military occupations would permit, for the sake of settling this political dispute.

*“Newmarket, April 5--16.* I had the satisfaction to receive here last night the favour of your's of the 31st of March, from the Hague, and of prince Eugene having been there before you. I hope your affairs on that side will soon be dispatched, because it is plain those on this side will not be so without your assistance; and yet I am not in despair, but your being one fortnight here would obtain what is reasonable to be done, and set things upon a tolerable foot, which otherwise are like to come to great extremities next winter, in the opinion of your humble servant.”

The duchess was equally pressing for the return of her husband, and the whigs, through their organ, lord Sunderland, expressed their hopes that his presence would extort the consent of the queen to their just demands.

LORD SUNDERLAND TO THE DUCHESS OF MARLBOROUGH.

*“Whitehall, April 6--17.* A dutch mail came in this morning, by which we had reason to hope that lord Marlborough is determined to return for some days. I can't but rejoice extremely at it, because I think it is of the last consequence to every thing here; and, besides, will bring you back to us again, which I heartily wish, not only for the satisfaction it would be to all



friends; but because I am more and more convinced of what I took the liberty of saying to you, before you went out of town, that I am sure your absenting yourself for any long time, is just doing what your's and all our enemies desire, and proclaiming to the whole world what they, by all arts, endeavour to make people believe. Whereas till every thing breaks to pieces, which I hope will not be yet, sure it would be right to endeavour to deceive the world, at least in this point. I beg pardon for touching on this subject, which I know is not agreeable to you; but I think it is of so much consequence, that I could not help doing it.

“The letters of to-day tell us the prince of Wales is gone back to St. Germain, so that there is an end of that danger, at least for this year; and it is not to be imagined the consternation they are in at Paris upon this disappointment. It does really look as if they put their whole hopes upon this single expedition; and it has raised as much the spirits of all our friends in Holland.

“As to our elections here at home, by the nicest calculation that can be made, they will be very considerably better in this parliament; so that if all this will not keep you from the spleen, I don't know what will. I am sure nothing can keep us from it, but your coming back again among your friends.”

Marlborough promised to comply with these instances, and made preparations for his immediate departure, as soon as he had completed his military dispositions. He had scarcely, however, adopted his resolution, before he was assailed by remonstrances from the States, who were apprehensive lest he might be detained in England by contrary winds, and expatiated on the injury which would arise from his absence, to the interest of the confederacy. They even applied to the queen, repeating their instances against his departure.

The timidity of the republic would not, however, have prevailed, had he not been swayed by difficulties of another kind. To execute the plan which he had concerted with Eugene, it was necessary to obtain the co-operation of the german princes, who



manifested the utmost reluctance in sending their troops into the field.

The elector palatine refused to supply his contingent, unless the emperor would restore the territorial possessions and honours, which had been wrested from his family at the peace of Westphalia, and conferred on the bavarian line. Similar difficulties were raised by the landgrave of Hesse, and king Augustus, as elector of Saxony; but the greatest arose from the elector of Hanover, who evinced unusual eagerness to command a powerful army, and expressed the utmost indignation at the slightest hint of a diminution of his forces.

Eugene engaged to negotiate with the palatine and saxon electors, and the landgrave, but knowing that he was himself obnoxious to the elector of Hanover, he earnestly entreated Marlborough to join him at that court, in the full confidence that his influence could alone prevail. The necessity of the case was so urgent, that Marlborough, though reluctantly, yielded to the arguments of his friend, and relinquished his design of returning to England. He announced this change in a letter to secretary Boyle.

*"April 20, N. S. Prince Eugene, who is gone to Dusseldorp, to concert with the elector palatine, being very pressing with me to meet him again at Hanover, to persuade the elector to come into the measures for the operations of the campaign, and the States having written by this post to pray the queen to dispense with my return to England; I hope her majesty will not disapprove my setting out the beginning of next week for Hanover, where I purpose to continue only forty-eight hours, and to be here again in twelve days."\**

He did not linger at the Hague after the departure of Eugene, but proceeded to Hanover, where he arrived on the 26th. His first letter to secretary Boyle contains a brief account of his journey and proceedings.

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\* State Paper Office.



“*Hanover, April 27.* After I writ to you on Monday, I made such diligence, that I arrived here yesterday in the evening. I took up the count de Rechteren\* at his house on the road, and prince Eugene joined us at the last stage. We had at night an audience of the elector, electress, and electoral prince. To-day we have begun our conferences with the ministers: what the result may be, will appear from the next, which it is likely will be from the Hague, intending to leave this place Sunday or Monday.”

On reaching Hanover, the two generals were equally concerned and surprised to find that the elector had conceived a jealousy of the plans in agitation, and was determined not to resume the command on the Rhine. He in particular did not conceal his aversion to Eugene, whom he considered as sent to usurp those laurels which he himself had hoped to acquire. During their stay of two days at Hanover, they however soothed his jealousy, or at least overcame his repugnance; and obtained his consent for the formation of a separate army on the Moselle. But he was not acquainted with the real project, and was left to suppose that Eugene might either act on the Moselle, or repair to the Rhine, as circumstances required. He was also gratified with 2,000 imperial horse, intended for Eugene, and was promised a further reinforcement of 5,000 men from the Netherlands. A pledge was given on the part of the emperor, to obviate the objections which had hitherto prevented the formal establishment of the new electorate in the house of Hanover.

Here the two great commanders separated. Having already gratified the elector palatine, and the landgrave of Hesse, by announcing the acquiescence of the emperor in their demands, Eugene proceeded to Dresden, where he was equally successful with king Augustus. From thence he took the route to Vienna, to accelerate the preparations for the ensuing campaign, and to effect an accommodation with the court of Turin.

Marlborough returned to the Hague, which place he reached on the 2nd of May. After communicating to the States the result

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\* Envoy from the States General, formerly baron d'Almelo.



of his negotiations, and concerting the measures for opening the campaign, he proceeded to join the army, which was assembling in the vicinity of Brussels.

At the Hague, he found letters from Godolphin and the duchess, filled with reproaches for his refusal to repair to England.

FROM LORD GODOLPHIN.

“*Newmarket, April 8--19.* I have the favour of your's of the 15th, and am very sorry you have so little time to yourself, while I am so idle as to be here. One of my best reasons for it was, the hopes I have to meet you at London at my return thither. But I must own your letter leaves that matter very uncertain, since you seem to think that the enemy's forming a small camp near Ypres, will oblige you to go to Flanders. For my part, I cannot see much ground to apprehend the french preparations there, or any where, since their disappointment in Scotland, which seems to have very much disordered all their measures.

“I entirely dislike all prince Eugene's projects, even if they should succeed; for considering how the court of Vienna used us as soon as they were masters in Italy, it would surely be very unadvised to put it into their power to do the same again, by making them masters again upon the Rhine and Moselle, and neglecting the opportunity of our own advantages nearer home, of which our people will be much more sensible. I wish, therefore, most earnestly, that your notion may prevail with prince Eugene, but not at the price of those two electors;\* because that could not fail of being called here a *pretext* not to return into England, our world not being much better natured than when you left it.”

“*Sunday night, April 11--22.* The wind had been so fair all the while I was at Newmarket, that at my return from thence on Sunday, I was not out of hopes to have found you here; but instead of that you don't think of coming, which I must own is a great mortification to me; for I had much set my heart upon the hopes of seeing you, and endeavouring once more to have set Mrs. Morley's affairs upon a right foot; and I really think it

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\* Palatine and Hanover.



would be very hard for her to have resisted the plain necessity with which our arguments might have been enforced at this time. I say this chiefly because I really believe one of your chief reasons for your not making use of the fair wind that presented, was, your apprehension that your being here would not be able to do any good; for you must give me leave to say, that I cannot think you will go to Hanover, or that you will think yourself there is any occasion at present for your going to Flanders.

“ I am very sorry for what prince Eugene tells you of the little to be expected from the duke of Savoy. I confess I had great hopes that something might be done with effect on that side, where there seems to be the least preparation for any resistance. \* \* \* \* \*

“ A good many people seem to be uneasy here, at your sending for three regiments, but I hope it will soon be over, if the diligence of lieutenant general Erle, joined to the great allowances which I have made at the treasury, for restoring the Almanza regiments, can be sufficient to have them completed by Midsummer, the time assigned for that purpose. He goes to-morrow to Northampton, to review such of the troops as are upon their return from the frontiers of Scotland.”

“ *April 13--24.* Since my former letter of the 12th, the letters of the 20th are arrived from Holland, and to my great surprise I have none from you, nor had lady Marlborough received her's when I sent this morning; so I conclude some accident must have happened to her letters and mine. By your's to Mr. Boyle, I am very sorry to find you resolve to go to Hanover. It will be looked upon here as a very full conviction, that any place is more agreeable than England; and I am afraid the pains you take in going thither can have no other effect, than to increase the elector of Hanover's jealousy of prince Eugene, and render him still fuller of difficulties and irresolution.”

“ *April 16--27.* In my last I acknowledged your's of the 20th with the account from prince Eugene of king Augustus's proposals to the emperor, in which matter the queen does fully agree with your opinions at the Hague.



“As to what is said to you by those of Amsterdam, concerning their *barrier*, we in England shall be easy I believe in giving them any satisfaction about that matter with these two conditions:—1st, that Ostend remain in the hands of Spain; and, secondly, that Dunkirk be demolished. I think we are undone whenever we consent to any peace, without these two articles.

“I wish your next letters from Hanover may give us a good account of your having had success there, but I must own it is more than I expect.”

The replies of Marlborough shew how deeply his feelings were wounded by these querulous reproaches.

TO THE DUCHESS.

“*Hague, May 3.* At my return last night at this place I had the pleasure of receiving your's of the 5th and 6th. I am very sorry, and do assure you that it was never my intention that any letter of mine should give uneasiness to you; but the contrary, for I can have no content, if I must live without your esteem and love. The letter writ by the States\* proceeded from my positively refusing of them, and not from any desire of not returning. I must own to you, that I have never been one day since I left England without very dismal thoughts; for I am very much of your opinion, that the queen's inclinations are such, that the whigs must be angry, and, consequently, the lord treasurer and I not only uneasy, but unsafe. All this I could bear if I could be so happy as to gain your love and esteem; for however unhappy my passion and temper may make you, when I have time to recollect, I never have any thought but what is full of kindness for you.

“The hope you have of the good instructions that have been given to the duke of Devonshire,† in order to persuade the queen, is what I am afraid will signify very little, since the power and inclinations of Mrs. Masham will be opposite. For my own

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\* Alluding to the letter written by the States to the queen, against his return to England.

† He here alludes to the proposal for admitting lord Somers into the council, without an office.—See the next chapter.



part, I shall this campaign do my utmost for the good of the common cause, and the queen's service, after which, I should, from my soul, be glad of being excused from any farther service. I shall leave this place in two or three days, and shall take care to have your letters follow me to Brussels.

"The inclosed paper you sent me, I should think would do good."

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

"*Hague, May 3.* At my return here last night, I had the happiness of your three letters of the 3rd, 5th, and 8th, by which I am sensible of your kind desires for my return. I am now thoroughly convinced if I had avoided being at Hanover, at the same time with prince Eugene, not only the project made at the Hague had miscarried, but also these people would have laid the fault at my door.

"After a very great deal of uneasiness, the elector has consented to the project for three armies; but we have been obliged to leave on the Rhine two imperial regiments, more than we designed, so that prince Eugene will have 2,000 horse less on the Moselle; and as for the joining the two armies, we thought it best not to acquaint the elector with it, so that I expect when that is put in execution, he will be very angry; but since the good of the campaign depends upon it, I know no remedy but patience.

"The burgomasters of Amsterdam were above two hours with me this morning, to convince me of the necessity of a sudden peace. I need not repeat you their reasons, the greatest part of them were such as you have heard formerly from Mr. Buys. That which gave me the greatest surprise was, that they hoped the queen would come into measures with them for the proposing peace to France, in case France should make none to them by the month of July. This from the most zealous part of the dutch has very much alarmed me. The next thing they desired was, that the queen would be pleased to lose no time in giving her orders for beginning a treaty for their barrier; and that they on their side were willing to take any measure her



majesty should propose to take, for the security of the union, and the protestant succession. They insist on the same barrier they formerly proposed, with what they call an expedient, which is, that half the garrison of Ostend might be spaniards. They make difficulty of giving me this in writing, but at last, I believe, they will do it. In the mean time, I beg you will acquaint the queen, that I may know her pleasure. Though they pressed me very much to acquaint you by this post, at the same time they were very earnest that you should let nobody know it but her majesty.

“Not only in this conversation, but in that which I had with them before I went to Hanover, I find they think the tories are in the interest of 54, and that the court is divided. This opinion may prove very fatal to the queen’s interest. Every thing has so ill a prospect, that I should despair, were it not for the hopes that God will give me, this campaign, an opportunity of serving the queen and common cause.

“Before I left England, I did speak to the queen, that in this promotion the earl of Rivers might have a commission of general of the horse, he being the only lieut.-general of the last war. If her majesty pleases, I think it reasonable that his commission should be dated from the time he was sent for Portugal.

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“I own to you that I expect no good nature from my dear countrymen; but I beg that justice and friendship of you to believe, that I could no ways avoid my journey to Hanover, without hazarding the project we have made for this campaign.”

TO LORD SUNDERLAND.

“*Hague, May 4.* My lord;—At my arrival here last night, I had the favour of your’s of the 6th. I am of your opinion, that the proposal from the court of Vienna for levy money, is very unreasonable. I also agree with you that it will be impossible for those that are thought to have the credit, to be able to do her majesty or their country any service. For my own part, I shall endeavour to do my duty this campaign, after which, I should be glad to see my place well filled, and that for the remaining part



of my life I might have a little quiet, and be sometimes with my children. You will see by Mr. Secretary Boyle's letter what we have done at Hanover. I shall leave this place on Monday, in order to take the field, as soon as there is any grass, the spring being very backward. My kind love to lady Sunderland, and be assured that I am tenderly your's, &c."

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

"*May 6.* \* \* \* \* The pensioner's sickness hinders me from seeing him, but I have pressed M. Fagel, the greffier, that their ships might be hastened to you. Yesterday's letters from Paris assure us, that the duke of Burgundy is to command in Flanders, and that they are to have a superiority of 30,000 men, which I think is impossible. But if they send him, they think themselves strong enough to act offensively, by which we may have an action. Those who are angry at the coming over of the three battalions, do not know that they are part of our 20,000 men, as also the regiment of Raby. But I am so sensible of some people's being glad to find fault, that I am quite weary of serving; for though I give myself no rest, and ruin my constitution, I cannot please without doing impossibilities.

"I shall write to my brother George, as you desire.

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"I go from hence to-morrow morning, but shall not be at Brussels till Thursday, being resolved to go by Ghent, to give the necessary orders for the english. The recruit horses not being come, will make it very difficult for the english horse to take the field, at the same time with the rest of the army."

TO THE DUCHESS.

"*Hague, May 6.* \* \* \* \* I am of your mind, and not that of Mr. Berty's, for Mrs. Masham will not have that preferment, since it must prove her ruin; but I am afraid she will have the power of doing all the mischief that is possible to the queen. There is care taken, by letters writ from England, to persuade these people that the queen has no kindness for you, the lord



























not defer writing, and begging leave, in a few words, to acquaint you with my thoughts of your affairs abroad, as well as in England.

“ I must begin in observing to your majesty, that the town of Amsterdam, which has always been the most zealous for the carrying on of this war with vigour, has, as your majesty may have seen by my former letters to lord treasurer, pressed me in two conferences, by their burgomaster and pensioner, for the making steps towards a peace, which I think not for the honour or interest of your character. I have reason to believe this change of their's does not proceed from the apprehensions they have of France, but from what passed in England last winter, and from the continued intelligences they have of your majesty's being resolved to change hands and parties. They being sensible of the fatal consequences this may have in the next parliament, is the true reason of their being earnest to have propositions of peace made this campaign.

“ As for England, I do not doubt but care is taken to incline your majesty to believe that the tories will have, this next parliament, a majority in the house of commons. But I beg your majesty to consider, before it is too late, how that is possible, after the attempt that has been made by France for the pretender; and that the greatest part of that party is suspected, either to have known, or at least to have wished success to the attempt. Besides, their continual endeavours to incline the people to a peace, which in the circumstances we are in, can only tend to the lessening your majesty, and consequently the advancement of the pretender's interest.

“ This being the truth, how is it possible, madam, that the honest people of England, who wish well to you, and the carrying on of the war, can be prevailed upon to chuse such men, as they believe would ruin all that is dear to them. If what I have the honour to write to your majesty be the truth, for God's sake consider what may be the consequences of refusing the request of the dukes of Newcastle and Devonshire; since it will be a demonstration, not only to them, but to every body, that lord treasurer and



I have no credit with your majesty, but that you are guided by the insinuation of Mr. Harley.

“ We are assured that the duke of Burgundy is coming to the head of this army, with the king of France’s leave, and orders to venture a battle. I shall be so far from avoiding it, that I shall seek it, thinking it absolutely necessary for your service; so that God only knows whether this may not be the last I may have the honour to write to you, which makes me beg with the same earnestness, as if I were sure it were to be my last, that your majesty will let no influence or persuasion hinder you, not only in this, but in all your worldly affairs, to follow the advice and good counsel of lord treasurer, who will never have any thought but what is for your honour and true interest.”

TO THE DUCHESS.

“ *Ghent, May 9.* I have sent to the lord treasurer the queen’s original letter, which I have desired nobody but yourself may see. In it you will see her positive resolution. Mr. Montgomery will shew you what I have writ to her. I wish it may do good, but I fear all is undone; for our affairs here abroad go every day worse. I stay here to-morrow, and the next day go for Brussels, from whence you shall be sure to hear from me. The writing and copying Mrs. Morley’s letter has so tired me, that I can say no more.”

“ *Brussels, May 14.* Since my arrival here, I have had your’s of the 27th of the last month, and am very sensible of the indiscreet behaviour of my brother. I know not what effect it may have; I have writ my mind freely to him.

“ As to what you say of the garter, I think it should not be given till the queen is sensible of the shame it would be to let so worthless a creature as 40 so much as expect it. Not only this, but every thing I hear, puts me very much out of heart, that I expect nothing but confusion. If my letter to the queen has no effect, I hope both the lord treasurer and you will be convinced that I have no credit, and will accordingly take your measures.

“ We are in so great want of rain, that I shall be forced to delay the meeting of the army four or five days; besides, the











Mr. Withers, of telling you that though Mr. Montgomery has had two conversations with Mrs. Morley, of two hours apiece, upon the subject of Mr. Freeman's letter, she continues hitherto inflexible on that point, and resists all the plainest reasons and arguments that ever were used in any case whatsoever. At the same time, she renounces and disclaims any talk, or the least commerce with Mr. Harley, at first or second hand ; and is positive that she never speaks with any body but the prince, upon any things of that kind. From whence the prince's notions come is not hard to conjecture. Upon the whole, Mr. Montgomery's life is a burthen to him, and like to be so more and more every day. After I have said all this, I know nothing to be done, but to persist upon all occasions in the same language, and hope that time and accidents may open people's eyes, as the danger comes nearer. But as often as you have any occasion to write, I think you should still continue to represent, that the longer that matter is deferred, the less good effects must certainly attend it."

## TO THE DUCHESS.

"*May 14.* I have had the pleasure of your very kind letter of the 4th, and it has been a pleasure to me that you approve of my letter to the queen. If it has the effect I wish, it would encourage me to hope that her business might go gently this next winter, without which we can never get out of this war with honour and safety.

"You are so good as to say you will never write of politics that may be disagreeable to me, if I desire it. You know in friendship and love there must be no constraint ; so that I am desirous of knowing what your heart thinks, and must beg of you the justice to believe, that I am very much concerned when you are uneasy.

"When I took leave of lady Tyrconnel, she told me that her jointure in Ireland was in such disorder, that there was an absolute necessity for her going for two or three months, for the better settling of it ; and as the climate of Ireland will not permit of her being there the winter, she should begin her journey about ten days hence, and that she did not intend to go to London, but hoped



she might have the pleasure of seeing you at St. Alban's. I have offered her all that might be in my power, to make her journey to Holland or England easy, as also that if she cared to stay at St. Alban's, either at her going or return, you would offer it her with good heart. You will find her face a good deal changed; but in the discourse I have had with her, she seems to be very reasonable and kind.

"I have this morning received your's by lieut. G. Withers, as also that of the 7th by the post. The copies of the several letters you have sent me, I shall not have time to read them till tomorrow, that I go to the army; for in this place I have very little time to myself.

"You will see by the two inclosed letters from Mrs. Morley, both which were writ since she received mine.\* I desire that nobody may see them but Mr. Montgomery, for I believe that you and lord treasurer are of opinion with me, that the queen should not know that her letters are sent to any body. If I receive any others, you shall be sure to have them, and you will keep them till my return. You may assure lord treasurer, that on all occasions I have to write to the queen, I shall follow the directions he has given, in his letter by lieut. G. Withers, though I must own to you, that I am thoroughly convinced, that until the queen has suffered for the obstinate opinion she is now in, neither lord treasurer, you, nor I, will be able to prevail, though never so reasonable; but when she shall be sensible of her having been ill advised, she will then readily agree to all that may be advised by us. I pray God it may not be then too late. Whatever happens, if you are kind, I will flatter myself with enjoying some happy years at Blenheim. I am sorry for the death of Mr. Botter, and glad you are going thither, so that the finishing of the inside may be to your *mind*."

From this letter it appears that the treasurer gave credit to the solemn disavowal made by the queen of any intercourse with

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\* Something omitted in the original.



Mr. Harley ; and at the same time, we find the duchess herself asserting that the queen did not consult Mrs. Masham. They therefore joined with the whigs in ascribing her obstinacy to the insinuations of admiral Churchill, through the prince of Denmark, and wounded the feelings of the duke by the heaviest accusations against the conduct of his brother. The duchess, as we have already seen, did not fail to re-echo and exaggerate these complaints. Their suspicions were, however, ill-founded ; for the counsels of Harley were still heard with the same complacency, and followed with the same confidence ; and Mrs. Masham was also still the agent of his private intercourse with the queen.

The person who was charged with the preceding letter from Godolphin, carried also a reply from the queen, to the remonstrance which Marlborough had written from Ghent, evincing a decided perseverance in her former resolutions.

“ *Kensington, May 6-17.* I writ to you on Tuesday by the post, by which letter I believe you will expect a longer from me now ; but I have been so tired to-day with importunities, that come from the whigs, that I have not spirits left to open my afflicted heart so freely and so fully as I intended ; and, therefore, should not have troubled you till to-morrow, by the post, but that having told lieut.-general Withers I would write by him, I thought he might wonder if I did not do it.

“ I can now only tell you, that as to what you mention, and what the lord treasurer told me some time ago, of your being pressed in two conferences for the making steps towards a peace, I am entirely of your opinion, thinking it neither for my honour nor interest ; and do assure you, that whatever insinuations my enemies may make to the contrary, I shall never at any time give my consent to a peace, but upon safe and honourable terms. Excuse my answering nothing more of your letter at this time, and be so just to me as not to let any misrepresentations that may be made of me, have any weight with you ; for that would be a greater trouble to me than can be expressed. I cannot end without begging you to be very careful of yourself, there being



nobody, I am sure, that prays more heartily for your preservation, than her that will live and die most sincerely your humble servant.

“The prince desires his service to you.” \*

The determination which her obdurate silence, on the great point at issue evinced, is still more fully proved by the communications of the treasurer.

“*April 30--May 11.* \* \* \* I am now to acknowledge the favour of your's of the 5th, 6th, and 8th of May, by which last you refer me to the next post, for your answer to mine by Mr. Durell; but you take no notice of your having received Mrs. Morley's letter, which Mr. Durell also carried to you. I hope your answer to both will be such as may bring that matter to a good end at last, which has hung unreasonably long, considering either what is past, or how much all things to come depend upon a right decision of that affair.”

“*May 11--22* Every body here is busy at present about elections and the talk of them. The generality of them are as good, I think, as can be desired, and there is little reason to doubt but the next parliament will be very well inclined to support the war, and, I hope, to do every thing else that is reasonable, if they can have but reasonable encouragement. All seems to turn upon that. Mrs. Morley continues to be very inflexible. I still think that must alter; my only fear is, that it will be too late.”

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

“*May 24.* I have had the favour of your's by lieutenant-general Withers, as also that by the post of the 7th. I am so extremely sensible of the difficulties you meet with, that were it in my power, I should despise any danger to make your life easier; but we must venture both life and quiet for the service of the queen, or all is undone.

“I beg you will read the inclosed letter to the queen. She may depend upon the truth of it; for the author of the inclosed

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\* This letter, as well as the preceding, is printed from copies preserved by the duchess.



drew the answer to lord Peterborough by the elector of Hanover's orders. What the answer of the electress was, I do not know."

We here insert a translation of the letter from Robethon, to which reference is here made; and which will serve to shew how zealously the discontented parties exerted themselves in promoting the invitation.

"*Hanover, May 18.* My lord;—I have received Mr. Cardonnel's letter from Ghent, but do not answer him, because I prefer addressing myself directly to your highness, in order to inform you, in confidence, that lord Peterborough has written letters, dated April 3-14, to the elector and electress, for the purpose of representing to them the absolute necessity there is, that some member of their house should go and reside in England, since 5,000 french troops have thrown every thing into the utmost consternation, and have been prevented from effecting a descent in Scotland by a mere chance. He speaks much against the ministry of the queen. He says he will come hither this summer, to tell the electress many things, which he cannot venture to write, and will afterwards serve the campaign with the elector. This prince answered him in a manner calculated to prevent him. But as I know what embarrassment this master firebrand would occasion, when seconded by Mr. Scott, I thought proper to communicate the intelligence to your highness, who may perhaps find some means to frustrate this hopeful journey. M. Plessin is going to England, and in passing will see M. Bernstorff and myself, and we will endeavour to give him proper ideas of the business of that country."

FROM LORD GODOLPHIN.

"*May 17--28.* I have had an opportunity to read your's of the 24th to the queen, with the letter from Hanover. She was not much surprised at it, and seems prepared to expect a great deal of trouble upon that matter, in the winter, but cannot be prevailed with, upon that or any other account, to do what can only, in my opinion, prevent it.

"Lord Halifax tells me that he heard there is a letter in this town (I believe it must be from Scott) which pretends to say, that



when Mr. Freeman was lately at the elector of Hanover's, he told the elector that there would be a necessity that something of that kind should be done next winter, because of the extreme perverseness and imbecility of the queen. As ridiculous and preposterous as this story seems, yet I intend to acquaint Mrs. Morley with it; because I think it not unlikely to be an invention of Mr. Harley, who, perhaps, intends to make his use of it."

"*June 1--12.* \* \* \* \* I am now going to give you an account of a conversation this morning, betwixt Mr. Montgomery and Mrs. Morley, which ended with the greatest dissatisfaction possible to both. They have had of late many great contests, upon the subject of lord Halifax's brother, but without any ground gained on either side. This day it held longer than ever. The particulars are both too tedious, and unnecessary to trouble you with them. In short, the obstinacy was unaccountable; and the battle might have lasted till now, if after the clock had struck three, the prince of Denmark had not thought fit to come in, and look as if he thought it were dinner time.

"I hope your next will acquaint us with prince Eugene's arrival, which will be very welcome news to me."

"*May 26--June 6.* I have had a letter from lord Coningsby, whose judgment and experience, in all the affairs of the parliament, I value very much. He tells me he has had sore eyes, which makes it uneasy to him to write; but in a little time he will send me his thoughts very fully, as to the measures which ought to be taken about parliament; and he adds, that a little more delay will go near to make every thing that is good impossible to be effected. I am intirely in the same mind, but find the queen so perverse and so obstinate, without the least foundation, that nothing in the world is, in my opinion, so unaccountable, nor more dreadful in the consequences of it. I can only say in this case, as I have heard my lord Crofts say, a great while ago, in things of this kind, '*Well, Sirs, God's above.*'"

"*June 11--22.* Having no letters from you since my last, nor any thing either from Spain or Portugal, I shall have very little to trouble you with by this post, unless I would give you an account



of Mr. Montgomery's complaints, which, indeed, would be endless; and if I can judge rightly of him, I think he would rather chuse to sink under the burthen of them himself, than to give you the trouble of them, to no purpose, who have so many things of greater consequence to take care of."

Wearied with fruitless representations to the queen, and chagrined by the importunities, and even threats of the whigs, the treasurer made a tender of his resignation, and announced his resolution in a letter, dated June 13--24.

"There will be three posts due from you to-morrow; and col. Sutton telling me he designs to go over in the packet boat of the 18th, I beg to write this letter beforehand, without consequence to those I shall continue to write to you every post; because by so safe a hand, I may venture to write more freely than I am willing to do by the ordinary post.

"The queen continues so averse to every thing Mr. Montgomery can propose, for the support of Mrs. Morley's affairs, that he is tired out of his life at present, and has so little prospect of any tolerable ease in the winter, that he has been obliged once or twice to beg of the queen, either to follow his notions, or to dismiss him, and not let him bear the burthen of other people's follies. But all this hitherto has been to no purpose, and seems to make no manner of impression.

"The case with the prince is little better. He is sometimes uneasy at the apprehensions of what he shall meet with, but unadvisable in what is proper to prevent it; whether from his own temper, or made so by your brother, I cannot judge. But your brother is not, at least seems not to be, without his own uneasiness too, in which I always confirm him when we talk together; and he appears to be upon those occasions very much of my mind; but, however, he has great animosities and partialities, and he either cannot, or will not prevail with the prince to do any good.

"This being the case here at present, and not very likely to mend before the parliament, I had a mind, by so safe a hand as col. Sutton, to prepare you to expect, that it will not be possible for me to continue as I am till the meeting of parliament, unless



it may consist with Mr. Freeman's affairs to see England, and settle measures both with me and the queen before the meeting of parliament, for at least 15 days."

TO THE DUCHESS.

"*June 25.* \* \* \* \* I have had the happiness of your's of the 8th. The declaration made by the queen to 148 is very surprising. What you write of the duke of Devonshire is, I believe, very true; for I had a letter from him, by which I could see he was dissatisfied with the queen. He is a very honest man, and has had opportunities to know the pains the lord treasurer and I have often taken with the queen, to no purpose, so that I dare say he will do justice to us upon all occasions; for as much as I can observe, he governs himself by reason. I wish I could say so of all our acquaintance.\* You are so kind to be in pain at what may happen when prince Eugene comes. Put your trust in God, as I do, and be assured that I think I can't be unhappy as long as you are kind."

"*July 1.* Tho' we are in the month of July, I am now writing by a fire, the weather being very wet and cold, which I am very sorry for, since it must be very inconvenient to prince Eugene's army, who are now on their march. God knows what we shall be able to do when we join! I am sure of nothing so much, as that I earnestly long for doing something that may put an end to this war, so that I might have the happiness of being in quiet with you; for were this war ended, nothing should persuade me to torment myself with business and absence.

"I have received your's, which should have been dated the 15th, by which I see the intentions of the whigs. I need make no other answer, than what I have already assured you, that I shall be glad to strengthen them, but never to divide them."

Indignant at the failure of their attempt to introduce Somers into office, or even to procure his admission into the cabinet

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\* Alluding to lord Sunderland,



council, the junta proceeded to still farther extremities, and again hoped to extort by force, what they could not obtain, either by persuasion or importunity. The crisis of the new elections offering a favourable occasion, to increase the strength of their party, they did not hesitate to carry into effect, a plan which they had already formed, for the establishment of an interest in parliament, independent of the crown.

In England, where the whig party predominated, their efforts were less marked, and more successful; but in Scotland, where the union had created such a struggle of contending passions, they joined with the tories, and even with the jacobites, to obtain partisans. Sunderland, though minister of the queen, so far forgot the respect due to the sovereign, as to assume the principal management of the cabal; and though he did not venture to use the royal name, yet by the influence attached to his official situation, he essentially furthered the views of his party.

The whigs combined their influence to obtain the liberation of the suspected jacobites, and particularly of the duke of Hamilton, who was intimately connected by marriage with lord Sunderland.\* Newcastle, Wharton, and Halifax became bail for this nobleman, though he was arrested on the strongest presumption of treason. With this tie on his gratitude, strengthened by his jealousy of those, who were employed in the administration of Scotland, they sent him back to his native country, on the eve of the new election, and found in him a faithful and active agent, whose connections and influence extended to every rank in society. By his assistance they hoped to secure the majority in the choice of the sixteen peers; and, indeed, gained the aid of the leading jacobites. He was supported by all the interest of the dukes of Roxburgh and Montrose, and other scottish peers, who participated in the sentiments of the whig chiefs. On the other hand, the influence of government was entrusted to the duke of Queensbury, secretary of state for Scotland, who had been recently raised to the english

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\* His first wife was lady Anne Spencer, sister of lord Sunderland.



peerage, by the title of the duke of Dover. With him were joined the earls of Mar and Leven, and other persons of note.

For some time the utmost secrecy was observed on both sides, and the duke of Marlborough was unacquainted with the political manœuvres of the contending parties, till the crisis of the election approached. In a letter to the duchess, dated May 31st, he imparts the first hints, which he had received, of the intrigue with the duke of Hamilton, and requests her to ask an explanation of lord Sunderland. "I desire," he says, "you would know of lord Sunderland, as from me, if the duke of Hamilton pretends to be chosen, and from what party; for I am sometimes told such extravagancies as are very hard to believe."

Even at the time when the mystery was developed, lord Godolphin, from delicacy, maintained a cautious reserve, and referred him to the information which he might readily draw from the scottish officers in the army.

"June 18--29. The letters we have to-day from Scotland are full of the feuds and animosities of that country, about the election of peers. I have no mind to trouble you with the particulars, for they would be endless. Besides, since you must needs see very often both the duke of Argyle, lord Stair, and lieutenant-general Ross, you cannot easily avoid hearing what passes on this troublesome occasion."

Marlborough was no sooner acquainted with the unwelcome truth, than he hastened to give a proof of his public sentiments, and attachment to the cause of government, by sending his proxy as baron Aymouth, to the earl of Mar. This authorisation was immediately announced, and produced a considerable impression, as we find from the letters of the scottish jacobites and whigs to lord Sunderland.

Inflamed by mutual rivalry, both parties proceeded to the contest; and the struggle was marked by all the fury of contending passions. But the hopes of the whigs were baffled, by the predominant weight of the crown, and the unexpected defection of the presbyterians, who were alienated by the coalition which



the junta had formed with the jacobites. Of the sixteen peers, only six of the whig candidates were chosen;\* and of the commons, a considerable majority was returned in favour of government, although many of the officers of the army were gained by the whig party; and lord Orkney, in particular, declared for the list of his brother, the duke of Hamilton, though he owed his election solely to the influence of the commander in chief.†

Such political hostility from a party who had affected to identify themselves with government, created unusual concern in the minds of Marlborough and Godolphin; and their chagrin was augmented by the consideration, that the principal agents of the cabal were Sunderland, who was connected with them by the ties of marriage, and Somers, whose interest they were sincerely labouring to promote. They smothered, indeed, their indignation, from delicacy to that connection, and from their fear of offending the whig leaders; but in their private correspondence they gave full scope to their feelings, and in the letters from Marlborough to

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\* It is singular that the duchess in her *Vindication* takes no notice of the violent struggle in Scotland, nor of the schism between the whigs and the government. Burnet mentions it only incidentally, and as a thing of trifling importance; whereas it threatened the total ruin of the administration. Tindal uses the very words of Burnet—"The queen supported Godolphin against the whigs, from a principle of resentment and jealousy, disliking him less than the whigs." The author of *The Other Side of the Question* is the only political writer, who seems to have understood the intrigue, and we find him reprobating the violent and imprudent conduct of Sunderland, with all the vehemence of political rivalry. He quotes a singular letter from that nobleman to the duke of Roxburgh, in which is the following expression: "I would not have you be bullied by the court party, for the queen herself cannot support that *faction* long."—p. 380.

It is, however, little wonder that a transaction of such moment should not have attracted due attention from historians, when we find De Foe, who was not only a contemporary, but engaged by Godolphin to promote the views of government, expressing to lord Sunderland, with whom he was also in correspondence, his extreme surprise and embarrassment, at the mutual hostility which he witnessed in the two parties, whom he supposed to be both united in the interest of government.—Letters from De Foe to lord Sunderland, May 20th, and 25th, 1707.

† Letters from the duke of Queensbury to the duke of Marlborough and lord Godolphin.—Also from the dukes of Roxburgh, Hamilton, and Montrose to lord Sunderland.



the duchess, we find him lamenting the perverseness of his son in law, and the ingratitude which he had himself experienced from those he had endeavoured to serve.

However great their disapprobation, it was surpassed by the resentment of the queen, who was highly indignant that one of her own ministers should presume to set up an independent interest ; and she accused the secretary of state of employing her name and authority, to secure the election of his own partisans. She was still more deeply offended by the disrespectful remonstrances, which he personally made against her partiality to the tories. Indeed, she even threatened to dismiss from her service, a minister who was not only personally disagreeable to her, but whom she considered as having abused the trust she reposed in him.

Marlborough, though disapproving the conduct of his son in law, was sensible that his disgrace at this juncture would prove a fatal blow to the public interests, as well as to his own consideration abroad. He therefore laboured to soothe the resentment of the queen ; and with difficulty induced her to credit the solemn asseverations of Sunderland, that he had exerted no ministerial influence in favour of his party. He likewise urged the duchess to reprove the froward spirit of her son in law, and persuade him to behave with more respect towards the queen. By his intercession the fatal blow was suspended, and Sunderland was suffered to remain, though no argument could eradicate the displeasure and indignation, which still rankled against him in the mind of the sovereign.

Notwithstanding the conciliatory part, which Marlborough and Godolphin had acted, this ill-timed struggle created additional dissatisfaction and embarrassment. The whigs resorted to still more violent means both against the queen and ministers. They even threatened to revive the long agitated question for the invitation of a member of the electoral family ; but instead of the electress Sophia, they purposed to bring over the electoral prince, whose youth and enterprising spirit were likely to render him a more dangerous visitor to the queen, than a princess in the decline of



life. They gained the duchess of Marlborough to their views, and she was so indiscreet as to recommend the unwelcome proposal, not only to her husband, but to the queen.

Nor was this the only instance in which the duke was implicated, by the imprudence or officiousness of others. The duke of Somerset, who to the advantage of high birth and extensive property, united a perfect acquaintance with the cabals of courts, had attained considerable influence with the queen, by means of the access which his post, as master of the horse, gave him to the royal presence. Having taken an active share in obtaining the dismissal of Harley, he was so elated by success, that he aspired to become head of a separate party. Though hitherto classed with the zealous whigs, he suddenly assumed the tone of moderation, and flattered the queen by condemning the violence and overbearing pretensions of the junta. He even conceived the design of dividing the whigs, and tampered with those, whom he hoped to sway by his promises, or influence by his arguments. He thus acquired such interest, that even the duchess, through her agent, Mr. Mainwaring, condescended to solicit his support, in the struggle for the introduction of Somers into the privy council.\*

The whig chiefs were too vigilant and zealous to overlook these intrigues. Aware of the intercourse between him and the

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\* In one of his letters Mr. Mainwaring gives a curious account of one of his conversations with the duke of Somerset. The letter is without date, but was evidently written in March or April.

"I had the honour to be with his grace this morning, who expressed a great liking of the proposal to bring lord Somers into the cabinet, without an employment, which he said, shewed that he and his friends were at last come to their reason, and looked as if there would be an end of their extravagant demands; and that for his part, there was nothing that he would not do to bring it about. But yet I am not sure that he does not think that this would in some measure eclipse his present lustre in the court; for 'tis certain never man had such a thirst for power, not without some ingredients of vanity; but yet he is, without doubt, as honest as it is possible for *so great a statesman* to be; and, therefore, since your grace thinks it will be sometimes in his power at least to do hurt, it shall be my care to discharge my duty to him with more diligence than I have done, to see if my poor endeavours may be of any use to make him do what you wish."



duchess, and conceiving that he would not have shewn sufficient courage to set up a separate interest of his own accord, they suspected that he was actuated by the secret instigation of Marlborough, and unjustly accused the duke of resorting to so indirect and dishonourable a method of dividing their party.

These cabals and accusations form a prominent subject in the correspondence, which will be submitted to the reader, when we again resume the subject.

Commencement of the campaign—Marlborough departs from the Hague—The French attempt of the French to surprise Blenheim—The two armies take the field—Military movements on both sides—Marlborough prepares to execute the plan concerted with Eugene—The French intend to march—Rapid march of Marlborough to Verdun—Correspondence on the situation of military affairs—Arrangements for the junction of Eugene—Commencement of hostilities—Success of Marlborough in the first battle of Blenheim—Review of the British forces—Gave orders for the movement of the different corps towards the place of rendezvous in the vicinity of Brissels—Collaterally with the plans of offensive operation, the French commanders had formed the design of recovering the principal fortresses of the Netherlands by treachery, and had readily found agents for the purpose among a people who were highly dissatisfied with the change of government. A correspondence of this kind for the surprise of Antwerp, was detected while Marlborough remained at Ghent, as appears from a letter to Count Rechteren, dated May 30. The first hint of the treachery which we received of this conspiracy was, by a letter intercepted at Brissels, which was sent to Ghent. Several officers have been since taken and addressed to the count of Bergueich, to whom they have been sent to pass. But as they were not subscribed, we could not discover the author. Lastly, six days ago we seized a woman, who put one of these letters into the post office. She acknowledged the writer to be



## CHAPTER 68.

1708.

*Commencement of the campaign—Marlborough departs from the Hague—Detects an attempt of the french to surprise Antwerp—The two armies take the field—Military movements on both sides—Marlborough prepares to execute the plan concerted with Eugene—The french threaten Louvain—Rapid march of Marlborough to Terbank—Correspondence on the situation of military affairs—Arrangements for the junction of Eugene—Commencement of his march.*

WE have carried down the narrative of these political feuds till after the commencement of the campaign, that we may present a more connected account of the military operations.

Marlborough reached Ghent on the 9th of May, and after reviewing the british forces, gave orders for the movement of the different corps towards the place of rendezvous, in the vicinity of Brussels.

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“The first hint,” he observes, “which we received of this conspiracy was, by a letter intercepted at Brussels, while I was at Ghent. Several others have been since taken, all addressed to the count of Bergueich, to whom they have been suffered to pass. But as they were not subscribed, we could not discover the author. Lastly, six days ago we seized a woman, who put one of these letters into the post office. She acknowledged the writer to be



her son in law, who was heretofore a shop-keeper at Antwerp. He has escaped, and we are endeavouring to discover his accomplices. As we have taken measures for the security of the place, we find, by several letters since intercepted, that the enemy are much disconcerted." \*

Having completed his arrangements at Ghent, the british commander proceeded to Brussels, where he held a conference with the veteran general Overkirk, to complete the dispositions for taking the field.

From Brussels he wrote to Godolphin:

" *May 14.* The great want of rain will oblige me to put off the assembling of the army till the 21st of this month. The french continue to threaten us with the duke of Burgundy and a vast army. I hope the duke of Burgundy will come; and for their army, I cannot see how it is possible for them to be stronger than they were the last campaign.

" I send you the inclosed, that you may be the better able to judge of their tempers at the Hague, as to the duke of Savoy. It is certain that the french leave fewer troops in Dauphiné than was expected. I hope they may be the dupes in that matter, for I think it impossible that the duke of Savoy can rely on any promises of the king of France. \* \* \*

FROM LORD GODOLPHIN.

" *April 30--May 11.* Last night, by Mr. Hare, I writ to you upon a particular matter. Whether you will receive that letter so soon as this, is uncertain. I rather think Mr. Hare will not travel as fast as the post.

" I think all you have done with the elector and prince Eugene is entirely right, and will, I hope, have a very good effect, if they come timely enough into the field. But the general backwardness of the germans is extremely discouraging. The duke of Savoy makes heavy complaints by this post, that general Visconti has refused to send him 6,000 men for a particular expedition, which he had designed. I hope he lets you know the

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\* Translation from the french draught.



same things by count Maffei, for there will be no remedy of this from Vienna, but by your means ; and it would be a great pity the duke of Savoy should be stopped by his friends ; for I don't see that our enemies are likely to be, on that side, in any condition of stopping him. I am very well pleased with their changing their generals in France ; and I think it is no good sign for them. The elector of Bavaria's going to the Rhine will make all Flanders uneasy, and jealous that the french design to give them up to the States, as I really believe they intend to do, in case of any check or considerable disadvantage. For that reason they are willing to have him out of the way, though they endeavour to make him like it, by telling him he will be much nearer the opportunity of getting into his own country.

“ I am of opinion that the duke of Burgundy and the rest of the french princes that accompany him, will be rather a hindrance and a perplexity to M. de Vendome, and not any advantage ; but I agree with you, that it may very soon be the occasion of some action, not so much from the superiority the french pretend to have, as from the impetuous temper of that prince, who is full of ambition and desire to get a reputation in the world. I should think this consideration ought to make you act with the greater caution, in the beginning of the year, till the germans come into the field, and oblige the enemy to weaken their army. And I hope you will allow me to put you in mind of one thing more, which is, that even after the germans shall be in the field, the communication from the french armies to one another, is quicker than it can be between prince Eugene's army and your's. Consequently you may be full as liable to be surprised, by any sudden motion of their's, as they by your's.

“ What you write about Portugal, and of our annoying the coast of France, is extremely right, and shall be followed here as far as we are able to do it. But I have always told you, we cannot do it, without the assistance of the dutch ships, to lie before Dunkirk ; and as yet, I see no assurance of them.”

TO LORD GODOLPHIN, IN REPLY.

“ *Brussels, May 17.* I have this morning had the favour of



your's of the 30th, and in a day or two expect your's by Dr. Hare. I do intend, if the enemy will give me leave, to follow your advice, by gaining time ; so that the elector of Hanover and prince Eugene may have time to act. As yet, the french have sent no troops to the Moselle.

" I have writ very pressingly to Vienna in favour of the duke of Savoy. Palmes writes me, that the prince of Salms endeavours to mortify that duke in every thing, which I fear at last may prove very fatal. It is most certain the french have drawn great part of their troops from that country. Mr. Howe says that the elector of Hanover appears very much out of humour, and no ways fond of his journey, not beginning by eight days so soon as he promised. I pray God bless me with success, for I expect none from the elector of Hanover."

" *May 24.* \* \* \* \* To-morrow I shall march towards Hall, where we shall join the english and the rest of the troops which came from Flanders. You know already my intention of gaining time, till prince Eugene can act with his army, which I am afraid cannot be till about the middle of next month.

" I have and shall continue to write to Vienna, as I am commanded. I inclose a letter of count Maffei's, which I received last night. By that and some others I have received, I very much fear we must not expect any great things from the duke of Savoy this campaign ; so that my only dependence is upon the junction of prince Eugene with me ; for if we should not be able to do something considerable, our affairs in all parts will be in a bad condition.

" The discovery we have made of the design the french had for seizing the citadel of Antwerp, will oblige, I believe, M. Vendome to change his measures. Next Saturday is appointed for their general review. After that, we shall have their order of battle, by which we shall know their number of battalions and squadrons. You will see by the letter from Hanover, that the prince electoral is to serve with his father's troops in this army. It would have been more natural for him to have served with his



father; but I suppose they have a mind he should make acquaintance with the english officers."

On the 23rd of May, the german troops composing part of the allied army began to assemble at Anderlecht; and while Marlborough was waiting for the arrival of the british and dutch, he received intelligence that Vendome had collected his forces behind the Haine, in the vicinity of Mons, and was preparing to advance. This information induced him to make a counter movement, and the troops immediately marched to Hall, where Overkirk established his head quarters, while those of Marlborough were fixed in the abbey of Belleghem. Here he was joined by the british and dutch. The field deputies also made their appearance, not as before, to control his operations, but with private instructions to submit implicitly to his orders. The army amounted to 112 battalions and 180 squadrons, and was furnished with a train of 113 pieces of artillery.

As Marlborough had foreseen, the french commander moved at the same time to the vicinity of Soignies, where he was joined by the dukes of Burgundy and Berry, and the young pretender, who were all animated with the hopes of signalizing their first career in arms. The force under their command amounted, at the lowest computation, to 124 battalions, and 197 squadrons; and the vicinity of the two armies, with the superiority of the enemy, and the presence of the french princes, seemed to portend a battle, which would perhaps again decide the fate of Brabant.

Not daunted by the imposing attitude of his antagonists, Marlborough took measures for receiving the expected attack, by establishing his camp on the 29th, between Tubise and Herfelingen, and fixing his head quarters at St. Renelle. Here he prepared to execute the plan, which had been previously formed for the junction of the army assembled on the Moselle, by writing to count Rechteren, who commanded in the absence of Eugene, enjoining him to advance with all speed, and without waiting even for the arrival of the 10,000 palatines. He previously dispatched an



ostensible letter to the prince, the object of which was, to reconcile the elector of Hanover to the design.

“*Camp of St. Renelle, May 30.* I write this with the hope that it will find you in the vicinity of Coblentz, to explain to you our situation. The 21st we began to encamp near Brussels. The 25th all the troops were within reach; and on the 26th they joined in the camp at Hall, the right at Kester, and the left at Hall. From thence we made a forward movement to this camp. On the 26th the enemy encamped at Soignies, three leagues from us; and as it rained almost without interruption, for the two next days, they were prevented from moving, so that we cannot yet penetrate their design. Some say that they intend to march directly to us, in which case I shall wait to receive them. According to other advices, they meditate an attack on Ath, which we shall find it difficult to prevent, in consequence of the situation of the ground, and of the two armies; and so much the more, because they have not yet turned the least attention to the Moselle, where they are much superior. So that if affairs do not change, I see, to my regret, no appearance of doing any great matter here, the whole campaign, since we shall be obliged to remain on the defensive.

“All this induces me to think, that if your highness has no hope of pushing your designs on the Moselle, and if the preparations for that purpose are not ready, it would be much more useful to the common cause, if instead of remaining inactive with your army, you would make a sudden march with all the troops towards this side, advancing in diligence with the cavalry, while the infantry follows in the same manner. This measure might give us an opportunity of gaining a battle, which would decide the fate of the war. The elector of Hanover might at the same time obtain a great advantage; since the enemy would have no means of parrying this blow, except by drawing a strong detachment from the Rhine.

“If your highness agrees with me, and will commence your march as soon as possible, I beg you to impart this letter to his electoral highness, as I have not yet communicated with any



living soul. But if you are of another opinion, and think you can quickly oblige the enemy to draw detachments from hence, then you will please to commit it to the flames, that no one may know the least of it. Above all, I intreat you to let me hear from you as soon as possible, by express, that I may take my measures for the event; for every thing depends on expedition, since it is certain that your highness might be here a fortnight, before any troops which the enemy may draw from the Upper Rhine.\*

From the same place we find two letters addressed to Godolphin.

“*May 28.* Having this opportunity by col. Hammond, I may venture to write freer than by the post. The motions the french have made, makes me begin to be of your opinion, that they are in the mind at this time to venture; and by their having sent no troops to the Moselle, they are certainly a good deal stronger than we are. If we should come to action in this part of the country, it must be decided in a great degree by the foot, which is what we ought to wish for. But what I fear is, if they have a sufficient strength, that they may post themselves so as to attack Ath, and take it before prince Eugene can join. But this I beg you will say nothing of, to any body. I hope they will not venture it; but as they are now camped, it is in their power. I believe you judge very right of the reason of sending the elector of Bavaria away; for the king of France does know, that one way or other the dutch will have peace, which must make the queen's business more difficult in England. Besides, I have some reason to believe, that several will be of the opinion of lord Peterborough for the invitation, which must be very mortifying. I am very glad to find by your's of the 11th, that you have hopes that Mrs. Morley, though late, will do what you desire. Nothing else can make us happy in serving her well, for though I should have success, that might give safety abroad, but could not hinder disagreeable things at home. You may see that I have very

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\* This and the other letters which we find to prince Eugene and count Rechteren are translated either from the french draughts or originals.



melancholy thoughts, but be assured that I shall use my utmost endeavours that this campaign may be glorious to the queen and nation."

"*May 31.* I have this morning had the favour of your's of the 14th, with lord Galway's letters, by which I have the pleasure to see that we may fear nothing on that side.

"Count Sinzendorf writes me by the last post, that Palmes has so well succeeded in his negotiations, that the duke of Savoy will have reason to be satisfied, that the elector palatine's affairs are settled to his mind, and that the emperor consents to the sending the 4,000 foot for Catalonia, which, by this time, I hope Sir J. Lake is taking care of their embarkation. I am sorry to see in some of your former letters, the difficulty there is in leaving a squadron in the winter in the Mediterranean; for I am very much persuaded that till a squadron stays the whole winter, you will not succeed in Spain."

The duke had scarcely dispatched these letters, before his situation became highly critical. The french, instead of hazarding a battle, as was expected, broke up their camp, and moved on his flank through Bois Seigneur Isaac, to Brain l'Allieu, as if with an intention of advancing against Louvain, a design which had been ineffectually attempted in the preceding year. Marlborough was at first doubtful of their object, and fell back to Anderlecht, with the intention of covering Brussels; but finding that the enemy continued their march towards the Dyle, he penetrated their real design, and pressed forward during the night, amidst a deluge of rain. After a forced march of twenty-four hours, the heads of his columns reached the strong camp of Parc. The rest of the army arriving in the course of the afternoon, the head quarters of Marlborough were fixed in the abbey of Terbank, and those of Overkirk in the suburbs of Louvain.

He communicates the account of these movements to his friends in England.

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

"*Terbank, June 4.* I have this morning received the favour of your's of the 16th by captain Coot, and that of the



17th by the post, by which I see you have had the pleasure of Newmarket. You will see by my letter to Mr. Secretary, that the french having marched all Friday night and Saturday, with the intention, as I was assured, to continue their march for Louvain, I thought it for the service not to camp at Brussels, but continue the march to this place, where the head of the army arrived yesterday, between eleven and twelve o'clock in the morning. If the french would have ventured, they might have been here at the same time; but finding I continued my march, I believe occasioned their staying at Brain l'Allieu, where they are now encamped, which makes me think, notwithstanding their bragging, that they will not venture a battle.

“ You have an expression in your letter of the 17th which is very melancholy, that success cannot secure quietness next winter. By the last letters from Vienna, you might see that the business of the Upper Palatinate was settled to the elector's content; upon which, he sent orders for his troops to march; but two days after, an express arrived at Dusseldorf from Vienna, upon which he has sent positive orders to his troops not to march. I do not know what the difficulties are; but I fear we shall not have the use of those troops a good while, which may, in a great degree, break our measures, they being 10,000 men. You may by this, see the great advantage the king of France has over the allies, since we depend upon the humours of several princes, and he has nothing but his own will and pleasure. The elector should have been on the Rhine by the 20th of the last month; but my letters from Hanover say, that he did not intend to leave that place, till the 30th, notwithstanding that they knew the elector of Bavaria would be at Strasburgh the 21st. I know not what to make of this, but I am afraid we must expect no good news from thence this summer. I would not willingly blame prince Eugene, but his arrival at the Moselle will be ten days after his promise. I believe his stay at Vienna is occasioned by the difficulties of the Palatinate. I am so tired, and am to be up so early to-morrow, that I cannot read my letters, so that you will excuse any errors.”



"*Terbank, June 7.* I had the favour yesterday of your's of the 20th from Newmarket, where I should have been glad to have been with you; for besides the pleasure of your company, I should have enjoyed quietness, which is what I long extremely after; but God knows when I shall have it. You will know by this post, that the elector of Bavaria has been obliged to make a detachment to the Moselle, which will give an opportunity to the elector of Hanover to cross the Rhine. You will have seen by my last, that we are like to lose the 10,000 palatines, at least for some time. I have writ to prince Eugene, I think time so precious that he ought not to stay for the palatines.

"The enemy continues in their camp at Brain l'Allieu; and I shall not march till they do, or that I hear from prince Eugene; so that I have begun this day to pass in review the right wing of horse of the first line, and to-morrow shall see half the foot of the same line, and so continue every day, till I have seen the whole army. I shall by the next post do myself the honour of sending the prince \* an order of battle of the enemy's, as well as of our own army. If you have curiosity, the prince may let you have a copy of them."

TO THE DUCHESS.

"*June 11.* Whenever I have any reason, and my mind a little at ease, I make use of that time to write to my dear soul. The post does not go till to-morrow; but as I am that morning to see the left wing of horse, I make use of this time to tell you, that I am in my health, I thank God, as well as one of my age, and that has not his mind very much at ease, can be; for what I concerted with prince Eugene will not be executed by 15 days so soon as was resolved, which will be an advantage to the duke of Vendome, by giving him time. But the slowness of the germans is such, that we must be always disappointed.

"Our news from Spain is as favourable as we could expect, and by lord Galway's letters we have nothing to fear on the side of Portugal.

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\* The prince of Denmark.



“ The elector of Bavaria having been obliged to make a considerable detachment from his army for the Moselle, will, we hope, enable the elector of Hanover to do something on the Rhine. By this time we flatter ourselves that the duke of Savoy is taking the field ; the greatest difficulty he will meet with is, the mountains he must pass before he can get into France. As for us in this country, we have a very good army, but the french think themselves more numerous ; however, I hope, with the blessing of God, that this campaign will not pass without some good success on our side. You easily believe me, when I tell you that I do from my heart wish that the favourable account I now give you of the posture of our armies, may meet with no disappointment, and that this campaign may be so successful, that I may have the happiness of being with you in quiet this next summer, and for the remaining part of my life. I have this afternoon the favour of your's of the 23rd and 25th, but am returned so late to my quarters, that I must answer them by the next post.”

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

“ *Terbank, June 11.* Since my last I have none of your's to answer ; and I have been busy every day in reviewing the troops. The greatest part are in extreme good order. I shall continue in this camp, unless the enemy march, till I hear from prince Eugene, that he is in motion ; for as yet I have no account of his being gone from Vienna. The news we have from Spain is more favourable than we could reasonably expect, and I find by lord Galway's letters, that we have nothing to fear on the Portugal side. We do flatter ourselves, that the detachment the elector of Bavaria has been obliged to make, may give an opportunity to the elector of Hanover of doing something on the Rhine. The continual complaints of the duke of Savoy are, I am afraid, forerunners for our not expecting much on that side. The disappointment of the palatine troops, and Eugene not being able to put in execution by at least a fortnight, what was agreed between him and me, gives great disadvantage. However, I have taken my measures, that nothing may be wanting at his arrival, being persuaded that our greatest hopes must be in what we shall be able to do in



the first four or five days ; for their foot will be able to join them as soon, if not sooner than ours. But if prince Eugene uses that diligence he has promised, he may, with his horse, join me some days before they can, by stealing a march, which time we must make use of. I have this afternoon received your's of the 25th, but have not time to do more than to thank you, till the next post."

" *Terbank, June 14.* By the letters of lord Galway, as well as what you write me in your's of the 25th and 26th, I cannot but observe that his project, that he now makes, does no way agree with the project he sent by Mr. Stanhope. That would have been expensive, but this is likely to be much more. There can be no doubt but Cadiz would be of great use. But I beg you to consider how impossible it will be to have success, unless it be done by surprise ; and how impossible that will be, when the much greatest part of the troops are to march by land, and that you are to deceive the portuguese, as well as the french and spaniards. But if it be practicable, it must be this year and not the next, for when you shall the next winter, put your troops into such quarters as may be proper for that expedition, you may be assured that they will take such precaution as will put that place out of danger.

" You know that by the treaty, England and Holland are obliged to give every year to the king of Portugal, upwards of 4,000 barrels of powder, which is more than is expended by France and all the allies in their armies ; so that I beg you will be cautious of giving any encouragement of having an english train established in Portugal ; for if the attempt at Cadiz goes on, the cannon and every thing for that expedition must be furnished by the fleet. As for the refugee officers, I think he sets a much greater value on them than they deserve. If he can make any use of them, I should think they would be better there than in Ireland.

" I am very sorry you have so much occasion to put you in mind of lord Croft's saying, but as *God is above*, so I trust in him, or else our prospect is very dreadful.



“The inclosed is what came to me by express from count Rechteren. You will see by it how uncertain all measures taken with the germans are; for the army on the Moselle was to be formed, at farthest, by the 27th of May, and by this letter we must not expect it till the beginning of July. Patience is a virtue absolutely necessary, when one is obliged to keep measures with such people. I beg you will inform her majesty and the prince, that they may not think me negligent; and if the queen approves of it, I think count Rechteren's letter might be read to the cabinet council, so that they might see the reason of my staying in this camp. What you mention of Toulon is not now to be thought on. I own to you that I fear we must not expect, this campaign, much from the duke of Savoy; but the best thing we can do is, to make him believe, that we flatter ourselves with great success on his side, and that we rely entirely on him, not doubting but he will take the best measures.”

In the interval, Marlborough had again written to count Rechteren, apprising him of the measures for facilitating the march of the troops, and desiring him to make such movements as might draw the attention of the enemy towards the Moselle. He also dispatched one of his aides de camp, captain Armstrong, who, besides regulating the details of the intended march, with count Rechteren, advanced as far as Frankfort, to meet Eugene on his return from Vienna.

On the 11th of June he again wrote to Eugene.

“I am glad that count Rechteren sent captain Armstrong with my letters, to meet your highness at Frankfort, since that will have given you an opportunity of concerting the necessary measures with the elector of Hanover, without loss of time. You will have learnt on your arrival, that the elector of Bavaria has sent a strong detachment towards the Moselle, which will doubtless march forward, in proportion as your troops advance, so you will easily judge that for a beginning we can rely only on the cavalry, with which I request you to hasten in all diligence; for we can only reckon on a surprise, which will depend on the little time you may take for your march between the Moselle and the Meuse. If the



palatines are not arrived, you will please not to wait for them; and as soon as I know the day you will be at Maestricht, I will send some one to meet you, and acquaint you with my projects.

“ If you can gain only forty-eight hours, I will make my dispositions for the moment of your arrival; and with the blessing of Heaven, we may profit so well by those two days, as to feel the good effects of it the rest of the campaign. You will order the infantry to hasten as much as possible to Maestricht, where they will receive directions for their further march.

“ The two armies have remained eight days in their present camps, and there is no appearance of a change, till I have the news which I expect from your highness. I have employed this time in making an exact review of the troops, which are in so good a condition, that it would gratify your highness to see them.”

By a letter from Eugene, dated June 14, the british commander had at last the satisfaction to hear that the discussion with the elector palatine was terminated, and that he might daily expect intelligence of the intended march.

“ *Frankfort, June 14.* I have continued here some days since I received your highness's letter. The count of Rechteren, who has kept your's of the 30th, will come to-morrow to Rheinfels to meet me. I press forward the march of the troops, and make all the necessary arrangements. Some difficulty has arisen for the palatines, the elector having persisted in not letting them march, until the investiture had taken place, which, however, depends on certain formalities, not arising from the emperor. But from letters, which I have just received from cardinal Lamberg, at Ratisbon, the affair seems to be done. Your highness may be convinced, that I will omit nothing to press on my march from Rheinfels. I will give you due notice by a courier, being myself extremely impatient to assure you in person, of my respect, &c.”

REPLY OF MARLBOROUGH.

“ *June 23.* I was much rejoiced at what your highness did me the honour to write to me, in your's of the 15th, that the affair



of the palatinate was finished ; so that I hope the palatine troops are ready to join. I send your highness another letter, in conformity with the project concerted with count Rechteren, to be communicated to the elector of Hanover. Your highness will also do well to write a few words to the elector palatine, and the landgrave of Hesse, that they may not be offended with the secrecy which we have observed."

The second letter to the elector, here referred to, was conformable to that of May 30, which Eugene, from prudential considerations, had deferred delivering.

At this anxious crisis, the difficulties of the british general were increased, by the alarm and despondency which reigned in Holland, and the consequent eagerness manifested by some of the members of government for a peace. On this subject, as well as on the military movements, we find two interesting letters to lord Godolphin.

"*Terbank, June 18.* Since my last I have had the favour of your's of the 31st, and 1st of this month. I am not surprised at the conversation you have had with the duke of Savoy's minister, though I am very confident he has no thoughts of that expedition for this campaign ; but he knows very well how fond every honest englishman is of that project. \*

"My opinion is, that the duke of Savoy knows too well that if he shall be able to do nothing considerable this campaign, the allies may grow weary of leaving so many troops with him the next year, unless he can, by some plausible offer, engage England.

"By what I have received this morning from prince Eugene, the difficulty of the palatine troops continues, and he is not certain when the 4,000 imperial horse can be at their rendezvous. In the mean time, you will see, by the inclosed paper, the diligence and care taken by the elector of Bavaria. It is most certain that the few troops which the french have on the Rhine give a

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\* Alluding to some proposal for a renewal of the design on Toulon.



great occasion to the elector of Hanover, and I should think a good opportunity for that of Franche Comté.\*

"I shall follow your advice in letting the elector know what my thoughts are; but I must own frankly to you, that I take the humour of the elector to be such, that the sure way of not being disappointed is, to expect nothing from thence.

"I send you the letter I have received this morning from M. Buys, with the answer I have made to it. You will see by it that they are not changed in their opinion, so that it will be necessary for you to think well of what answer I shall give; for it will be communicated to the four burgomasters. I am afraid that Amsterdam is very much determined for peace, and if that should be once known by the States, it might be of very dangerous consequence this winter. When M. Buys and his companion spoke of this matter to me, they assured me they had acquainted nobody but myself, being very sensible of the consequence. Your letter by Molesworth is not yet come to me."

"June 28. \* \* \* \* \* By letters I received last night from prince Eugene, he gives me hopes of being in a condition of beginning his march, either to-morrow or the day following, and that he will, the night before his march, send a copy of my letter of the 24th to the elector of Hanover. The inclosed is a copy of my letter. Prince Eugene thinks the elector will not approve of his march, which is the reason of his not acquainting him sooner with my letter, so that he might not have it in his power to hinder the march, which he thinks otherwise he would do. That which gives me the greatest uneasiness is, that I find prince Eugene thinks that their horse cannot join me in less than ten days, and that their foot must have 14 or 15 days. If they cannot make greater expedition, I fear the horse of the duke of Berwick will get before them, which I have writ to the prince, by express, this morning. According to the answer I shall have

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\* This alludes to a plan, which at this time was formed by La Braconnière, a refugee officer, to excite an insurrection in Franche Comté.



from him, I shall give the necessary orders for eight days bread, which I shall take with me when I leave this camp, my design being to engage their army, if possible, or to oblige them to retire to such a post, as that I may have it in my power to make the siege of Charleroy ; but if they take such a camp as will cover Charleroy, I shall then be obliged to stay for the foot, before I begin my march for Flanders. Since the disappointments prince Eugene has met with have lost us above a month, and that the enemy know too much of our design, the best thing we can hope for is, that we may be able to oblige them to come to some action ; for it is the opinion of prince Eugene, as well as mine, that we must not expect any ease from the elector, which is a misfortune, but such a one as I know not how to remedy. We were in hopes to have heard that the elector of Hanover's army had passed the Rhine, the french being at this time very weak on that side. The letters from that army do not come till to-morrow, but our letters from Frankfort say, that they will not pass that river till prince Eugene's army begins to act."

"*Terbank, July 2.* Since my last I have had the favour of your's of the 11th and 15th. By the first I see the uneasy circumstances you labour under ; and I do assure myself that you do me the justice to believe, that for your sake, as well as for the queen, I would cheerfully venture my life to make you two of one mind ; for unless that can be, it were quieter and better to be under ground. I beg you to believe that my love and zeal for you is so much, that I should not value the difficulties I meet with here abroad. I have by this night's post sent your's of the 15th to M. Buys ; what answer he makes you shall be sure to have. I am told that he is so possessed with the thoughts of peace, that he could not forbear saying lately to an honest man, who was not of his opinion, that if we had not good success this campaign, they must have peace."

TO LORD SUNDERLAND.

"*Terbank, July 2.* My lord ;—I thank you for your letter of the 15th past, and shall expect your's and my lord treasurer's



thoughts relating to the marquis of Guiscard, \* as you promise me. You will now hear that the investiture is actually given to the elector palatine, and I hope our next letters will tell us the same of the Montferrat to the duke of Savoy. Prince Eugene began his march with his army on Friday last, in order to join us, and I hope will make so much diligence as to prevent the enemy, upon which the whole depends; for though we have no account yet of their motions, 'tis not to be doubted but they are likewise hastening this way. I expect the prince himself here, on Thursday or Friday, to concert matters with me, and reckon his horse will not be above two or three days behind him. As soon as they are at hand, we shall begin to move towards the enemy, in hopes to bring them to a battle, which I fear they will avoid. I wish I could flatter myself, but I have no hopes, that Toulon will be attempted; for of all projects that were the best for England. I am, with truth, &c."

Having made all these arrangements, and taken precautions to act offensively against the french army in the Netherlands, Marlborough deemed it expedient no longer to withhold the information from the States. He therefore dispatched a letter announcing his design, by a courier from Terbank, on the 2nd of July.

"High and mighty lords;—Having reflected on the situation of our affairs in this country, and considered those on the Moselle, and observing the little probability of supplying the army of prince Eugene with all the requisites, so as to act offensively and with vigour; and being confirmed in my opinion by a resolution of your high mightinesses, communicated to me by the deputies, I have imparted to prince Eugene and to count Rechteren my opinion, that it will be more advantageous to the interests of the common cause, for the army on the Moselle to join us in Brabant, without delay, and entreated them, should they be of my opinion, to communicate the same to the elector of

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\* We find among the Marlborough Papers innumerable letters and projects, furnished by Guiscard, for the invasion of France, which were never carried into execution.



Hanover, and to begin their march as soon as possible. These measures being taken in conformity with the approbation of the field deputies, I doubt not but they will give notice to your high mightinesses. Nevertheless, I would not fail to inform you, that I have just received, from prince Eugene, intelligence that his army commenced their march last Friday, the cavalry advancing by long forced marches, while the infantry rapidly followed; and that it was his intention to arrive in our camp on the 5th or 6th, to concert with me the operations, according to our arrangement, that as soon as the cavalry shall approach, we shall move directly upon the enemy, and bring on a battle, trusting in God to bless our designs, and hoping that I shall soon have an opportunity of sending you good news. \*


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\* Translated from the french draught.











## CHAPTER 69.

1708.

*Plans of the french commanders for the recovery of the conquered places in Brabant and Flanders—Importance of Oudenard—Surprise of Ghent and Bruges—Movement of the french, to cover the siege of Oudenard—Counter movement of Marlborough—Encamps at Anderlecht and Asch—Arrival of prince Eugene—Temporary illness of Marlborough—Rapid march to the camp of Lessines—Retreat of the french towards the Scheld—Resolution of Marlborough and Eugene to risk an engagement—Advance towards the Scheld—Description of Oudenard and its vicinity—Passage of the Scheld—Victory of Oudenard—Retreat and loss of the french army—Letters written from the field of battle.*

**W**HILE Marlborough remained at Terbank, eagerly looking to the movements of Eugene, and anxiously expecting the junction of his forces, new dangers arose in other quarters.

Unwilling again to measure their strength with the british general in the field, the french commanders formed a plan, no less bold than judicious, to rob him of all his recent conquests, and reduce him to the same situation, as when he commenced his glorious career. This design was grounded on the general discontent, which pervaded the Netherlands, under the oppressive government of the dutch; and which had already manifested itself in the plot for the surrender of Antwerp. They meditated the surprise of Ghent, which commanded the course of the Lys and the Scheld; and of Bruges, the center of the principal water communications. They calculated that the acquisition of these important fortresses would lead to the capture of the smaller places; and, finally, their plan embraced the reduction of Oudenard, a point of the highest consequence, in a military view.

Situated on the Scheld, and at the verge of the frontier, Oudenard was the connecting link for the alternate defence of



Flanders and Brabant; and although incapable of a protracted resistance, was yet the most convenient place of arms for the operations on either side. While it was occupied by the allies, they could penetrate towards Lille, raise the sieges of Menin or Courtray, interpose between the borders of France and Ghent, and cut off the communications of a hostile army. If Brabant were threatened, they might pass the Scheld; and occupying the strong camps of Lessines or Leuse, present a front, or hang on the flank, of a corps attempting to push towards Brussels. The banks of the Scheld being elevated, present many defensive positions on either side; but such positions were useful only to the army which held the fortress. If Oudenard was thus important in a general view, it was still more valuable, in the actual circumstances of the allies. It was the chief avenue to their other fortresses in Flanders, as well as the only channel of their direct communications with England, and its fall would have ensured the loss of all their conquests in that quarter; while the enemy, seated in the most fertile and opulent district of Europe, and holding the fortresses on the Scheld, would have easily baffled every attempt for their expulsion, flanked all direct attacks on French Hainault, and stripped of their value the advantages of the two preceding campaigns.

The first part of the design conceived by the french commanders, was no less successfully executed, than judiciously planned. Having diverted the attention of Marlborough, by their feints on the side of Louvain, they suddenly decamped from Brain l'Allieu, on the evening of the 4th of July, and rapidly advanced towards Hall and Tubise, where they intended to cross the Senne. In their march, they detached several corps to the different places of Flanders, where they had established a secret correspondence with the disaffected. At the dawn of the 5th of July, one of these parties, commanded by brigadier La Faille and Pasteur, appeared before Ghent. By the negligence or treachery of the watch, a small number of soldiers were suffered to gain admission as deserters, and found means to amuse the guard, till the main body arrived, and secured the gate. The other gates



being seized with the same facility, the whole detachment advanced into the market place. La Faille, who had been high bailiff of Bruges, and was well known to the inhabitants, assembled the magistrates and burghers in the town house. Producing a pardon, signed by the elector of Bavaria, for their defection to the allies, he readily obtained their submission, and invested a small garrison of 300 men, who held the citadel.

Six hours after the surprise of Ghent, count de la Motte appeared before Bruges, which likewise surrendered on the first summons. He next endeavoured to surprise Damme, but failing in his attempts to intimidate the governor, he marched to Plassendaël, a small but important fort, on the canal of Bruges, and took it by storm.

Major-general Murray, who had been posted with a detachment at Mariekirk, was no sooner apprised of these movements, than he hastened towards Ghent, and arrived in time to save the place, had he not been refused admission by the burghers. He had, therefore, no resource but to retire to Sas van Ghent, and leave the small garrison in the castle to their fate. Here he was joined by deputies, from the Hague, who on the first alarm were dispatched, to concert with him the requisite measures for the defence of the forts and posts, which covered this part of the frontier.

Receiving prompt intelligence of the sudden movement made by his antagonists towards the Dender, Marlborough broke up from Terbank, on the morning of the 5th, and crossing the Senne and the canal of Brussels, encamped with his left at Anderlecht, and his right at the mill of Tombeck. Here he learnt the march of the hostile detachments against Ghent and Bruges, and pushed forward a body of cavalry, under general Bothmar, with orders to cross the Scheld, near Termond; and if possible, to obviate the danger.

During this march, the french were traversing the Senne, at Tubise and Hall, within a short distance of the camp which he had chosen. He arrived too late in the evening to arrest their progress, but he hoped to bring them to an engagement before



they could reach the Dender. He therefore sent out a strong detachment to harass their rear, and at one in the morning, riding to the right of his lines, he ordered the troops to form, and hold themselves in readiness for battle, on the first appearance of the dawn.

The alertness of the enemy, however, baffled his design. Continuing their march during the night, they crossed the Dender in several columns, near Ninove, and the allied detachment arrived in time only to seize a part of their baggage, and to make three hundred prisoners. In their haste they sunk their bridges, and the panic, which reigned among them, was proved by the crowds of deserters who flocked to the confederate camp. Having accomplished the passage of the Dender, they descended the stream, and took post between Alost and Oerdegem, with a view to cover the attack against the citadel of Ghent, and at the same time to threaten Brussels. The consternation, indeed, was so great among the inhabitants of that large and opulent capital, that Marlborough advanced to Asch, within a league of Alost, where he encamped on the evening of the 6th. Here the melancholy forebodings, which the movements of the enemy called forth, were realised, by the intelligence which arrived of the surprise of Bruges and Ghent, and the investment of the citadel. The alarm was at its height both in Brussels and in the army.

In this trying moment, Marlborough was cheered by the arrival of Eugene, who, finding that he could not effect a junction in time, left his cavalry at Maestricht, and hastened to take a personal share in the expected conflict. The appearance of the illustrious chief restored joy and alacrity; and Marlborough welcomed him by observing, "I am not without hopes of congratulating your highness on a great victory; for my troops will be animated by the presence of so distinguished a commander."

Eugene warmly approved the resolution, which his friend had adopted, of engaging the enemy; and the proposal being sanctioned by a council of war, held the ensuing day, pioneers were instantly detached in every direction, to clear the roads for the passage of the troops. As Oudenard was known to be the next object of



attack, general Chanclos, who commanded at Ath, was directed to collect reinforcements from his own and the neighbouring garrisons, and with these troops, and a corps of Waleff's dragoons, to throw himself into the place. This he happily accomplished, without the slightest obstruction.

On the eve of so awful a crisis, which he might not survive, Eugene took the opportunity to visit his aged mother, the countess of Soissons, who resided at Brussels. Soon after his departure, Marlborough was seized with a fever, the result of fatigue, anxiety, and watchfulness, and was earnestly recommended by his physicians to quit the camp. The peril of the moment, however, raised his active mind above the sense of bodily suffering: he matured his arrangements for the approaching conflict, though on account of his indisposition, he continued in his tent, and the regular orders were issued from the quarters of marshal Overkirk. His disorder abating the ensuing day, he was enabled to resume the arduous duties of his station.

The enemy having received intelligence that the citadel of Ghent had surrendered, after a defence of two days, prepared to execute the rest of their design. Detachments were sent against Oudenard, which was invested on the morning of the 9th; and a train of heavy artillery was ordered from Tournay. To cover the siege, they prepared to occupy the strong camp of Lessines, on the Dender.

But they were opposed to a general, whose promptitude and activity have been seldom paralleled, and whose resources were called forth, by the magnitude of the stake for which he was contending. Although the distance he had to traverse was twice that of the enemy, no obstacle could divert him from his object. To quiet the alarm which reigned in Brussels, the garrison was reinforced with four battalions of infantry. The roads having been cleared, the army broke up from Asch, at two in the morning of the ninth, and moved towards Herfelingen, by the left, in four columns, the infantry in the center, and the cavalry on the flanks. The whole body of grenadiers, and thirty squadrons of horse, under lord Albemarle, covered the rear, and



prepared to check any attempt of the enemy on Brussels. In consequence of this precaution, the movement was so rapid, firm, and connected, that before mid-day the heads of the columns reached Herfelingen, five leagues from Asch. Here the duke halted, and the troops encamped in their order of march, with the village in the rear, and the front towards the Dender.

Four hours afterwards, Cadogan was detached, with eight battalions, and as many squadrons, to throw bridges over the Dender, and post himself at Lessines. At this moment Eugene returned, and participated in the exultation, which the prospect of a battle inspired. The evening tattoo was the signal for the army to resume its march, which was continued during the night. Towards morning Marlborough had the satisfaction to find that Cadogan had reached Lessines at midnight, and leaving 800 men to occupy the place, had taken post beyond the Dender, over which he had thrown bridges. He therefore crossed with exulting confidence, and encamped with his right to the Dender, and the front covered by a stream, which falls into that river.

At this moment he descried the heads of the hostile columns on the distant heights, and perceived that his promptitude had disconcerted the plans of his antagonists. Indeed the french generals had so little calculated on the rapidity of his movement, that they delayed detaching a corps for the occupation of Lessines, until it was too late. Disappointed and discouraged, they now turned to the right, and hastened towards Gavre, with a view to shelter themselves behind the line of the Scheld.\*

From Herfelingen and Lessines, Marlborough announced the progress and event of his march to the treasurer.

"*July 9.* I should answer two of your letters, but the treachery of Ghent, continual marching, and some letters † I have received from England, have so vexed me, that I was yesterday in so great a fever, that the doctor would have persuaded me to have gone to Brussels; but I thank God I am now better, and by

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\* Circulars from Herfelingen and Lessines—Letters from Marlborough to Mr. Boyle and lord Godolphin—Gazette—Complete History of Europe—Ledyard—Histoire de Marlborough.

† From the queen and the duchess.



the next post I hope to answer your letters. The States have used this country so ill, that I no ways doubt but all the towns in this country will play us the same trick as Ghent has done, whenever they have it in their power. I have been desired by the deputies to write, that her majesty would be pleased to let the troops, now in the Isle of Wight, be sent for their relief to Ostend; so that it is likely you will be desired the same thing by M. Vriberg; but I hope the queen will continue in the resolution of employing those troops as she first designed; for I think that will be much more for her's and the nation's honour, but Vriberg must not know my opinion.

“ I beg, with my humble duty, you will make my excuses to the queen, for my not acknowledging the honour of her's till the next post. I am so extremely troubled at what has been writ me concerning my brother George and Mr. Walpole, that I beg you will acquaint me with what you know of that matter.

“ Having made a halt of five hours, I am continuing my march, as I intend to do all the night, in hopes of getting to the camp of Lessines, before the enemy, who made yesterday a detachment of 16,000 men, for the investing of Oudenard. If I get the camp of Lessines before them, I hope to be able to hinder the siege, being resolved to venture every thing, rather than lose that place.”

“ *Lessines, the 10th.* Mr. Cardonnel telling me that by a mistake the letters were not gone, I have opened mine, to let you know that the head of the army is got hither. I have received advice this morning from the governor of Oudenard, that he was invested on both sides of his town, yesterday morning. I should think myself happy since I am got into this camp, if they continue their resolution of carrying on that siege.”

As the ensuing march from Lessines produced the decisive engagement at Oudenard, we shall here pause, to take a survey of the surrounding country and field of action, that we may more distinctly exhibit the movements and details of this memorable conflict.

From the frontier of France to the confluence of the Scheld



and Lys, the surface consists of low hills and bold undulations, which contract the valley of the Scheld in various places, till they gradually subside in the vicinity of Ghent. Human industry here exerts unremitting efforts, and the eye no where rests on a patch of heath, or even on a single acre in repose. On the bolder swells of the upland, which are generally denominated Couters, corn predominates; on the lower, flax, clover, peas, and buck wheat. Woods or coppices are found only on the steep acclivities, where the plough cannot act, or in patches of plantations, except toward France, where the country is shaded by forests. Numerous villages and hamlets enliven this rich and varied surface; small farms and cottages are scattered in every direction; and at intervals appear the turrets of a castellated mansion, a convent or abbey. Of the roads, which form the communications between these countless dwellings, those across the couters are usually bare, and the others are mostly fringed with underwood, or bordered with avenues. Towards the Scheld, which winds along a valley comparatively low, are ranges of meadows, intersected with numerous drains and water-courses.

At the distance of a mile north of Oudenard, is the village of Eyne. Here the ground rises into a species of low, but capacious amphitheatre. It sweeps along a moderately sized plain, southward, to near the glacis of Oudenard, where it is crowned by the village of Bevere, and numerous windmills. Turning westward, it then rises into another broad hill, under the name of the Boser Couter, and the highest point, is near a tilleul or lime tree, and a windmill overlooking the village of Oycke. From thence the ground curves towards Marolen; and the eye glancing over the narrow valley watered by the Norcken, is arrested by another upland plain, which trends by Huyse, gradually sinking till it terminates near Asper. A line representing the chord of this semicircle, would commence about a league above the confluence of the Norcken with the Scheld, and traverse the plain of Heurne, which is nearly as high as the amphitheatre itself. Within this space two scanty rivulets, gushing from the base of the hill of Oycke, at a small distance asunder, embrace a low tongue of



land, the middle of which rises into a gentle elevation. The borders of these rivulets, and a part of the intervening surface, are intersected with inclosures, surrounding the farms and hamlets of Barwaen, Chobon, and Diepenbeck. At the source of one is the castellated mansion of Bevere or Brian, at that of the other, the hamlet of Retelhoek, situated in a woody and steep recess. These streams uniting near a public house, called Schaerken, proceed partly in a double channel along a marshy bed to the Scheld, near Eyne. The Norken rising near Morlehem, beyond Oycke, runs for some distance almost parallel to the Scheld; then passing by Lede, Mullem, and Asper, it meets another streamlet from the west, and terminates in a species of canal, skirting the Scheld to a considerable distance below Gavre. The borders of the Norken, like those of the other rivulets, are fringed with underwood, coppices, and thickets; and from Mullem to Herlehem the roads are skirted with avenues. Behind, are inclosures surrounding a small plain, which terminates beyond the mill of Royegem. Between these is a hollow road, which leads up to the hill of Oycke.

After this cursory view of the scene of action, we proceed to trace the movements of the contending hosts.

During the night of the 10th, the allied commanders prepared for an engagement, although they had a space of no less than fifteen miles to traverse, and a broad and rapid stream to cross, and although they were yet in doubt what course their antagonists would pursue, or what position they intended to occupy.

The state of the hostile army was, however, highly favourable to their views. The french commanders, relying on the apparent anxiety of Marlborough to cover the great towns in his rear, little suspected that he would have made so bold and rapid a movement as the march to Lessines, which placed him between them and their own frontier. This disappointment inflamed the contention which already reigned between the duke of Burgundy and Vendome; and the discord which it produced in their counsels was not unknown to the confederate chiefs. Foiled, therefore, in their design on Lessines, the french commanders relinquished the



investment of Oudenard, and directed their march to Gavre, where they had prepared bridges for crossing the Scheld.

On this occasion Marlborough and Eugene evinced the same promptitude, decision, and spirit, which had marked their operations on the Danube; and they were ably seconded by their veteran colleague Overkirk. Aware that an army which is attacked in retreat, or in crossing a river, loses all the advantage of order and discipline, they pushed forward to the Scheld, to come in contact with the enemy at the moment of their passage.

Preparatory to this movement, Cadogan and Rantzau were detached with a strong advanced guard of 16 battalions, consisting of the brigades of Sabine, Plettenberg, and Evans; and eight squadrons of the dragoons of Bulau, Leibregement, and Schulemberg, with the quarter colours, and 32 pieces of artillery. They were directed to clear the roads, and throw bridges over the Scheld, in the vicinity of Oudenard. Departing at the dawn of the 11th, they were followed at eight in the morning by the whole army. The order of march was again in four columns, by the left, each line forming two columns, the cavalry leading the way, and the artillery in the rear.

At half past ten in the morning Cadogan reached the right bank of the Scheld, between the town and abbey of Eename, and immediately commenced the construction of the bridges. About the same time the hostile columns drew towards Gavre, two leagues below. Their bridges being already prepared, the french advanced guard, led on by the marquis de Biron, passed leisurely over, without suspecting the approach of the allies; and some of the soldiers were even detached to collect forage.

Cadogan's detachment completed the bridges about mid-day. As the heads of the columns of cavalry were drawing near, Rantzau passed the Scheld with the horse and quarter colours, and was followed by Cadogan, with twelve battalions, the other four being left to guard the pontoons. They advanced to the top of the high ground, between Eyne and Bevere, and formed at the extremity of the amphitheatre, the infantry opposite Eyne, and the cavalry extending, on the left, towards the inclosures near Schaerken.



Cadogan proceeding to reconnoitre, descried several squadrons of the enemy on the farther side of the plain, and observed their foraging parties scattered about Heurne and Ruybroek. He immediately sent the cavalry to attack them, who drove them towards Synghem, and took several prisoners. But the alarm being given, Biron advanced with twelve squadrons, repulsed all the assailants, who had proceeded beyond Eyne, and advanced to the windmill behind the village. Here he saw the allied detachment in position, and observing at the same time the battalions posted near the bridges, and the columns of cavalry in the act of crossing, he withdrew, to avoid the shock of the whole confederate army, the greater part of which he supposed had already traversed the river.

The celerity of Marlborough, indeed, gave colour to this conjecture, for hearing, on his way, that the enemy were crossing at Gavre, he became alarmed for the safety of his advance. Directing the flank column of cavalry to guard against the movements, which he supposed the enemy might make on his line of march, he and Eugene pressed forward at the head of the second column, which consisted entirely of prussians. They proceeded part of the way at full gallop, and fortunately reached the bridges at the moment the marquis de Biron had advanced to reconnoitre the assailants, by whom his foragers had been so unexpectedly attacked.

The apparition of the allies created a general sensation throughout the french ranks. Vendome, however, did not partake of the alarm which seems to have seized the rest of the commanders. From the distant clouds of dust, which marked the course of the moving columns, he judged that the main body was yet half a league from the Scheld, and that there was still sufficient time to attack the confederates, before they could form in order of battle. To secure the plain of Heurne, and cover the deploiement of his lines, he directed seven battalions of the swiss regiments of Pfeffer, Villars, and Gueder, to occupy the village; and the cavalry of the right, consisting of part of the household troops, to draw up near the windmill. Under cover of this preliminary dis-



position, he intended to form his left on the plain of Heurne, and extend his right across the Boser Couter, towards Mooreghem. The duke of Burgundy, however, countermanded the order, either from persuasion that an army so numerous as that of the confederates could not make so rapid a march, or from the opinion, that the high ground of Huysse, with the Norken in front, would afford a more eligible position. The altered direction of the french columns was visible to the allied detachment: it appeared doubtful whether they would risk an engagement, or hasten towards their lines, between Tournay and Lille: irresolution and perplexity were evident in all their movements.

Meanwhile Pfeffer, with his seven battalions, instead of occupying Heurne, advanced and took post at Eyne, either from inadvertence, or from a mistake caused by a similarity of names. Although this post was advantageous, the change in the direction of the french army placed him beyond the reach of protection; and the household horse, who had orders to cover him, were not only too far in the rear, but were afterwards recalled, and only a few squadrons left in their stead.

Marlborough and Eugene lost no time in taking advantage of the enemy's indecision. While the march of the infantry was accelerated by repeated orders, they jointly superintended the passage of the Scheld, and posted the troops as fast as they arrived. Soon after two o'clock the second column of cavalry was formed in front of Bevere, and a battery of six field pieces placed on the hill above Schaerken. About three, the head of the first column of cavalry, and the whole infantry of the right wing reached the bridges. To accelerate the passage, the horse of the left column went through Oudenard, and began likewise to appear. The four battalions, who had hitherto guarded the bridges, marched to join the advanced guard, and general Cadogan seized the favourable moment to strike the first blow. Having observed the insulated position of Pfeffer's brigade, and the diminution of the corps of cavalry left to protect him, he advanced with 12 battalions, and the cavalry of Rantzau. Brigadier Sabine, at the head of four english battalions, led the attack. They descended



the hill, and forded the rivulet, near Eyne, while the cavalry passed above, and turned the rear of the village. A sharp conflict ensued, but the enemy were soon forced, and three entire battalions, with the brigadier, were made prisoners. The rest were either killed, or intercepted in their flight near the windmill. Rantzau, with his eight squadrons of hanoverians and the quarter-masters of the army, then advanced upon the plain of Heurne, to charge the cavalry, who perceiving the destruction of the infantry, endeavoured to retire into the inclosures behind. But before they could effect their purpose, they were overtaken, routed, and driven across the Norken, among the columns of their own army, which were forming on the farther side. Twelve standards fell into the hands of the victors, and the colonel of the regiment of La Breteche was made prisoner. The electoral prince of Hanover, afterwards George the second, with general Schulemburg, count Lusky, and several volunteers of distinction, animated the troops by charging at the head of a squadron. Count Lusky was killed in the struggle, and the prince himself had a horse shot under him.

The french commanders were now convinced that to retire without an action was impossible, and many general officers who had thwarted Vendome, from blind deference to the duke of Burgundy, now loudly clamoured to be led against the enemy. Active preparations were accordingly made by the french commanders to repel a general attack, and the army drew up on the high ground of Lede, Huysse, and Maldegheem, in two lines, with a reserve. The greater part of the cavalry were posted on the right, opposite Oycke, the left extended to behind Mullem, the front being covered by the Norken, and the defiles along its banks. Had they remained firm in this position, it is doubtful whether the confederate forces, after a long march of near five leagues, would have ventured to risk an attack that evening, and they might have retired in the night. But the duke of Burgundy and the clamorous officers were now as impatient to attack, as they were before desirous to remain on the defensive.



It was four in the afternoon, and the allies were not formed, when the duke of Burgundy directed general Grimaldi to lead 16 squadrons across the Norcken, apparently for the purpose of reconnoitring whether the right wing could advance and occupy the space between the two rivulets at Diepenbeck and Chobon. Grimaldi came to the brink of the first rivulet, but made no attempt to pass; for observing the prussian cavalry already formed, and the british advancing, he fell back to the small plain near the mill of Royeghem. Vendome, who disapproved of this movement, which he foresaw would produce a conflict, in the very manner the allies wished to engage, had, nevertheless, directed his left to advance at the same moment, with a view of bringing both wings into action together. But the duke of Burgundy again countermanded his order, under pretence that an impassable morass separated the two armies on that side, although Vendome had himself traversed the pretended swamp only an hour before. Whatever was the cause, the left wing of the french remained in position, and another invaluable hour was lost in useless movements.

Marlborough observing the right wing and center of the enemy passing the defiles in their front, and forming irregularly, judged that they intended to attack him by the right. He conjectured that they would speedily advance towards the castle of Bevere, line the rivulet to Diepenbeck and Herlehem, and under cover of this manœuvre, bring their left into the plain of Heurne, where the squadrons of Rantzau, and some battalions of Cadogan were yet unsupported. Two battalions of the four, who had covered the bridges, had been already posted in the hedges near Groenevelde, where the first attack was expected. To keep the hostile right in check, they were reinforced by the twelve battalions of Cadogan, who had already partly occupied Eyne and Heurne. Marlborough himself advanced by Heurne, with the prussian horse, and drew them up in front of the enemy. While this movement was in progress, the whole first column of the first line of the right wing, consisting entirely of british, formed rapidly on the height of Bevere.



At this moment 30 battalions of the enemy's right, among whom were the french and swiss foot guards, the brigades du Roi, Picardi, and Royal Roussillon, debouched, as had been expected; and after some hesitation attacked the four battalions posted at Groenevelde, before the corps of Cadogan could arrive to sustain them. This small force, however, disputed the edge of the streamlet, and maintained their ground until the other battalions arrived on their right, and boldly attacked the enemy's center. The duke of Argyle, who led the british infantry, hastened also into action with 20 battalions, and a few pieces of cannon.\* His left took post near Shaerken, and his right joined the infantry already engaged near Ruybroek and Groenevelde. A heavy conflict of musketry ensued, each battalion being engaged separately in the fields and enclosures which border the rivulet. The remaining part of the enemy's right, following the direction of the corps engaged, gradually prolonged their line, till they outflanked some prussian infantry on the left of the british, and after pushing them back, occupied Barwaen and the farm of Banlancy. But count Lottum, with the second column of infantry, consisting of prussians and hanoverians, had now likewise formed, and at six o'clock advanced in his turn, recovered the lost ground, and drove the enemy across the rivulet. As the lines extended, and the number of troops augmented, partial conflicts gradually increased into a general roar of musketry, which spread along the outer portion of the semicircle, formed by the two rivulets winding near Schaerken.

Marlborough and Eugene, who had hitherto remained together, now separated. The duke complimented the prince with the command of the right, comprising the british troops, whose valour he had often witnessed and applauded. He foresaw that

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\* From the rapidity of the march, and the peculiarities of local situation, this memorable battle was fought with little aid from artillery on either side. The only pieces employed on the part of the allies, appear to have been those which accompanied the advanced detachment; and on the part of the french, we find reference to only six pieces. For this reason no allusion is made to the artillery in the Gazette and official accounts.



the stress of the action would lie on this quarter, and therefore ordered count Lottum, with twenty battalions, to prolong his right, and strengthen the wing under Eugene. The opening which this movement occasioned, between the castle of Bevere and Schaerken, was filled up by eighteen battalions, drawn from the right of the left wing, who had just reached the scene of action, and formed across the Boser Couter, with the left in front of Mooreghem. Thus nearly sixty battalions fought under Eugene, while only twenty remained under the direction of the duke himself, in the center.

The prince was warmly pressed, when the reinforcement arrived; for the corps of Cadogan, occupying a kind of focus in the center of the hostile position, had been driven out of the coverts and avenues near Herlehem into the plain. With this accession of strength, Eugene, however, again advanced and broke the first line of the enemy. General Natzmer took an immediate advantage of the disorder; and at the head of the prussian gens d'armes and cuirassiers, charged through the second line into the small plain, near the chapel of Royeghem. But his career was checked by the household squadrons, and his ranks swept away by the fire of musketry which flashed from every hedge. After losing half his men, and receiving himself several sabre and gunshot wounds, he escaped with the utmost difficulty, by leaping over a broad ditch.

While the action thus raged with varied success on the right, Marlborough, with the hanoverian and dutch battalions, pressed forward from the farm of Banlancy, and the hamlet of Barwaen. The enemy disputed every inch of ground, and set fire to some houses which they could no longer defend; but the gallant commander passed the nearest rivulet, and forced one inclosure after another, till he reached the hamlet of Diepenbeck. Here he encountered such obstinate resistance, that his troops were compelled to pause. His vigilant eye, however, discovered that the right of the enemy extended only to the steep acclivity of the hill of Oycke, and that they had neglected to occupy the commanding ground above. Of this error he did not fail to profit. Concluding that their



right might be turned, and cut off from the main body, he requested marshal Overkirk, who had brought up the rear, with nearly all the cavalry of the left, and twenty battalions of dutch and danes, to execute this bold and decisive manœuvre.

The veteran hero, unmindful of his age and bodily infirmities, roused his expiring energy, and obeyed with equal alacrity and spirit. The last column of infantry having reached its ground, and deployed for battle, he directed general Week, with the brigades of dutch guards, and Nassau Woudenburg, to force the ravines near the castle of Bevere. The troops moved rapidly to the attack, having the castle to their right, and after a vigorous conflict, drove back the enemy into the coppices which fringe the banks of the rivulet. The prince of Orange and general Oxenstiern instantly followed with the remainder of the 20 battalions, ascended the Boser Couter, sustained by the cavalry under Overkirk and count Tilly, and formed with the left behind the mill of Oycke. Finding no enemy on the summit, the whole mass changed front to the right, and extended their left towards de Keele. The allied army thus formed a vast semicircle round the right wing of the enemy, who could only partially communicate with their center and left, through the ravines and passes of Marolen, and by the mill of Royeghem.

This manœuvre being announced to the duke, he urged marshal Overkirk to make a farther effort with his left, and cut off the remaining communications of the enemy. The execution of this movement was intrusted to the young prince of Orange, whose impetuous spirit panted for distinction. Accompanied by general Oxenstiern, he rushed with the infantry down the height overlooking Marolen, penetrated through the defiles, and forming in two lines, was sustained by twelve squadrons of danes, under count Tilly. Here they encountered a corps of french grenadiers, supported by the household cavalry, and covered by the hedges which skirted the extremity of the plain. A series of vollies and charges ensued, and the enemy were evidently dismayed by so unexpected an attack on their rear.

The onset was visible from the right and center. The frequent



vollies of musketry re-echoed by the woods, and heightened by the growing darkness, infused new ardour into the ranks of the allies, and equally damped the courage of the enemy. Cut off from their own army, the hostile troops slackened in their resistance, and were at length broken and driven back on each other. At this moment the french dragoons made a noble effort, to favour the escape of the infantry, and cover the retreat of the household squadrons; but their valour was fatal to themselves; for the greater part of seven regiments were either killed or taken, and the gendarmerie suffered no less severely from the charge of the danes.

Meanwhile Marlborough had continued to gain ground, and at length established his line between Chobon and Diepenbeck. Vendome indeed made a personal effort to avert the fate of the army which was intrusted to his care, by dismounting from his horse, and leading the infantry, near Mullem, to the rescue of their companions. But his exertions were unavailing. This body, inferior in numbers, subdued in spirit, masked by Eugene, and intangled by the intricacy of the ground, could make no impression; while the left wing was thrown out of action by the defiles and river in their front, and held in check by the british cavalry, which was drawn up in perfect order on the plain of Heurne.

In this crisis, darkness enveloped the contending hosts, and the positions were discernible only by the flashes of musketry which rolled round the narrowing circle of the devoted army, till the right of Eugene and the left of the prince of Orange approached the same point. They mistook each other for enemies, and their conflict might have produced the most deplorable effects amidst the victorious ranks, had not the generals exerted themselves with unusual activity to put a timely stop to the fire. About nine, orders were given for the troops to halt as they stood, and suffer the enemy to escape, rather than expose themselves to mutual destruction. To this order numbers of the enemy owed their safety. Favoured by the obscurity, the broken corps forced their way in tumultuous crowds, as they were impelled by fear or despair. Some thousands slipped unperceived through an opening



in the allied lines, near the castle of Bevere, and directed their flight towards the french frontier ; others endeavoured to rejoin their left wing, in the direction of Mullem ; and a considerable number wandered to the posts of the allies, and were captured. In the midst of this tumultuous scene, Eugene ordered several drummers to beat the french retreat, and the refugee officers to give the rallying word of the different corps, who were known to be in the inclosures ; they thus succeeded in capturing crowds of fugitives without resistance.

When Vendome perceived the destruction of his right wing inevitable, he retired with the infantry, which was still posted on the bank of the Norcken, near Mullem, and joined the left wing at Huyse and St. Denast, where they were grouped together in great disorder. With his characteristic presence of mind, he proposed to the duke of Burgundy, and a crowd of panic struck generals, to take advantage of the night for restoring order among the troops, so as to retire regularly ; but his representations were fruitless. Finding therefore that his arguments could not persuade the reason, or allay the fears of the surrounding multitude, he consented to order a retreat. The word was no sooner given than generals and privates, horse and foot, hurried in the utmost disorder towards Ghent. He could only persuade 25 squadrons and some battalions to remain united, and with these he covered the flight of the crowd in person.

The allies meanwhile impatiently paused on the field, but dawn was no sooner visible, than Marlborough detached 40 squadrons from the right wing, under generals Bulow and Lumley, and a corps of infantry, commanded by major general Meredith, to pursue the enemy. With the return of day opened a scene of the most distressing nature, which gave scope to the humanity of the british general. Among several thousand corpses, lay a prodigious number of wounded of different nations, enveloped in carnage and surrounded with the wreck of war. By his orders the utmost exertion was instantly made to collect the survivors, and to bestow on all, without distinction, the care and relief which circumstances would permit. The agonies of suffering



nature were thus soothed, and many were snatched from a lingering and painful death, to acknowledge the beneficence, and bless the name of their conqueror. \*

We find two letters from the duke, written in the first exultation of victory. One to the duchess deserves notice, because it proves that in his mind the joy of success was considerably allayed, by reflexions on the perplexed state of affairs in England, and the perverseness of the queen.

“ *July 12.* I have neither spirits nor time to answer your three last letters: this being to bring the good news of a battle we had yesterday, in which it pleased God to give us, at last, the advantage. Our foot on both sides having been all engaged, has occasioned much blood; but I thank God the english have suffered less than any of the other troops; none of our english horse having been engaged. I do, and you must, give thanks to God for his goodness in protecting and making me the instrument of so much happiness to the queen and *nation, if she will please to make use of it.*”

The other to Godolphin is particularly interesting, because it shews that the attack on the hostile army was as daring, as the preparatory movements had been rapid and decisive; and that where the exigency of affairs required, our able commander overstepped the established rules of military science, and surprised and disconcerted his antagonists, by efforts beyond the calculations of ordinary experience.

“ *July 12.* I have been so very uneasy, and in so great a hurry for some days, that I should not be able to write, were I not supported by the good success we had yesterday. The particulars you will have from lord Stair, who will give you this.

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\* For the description and plan of this battle we are chiefly indebted to major Smith, who is well acquainted with the ground. The principal authorities, from which the narrative is drawn, are—Correspondence of Marlborough—Letters and relations in the Gazette—Complete History of Europe—Ledyard—Kane—Milner—Lives of Marlborough and Eugene—The french biographers—Unpublished letters from captain Bonnel of the artillery, and count Maffei—Observations of the french military writers and tacticians, particularly Quincy, Feuquières, and Grimoard—Vie du Prince Eugene.



You know his pretensions, and the friendship I have for him; and I will own to you, that I hope her majesty may have, by this message, an excuse for others, if she is pleased to distinguish\* him at this time.

“ I must ever acknowledge the goodness of God, in the success he was pleased to give us; for I believe lord Stair will tell you, they were in as strong a post as is possible to be found; but you know when I left England, I was positively resolved to endeavour by all means a battle, thinking nothing else would make the queen’s business go on well. This reason only, made me venture the battle yesterday, otherwise I did give them too much advantage; but the good of the queen and my country shall always be preferred by me, before any personal concern; for I am very sensible if I had miscarried, I should have been blamed. I hope I have given such a blow to their foot, that they will not be able to fight any more this year. My head aches so terribly that I must say no more.”

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\* By conferring on him a british peerage.



## CHAPTER 70.

1708.

*Offensive designs of the confederate generals—Departure of Eugene for Brussels, to superintend the march of the artillery and stores—Capture of the french lines between Ypres and Warneton—Advance of Marlborough to Werwick—Correspondence on military affairs, and on the state of the public mind in England—Proposal of Marlborough to mask Lille, and penetrate into France—Opposed by Eugene, and counteracted by the dutch deputies—Resolution taken to besiege Lille—Projected descent on the french coast.*

**T**HE two victorious commanders devoted little time to repose. The evening of the battle and the ensuing day were spent in concerting the necessary arrangements for their ulterior designs, and on the morning of the 13th Eugene departed to Brussels, for the purpose of forwarding the march of his army, which had already reached its vicinity. He was also to send out detachments for the protection of Flanders, and to superintend the conveyance of the heavy artillery and stores, which were to be drawn from Maestricht and the great towns of Holland.

Conscious that Berwick was hastening from the Moselle, Marlborough displayed his customary diligence. While the army remained on the field, count Lottum was dispatched at midnight of the 13th, with fifty squadrons and thirty battalions, to possess himself of the lines, which the enemy had constructed from Ypres to Warneton, for the purpose of covering the country between the Scheld and the Lys. The main army followed in the morning, and took up a position between Belegchem and Hauterive, with the head quarters near Helchin. On the following day Marlborough resumed his march, and on his route had the satisfaction to receive intelligence that Lottum had forced the lines,







*[Faint, illegible text visible through the paper, likely bleed-through from the reverse side. The text appears to be organized into paragraphs and possibly includes a list or table structure.]*



captured Warneton, Comines, and Werwick, and made prisoners the whole guard left for the defence of the post, amounting to 500 men. This operation was effected at the very moment when Berwick was hastening to the spot, exhorting the officers to defend the lines to the last extremity, and announcing the approach of succours. Marlborough accordingly pressed forward, crossed the Lys near Menin, and on the evening of the 15th established his head quarters at Werwick, having his left at Comines, and his right extended towards Menin.

We insert several letters written from this camp, to his correspondents in England.

TO THE DUCHESS.

"*July 16.* I hope before this you have had the news by lord Stair, of the good success we had on last Wednesday. I have been obliged ever since to be in perpetual motion, so that I am a good deal out of order. I was in good hopes that the diligence I have made in getting into the french country (for I am now behind their lines), would have obliged them to have abandoned Ghent; but as yet it has not had that effect, but on the contrary, M. de Vendome declares he will sacrifice a strong garrison rather than abandon that town, which, if he keeps his word, he will give me a great deal of trouble; for till we are masters of Ghent, we can have no cannon. The governor of Oudenard, to whom we sent our prisoners, assures me that the number is above seven thousand, besides seven hundred officers, and we have a great many killed and wounded on both sides. They were forced to leave the greatest part of theirs on the place where they fought. We did take care to send all ours into Oudenard, after which I ordered that such of the french as were yet alive should be carried into the town. I have no account of what that number may be, but it being a wet night, I believe a great many of them suffered very much. If we had been so happy as to have had two more hours of day-light, I believe we should have made an end of this war. The duke of Berwick came to Lille the day before yesterday, but his troops will not be here these three or four days, those of prince Eugene came last night to Brussels, so that both our armies will be abundantly recruited. However, I believe the



french will be careful not to venture any more this year ; but the greatest mischief they can do is, the venturing all for the preserving of Ghent. I shall labour with pleasure the rest of this campaign, in hopes it may be the last, so that I may be blest with you and quietness."

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

" *July 16.* My blood is so extremely heated, that I must refer you to what Mr. Cardonnel will write to the secretary's office of what has passed since my lord Stair left the army. If we had been six hours later, I am afraid we should not have been able to have forced these lines ; for M. de la Motte was got with his little army to Ypres, and the duke of Berwick was at the same time at Lille. We are now masters of marching where we please, but can make no siege till we are masters of Ghent, from whence only we can have our cannon. The camp the french are now in, behind the canal of Bruges, makes them entirely masters of Ghent and Bruges ; but at the same time they leave all France open to us, which is what I flatter myself the king of France and his council will never suffer ; so that I hope by Thursday, M. de Vendome will receive orders from court, not to continue in the camp where he is, from whence we are not able to force him but by famine.

" I am taking measures for attacking Ghent, as soon as he marches, and if the duke of Vendome's resolution of staying where he is, be approved at court, I shall then endeavour to cut off all provisions, as much as possible, from going to him ; for if he stays, and we can ruin that army, France is undone ; but if they can subsist longer than we can, they will be able by that, to hinder us from doing any thing considerable, for want of our cannon. Upon the whole, the hazard to them is so very great, that I cannot think the king of France will venture it. Four or five days will let us see their intentions. In the mean time I shall take what rest I can, in order to be the better able to serve, for at this minute my head is so very hot, that I am obliged to leave off writing.

" Prince Eugene's foot came last night to Brussels. My humble duty to the queen."



" *July 19.* I have this day had the favour of your's of the 28--9th and 2--13th of this month, and am very sorry to see that England is capable of being so easily frightened; for I dare say they have not one thousand men on all their coast. This country lies all open to us, but for want of cannon we are not able to do any thing considerable. One of our parties has burnt the suburbs of Arras. That and some other burnings have given a very great consternation, insomuch that they are already come to tell us, that they have sent to the king for leave to treat for the contributions. That which hinders us from acting with vigour is, that as long as the french are masters of Ghent, we cannot make use either of the Scheld or the Lys. But we are using our utmost endeavours to get some cannon by land, which meets with infinite difficulties; but we must overcome them, or we shall have very little fruit of our victory. The duke of Vendome is not contented with having the canal before him, but he is also retrenching, as if he intended to stay there the rest of this campaign. But when the king of France shall see that we have a probability of getting a battering train, I believe he will not let his own country be abandoned, for the maintaining their treacherous conquest of Ghent.

" We have this day returned our solemn thanks to God, for the good success he has been pleased to give us; and in the evening the cannon and both lines fired three times.

" You know my opinion as to La Braconnière; but since he is come, I shall write to the elector of Hanover by him; but he must not be trusted with the project we hope to put in execution. I wish I may be mistaken, but I fear he has no other design but that of getting; however, I have promised him that Mr. Stanyan shall have thirteen blank commissions, which they may fill on the place. You will be pleased to speak to lord Sunderland to dispatch them; one must be for a colonel, and the other 12 for captains. These will cost her majesty only the trouble of putting her name, and if they should not be sent, he will pretend all would have succeeded, if he had had these commissions. Prince Eugene has desired me to write to you to hasten the 20 crowns a



man for the 4,000 foot; for till they receive that money, they cannot begin to raise those men, which will be prejudicial to the service, so that I beg you will speak to the comte de Gallas about it."

Soon after his arrival at the camp of Werwick, Marlborough received numerous letters from his friends in England, congratulating him on the splendid victory, and announcing the appointment of another thanksgiving day, for the purpose of offering up to the Lord of Hosts the grateful acknowledgments of an exulting people. We introduce two of these letters, one from Mr. Craggs, exhibiting the effusions of party malice, and the other from Godolphin, endeavouring to remove the impression, which these malicious reports produced on his mind.

MR. CRAGGS TO THE DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH.

"*London, July 13--24.* My lord;—As your glorious conduct must have altered the face of affairs at Paris, so it has disconcerted a world of knavish politics and designs here; and I am sure every body that told your grace the truth, must allow there never was more stirring, which nothing under Heaven but your own great genius could have quelled. A very great peer was heard to say, that as this battle might be the occasion of reducing France, so it would give you such a power at home as might be very troublesome, or words to this effect.

"But I hope in God, as your valour has restored the crown to a power of giving protection, and doing justice to its subjects, that power will be maintained where it ought, in the queen and her ministers; for such deliverances from tyranny abroad, and anarchy at home, are not to be hoped for every day.

"There has been no mail from Holland since my lord Stair's arrival, and the accounts were so ill related for two or three days, that the fine schemers and their allies, the disaffected, began to find ten thousand reasons against a total defeat, or having any great consequences from it. But by my lord Stair's journal, and three mails which came from Ostend to-day, these wise well-meaning persons have again changed their notes, and begin to cry Hosanna with the foremost. My lord, I do not speak this



as my own observation only, but by the instigation of some very great and faithful friends of your grace's, that when the differences shall be accommodated, which they will now very easily be, those who have taken unreasonable opportunities to find unnecessary faults, may not carry it off with an air of having been the only or best well wishers to the public good. For my own part, I have a full and perfect joy, that God Almighty has given these great blessings to us, by the means of your grace's unexampled conduct and valour, which, in defiance of all the envy, hatred, and malice, which the devil can invent, or villainous man design, must be a pillar of glory to you and your memory, as long as annals and tradition do last, which brings me to beg leave to subscribe myself."

FROM LORD GODOLPHIN.

"*Windsor, July 23.* \* \* \* \* Since I had written thus far, I have the favour of your's of the 26th, with the inclosed letter from M. Buys. You know so much of my apprehensions of the temper of M. Buys and his neighbours, that you will not be at all surprised, when I tell you I did not expect a letter less strong from him upon that occasion, taking it always for granted that they will endeavour to make use equally of good success, and of ill success toward their aim, which is peace; and on the other side, we must continue our endeavours as zealously, to keep them on as long as we can, in the expectation of farther advantages by doing so. And I hope you will not, upon second thoughts, be so much disheartened by the idle notions and expectations of impossibilities, which you may hear of from hence. Something of this arises from malice and envy, and from a desire to raise expectations, which they think cannot be made good, and when the Tories talk at this rate, these are the true reasons of it. But you will consider besides, that it is the temper of our nation, confirmed by daily experience, that we are at the top of the house in prosperity; and in misfortune, indeed, upon the least alarm, we are ready to sink into the earth."

But it was not the malice of his enemies, or the extravagant expectations of his admirers, that Marlborough had alone to regret;



for attempts were even made to excite jealousy between him and Eugene, by exciting their emulation, and insinuating that justice had not been rendered to the merits of the german commander. These attempts were repulsed with becoming dignity by both parties; and Marlborough omitted no opportunity to bear testimony to the services of his colleague.

To count Sinzendorf he observes, July 18, "You will have doubtless heard that the prince of Savoy has been with us nearly a fortnight. His presence alone was the greatest advantage during the battle, of which he has given you an account by express. All his troops are on this side Brussels, where they render us essential service, by keeping the enemy in check, while we are so far in advance."

In another letter to Mr. Travers, one of the agents for superintending the disbursements at Blenheim, he alludes more distinctly to the machinations which had been employed to create a misunderstanding.

"*Camp at Werwick, July 30.* Sir;—I have received your favour of the 8th instant, and am obliged to you for your compliments on the late happy success, with which Providence has blessed the arms of her majesty and her allies, against the common enemy. I believe I need not tell you, how much I desire the nation may at last be eased of a burthensome war, by an honourable peace, and no one can be a better judge than yourself of the sincerity of my wishes, to enjoy a little retirement at a place you have contributed, in a great measure, to the making so desirable. I thank you for your good wishes to myself on this occasion. *I dare say prince Eugene and I shall never differ about our share of laurels.* While the public has any real benefit of my services, I shall not be much concerned at any endeavours that may be used to lessen them.

"I thank you for your continued care and pains at Blenheim, and am with truth, &c."

Aware of the discontent which reigned in France, and the panic which prevailed in the defeated army, conscious also that some brilliant enterprise was necessary to prevent the dutch



from listening to overtures of peace, Marlborough proposed to mask Lille, and penetrate through the northern frontier into the heart of France. Collaterally with this design a small expedition was fitted out in England, under general Erle, which was intended to act on the coast, and if a landing could be effected, was to be supported by a detachment from the main army. But the design of penetrating directly into France was deemed too bold, even by Eugene, and of course encountered strong opposition from a government so timid and vacillating as that of Holland. Meanwhile, however, numerous detachments were sent out to excite alarm, by scouring the country and levying contributions; and the french commanders retaliated, by a similar irruption into the isle of Cadsand, which besides the advantage of plunder, was expected to produce a great impression among the dutch.

The correspondence, which occurs at this period, will not only exhibit the sentiments of the british commander, but will shew the utter impossibility of satisfying the extravagant expectations of his zealous admirers, and the difficulty of carrying even his own designs into execution.

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

"*July 23.* \* \* \* \* We continue still under the great difficulty of getting cannon, for whilst the french continue at Ghent, we can make no use of the Scheld and Lys, which are the only two rivers that can be of use to us in this country. We have ordered twenty battering pieces to be brought from Maestricht, and we have taken measures for sixty more to be brought from Holland. The calculation of the number of draught horses, to draw this artillery, amounts to sixteen thousand horses, by which you will see the difficulties we meet with; but we hope to overcome them. In the mean time, we send daily parties into France, which occasions great terror; so that I cannot think the court of France will suffer the duke of Vendome's army to continue where they are, as soon as they shall know we have a possibility of getting cannon; for by the intercepted letters we find that both in France, as well as in the duke of Vendome's army, they think it impossible for us to get a battering train, which makes them as



yet bear the inroads of our troops into their country. I have this morning sent 1,600 men to Armentières, for the greater security of our parties.

"I am very glad you have sent lieut.-general Erle to hasten the troops on board, for though the number is not great, they will much alarm the coast. I hope you will not determine to send these troops for Portugal, till we first see, whether they may not be of much more use on the coast of France. You know formerly you sent me a project for Abbeville; I have looked for it, but cannot find it. I should be glad you would send it me, for I think something of that kind might be practicable, and in that case, those troops, as well as the fleet, will be necessary.

"The duke of Vendome's army is so frightened, I am very confident if we could get them out of their retrenchments, and from behind the canal of Ghent and Bruges, we should beat them with half their numbers, especially their foot. This is one of their reasons for their staying where they are. It looks affected to be complaining in prosperity, but I have so many vexations, that I am quite tired, and long extremely for a little ease and quiet.

"It has happened upon the Rhine, as I formerly writ you, and the french talk of having another detachment from thence. This that the duke of Berwick has brought, consists of 55 squadrons and 34 battalions. He has been obliged to put some of his troops into Lille and Tournay, and is encamped with the rest at Douay."

"*July 26.* Since my last I have received the inclosed by M. Buys. You will by it see the inclinations of the burgomasters of Amsterdam. Whenever their inclinations shall be known, you may depend upon it that the States will be of the same opinion; for let our success be what it will, this campaign, I find the States are determined for peace, which I am afraid the king of France knows. By our news from Paris, Tortosa was taken the 11th, so that the troops from Italy will come too late. You may see by the Paris Gazette the turn they give to the battle of Oudenard, taking no notice of the 706 officers, nor the 7,000 prisoners. We have also taken 95 colours and standards, besides 3 the prussians



keep to send to their king ; but that which is our greatest advantage is, the terror that is in their army, so that it were to be wished that we could get near them.

“ What you apprehend, in your's of the 8th, of the States is very just ; for by what I hear from Buys, it is plain that they think enough is done for peace, and I am afraid they will not willingly give their consent for the marching their army into France, which certainly if it succeeded, would put a happy end to the war. I have acquainted prince Eugene with the earnest desire we have for our marching into France. He thinks it impracticable, till we have Lille for a *place d'armes* and magazine ; and then he thinks we may make a very great inroad, but not be able to winter, though we might be helped by the fleet, unless we were masters of some fortified town. If it depended upon pensionary Heinsius, he is so honest a man that he would not at this time think of peace ; but he is in his nature so timorous, that he will never contradict, whatever the inclinations of the States may be. The letter I send you from M. Buys was written before they knew of the loss of Tortosa, by which you may be sure their inclinations for peace will increase. I am assured that if this action had not happened, some proposal of peace was to have been made towards the end of August.

“ You will very easily believe me, when I tell you that I am a good deal vexed and mortified, to see that finding fault is more natural than helping to ease those that are forced to serve the public ; for I see by my letters from England, that if impossibilities are not done, after this success, your humble servant is to be blamed. I beg you to consider our situation. We are in a country where the duke de Berwick, and M. de Bernier, the intendant, in the king's name, order all the people to abandon their dwellings and retire to the strong towns. This joined with the difficulty of getting cannon, makes me uneasy to the last degree. It is most certain, that the success we had at Oudenard has lessened their army at least 20,000 men, but that which I think our greatest advantage, consists in the fear that is among their troops, so that I shall seek all occasions of attacking them. But their army is far from being



inconsiderable, for when the duke of Burgundy's army shall join that of the duke of Berwick, they will be at least one hundred thousand men. If it had pleased God that we had had one hour's day-light more at Oudenard, we had, in all likelihood, made an end of this war. This is the true state of our condition, which is proper for the queen to know; and I beg you to assure her majesty, that I shall endeavour every thing that I think may be for the public good and her service. In my last letter you have had my thoughts as to the expedition. I long to hear they are sailed."

TO THE DUCHESS.

"*July 26.* Since my last I have the happiness of your's of 8th, (O. S). By that and some others from England, I find much more is expected from the success it has pleased God to give us, than I am afraid is possible. I am sure you and my friends are so just and kind, as to believe that I shall do my best. I have the advantage of having prince Eugene and very good troops, but our difficulties are much greater than can be imagined in England. I no ways doubt but the tories will endeavour all they can to vex me, but I hope the whigs will support me in this war, and then I don't doubt but to bring France to such a peace as they desire; but to effect it there must be one campaign more after this. This is not only my opinion, but the opinion also of prince Eugene, which I desire you will let lord Sunderland know, and that I desire he would acquaint his friends with it, particularly lord Halifax and lord Somers, and lord Wharton, if he be in town, after which, I should be glad to hear from him on this subject; for prince Eugene and I consult daily, not only how to end this campaign, but also the war, with advantage; so that it will be of great use for me to know the opinions of those lords. You will see by the date of the inclosed letter, that I should have sent it you some time ago; but I have been in so continual a hurry, that for this, and I am afraid, other omissions, that must be my excuse. I must end my letter with assuring you, that I am very sorry for what you mention in the beginning of your letter, of the fondness of the queen for Mrs. Masham; I do not mean it as a thing that



may vex you or me, but as a thing that must at last have very ill consequences. I should have been glad on this occasion to have had a letter from the duke of Devonshire, so that I might, in some degree, have made amends for my last."

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

"*July 30.* We continue under very great difficulties of getting our cannon. Lille, Ypres, and Tournay, which should have furnished 5,000 horses, have received positive orders to furnish none; so that I am afraid, we shall be obliged to bring from Brussels at twice, what we were in hopes to have done at once, which must lose a great deal of time. We are assured that the dukes of Burgundy and Vendome have obtained the king of France's consent to continue in their camp behind the canal of Bruges and Ghent, they having assured him that it will not be in our power to do any thing considerable, but the settling some contributions, and the plundering the country, as long as they continue masters, by the situation of the town of Ghent, of the two rivers of the Scheld and Lys. They have another reason, which they do not give, for their staying where they are, which is, that they dare not trust their men in any camp, where we might be able to come to them.

"M. de Boufflers is come to his government of Lille. I hope he will not have better success than he had at Namur,\* if we were once so happy as to get our cannon. M. de Chamillard was yesterday at Lille, and it is said he is gone to day to Valenciennes. The alarm in France is very great, so that we should bring them to reasonable terms, if Holland would let us act as we ought to do. But I hear this evening that the french have forced their passage into the isle of Cadsand, which will give alarms to Zealand, and consequently make great noise at the Hague, and might occasion some unreasonable resolution, which might make us incapable of acting in this country. My only hopes are, that their eagerness for contribution may incline them to suffer a little, and let us act with the troops we have, we having

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\* He was commandant of Namur when it was taken by king William.



already settled five hundred thousand crowns for the country of Artois, and we hope to get them much more from Picardy. This being a contribution that is likely to last as long as the war, I did flatter myself it might have inclined them to continue the war till we might have had a good peace. We shall now see what use the party that is for peace will make of the french being in the isle of Cadsand."

"August 2. I thank you for lord Coningsby's letter, and send it back, not knowing but you may think it proper to shew it to the queen, if you have not already done it. I wish her so well, that I would be glad she might know what is in every body's heart."

"The delay that has been occasioned by cross winds to the embarkation, is a great *contretems*; but as I think most things are governed by destiny, having done all that is possible, one should submit with patience.

"We have got great part of our cannon to Brussels, so that now our greatest application is to have it here. The alarm the french have given by getting into the isle of Cadsand, has weakened our army of eleven battalions. As yet, we do not know what effect it has had in Holland; but no doubt, those that are for a peace, will endeavour to make all the noise they can. We have an account that our parties have occasioned very great terror in Picardy, and that they exclaim very much against M. de Vendome staying where he is; but by the measures he takes, there can be no doubt of his intention of staying there all this campaign. If we can succeed in our undertakings, we must not think of winter quarters, till we have obliged him to quit that country. It must be by force, for it is not in our power to hinder them from having subsistence, even for the whole winter, if they should be permitted to stay."

Meanwhile count Lottum had accomplished the demolition of the french works, and rejoining the main army, took post on the left, prolonging the line to Pont Rouge, near the confluence of the Marquette and the Lys. The heavy baggage, which had been left at Brussels before the engagement, was brought in safety to the



camp, by the precautions of the duke. Having thus effected the re-union of his troops, and secured the requisites for the comfort and subsistence of the army, Marlborough turned his attention to the means of prosecuting his success.

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

*“August 3.* I have this morning received your's of the 18th by the express. I must refer you to Mr. Secretary's letter, by which you will see prince Eugene's and my opinion. I have spoke of it to nobody but the prince; for by several observations I have of late made of the deputies of our army, I am afraid the States would not be for this expedition, nor any thing else, where there is a venture; by which, I am confident they think themselves sure of peace, the thoughts of which may ruin themselves and the allies, for I verily believe the intention of the king of France, is to amuse them, in order to gain time. After we have succeeded at Lille, and that we shall think it feasible to support the project of Abbeville, I should agree with you that lieutenant-general Erle should have the chief command during this winter, so that he should endeavour to inform himself of the number of troops that will be necessary for the supporting him in that post; for as one of the difficulties will be his subsistence, he must not ask for more men than what are absolutely necessary.

*“You will see by Mr. Secretary's letter, that we are taking the best measures we can for the security of our cannon, which the enemy threatens; but I hope we are in no danger, prince Eugene having for their security 90 squadrons and 53 battalions; and if the duke of Vendome should march with his whole army, I am ready to follow with the troops that remain with me. I am in haste to send this messenger, that no time may be lost in sending Erle to the coast of Normandy.”*

We add other letters, because they throw light on the offensive projects of the british commander, particularly the proposed descent on the french coast.

TO SECRETARY BOYLE.

*“August 3.* I received this morning the honour of your letter of the 18th of July, and have kept the messenger no longer than



was necessary to advise with prince Eugene, and to return you our opinions relating to the project. You know already, that by the unanimous concurrence of the States, and of the chief generals of the army, in the present juncture, the siege of Lille has been thought preferable to any other operation; and you cannot be insensible, from my several letters, of the difficulties we have been struggling with, for this fortnight, and more, to get the greatest part of our heavy artillery to Brussels, which being happily effected, the prince is going to-day with 25 battalions and 25 squadrons from hence, to strengthen his army, in order to bring the artillery forward. This being our present situation, both the prince and myself are of opinion, it will be impossible for us to take any just measures for seconding lieut.-general Erle's design upon Abbeville, till we are masters of Lille, and that therefore the fleet, with the troops, should go directly to the coast of Normandy, and land and make what impression they can there, till the siege be over; and then I shall give you timely notice when it may be proper to come this way. For we are of opinion no attempt should be made upon Abbeville, nor the least jealousy given that way, till towards the end of September, that our people may have the winter season to favour them to keep their ground; for it is certain the french will use their utmost endeavours, if the weather will permit, to force them on board again. In the mean time, you will do well to advise with such french people as may be perfectly acquainted with the place, and the country thereabout, what number of troops may be sufficient to maintain the post all the winter. You must consider withal, that they may be supplied with provisions from England, for no doubt the enemy will block them up so close, that they can have little or no assistance from the country. Now, after all, this project must depend upon our success at Lille, and then if it shall be thought practicable, and can be executed, we must certainly reap a very great advantage by it, by joining them with a good body of troops in the Spring, and carrying the war into the heart of France. As I have dispatched the messenger back again, as soon as possible, and directed him to use his utmost diligence, I hope



he will arrive in time before the fleet sails, that they may receive the necessary instructions. You will please to lay this, with my humble duty, before her majesty and the lords of the council. I am truly, &c."

TO GENERAL ERLE.

"*Camp at Werwick, August 6.* Sir;—On Friday last one of the queen's messengers arrived here, and brought me a letter of the 18th of July, with the project that by your's just now come in of the 20th, I understand was communicated to you and Sir George Byng that day at Windsor. I dispatched the messenger back the same morning, with my reasons against that project, which I dare answer will be approved by her majesty and the council, since I acquaint them we are no ways in a condition here, at present, to second those designs; and seeing by these last letters, you were put to sea with all expedition, so that I fear the messenger may not arrive in time for you to receive instructions from court, I send this off from the coast of Flanders, to advise you and Sir George Byng of it, that you may not pursue your last instructions, but follow those that were given you first for the coast of Normandy or Brittany; and I hope, if need be, towards the end of the next month, we may be in a posture of seconding you nearer hand."

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

"*August 6.* Since my last, I have received your's of the 20th, as also the instructions of lieut.-general Erle, which makes me in pain, fearing he may be landed before he receives contrary orders, which I hope were sent as soon as you received mine of the 3rd, it being impossible for us to send any detachment till our siege was over. I earnestly desire that, though he should be landed, you will send orders for their re-embarking, and that they lose no time in going to the coast of Normandy. I shall endeavour to send to Mr. Erle, but it will be great odds it never comes to him, so that nothing is to be relied on but one of the queen's ships. I am in hourly expectation of hearing that our cannon left Brussels this day. The french have several detachments abroad, in order to trouble the march, but I hope to no purpose; for the prince's



army is now strengthened from hence by 47 squadrons and 30 battalions, so that I reckon he has 50,000 men with him.

“By some letters from England, I find, in all manner of ways, I am to be found fault with; for when I am lucky, I am negligent, and do not make use of the occasion; and if I should ever prove unfortunate, no doubt I should run the risk of being a fool or traitor. In my opinion, it is high time for me to think of retiring, by which I should be in nobody's power; but I will take no resolution, except by the advice of the queen and you; but I hope you will allow me to do it this next winter, which may be a proper time, if what I hear from the Hague be true, which is, that they are resolved to have peace.”

which I have answer will be appropos, since I repeat them we are no ways in a condition here, at present, to second those designs; and seeing by these last letters, you were put to sea with all expedition, so that I fear the messenger may not arrive in time for you to receive instructions from court. I send this off from the coast of Flanders, to advise you and Sir George Byng of it, that you may not pursue your last instructions, but follow those that were given you first for the coast of Normandy or Brittany; and I hope it need be towards the end of the next month, we may be in a posture of seconding you nearer hand.

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.  
August 6. Since my last, I have received yours of the 20th, and also the instructions of lieutenant-general Fife, which makes me in pain, fearing he may be landed before he receives contrary orders, which I hope were sent as soon as you received mine of the 3rd, it being impossible for us to send any detachment till our ridge was over. I earnestly desire that, though he should be landed, you will send orders for their re-embarking, and that they lose no time in going to the coast of Normandy. I shall endeavour to send to Mr. Fife, but it will be great odds if never comes to him, so that nothing is to be relied on but one of the queen's ships. I am in hourly expectation of hearing that our cannon left Brixels this day. The french have several detachments abroad, in order to trouble the march, but I hope to no purpose; for the prince's



## CHAPTER 71.

1708.

*Continuation of the correspondence on the political feuds—Increasing contentions between the duchess and the queen—Their violent altercation soon after the thanksgiving for the victory of Oudenard—Visible decline of the favour enjoyed by the duchess—She adopts the resolution of suspending her correspondence and remonstrances with the queen.*

**T**HE duke of Marlborough being stationary for a month at the camp of Werwick, and the military movements suspended, we take this opportunity of resuming our account of the political feuds, and of introducing the interesting correspondence which passed with the queen and his friends in England.

In the midst of the cares and anxieties attendant on the great operations, which he was now directing, Marlborough was still fruitlessly employed in combating the prejudices of the queen, and labouring to promote the cause of the party, to whose injurious suspicions and acrimonious reproaches, he was continually exposed. Discouraged, however, by the ill success of his own representations, and wearied by the importunities of the duchess and Godolphin, who complained of the instances he had already made, as too lukewarm for the occasion, he forwarded to them the letters which he received from the queen, with draughts of his intended answers, and requested them to furnish for his replies, such hints and arguments as their intimate knowledge of the state of the court and parties might suggest. Accordingly we find at this period several draughts of letters, in the hand-writing of the duchess and Godolphin, relating to the topics which had lately been the incessant subjects of discussion and correspondence. Some of these he appears to have adopted, others



his better judgment rejected; and the different modifications and changes, which he made in their draughts, as well as in his own letters, heighten our respect for his loyalty, circumspection, and firmness.

The discussion relative to the promotion of Somers, and the other demands of the whigs, which had been suspended in the midst of the preparations for battle, was revived with redoubled warmth, as soon as the assurance of victory had given a temporary relaxation to his anxious mind.

FROM LORD GODOLPHIN.

*“Windsor, July 6--17, at night.* I have troubled you this morning with so long a letter, that I shall only make use of this opportunity of inclosing a letter from the queen, to tell you that when you answer it, I wish, in case you are of my opinion, you would take that occasion to let her see, that when God has blessed her arms with so great success, it would be a right time for her to shew mercy and forgiveness to those who may have displeased her, and to put an end to her resentment against Sir J. Montague, which is a thing extremely prejudicial to her service; and I have hitherto been but just able to keep her from coming to extremities in it, with all the industry and skill imaginable.”

TO THE DUCHESS.

*“July 19.* Since my last I have had none from you; but having had for some time two or three of your former letters to answer, I begin this morning very early, tho' the letters do not go till the evening, so that I may hear from you before this is sealed.

*“You give me an account in one of your's of a conversation\* that the duke of Somerset had with lord Wharton; and by the latter's answer, it looks as if he thought that the duke of Somerset spoke the thoughts of the lord treasurer and mine. You know*

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\* The duke here alludes to a conversation in which the duke of Somerset endeavoured to lure Wharton from his party, by the offer of some post under the government, and justified the queen's exclusion of lord Somers, on the plea that he had personally offended the prince of Denmark. Lord Wharton contemptuously rejected the overture. An account of this conversation is given in one of Mr. Maynwaring's letters to the duchess.



that I have already assured you, that I shall be very far from endeavouring to divide the whigs ; and I beg you will have so kind an opinion of me, as to believe I can't be so indiscreet as to employ the duke of Somerset in any thing that is of consequence. You seem to think that the design of removing lord Sunderland is over, but by the two inclosed letters I think it is not. My not being well, the battle, and the hurry I have been in, has been my excuse hitherto for my not having answered either of them. I beg that you will let nobody know that I send them to you, only Mr. Montgomery, with whom I desire you will advise what answer I should give.

“ I am very sorry to see by your's that the queen is fonder of Mrs. Masham than ever ; I am sure, as long as that is, there can be no happiness, I mean quietness.

“ By what you write me of lady Tyrconnel,\* I believe her discourse to you has been much the same as it was with me, which was, not to rely upon any body, and persuading me to think the government of this country to be the greatest and happiest thing that could happen to me. I could also perceive that she thought you and I were not so well with the queen as formerly. I do not wonder at that, for I believe it is the opinion of every body ; but if I can end this war well, and you are kind, nothing can make me unhappy.

“ Having writ thus far, I have received your two letters of the 28th of the last month, and the 2nd of this. The two inclosed you have sent me of Mrs. Morley's are as one would wish ; but I think, in prudence, you must not seem to have any doubts, and that may in length of time enable you to do good to the nation and the queen. I am very sensible of the very unreasonable opiniatrety of the queen ; however, knowing the faults of those which were before her, and what, I fear, will be in those that are to follow her, I do from my heart wish her a long and

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\* Lady Tyrconnel, the sister of the duchess, was at this period allowed to return to England, to obtain the payment of her jointure, which had run in arrear, in consequence of her absence abroad, and the exile of her deceased husband, for his attachment to the dethroned sovereign.



prosperous reign, so that you must take pains ; for the happiness of England depends upon her doing what is right and just. Besides my love to my country, I own to you I have a tenderness for the queen, being persuaded that it is the fault of those whom she loves, and not her own, when she does what is wrong. God has been pleased to make me the instrument of doing her again some service ; *I wish she may make a right use of it.* I send you back your two letters, as you desire, with the two writ to me, which I again beg nobody may know but Mr. *Montgomery*.”

TO THE QUEEN.

[In reply to her congratulatory letter of July 6, O. S.]

“ *July 23.* Madam ;—I have the honour of your majesty’s letter of the 6th, and am very thankful for all your goodness to me ; and I am sure it will always be my intention, as well as duty, to be ready to venture my life for your service.

“ As I have formerly told your majesty that I am desirous to serve you in the army, but not as a minister, I am every day more and more confirmed in that opinion. And I think myself obliged, upon all accounts, on this occasion, to speak my mind freely to you. The circumstances in this last battle, I think, shew the hand of God ; for we were obliged, not only to march five leagues that morning, but to pass a river before the enemy, and to engage them before the whole army was passed, which was a visible mark of the favour of heaven to you and your arms. Your majesty shall be convinced from this time, that I have no ambition, or any thing to ask for myself or family ; but I will end the few years, which I have to live, in endeavouring to serve you, and to give God Almighty thanks for his infinite goodness to me. But as I have taken this resolution to myself, give me leave to say, that I think you are obliged, in conscience, and as a good christian, to forgive, and to have no more resentments to any particular person or party, but to make use of such as will carry on this just war with vigour, which is the only way to preserve our religion and liberties, and the crown on your head ; which, that you may long



enjoy, and be a blessing to your people, shall be the constant wish and prayer of him, that is with the greatest truth and duty." \*

The letter of July 12, which Marlborough had written on the field of battle to the duchess, was communicated by her to the queen, and she accompanied it with a commentary, containing the severest reflections on the ungrateful return which her majesty had made to the instrument of such success. She even indulged herself in pointed censures against admiral Churchill, whom she indirectly accused of exerting his influence to the detriment of his own brother, and then launched out into a still more acrimonious invective against Mrs. Masham.

This imprudent effusion did not tend to soothe the wounded feelings of the irritated sovereign. She not only replied in a style of similar invective, but wrote to the duke himself, adverting to the misconstrued expression in his letter, and justifying her own conduct.

"*Windsor, July 13--24.* I cannot let lord Stair go without giving him a letter, and assuring you, that as soon as it is convenient for my affairs, I will do for him what he desires ;† and, indeed, I think I owe it to him, he certainly having lost his election in Scotland, by being at that time doing his duty in Flanders.

"We have had the satisfaction to-day of hearing more good news by the way of Ostend, and I hope to-morrow we shall have it confirmed from you, and that I shall have another letter to thank you for by the next. I was shewed a letter the other day, by a friend of your's, that you writ soon after the battle, and I must beg you will explain to me one expression in it. You say, after being thankful for being the instrument of so much good to the nation and me, if *I would please to make use of it*. I am sure I will never make an ill use of so great a blessing, but according to the best of my understanding, make the best use of it I can, and

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\* Printed in the *Conduct*, p. 258.

† This was a request of Marlborough that he should be raised to the british peerage.



should be glad to know what is the use you would have me make of it, and then I will tell you my thoughts very freely and sincerely.

“ I will not trouble you with any more now, but I beg you would never have any doubts of my sincere esteem and friendship for you, which I do assure you shall be lasting as my life.”

TO THE DUCHESS.

“ *August 2.* The inclosed I send, you will see is from Mrs. Morley. I have altered my answer, since I received your's of the 16th. What I write is the truth of my heart; nobody must see them but Mr. Montgomery. You must keep all her letters and my answers, for I keep no copies, and you must be careful in the conversations you have, not to let her think that you have any account of her letters; for that would make her more shy when she writes.

“ I am afraid what you say of Abigail is but too true, but we must, for our own reputation, have all the consideration imaginable for the queen. I believe it is in the power of Mrs. Masham to do very ill offices, but I do not think she could get the blue ribbon for any body.

“ Lord Raby is in friendship with Mr. Harley and all that cabal, so that I hope lord treasurer will give him as little countenance as possible.

“ What you wish in your's of the 13th, of my being able to make so good a campaign this year, that I might never more stir out of England, I do with all my soul wish it; but I dare not flatter myself it will be so, for I fear there must be one year more to make a good peace. I am sorry that my brother George is gone to Oxford, fearing he may do what I shall not like. I can't hinder being concerned for him, tho' I find he is not at all sensible of the trouble he is like to have this winter, so that I shall certainly have mortifications upon his account.

“ Having ended my letter, I received your's of the 16th, so that I am obliged to make some alteration in my answer, that it might agree with what you sent me. I have corrected my copy, and have marked in your's what I have left out, believing that would rather do hurt than good; for I know the queen would



venture every thing to effect the dividing of the whigs; so that those expressions would have no other effect but that of encouraging her to go on in the fatal way she is now in. This is my opinion, but I submit to better judgment.

“ You may from me assure lord Sunderland, that I will always be in the interest of the whigs, with which assurance I desire he would acquaint lord Halifax, lord Somers, and lord Wharton; and at the same time, for their sakes, and that of the public, as well as my own reputation, I must be master of judging of my actions towards the queen; for sooner or later we must have her out of the hands of Mrs. Masham, or every thing will be labour in vain.”

TO THE QUEEN.

“ *August 2.* Madam;—The uneasiness of my mind upon receiving your majesty’s letters of the 18th and 22nd of June, had such an effect upon my body as to make me very ill, till it pleased God to bless me with such good success, as in great measure covered me; though my sickness, before the battle, and the hurry in which I have been almost ever since, joined with the uneasiness of the subject, have hindered me from returning your majesty an answer so soon as I ought to have done. I was glad to observe that the impressions, which your majesty seemed to have in your’s of the 18th, of my lord Sunderland’s having made use of your name in his letters to Scotland, had been so far set right, by the assurances he gave you, as to let you see all possible endeavours had been used from thence, to incense you against him. And though he may have done, upon that occasion, what your majesty does not like, yet I beg leave to say, with all humility and duty to your majesty, that I did flatter myself nobody could have prevailed with you, to carry your resentment so far against him in my absence, as is mentioned in your letters, and to give me so great a mortification in the face of all Europe, at a time when I was so zealously endeavouring to serve you at the hazard, both of my reputation and of my blood. But though any consideration of me were wholly out of the case, I should think, for your own sake, you would suspend any farther resentment in



this matter till I have the honour to see you, and opportunity of thoroughly examining and discoursing upon it with your majesty. For God's sake, madam, consider, that whatever may be said to amuse or delude you, it is utterly impossible for you ever to have more than a part of the tories; and though you could have them all, their number is not capable of doing you good.\* These things are so plain, that I can't doubt but your majesty will be convinced nothing can be so fatal to your service, as any way to discourage the whigs, at this time, when after the blessing of this victory, you may be sure, that if you shew a confidence in their zeal for your interests, they will all concur very cheerfully to make you great and happy, as I wish. God Almighty bless and preserve you.

"I had writ thus far before I had the honour of your majesty's of the 13th, by lord Stair, and as I shall always endeavour to deserve from your majesty, so I shall never doubt of having your esteem and protection. Your majesty might see by the shortness of the letter that was shewn you, that I was in great haste when I writ it, and my fulness of heart for your service made me use that expression. What I then meant, as I must always think is, that you can make no good use of this victory, nor of any other blessing, but by following the advice of my lord treasurer, who has been so long faithful to you; for any other advisers do but lead you into a labyrinth, to play their own game at your expence. Nothing but your commands should have obliged me to say so much, having taken my resolution to suffer with you, but not to advise, being sensible that if there was not something very extraordinary, your majesty would follow the advice of those that have served you so long, faithfully, and with success."†

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\* The following words were here omitted, for the reason which he assigns in the preceding letter to the duchess:—

"Not more than their inclinations. They can do you hurt by making the whigs jealous and uneasy, and that is their great aim; for they know that must have the consequence of dividing the whigs, and by that means enabling them to cast the balance on the side of those who are, and always will be, in opposition to your majesty's administration and government."

† From the endorsement of the duchess, it appears that the draught of this letter was written by the duke, and transmitted to her and the treasurer for their approbation. It was



## FROM THE QUEEN, IN REPLY.\*

"I received your's of the 2--13th of this month on Saturday last, which was in answer to three of mine. I am very sorry to find you persist in your resolution of not advising me concerning my home affairs; but I would beg your pardon for disobeying your commands in that particular, it being impossible for me, who have on all occasions spoke and writ my mind very freely, as I think every friend ought to do to one another, to forbear doing the same still, and asking your opinion in every thing; there being nobody but you and lord treasurer that I do advise with, nor can rely on, which I will yet hope you will believe, since I tell you so, you having more than once or twice assured me you would credit what I said. Though I must confess, by what I am told every day of my being influenced by Mr. Harley, through a relation of his, and your saying you are sensible that if there were not something very extraordinary, I should follow the advice of lord treasurer and you, I fear you have not a thorough good opinion of me, and if that be so, it is in vain for me to say any thing. However, I can't help asking, why my not complying with some things, that are desired, and which you know I have ever been against, should be imputed to something extraordinary? Is not one body of one opinion, and *one of another*? and why then should it be wonderful, that you and I should differ in some things, as well as other people, especially since my thoughts are the same of the whigs, that ever they were from the time that ever I have been capable of having notions of things and people; and I must own, I can see no reason to alter mine.

"Since I began this letter, I have the satisfaction of receiving your's of the 9th,† by lord treasurer, who is just come out of the country. I am very sorry that your health is not yet confirmed. I beg you would be careful both of preserving that and your

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returned, with corrections and additions, and the copy of the letter which was apparently sent, exists in the hand-writing of the duchess, with the parts which were omitted by the duke, interlined. The postscript was written by the duke himself, on the impulse of the moment.

\* From a copy in the hand of the duchess.

† This letter is missing.



person, which is of so much consequence to me, and more sincerely and truly valued and esteemed by me than can be expressed. I have had so many hindrances since I began to write, that I can't say so much as I intended, nor any more to your's of the 9th, being in haste to send this to London, but must trouble you again some other time, till when, I beg you would be so just to me as to believe I am, and ever will be, your humble servant."

TO THE DUCHESS.

"*August 6.* I had not time by the messenger to answer your's of the 17th which he brought me. As to what you say of my brother George, you will see by my former letters that I think him in as wrong measures as is possible.\* It is a very great satisfaction the assurances you give me, that there will be care taken to make the mortification as easy as such a thing can bear; but in this country it must have a very bad effect as to my reputation, since he is my brother. I know not from whom you may have heard what you write, but I am sure Mr. Walpole ought to be satisfied with me; for I did say enough to him, that he might see that I was far from approving, but on the contrary, condemned the proceeding of my brother. The account you give me of the commerce and kindness of the queen to Mrs. Masham, is that which will at last bring all things to ruin; for by all you write, I see the queen is determined to support, and I believe, at last own her. I am of the opinion I ever was of, that the queen will not be made sensible, or frightened out of this passion; but I can't

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\* This passage alludes to a quarrel occasioned by the imprudent loquacity of admiral Churchill, who, with a view to mortify the whigs, circulated a report that the duke had given a regiment to a colonel Jones, at the secret instigation of Harley. He assigned, as his authority, the avowal of Mr. Robert Walpole, then secretary at war, and the confidential agent of the duke in all military affairs. The report, which was communicated to the queen and prince, by the admiral himself, created the greatest irritation on all sides, and was proved to be false. Mr. Walpole justified himself to his patron, in a letter, printed in the *Memoirs of his Life and Administration*, v. 11, p. 9; and in a second letter, dated June 29 (still preserved in the Marlborough papers.) The duke not only condemned the conduct of his brother, but endeavoured to soothe the wounded feelings of Walpole, as well as to exonerate himself from the censure, which the report was calculated to excite among the whigs. The extreme dissatisfaction of all parties is proved by the sensation, which an incident so comparatively trifling produced, and evinces the embarrassment which Marlborough encountered from the imprudence of his brother.



but think some ways might be found to make Mrs. Masham very much afraid. The discovery you have made of the queen's having the opinion that she has friends which will support her, can be no other than the tories; and it is true, they would ruin lord treasurer and me, and will be able to bring it about, if it can be thought ruin, to be put in the condition of quietness, which of all things I wish for; but not to be forced to it, which I shall certainly be, if Mrs. Masham remains in that credit you say, and I believe, she has with the queen.

“ I find you are in pain for my not being able to make use of the letter you sent me. You will by the last post have seen how I have made use of it, tho' I said nothing by way of excuse in my letter to Mrs. Morley. I did it by the same post to Mr. Montgomery, in the letter of the 23rd, with which he acquainted Mrs. Morley, without doubt, so that my letter may come very naturally to her.

“ What I hear from the Hague is, that those people are resolved to have peace on any conditions. This may prove fatal, but if they are determined, we shall find it very difficult to hinder it, so that you will let me have your thoughts how we may be most at ease. For when that happens, I believe nobody will be against my living quietly with you, and then the court may govern as they please, the consequence of which I would flatter myself will be, that we shall then be more esteemed by our friends as well as enemies; for the temper of England is such, that nobody in any great station can be liked, for if they are lucky they do not make use enough of their advantage; if unfortunate, they run the risk of being called fools and traitors.

“ You will know from hence the public news in the printed papers. By my letters yesterday from Cadogan, I am in hopes the cannon may begin their march from Brussels to-day or to-morrow.

“ Since I had finished this letter, I have received your's of the 20th, and have only time to assure you, that I am fully convinced that the tories would ruin me. You know my resolutions by my former letters, of being firm to the whigs; and if they support the



queen, they will make me more capable of serving them and my country."

The last letter written by Marlborough drew from the queen a reply, in a more ungracious style than the preceding. It appears to have been destroyed at his request, but we may judge of its tone and contents, by the deep impression which it produced on his mind.

TO THE DUCHESS.

"*August 9.* I have had the happiness of your's of the 23rd; by the same post Mr. Montgomery sent me one from Mrs. Morley.

"I have had a good deal of struggle with myself whether I should burn it, or send it you to shew lord treasurer. As I would have you two know every thing, that you might be the better able to act rightly; I have inclosed the letter I have received from the queen, but I must conjure you that you will not, in your discourse, or any other way, let any body know the contents of this letter, which has thoroughly convinced me that there is no washing a blackamoor white, and that we must expect this next winter all the disagreeableness imaginable; for the tories have got the heart and entire possession of the queen, which they will be able to maintain, as long as Mrs. Masham has credit.

"I do earnestly beg, when Mr. Montgomery has read Mrs. Morley's letter and this of mine to you, that they may both be torn to pieces, so that they may never hurt Mrs. Morley, whom I can't but love, and endeavour to serve, as long as I have life; for I know this is not her fault, otherwise than by being too fond of Mrs. Masham, who imposes upon her."

In the course of this arduous struggle, the whigs became more inflamed, in proportion to the resistance of the queen. Disappointed of the effects which they expected from their preceding manœuvres, they resumed, with increasing warmth, the proposal of an invitation to the electoral prince, and endeavoured to gain the acquiescence of Marlborough. This imprudent design did not escape the notice of their political antagonists, who availed themselves of a topic so disagreeable, to increase the resentment



of the sovereign. Lord Haversham even waited on the queen to communicate the unwelcome intelligence, and wrought on her timidity, by dwelling on the necessity to which she would be reduced, of proposing the invitation herself. \*

The queen, in the agony of her mind, communicated to Marlborough the information which she received from lord Haversham, less from a motive of confidence, than from a wish to employ his influence in averting the expected mortification.

*July 22, O. S.* "I cannot end this without giving you an account, in short, of a visit I had from lord Haversham. He told me his business was, to let me know there was certainly a design laying between the whigs and some great men, to have an address made in the next session of parliament, for inviting the electoral prince over to settle here; and that he would certainly come to make a visit, as soon as the campaign was over. And that there was nothing for me to do, to prevent my being forced to do this (as I certainly would), but by shewing myself to be queen, and making it my own act. I told him, if this matter should be brought into parliament, whoever proposed it, whether whig or tory, I should look upon neither of them as my friends, nor would ever make any invitation, neither to the young man, nor his father, nor his grandmother.

"What I have to say upon this subject, at this time, is, to beg you would find whether there is any design where you are, that the young man should make a visit in the winter; and contrive some way to put any such thought out of his head, that the difficulty may not be brought upon me, of refusing him leave to come, if he should ask it, or forbidding him to come, if he should attempt it; for one of these two things I must do, if either he or his father should have any desires to have him see this country, it being a thing I cannot bear, to have any successor here, though but for a week. And therefore I shall depend upon you to do every thing

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\* Letter from lord Godolphin, Windsor, July 30.



on the other side of the water to prevent this mortification from coming upon her, that is, and ever will be, most sincerely, &c.”\*

This pathetic appeal to his feelings and loyalty, made a due impression; and however dissatisfied with the conduct of the sovereign, he refused to countenance so indecorous a proposal, as we find by his reply † to the duchess on the same subject.

“ Since my last I have had time to read a second time your three letters of the 16th, 18th, and 22nd of the last month, by which I see that I have not yet answered some things in your letters.

“ In the first place, you may depend upon my joining with the whigs, in opposition to the tories, in all things; but as to the invitation, or what else may be personal to the queen, in regard to myself, as well as concern for her, I must never do any thing that looks like flying in her face. But as to every thing else, I shall always be ready to join with the whigs, in opposition to the tories, for whom I shall have no reserve. I am entirely of your opinion as to 37 and 222, that they may be had by those that shall think it worth their while to buy them. The first has already told me that he will do whatever I shall think fit for the service; but as I must be master of my own actions, which may concern the queen personally, so on the other hand, I shall solicit nobody to be of my opinion, but be contented in giving my reasons and vote in the house. You judge very right of the queen, that nothing will go so near her heart as that of the invitation. I think the project very dangerous: I wish the whigs would think well of it, but I am at too great a distance to be advising.

“ The business of Mr. Walpole has very much vexed me, for by what he writes me, my brother George has been much to blame. I wish, with all my heart, he would retire, for I have been long convinced it would be for his service and every body else. But as

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\* Printed in the Conduct, p. 164, but evidently only an extract from the original letter.

† Without date, but certainly written early in July.



I am told the prince will not hear it, I shall never desist from being for it.

“ I would by no means endeavour to change any opinion that lord Sunderland may have, but I think there is no necessity of his saying any thing to the queen, that she will take ill; but on the contrary, that he would endeavour to please, as much as is consistent with his opinion; for it will be very mortifying to me, upon many accounts, if she should persist to have him removed, so that I beg of him, upon my account, that he would do all that is in his power.

“ Having wrote thus far, I have received your dear kind letter of the 6th, and as my happiness depends upon your kindness, be assured as long as I have life, I shall do all I can to deserve your esteem and love. I enclose to you Mrs. Morley's letter, and the copy of my answer. You will let Mr. Montgomery see them both, but nobody else must know that I send them. We continue under the great difficulty of getting cannon. Till we have them, we must be contented with sending parties into France, which makes them very uneasy.”

We continue the series of this melancholy, but interesting correspondence, for a short time after Marlborough quitted the camp of Werwick, that we may present a more distinct and connected portion of the history of this political intrigue.

It is necessary, however, to observe that at this period the whigs again endeavoured to stimulate the zeal of Marlborough and Godolphin, by recurring to threats of hostility. This determination was announced by Sunderland, in a vehement letter to the duke, and afterwards by repeated messages through the duchess, who warmly seconded their representations.

THE DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH TO THE DUCHESS.

“ *Helchin, Aug. 16.* Your's of the 27th came so late that I could not, for want of time, do any more than thank you for it by the last post. You say that lord Sunderland has assured you that I may depend upon the friendship of the whigs, if I will make it possible. You and lord Sunderland may be assured that



I have no intentions or thoughts but that of deserving well from England, and consequently must and will depend on the friendship of the whigs; and if my good intentions are not seconded with success, I think I shall have nothing justly to reproach myself withal, so that I may retire with quietness and honour.

“The siege of Lisle, which was begun on Monday last, is of that consequence to France, that I nowise doubt of their drawing all the troops that is in their power together, to give us what disturbance they can. I pray God to bless this undertaking, and all others that may tend to the bringing of us to a safe and lasting peace, and then I will not put the visit of lord Haversham to Abigail much to heart. But as that angry lord has not for some years made any visit to any belonging to the court, I think his visit to Abigail will not be much for her service, nor that of the queen, since it must appear to all the world, that she is the protectress of those who would destroy the queen’s ministers, which must occasion very great prejudice to her service.

“But I think we are now acting for the liberties of all Europe, so that till this matter is a little more over, tho’ I love the queen with all my heart, I can’t think of the business of England, till this great affair is decided, which I think must be by another battle; for I am resolved to risk rather than suffer Brussels to be taken, tho’ the number of this army is very much diminished by the siege. But I rely on the justness of our cause, and that God will not forsake us, and that he will continue to keep our troops in good heart, as they are at present. I beg you to be so kind and just as to be assured, that my kindness for you is such, that my greatest ambition is bounded in that of ending my days quietly with you.”

The embarrassment which Marlborough encountered from the difficulty of proving his sincerity to the whigs, and combating the pertinacity of the queen, induced him to imitate the example of the treasurer, in offering his resignation. We do not find his letter to the queen on this occasion; but one, in which he announced his resolution to the duchess, we lay before the reader.



"*Aug. 20. I send you back your's to Mrs. Morley, as also that of Mr. Montgomery to her, as you desired, having marked the lines which I desire her to reflect on.\** I am doing my best to serve England and the queen, and, with all my heart and soul, I pray for God's protection and blessing; but I am so tired of what I hear, and what I think must happen in England, that I am every day confirmed, that I should be wanting to myself, and ungrateful to God Almighty, if I did not take the first occasion that can be practicable, to retire from business. And as I have for several years served my queen and country with all my heart, so I should be glad to have some time to recollect and be grateful for the many mercies I have received from the hand of God. I would not live like a monk, but I can't with patience think of continuing much longer in business, having it not in my power to persuade that to be done, which I think is right. I foresee the difficulty of retiring during the war, which is my greatest trouble at this time; but even that difficulty must be overcome, if I must be in some manner answerable for the notions of the queen, who is no ways governed by any thing I can say or do. God knows who it is that influences; but as I love her and my country, I dread the consequences.

"You say nothing of going to Blenheim, but the weather is so fine I could wish you there, by which the finishing within doors, I believe, would go on the faster. If it were possible, I would flatter myself that I might be so happy to see it the next summer, especially if M. de Vendome keeps his word in endeavouring the relief of Lisle, where the trenches are to be opened this night; and if they let us be at rest for a fortnight longer, they will very much oblige us."

"*August 23.* You say Mrs. Morley has taken no notice of your letter. I think that is a true sign she is angry. There being three or four posts come from England since she has received Mr. Freeman's last letter, I take it for granted the same method will

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\* These lines in italics were erased by the duchess, when she communicated the letter to the queen.



be taken of giving no answer. I am no ways dissatisfied at that manner of proceeding, for till the queen changes her humour and resolutions, the less the conversations are the better. What Mr. Craggs has told you of the meetings and resolutions of the tories, and that they think they have good ground to stand on, is very natural to people that have always flattered themselves. I both hope and think they can succeed in nothing, that can be of great consequence to the government; but they will always have it in their power to vex those that are in business. For my own part, I shall be in no ways surprised, when I see them act with all the malice imaginable against me. I shall ask no favour of them, being fully resolved of retiring, as soon as possible, to such a sort of life, that it shall not be in their power to vex me. I shall always endeavour to behave myself so, as that such of my friends as will be inclined to be kind to me, shall have no reason to be ashamed of it.

“I am very sorry that the inclinations of my brother are so violent for the tories, as that they depend upon his interest with the prince; but all that would quickly signify very little, if it were not for the great power Mrs. Masham has with the queen. I am so fully convinced of this, that I should never trouble the queen with any of my letters, but that I can't refuse lord treasurer and you, when you desire any thing of me. I am sure that the interest of Mrs. Masham is so settled with the queen, that we only trouble ourselves to no purpose; and by endeavouring to hurt, we do good offices to her, so that in my opinion we ought to be careful of our own actions, and not lay every thing to heart, but submit to whatever may happen.

“I do not take Mr. Bromley for a great negotiator, but a less able man than himself will reconcile lord Rochester and Mr. Harley at this time. I believe you may depend upon it that they will be all of one mind, and that they think themselves assured of the hearts of the prince and the queen, which is a very dismal prospect.

“If I had not made use of the leisure time I had yesterday, you had not been troubled with so long a letter, I having been



on horseback all this day. The trenches were opened last night before Lisle, so that we shall very quickly see what method M. de Vendome will take for the saving of that place."

THE QUEEN TO THE DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH.

[In reply to his offer of resignation.]\*

"I am sorry to find you in such a splenetic way as to talk of retiring, it being a thing I can never consent to, and what your country, nor your truly faithful friends can never think right, whatever melancholy thoughts they may have all this time. Besides, in my poor opinion, when after all the glorious successes God Almighty has blessed you with, he is pleased to make you the happy instrument of giving a lasting peace to Europe, you are bound in conscience, both to God and man, to lend your helping hand; and how can you do that, if you retire from business? You may be as grateful to God Almighty in a public station as in a private one; but I do not wonder at your desiring quiet, after all the fatigues and vexations you go through daily; for it is certainly the most valuable blessing in this world, and what every one would chuse, I believe, that has ever had any thing to do in business, if there were nothing to be considered but one's self.

"Lord treasurer talks of retiring too, and told me, not many days ago, he would do all he could to serve me, by advising with people, and settling a scheme for the carrying on my business in the parliament, before he went to Newmarket; but that he would not come back from thence. I told him, that must not be, that he could not answer it either to God or himself; and I hope you will both consider better of it, and not do an action, that will bring me and your country into confusion. Is there no consideration to be had for either? You may flatter yourselves that people will approve of your quitting; but if you should persist in these cruel and unjust resolutions, believe me, where one will say you are in the right, hundreds will blame you. Lord treasurer has gone to

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\* Without date, but endorsed by the duchess, August 27, 1708.—From a copy in the hand of the duchess.



make a visit to 42,\* where the town says he will meet with four or five gentlemen,† who I can never be satisfied mean well to my service, till they behave themselves better than they did in the last parliament, and have done ever since the rising of it; for from that minute they have been disputing my authority, and are certainly designing, when the new one meets, to tear that little prerogative the crown has to pieces. And now, because my servants and I set up one they formerly liked to be speaker,‡ they are against him; for no reason, I suppose, but because they will have none in any employment that does not entirely depend upon them. Now, how is it possible, when one knows and sees all these things, as plainly as the sun at noon-day, ever to take these people into my bosom? for God's sake, do but make it your own case, and consider then what you would do, and why a handful of men must awe their fellow subjects. There is nobody more desirous than I to encourage those whig friends that behave themselves well; but I do not care to have any thing to do with those that have shewn themselves to be of so tyrannising a temper; and not to run on farther on those subjects, to be short, I think things are come to, whether I shall submit to the five tyrannising lords, or they to me. This is my poor opinion on the disputes at present, which could not be, if people would weigh and state the case just as it is, without partiality on one side or the other, which I beg, for the friendship you have ever professed for me, you would do; and let me know your thoughts of what may be the best expedient, to keep me from being thrown into the hands of the five lords."

The answer of the duke to this pathetic and pressing appeal is not extant, but a draught in the hand-writing of lord Godolphin, which was sent for his use and approbation, will enable us to judge of its contents.

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\* From a letter written by Mr. Maynwaring to the duchess, alluding to this visit, it appears that the cypher 42 means Dr. John Moore, bishop of Ely. The meeting was purely for whig purposes, as we find from Mr. Maynwaring, that the duke of Somerset was displeased because he was not of the party.

† The whig junta.

‡ Sir Thomas Hanmer.



“ As to the reflections your majesty is pleased to make upon my *real* inclinations to retire, tho’ it be very natural and very desirable, after one has lived a great many years in a hurry, to enjoy some quiet in one’s old age ; yet I will own freely to your majesty, my inclinations to retire, proceed chiefly from finding myself incapable of being of any farther use to your majesty. The long and faithful services I have endeavoured to perform to your majesty, and the goodness you had expressed to me upon several occasions, had created a general opinion, both abroad and at home, that your majesty placed entire trust and confidence in me ; and upon that foot I was the more capable of doing many great and effectual services, both here abroad, and in England. But your majesty will give me leave to say, with all imaginable duty, that is now reduced singly to serving you at the head of the army this campaign ; for your majesty having shewn so publicly, last winter and this spring, that you have no more trust and confidence in me, nor any reliance upon my opinion, but much more upon the opinion of those, who have neither honesty nor capacity to serve you, and who visibly ruined your service last winter, in several undeniable instances, it is no longer possible for me to be of any further use to you ; and to continue in your council to advise, without credit enough to prevail with you to follow good advice, would only expose myself and my reputation in the world, by making myself answerable for other people’s follies, or worse.

“ And by what your majesty is pleased to say in your letter of the lord treasurer, tho’ I have nothing so far as that from himself, I believe his opinion, and his reasons for that opinion, must be the same with mine. Your majesty is pleased to think we shall be blamed for quitting ; but, not to reflect upon that coldness, and that behaviour in yourself, which forces us to quit, by withdrawing your trust and confidence from us, to give it to insinuating, busy flatterers, who can’t serve you one month this winter, without danger of being torn in pieces in the streets. I don’t doubt but these things are very sensible to the lord treasurer, as I am sure they are to me. However, I shall not trouble your



majesty any farther with the consequences that must follow, since I find plainly by your majesty's letter, that all I have said and written hitherto, is to no purpose, nor, indeed, ever can be, while your majesty's heart is possessed by all the false and malicious insinuations, which are possible to be suggested by our enemies; and, therefore, I shall conclude this head, with wishing your majesty may find abler servants than we have been, more faithful and affectionate, I will beg leave to say you never can.\*

“As† to the tyranny of the five lords, which you seem so much to apprehend, and so much to desire that you might be kept out of their hands, if your majesty were disposed to hearken to the advice of those who have supported you for almost seven years upon the throne, and much more before you came to it, you would be in no danger of falling into any hands but ours, whom you did not, till very lately, use to think dangerous; and certainly we are not altered. By a maxim I have often heard, that “interest cannot lie,” we can have no other interest but your majesty's, and to make your throne powerful, and your government strong. But your majesty will allow some people may have an interest to our prejudice, they may have an interest to create difficulties every day in your majesty's mind against us, and by that means to force us out of your service, and then, indeed, I am afraid you may be in very dangerous hands. But as to these five lords, if your majesty will be inclined to do such things only, as in themselves are not only just and reasonable, with regard to all that is past, but useful and necessary, for all that is to come, your majesty needs not to apprehend falling into any hands, but ours, who have done you very many faithful services, and who, whatever return we are like to have for them, will never fail to pray for your majesty's long life and prosperity.”

“I have written this in a good deal of haste and disorder, and

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\* This draught was transmitted to the duchess, to be forwarded to the duke, and we find two or three trifling alterations in her hand.

† On a separate paper in the hand of Godolphin, but evidently a continuation.



disorder, and therefore I believe it wants no little correction ; but you may omit or alter any part of it just as you please."

We cannot quit this subject, without again adverting to the interminable disputes, between the queen and the duchess, which acquired new force at this particular period, and may be traced to the same source.

Soon after the victory of Oudenard their altercations produced an open quarrel. The duchess, as mistress of the robes, had arranged the jewels to be worn by the queen, at the solemn Te Deum, celebrated on that occasion. The queen refusing to adopt the arrangement, the duchess ascribed her objection to the ill offices of Mrs. Masham, and reproached her, by letter, for such a proof of unkindness and contempt. She also taunted her royal mistress in the coach, as they passed to the church, and during the service itself, reverting to the subject, she coupled her indiscreet remonstrance with a complaint, in the name of the duke, that he no longer enjoyed the usual degree of confidence and favour. As the queen prepared to reply, the duchess interrupted her, by abruptly requesting, that she would cease the conversation, lest they should be overheard.

Soon after the ceremony, she sent the queen the letter from the duke, dated July 23, accompanied with an epistle, in a more aggravated style of invective than she had hitherto ventured to employ. The displeasure which so uncourtly and acrimonious an effusion excited, was marked by the tone of the queen's reply.

" *After the commands you gave me in the church, on the thanksgiving, of not answering you, I should not have troubled you with these lines, but to return the duke of Marlborough's letter safe into your hands.*"

The sarcastic and contemptuous brevity of this note, drew forth a reproachful answer from the duchess, in which, among other equally unbecoming expressions, she observed :

" I should think myself wanting in my duty to you, if I saw you so much in the wrong, as, without prejudice or passion, I think you are, in several particulars, and did not tell you of it." She then comments on the word *commands*, and concludes, with



affected humility : “ Though I have always writ to you as a friend, and lived with you as such, for so many years, with all the truth and honesty and zeal for your service that was possible, yet I shall never forget that I am your subject, nor cease to be a faithful one.”

This epistolary wrangle was not long afterwards followed by an interview, in which the duchess set the seal to her indiscretion, by renewing her expostulations on the countenance manifested towards Mr. Harley and Mrs. Masham. The minute of this conversation, of which no trace appears in the Conduct, is preserved in her hand-writing, and was evidently suppressed, on mature reflection. We give this characteristic document, without abridgment or alteration.

[Heads of the conversation with Mrs. Morley, Sept. 9--20, 1708.]

“ Nobody trusted or countenanced by her, but who is in some way or other influenced by Mr. Harley.

“ Mr. Harley never had a good reputation in the world, but is much worse thought of, since he is out of her service, where people were content to suffer him, because he was thought to depend upon lord Marlborough and lord treasurer. But since he was tempted by the favour of Abigail to set up for himself, and to betray and ruin those that had brought him into her service, and her service itself also, nobody alive can be more odious than he is, or more contemptible to all parties.

“ Why will she not consider fairly and coolly the distinction she makes between some of the whigs, who did her such real and acceptable service, in the union with Scotland, and in the matter of the invitation, and my lord Haversham, who, upon both these actions, and many others, talked so insolently and scandalously of her administration, in her own hearing. And yet that man was admitted to her presence with the air of a friend, though he is plainly in another interest, and can never serve her; and the others are kept at the greatest distance, contrary to the advice and opinion of all her servants, whom she has most reason to trust, though they have shewn themselves in her presence also,



both able and willing to serve her, and desirous to make her great and happy.

“ Even in this last session of parliament, the tories joined to a man against the council of Scotland, and Mr. Harley himself underhand ; when after all that was over, upon occasion of the late invasion, these men did expose the tories to all the world, by shewing their zeal for her and her government, by strengthening it every way in their power, at that time of danger.”

In the course of this interview the altercation became so violent, that the high toned voice of the duchess was heard in the anti-chamber ; and when she came out, her eyes were suffused with tears. The queen was found in a similar state of agitation, by those who first entered the apartment ; and we learn from a subsequent letter of the duchess, that she was dismissed with every proof of contempt and indignation.

These contentions, and particularly the final interview, could not long be kept a secret from the royal attendants ; and the reports, which were industriously circulated on the occasion, produced the usual effect attending the decline of court favour. An instance of this kind occurred in the conduct of the earl of Kent, who being blamed by Mr. Maynwaring, for his assiduities towards Mrs. Masham, faintly excused himself, on the plea that he must behave civilly to all the queen's servants. Some of the whigs also began to anticipate the disgrace of their zealous patroness, and treated her with such coldness and reserve, as to excite her suspicion, that they were transferring their devotions to the new idol.\*

The mortifying result of this altercation, and the no less mortifying consequences which it produced, appear to have cooled the zeal of the duchess. In a fit of spleen and disappointment she testified to the duke her contempt of all party distinctions, and at the same time announced a decided resolution to discontinue her fruitless and unwelcome remonstrances. Her deter-

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\* Letter from Mr. Maynwaring to the duchess, without date, but evidently written at this period.



mination was not only applauded by her husband, who had so often lamented her warmth and imprudence, but even by the whig chiefs, who perceived that her importunities injured, instead of promoting their cause.

TO THE DUCHESS.

"*Sept. 27.* Having received your's of the 10th this afternoon, I could not omit sending back all the inclosed papers, you have desired, and letting you know at the same time, what I have formerly writ in other letters, that I am glad you have taken the resolution of being quiet; for you are certainly in the right, that whatever is said or writ by you, the lord treasurer, and me, serves only for information to do hurt. The copy of the letter you have sent, I think, should be delivered; for if it does no good, it can do no hurt. For my own part, I am quite weary of all business; and if amongst all these disagreeable bustles, I could be so happy as to have liberty of remaining quiet with you, I should be at the height of my wishes."

"*Oct. 1.* By the french having taken all the posts along the Scheld, makes it almost impossible for our letters to go that way without falling into their hands; and that by Ostend is very near as dangerous, so that we are obliged to be upon our guard of what we write, if we would not have them know it; so that you must not expect particulars as to news. But as for my personal esteem and kindness for you, I should rather the world should know it than otherwise; for if I am to be happy, it must be with you. I have read your's of the 10--21st three times, and am so entirely of your opinion, as to the queen, that I cannot hinder repeating it again in this letter; for the resolution you have taken of neither speaking nor writing, is so certainly right, that I dare assure you, that you will find a good effect of it in one month. For I really am of opinion, that when the queen shall be sensible, which she will be in that time, that you, the lord treasurer, and I, are in such despair, that we offer nothing, but leave every thing to the direction of those, that have the present power with her, it will so startle her, that she will take other measures; and this will make her comply with what is necessary for the saving herself, or



nothing will do. I can't entirely agree with your opinion of the queen; I must own I have a tenderness for her, and I would willingly believe that all which is amiss, proceeds from the ambition and ill judgment of Mrs. Masham, and the knavery and artfulness of Mr. Harley."

"Oct. 4. Since my last, I have had the pleasure of your's of the 14th. Notwithstanding the difficulty of the passage of the letters, I did in my last explain my thoughts so fully, as to the queen, that you must not think my opinion changed, if I should not mention her any more this campaign. I do from my soul pity the lord treasurer; for his good sense must make him sensible how we are both exposed by the folly and opiniatrety of others."



## CHAPTER 72.

1708.

*Resolution adopted by the allied commanders to besiege Lille—Situation and defences of the place—Preparations for the siege—Successful march of the convoy of artillery, stores, and ammunition, from Brussels to the allied camp—Movement of Marlborough to Helchin—Investment of Lille by Eugene—Dispositions for the attack—Opening of the trenches—Progress of the besiegers—Junction of Vendome with Berwick, and march of their combined force round the sources of the Dyle, to raise the siege—Camp of Marlborough at Fretin—Preparations to repel the enemy—Indecision of the french commanders—They retire beyond the Scheld—Transactions of the siege—Eugene wounded in the attack of the counterscarp—Marlborough superintends the operations, both of the besieging and covering armies—Complaints of the mismanagement of the engineers—Receives from king Charles the offer of the government of the Netherlands for life.*

**A**FTER long and mature deliberation, the confederate generals finally resolved to undertake the siege of Lille, an enterprise which, though less bold and decisive than an immediate invasion of France, was yet the only operation in which the views, means, and interests of all parties could be brought to coincide. The difficulties with which it was likely to be attended, were, however, so great and multifarious, that it was made the subject of general ridicule in France; and Vendome publicly declared his conviction, that an able commander, like Eugene, would never venture to engage in so rash a design.

Lille, the capital of French Flanders, was one of the first conquests of Louis the fourteenth in 1667, and ceded to him by the treaty of Aix la Chapelle. It is situated in a swampy plain, watered by several streams. The fortifications were constructed under the superintendence of the celebrated Vauban, who strengthened it with a regular citadel, in the form of a pentagon,



defended with two ditches, and a double series of outworks. It was the key of the country watered by the Lys and the Scheld, and connected with both rivers by canals. A project for its defence was drawn up by Vauban himself, which, on his death, the preceding year, was consigned to his pupil and nephew. This able officer, as chief engineer, hastened to the place, as soon as it was threatened. The command was entrusted to marshal Boufflers, governor of Flanders, who was distinguished for his skill in the defence of fortresses, and assisted by officers of his own choice, the most intelligent and skilful in their several departments.

The troops who had escaped in the route at Oudenard were formed into four battalions, and the garrison was reinforced by two others; the whole, with three regiments of dragoons, and 800 invalids, making a total of nearly 15,000 men; and to use the words of the french biographer, "never were preparations better concerted, nor more proper to frustrate the efforts of the enemy." Nor did the strength of the place create the only difficulty. The season was already advanced, the necessary circumvallation was extensive, and the hostile army was not only superior to that which was to cover the siege, but commanded all the water communications with the nearest part of Holland.

On entering Lille the 29th of July, Boufflers prepared the usual means for a vigorous resistance. New works were constructed on the weakest points, the hedges and trees were cut down, to the distance of 800 paces, and fascines, and pallisades in abundance, were furnished by the district. Several mines were also formed under the covert way, in parts which appeared the most threatened; and every arrangement was made for maintaining a constant supply of arms and artillery, for the subsistence of the garrison, and for the regular distribution of the ammunition and stores.

This memorable enterprise excited universal attention, and drew to the spot many distinguished personages. The dethroned king of Poland arrived on the 19th of July in the confederate camp, together with the landgrave of Hesse. Marlborough reviewed before them the two lines of his army, and afterwards the king



repaired to the quarters of Eugene. It is not uninteresting to observe, that he was here joined by his natural son, Maurice, aged twelve years, afterwards so celebrated as marshal Saxe, who had secretly departed from Dresden on foot, and reached the army, notwithstanding the fatigues of the journey, and the vigilance of his guardians. Here also Munich and Schwerin, who both rose to such a height of military fame, made their first essay in a species of warfare, of all others, the most dangerous and critical. Lastly, here the young prince of Hanover added to the laurels, which he had gained at Oudenard, and contributed to increase the fame of that nation over whom he was destined to reign.

For want of water conveyance, the train and stores for the siege, amounting to 94 pieces of cannon, 60 mortars, and above 3,000 ammunition waggons, had been collected at Brussels. The whole attention of the two contending armies was therefore employed, one to secure, the other to prevent the march of this important convoy, which occupied a line of fifteen miles, and had to traverse a tract of twenty-five leagues, through a hostile force amounting to 100,000 men.

Eager to profit by so favourable an opportunity of striking a decisive blow, the french commanders detached a corps of 18,000 men, from the main army at Ghent, to Melle, with the view of annoying the convoy at its departure from Brussels. At the same time Berwick advanced to Mortagne, with a design of arresting it, as it passed across the Scheld, towards the allied camp. On their part, the confederate generals were not less vigilant, in watching over the safety of a convoy, on which their future success depended. Eugene visited the camp of Werwick at the latter end of July, to concert the necessary preparations with his colleague, and on the 3rd of August departed with a reinforcement of 25 battalions and as many squadrons, to rejoin his army, which had hitherto remained in the vicinity of Brussels. As the convoy approached the point of destination, active measures were adopted by Marlborough to strengthen the escort, and facilitate the movements of Eugene.



On the 6th of August the convoy departed from Brussels under the immediate care of the prince of Hesse, while Eugene commanded the covering army. It took the route to Soignies, which it reached on the same evening. The hostile detachment instantly moved from Melle towards Ninove, but finding the convoy too strongly protected, withdrew to its first position. Berwick, on the other hand, considered Mons as threatened, and weakened his force, by throwing succours into the place. Contrary, however, to their expectation, the convoy on the 8th directed its course from Soignies to Ath, where it halted the ensuing day. Thence it proceeded to Trasne in its way to the Scheld, which it was to traverse over bridges prepared at Pottes.

Meanwhile a constant communication had been maintained between the two allied commanders respecting its progress. Receiving intelligence on the 7th that it was preparing to move, Marlborough detached the duke of Wirtemberg, with 30 squadrons, to advance to Oudenard, and place himself under the orders of Eugene. On the 11th, being apprised that it had passed the Scheld at Pottes, the preceding day, he sent general Wood, with 30 squadrons, to guard against the enterprises of the troops at Ghent; and the prince of Orange, with 31 battalions, to Marquette, on the Lower Dyle, to hold in check the garrison of Lille. The following day he moved with the main army, and advanced to the vicinity of Helchin.

The convoy being now in safety, Marlborough had the gratification to meet Eugene, whose army had reached Templeuve, and to share in his exultation at the success of so arduous an undertaking. So perfect, indeed, were the arrangements, so indefatigable the exertions, and so consummate the vigilance of the two illustrious chiefs, that this immense train of stores accomplished its march, not only without losing a single carriage, but even without suffering a single insult. So consummate an enterprise extorted the wonder and admiration even of an enemy. The caustic Feuquières bears an involuntary testimony of applause, when he observes, "Posterity will scarcely believe this fact, though it is an indubitable truth." Nor can the



french biographer refrain from exclaiming, "Never was a daring enterprise conducted with more skill or greater circumspection."

The arrangements were now completed for the investment of Lille. The prince of Orange, who had reached the Marquette on the 11th, had surprised a french post in the abbey, by the enterprising valour of a british serjeant, who swam across the river and let down the draw-bridge. He thus straitened Lille between the Upper and Lower Dyle. On the 13th, Eugene led his army across the Marque at Pont à Tressin, and prolonged the investment from the Marque to the Upper Dyle. On the same day detachments of 1,500 horse and 1,200 foot were ordered to Templeuve and Pont à Chin to watch the movements of the enemy from Tournay, while the investing troops were taking post. On the 14th the camp for the south and east attack was traced. The quarters began near Haubordin on the Upper Dyle, passed by Lambessart to the abbey of Marquette, and then bending in a curve towards the Marque, continued through Flers to the point where they commenced.

While Eugene thus straitened the place, Marlborough continued at Helchin, where he covered the operation, and protected the convoys from Ath, Brussels, and Oudenard. He at the same time retarded the immediate junction of the armies of Vendome and Berwick, the first of which remained in the vicinity of Ghent, and the second near Mons. A large body of artificers and pioneers were employed on the lines of circumvallation, which were to be fifteen feet wide and nine deep, and to embrace a circumference of nine miles. The camp of artillery was placed with its right at Pont à Marquette, and amounted to 120 pieces of heavy cannon, 40 large mortars, 20 howitzers, and 400 ammunition waggons.

On this event Marlborough thus writes to Godolphin:

"August 9. I am obliged to you for the good counsel you give me, not to lay at heart the unreasonable behaviour of some of my countrymen. I think what you say is reasonable, but as I act to the best of my understanding, with zeal for the queen and my country, I cannot hinder being vexed at such usage.



“ Our cannon is come safe to Ath, so that we now think it out of danger. The next thing we have to apprehend is, the intelligences they may have in our great towns, and particularly that of Brussels ; for it is most certain the people are against us, so that we have been obliged to leave eight battalions and six squadrons for the security of the town. I shall be in pain till I hear that Erle is gone to the coast of Normandy.”

On the 18th of August each battalion was ordered to furnish fascines and gabions, and on the 19th the engineers examined the ground, bordering the road from Lille to Werwick, to ascertain the places proper for batteries. Regulations were also published for the conduct of the attacks, which are justly considered as a model of judgment, skill, and precision.\* Of the 50 battalions employed in the siege, 10 were to be always in the trenches, and to be relieved in succession.

Before the line of circumvallation was fully completed, Eugene opened the trenches, on the night of the 22nd, and the corps employed in the service consisted of three battalions of imperialists, four of palatines, and nine of hessians, supported by nine squadrons, under the orders of general Wilks, and 4,000 workmen. Attacks were traced on each side of the Lower Dyle, one on the right, against the gate of St. Andrew, directed by Des Roques ; the other on the left, by M. du Mey, against the works between the Dyle and the gate of St. Madelaine. This operation was not performed without considerable loss, as the troops were charged by Boufflers, with all the cavalry of the garrison. The following morning, the army of Marlborough passed the Scheld in two columns near Pottes, and took post with the right at Escanaffe, and the left at Ainieres, the head quarters of Marlborough being placed at Amougies, and those of Overkirk at Vaudripont. He thus facilitated the foraging parties, and retarded the junction which Berwick was preparing to effect with the main army, under the dukes of Burgundy and Vendome.

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\* Printed in Brodrick, v. 2, p. 26.



During these operations, we find several letters addressed to Godolphin.

“*Helchin, August 13.* You will know by this post, that our cannon is arrived safely at Menin, and that I have reinforced prince Eugene’s army, with 31 battalions and 34 squadrons. That, with the detachments we have made for Flanders and Brussels, makes this army to consist only of 140 squadrons and 69 battalions, with which I am to observe the motions of the duke of Burgundy’s army. That of prince Eugene is for the siege, and observation of the duke of Berwick. Prince Eugene’s army consists of 90 squadrons and 53 battalions, by which you will see, that when we join, which I believe we shall do, the whole will be 230 squadrons and 122 battalions. This day Lille is invested; I pray God to bless the undertaking. What I most fear is, the want of powder and ball, for so great an undertaking, for our engineers fear we must take the town, before we can attack the citadel.”

“*Helchin, Aug. 20.* By the threatening of M. de Vendome I did not think we should have continued thus long in this camp; but as yet he is not marched from behind the canal. But the duke of Berwick is drawing to his army, with all the troops he can, from their several towns. M. de Vendome declares in his army, that he has *carte blanche*, and that he will attempt the relief of Lille; that when the duke of Berwick joins him, they shall then have 135 battalions and 260 squadrons, which he flatters himself will be much stronger than we can be. If we have a second action, and God blesses our just cause, this, in all likelihood, will be the last campaign; for I think they would not venture a battle, but that they are resolved to submit to any condition, if the success be on our side; and if they should get the better, they will think themselves masters, so that if there should be an action, it is likely to be the last this war. If God continues on our side, we have nothing to fear, our troops being good, though not so numerous as theirs. I dare say, before half the troops have fought, the success will declare, I hope in God, on our side, and then I may have, what I earnestly wish for, quiet;



and you may be much more at ease, than when you writ your's of the 31st of the last month, which I received yesterday.

“ I find by Mr. Erle's letter, that mine was very welcome, since it gives them ease, as to their not landing at St. Valory. I wish they may be able to do any thing on the coast of Normandy. I do think their resolutions at the councils of war give no great encouragement, but they cannot avoid giving great alarms.

“ Lord Haversham's visit makes a great noise. I should be glad to know the occasion of lord Peterborough and he being friends ; no doubt it was concerted. If God puts it into the heart of the queen to do what is right, the projects of these gentlemen will signify very little. The pensioner did acquaint me with what M. Buys had said to him concerning peace, which, in effect, was nothing more, but to inform himself if his friends were willing to make any offers ; and that accordingly he should receive instruction from the king of France ; but I believe neither he nor any body else will have any orders, till they see the fate of Lille, and consequently the issue of this campaign. When I writ you that I must drive the french from Ghent and Bruges, I had no other thought than that it was absolutely necessary for the common cause. It certainly may occasion my coming ten days later, but if we are blessed with success, in this part of the country, they will have less heart for the defence of these towns, and then I may come home early.”

“ *Amougies, Aug. 23.* By your's of the 3rd I find you were going to be happy for some days in Wiltshire. If you have had the same weather we have had, you could not avoid being abroad the whole day. The trenches being opened last night, and the duke of Berwick having drawn all the troops of this part of the country to his army at Mortagne, I marched this morning to hinder his joining with the duke of Burgundy, between the Scheld and the Dender, at Lessines, which I was assured was their design, which now will be very hard for him to do. We expect the duke of Burgundy will march to-morrow. His first march will let us see if he has any design on any part of Brabant, or if his intentions are, what they write from Paris, of relieving Lille by a battle.



As soon as I see what time the siege of Lille is like to take us up, I shall then let you know my thoughts as to the employing the troops with lieut.-general Erle. In the mean time, they will have a month or six weeks, to do what mischief they can on the coast of France. I thank you for your good news of the galleons.\* If it has the consequence you mention, it will help to make us easy. The first thing we shall see, will be, the effect it will have on their credit. I am afraid they have found new methods of drawing money from Holland."

At this period the trenches were as rapidly pushed as the nature of the ground permitted. A sortie of the enemy was repulsed on the 23rd, and during the night the first parallel was extended, and two batteries were ready to fire at day break. A bloody struggle ensued for the possession of a chapel and wind-mill; but during the 24th and 25th, a second parallel, with its trenches of communication, was begun. Three batteries of cannon, mortars, and howitzers, were now opened from this parallel, which fired with a tremendous effect on the nearest defences, and were answered with equal spirit by the garrison.

On the night of the 26th a new contest ensued for the possession of the chapel, which was carried, and rased by the french. The second parallel being extended toward the river, on the 27th, at eight in the morning, the principal batteries were opened against the works of the place, Eugene himself firing the first shot at one attack, and the prince of Orange at the other.

The progress of the besiegers awakened the apprehensions of Vendome, and he began to dread, lest an enterprise which he had treated with ridicule, should be accomplished in the face of his superior army. He therefore concerted with Berwick the means of effecting a junction; but his movements did not escape the vigilance of his antagonist.

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

"August 27. \* \* \* \* I am in expectation of hearing every minute that the army of M. de Vendome and that of the

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\* The capture and destruction of seventeen spanish galleons, richly laden, off Carthagena, by admiral Wager, which took place in the course of the Spring.



duke of Berwick are on their march to join, so that I begin to write early this morning, fearing I may not have time in the afternoon. Our cannon before Lille began this morning to fire, so whatever M. de Vendome intends for the relief of that town, he must not lose much time, since our engineers promise that we shall have the town in ten days, after which we must attack the citadel. But when we are once masters of the town, we shall have no occasion for so great a circumvallation, by which the army will be much stronger; so that if the enemy will venture, it must be before we take the town. Our troops are in good heart, and their foot in a bad condition. They are, in horse, stronger than we, but upon the whole, I cannot think they will venture a battle, though it is said they have positive orders to succour the place. They write from the Hague, what I hope is not true, that a french detachment is marching from the Rhine to this country; for my only hope on that side was, that the elector of Hanover would act so as to hinder any detachment being sent hither. But it is so far from that, that the same news says they have also sent another for Dauphiné. They pretend these detachments should have begun their march on the 17th. Our next letters will inform us of the truth.

“ I have this minute advice that M. de Vendome has begun his march, but as his army was very much separated, he would take up his camp this night, his right half a league from Gavre, and his left towards Ninove; so that his army will not be above one league and a half from Ghent, which has made me resolve not to march till to-morrow, that I know positively which way he takes for his second march; for as I am now posted, it is impossible for him to get between me and the siege; and I have taken such measures with prince Eugene, for the strengthening each other, that I no ways doubt of preventing any thing they may flatter themselves with. And if they will attempt the relief of Lille, they must pass by Mons, which will cost them eight days, and I shall have it in my power to join prince Eugene, in less than three days, with ease. I will keep the post till to-morrow, that I may give you an account of their further motions.



“ By the slow motions M. de Vendome makes with his army, it looks as if his intentions were, to make the duke of Berwick march round by Brabant to join him ; for as I am posted, he can do it no other way, so that as to point of time, it is equal to us whether the duke of Vendome marches by Mons, or obliges the duke of Berwick to make the tour of Brabant. One day will inform us of his resolutions.”

The junction took place, as Marlborough had foreseen. The dukes of Burgundy and Vendome, leaving the count de la Motte with a flying camp of 20,000 men to protect Ghent and Bruges, directed their march by Melle to Ninove, where they passed the Scheld, while Berwick moved on the 28th of August from Mons through Herine. On the 30th, they joined in the plain between Gramont and Lessines. Their force now amounted to 140 battalions and 250 squadrons, exceeding 110,000 men. The next morning they encamped near Leuse, passed the Scheld near Tournay, and on the 2nd of September entering the plain, stretched between Blandin and Willemeau.

The confederate generals were not inattentive to these movements. Marlborough re-passing the Scheld on the 30th of August at Pottes and Escanaffe, encamped between Pont d'Espières and Avelghem. The next day he advanced to Templeuve and Willemeau, and on the 3rd of September took post behind the Marque, his right at Antreulle, his left at Austange, and his center at Peronne. In the evening he held a conference with his colleague. The next day Eugene repaired to the army, and the two generals rode out to examine the ground where the enemy were expected to arrive, near Phalempin. Naturally judging that the french commanders would turn round the source of the Marque to pass through the interval between that river and the Dyle, they decided that on the slightest movement of the enemy, the right of the army of observation should be extended to the Dyle, and supported on Noyelles, and the left brought to Peronne, in order to receive the expected attack.

These arrangements are communicated to Godolphin.

“ *Peronne, Sept. 3.* When I came to this camp on Saturday,



I immediately went to the siege, where I had the dissatisfaction of finding every thing backwarder than was represented to me by letter. We have this morning seized a man, who was endeavouring to get into Lille, who has confessed that he was to assure the marshal de Boufflers, from the duke of Burgundy, that he would attempt the relief. Prince Eugene dined with me yesterday, and we have marked the camp, where we are resolved to receive the enemy, if they make good their boasting. The ground is so very much for our advantage, that with the blessing of God we shall certainly beat them; so that it were to be wished they would venture, but I really think they will not. What I think they may be most troublesome in, is, in the hindering us from having provisions, for which they take all the measures they can, having defended, on pain of death, to all the french subjects, not to furnish any provisions.

“ I am afraid the town and citadel will cost double the time which was first thought, by which the honestest people are like to lose their money, in Holland as well as in England.

“ Since my last I have received yours of the 6th, 8th, 12th, 13th, and 17th. I have so very little time to myself, that it will be impossible for me for some days to answer the particulars in your letters; and as for my thoughts of the troops with Mr. Erle, that will depend very much upon the time we take Lille.

“ I see lord Galway presses very much for troops. It is certain, if the court of Portugal will not come into the queen's measures, whatever troops are sent, will be useless to the common cause; for they will do nothing but defend their own frontier. I desire this opinion of mine may be known to nobody but the queen and yourself.”

Meanwhile the besiegers continued to advance, though slowly, and after several obstinate conflicts. Their communications were gradually pushed forward and extended, and on the third of September the batteries being completed, the place was assailed with the fire of 120 pieces of cannon and 80 mortars. It is no wonder, therefore, as Marlborough expected, that Vendome should redouble his exertions to interrupt or raise the siege,



After some disputes with Berwick, respecting the proposed movement, he took the route of Orchies, encamped on the 4th at Mons en Pouille, and on the 5th entered the opening between the Marque and the Dyle.

The confederates prepared to receive his attack. While the french were filing through Orchies, Marlborough took the position before chosen, and was assisted by a strong reinforcement from the besieging army. Here he was fully protected by the natural advantages of the ground, and had reason to conclude that any attempt to disturb his operations, would involve his antagonists in new disasters.

Dangers and difficulties, however, appear not to have entered into the calculations of the enterprising Vendome, and he was only restrained from risking a sudden attack, under all disadvantages, by the opposition of his more considerate colleague, the duke of Berwick. He passed the interval, from the 5th to the 7th in opening passages leading to the allies, and thus Marlborough was enabled to fortify his position. His entrenchments were covered by ravines, leading from Noyelles towards Entières, and terminated near Fretin, on a marsh which borders the Marque. His infantry was posted along these entrenchments, and sustained in the rear by a double line of cavalry. The front, for the space of a league, was also strengthened with a ditch, 12 feet wide and 6 deep, and artillery was planted in proper situations.

The passages being at length opened by the enemy, with vast labour, the attack was found to be impracticable, or at least too hazardous. The duke of Burgundy accordingly appealed to the court for directions, and Chamillard reached the camp on the 9th apparently with orders to risk an engagement. Accordingly, after a council of war, the french army passed the Marque on the 10th, and ranged itself in order of battle, the right behind Avelin, and the left extended in front of Phalempin, and stretching towards Seclin. The allies were immediately in a state of defence, and a heavy cannonade ensued, but the whole operation terminated in the attack of Seclin, which was carried by the french on the 11th. In vain they reconnoitred the position of the



allies; even Vendome was compelled to acknowledge it impregnable, and another appeal was made to Versailles. They again received orders to risk an attack, but a new survey only convinced them that it was now too late. Marlborough and Eugene are said to have proposed to become the assailants, and the cautious Berwick admits that such an enterprise would have been fatal to their army, without support for its flanks, or space of ground sufficient for its movements. However, the proposal was counteracted, as usual, by the dutch deputies;\* and the french commanders having at length received from the king the expected permission, to abandon their design of relieving Lille, by a battle, endeavoured to accomplish their object, by intercepting the communications of the allies. Accordingly they retired on the 15th in four columns to Bac à Berse, encamping between Orchies and Mons en Pouille. The ensuing day they moved to Orq, and crossing the Scheld, occupied a position, extending from the windmill in the vicinity of Pottes, to Aubert la Trinité.

Marlborough at the same time changed his position to observe their movements. On the 17th he extended his line from Peronne to Forest. On the 18th he continued to prolong his line from Forest to Leers, having Lannoy behind his center; and on the 20th, he occupied a new camp, having his left above Leers, and his right at Treffry. We insert the correspondence, which passed in this important crisis.

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

“*Fretin, Sept. 7.* Since my last, I have had your's of the 20th, and am very sorry to see, by the journal and letters from the fleet, that we are not to expect much from the expedition; for it is certain, if the sight of tents and militia can hinder them from landing, they will, in some degree, find them all along the coast.

“M. de Vendome having drawn all the troops possible from the garrisons, and having a great train of artillery joined him from Douay, made his own army and our's believe we should have had

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\* Memoires de Berwick, t. 2, p. 30.



a battle on the 5th, which was the king of France's birth-day, so that prince Eugene joined me that morning with 72 squadrons and 26 battalions; but they not moving from their camp, which is in sight of our's, we sent back the foot the same night to the siege, resolving to entrench the front of our camp, which we began to do yesterday. The entrenchment is so far advanced, that I have this morning sent him back all his horse, as also a detachment of 2,000 foot, to assist him in the attacking of the counterscarp this night, and for the carrying on the siege with more vigour than hitherto; for it is certain our engineers find much more work than they expected. By the success of this night, we shall be able to guess when we may have the town; for should we be obliged to fire much more powder and ball, we should be very much put to, to find enough for the citadel, this being the twelfth day our batteries have fired." \* \* \*

"*Fretin, Sept. 7.* \* \* \* \* The elector of Hanover has called a council, and the opinions of the generals are given in writing, which are sent to Vienna, that the emperor may give such orders as he thinks proper. Mr. Bulau has promised me the whole in french. He says, by their reasonings nothing can be done, so that the elector, his master, is very uneasy; and that he is not sure, but that he may leave the army before the campaign is ended. The dutch are very uneasy, because the elector is very much dissatisfied at the success that prince Eugene and I have had, and cannot hinder shewing it upon all occasions."

TO PRINCE GEORGE OF DENMARK.

"*Camp at Fretin, Sept. 7.* Sir;—If the french had complied with their threats, I might now have given your royal highness an account of the success of a battle. We drew up the army twice before them, and gave them fair opportunities of coming to us, which having declined, they may now find it more difficult, since we have thrown up a line at the head of our camp, before the *overtures* that lead into the plain, that we may not be subject to sudden alarms, and draw part of the troops from the siege to no



purpose. The counterscarp has been delayed for some days : it is now intended for this evening. I send inclosed the disposition made for it, that your royal highness may please to see at your leisure how difficult a task it is."

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

"Sept. 13. Since my last M. de Vendome is come so near to us, that we did begin to believe that his intention was to attack us ; but yesterday and the day before he did nothing but fire a great quantity of cannon, and this day we have been very quiet, he having drawn his cannon from the batteries on our left, as we think, with a design to see what he can do on our right. We are encamped so near, that there is no possibility of being at ease till Lille is taken. I have been so disturbed these two last nights and days, that I am as hot as if I were in a fever, so that you will excuse my saying no more by this post."

TO THE DUCHESS.

"Sept. 17. Whenever I have a minute to myself, I make use of it to write to my dear soul ; for M. de Vendome having gathered much more strength together than we could imagine, and being camped so near, that in one hour's time we might be engaged, obliges us to be so very diligent that we have very little rest, by reason of the troops we are obliged to have at the siege, which makes him have near twice as much foot as I have in this army ; but I am so well intrenched, that I no ways fear their forcing us. But the siege goes on so very slowly, that I am in perpetual fears that it may continue so long, and consequently consume so much stores, that we may at last not have wherewithal to finish, which would be very cruel. These are my fears, but I desire you will let nobody know them. I long extremely to have this campaign well ended, for of all the campaigns I have made, this has been the most painful ; but I am in the galley, and must row on as long as this war lasts. The prince of Hanover has told me that as soon as the town is taken, he intends to return for Hanover. The french being marched by their right, I have been obliged to march by our left, so that we are now in our camp, where I was before I came to that which I intrenched. I believe the enemy will oblige us to



march again this night, they having already sent a detachment towards Oudenard, which they say in their camp they will besiege.

“ Since I had finished this letter, I have notice that the french are passing the Scheld by Tournay, so that I shall not march till to-morrow morning.”

TO LORD GODOLPHIN:

“ *Sanguin, Sept. 17.* I came to this camp last night, the french having begun their march, on the 15th, towards their right. I did not march till the next day, that I might be the better informed of their intentions, which seem to be for taking a camp between us and Oudenard, in order to hinder our convoys from Brussels, as also the provisions which come from that side to the army. They have carried their battering train to Tournay, and they say in their army, that they will besiege and take Oudenard, before we shall get Lille. For these last five or six days the siege has advanced very little, which makes every body uneasy. No doubt there will be many letters to the same effect, but I desire not to be named. If the enemy does not oblige me to march, which I fear they will, I shall go for two hours to the siege; so that I shall not seal this letter till my return, that if I have any thing good from thence I may send it you.

“ I have this minute an account that the french army begin to pass the Scheld by Tournay, which makes me resolve not to march till to-morrow. I have been with prince Eugene and the deputies at the siege, and find every thing in a bad way, which gives me the spleen.”

In this interval of suspense and expectation, the siege had proceeded with a slowness, which ill accorded with the impatience of Marlborough. On the 6th of September Eugene returned with his detachment to press the approaches, and the trenches were advanced to the glacis of the two horn-works, against which the attacks had been directed. The bastions behind had also been considerably injured by the fire, and twelve batteries, incessantly thundered on the place.



On the 7th Eugene resolved to attack the salient angles of the counterscarp on both sides of the Dyle, and above 14,000 men besides the ordinary guard of the day, were in readiness for this perilous and critical operation. While the troops advanced along the trenches, the cannon continued a tremendous fire: at seven o'clock it suddenly ceased, and after an interval of half an hour three pieces were discharged as a signal. The troops rushed into the covert way, but were suddenly assailed with a tempest of balls. Two mines were then sprung, and after a desperate effort they were driven back with great loss, except on two points of the works, where they continued to maintain themselves, against all the efforts of the besieged.

The night of the 8th they secured themselves in their post, and pushed their trenches towards other parts of the works. They were disturbed by a sally from the place on the 10th, but the 11th recovered their lodgment, and prepared new batteries. The siege was delayed by the march of Eugene on the 11th to the camp of Marlborough at Fretin; but the ensuing days the assailants improved their works, raised new batteries, and fired with such effect, that on the 17th, in the evening, they were ready to assault the tenaillons. They, however, advanced with great caution, extending their lodgments along the covert way, and opening new batteries against the outworks and body of the place. On the 18th Marlborough himself visited the attacks, and held a conference with Eugene and the deputies.

He was highly dissatisfied with the slowness of the siege, and in a letter to Godolphin heavily censures the misconduct of the engineers.

“Sept. 20. \* \* \* \* It is impossible for me to express the uneasiness I suffer for the ill conduct of our engineers at the siege, where I think every thing goes very wrong. It would be a cruel thing, if after we have obliged the enemy to quit all thoughts of relieving the place by force, which they have done, by repassing the Scheld, we should fail of taking it by the ignorance of our engineers, and the want of stores; for we have already fired very near as much as was demanded for the taking



of the town and citadel ; and as yet we are not entire masters of the counterscarp, so that to you I may own my despair of ending this campaign, so as in reason we might have expected. I beg you to assure the queen, that my greatest concern is on her account ; for as to myself, I am so tired of the world, that were she not concerned, my affliction would not be great.

“ When the fate of Lille is once known, we shall endeavour all we can to bring the french to a general engagement ; but as that is what we shall desire, I take it for granted, it is what they will avoid. Having drawn all the troops they can together, they are stronger than we ; and our letters of yesterday from the Rhine assure us, that the elector of Bavaria was to leave the army the next day, in order to drink the waters near Metz, that the troops, bavaroises and spaniards, had orders to march for this country, and that the elector was to have his residence this winter at Mons.

“ I also inclose a letter and draught of what has passed at Lille to this day, which I desire you will, with my duty, give to his royal highness ; and also let the queen know that I shall do myself the honour of answering her's of the 31st, which I received yesterday, by the next post ; for my head aches at this moment so extremely, that I am not able to write any more at this time.”

REPLY OF LORD GODOLPHIN.

“ *Windsor, Sept. 20--Oct. 1.* Your's of the 20th, which I received yesterday, gave me more trouble than I can express to you, both upon account of the public, and more particularly from the part I take in so much disquiet and uneasiness, which I am sure you had upon you, when that letter was written.

“ I beg of you not to let any misfortune which is occasioned by other people's faults, prey upon your spirits ; for it will make you sick, and you must consider that all good people here, who wish well to the public, look upon your life and health, as not only what has been, but what must, and I hope in God will be, the support of us all. I beg you therefore once more not to neglect either of them ; and I chuse to send this letter by the way of Ostend, hoping it may come some days sooner to you



than by Holland, since by a letter from Mr. Erle of the 27th, I find the communication between that place and your army had been opened; and if we may believe some extracts of letters, which we have seen from thence, of the 30th, the attempts of the enemy to hinder it have been very much disappointed.

“In case this should prove true, and that you find yourself able to preserve this communication with Ostend, you will best judge whether any provisions or ordnance stores, that we could send from hence to Ostend, could either be of use to you, or arrive in time. There are two regiments at Portsmouth, under orders to be sent thither, as soon as transports can be any way had for them.”

“*Windsor, Sept. 21.* \* \* \* \* I was indeed extremely desirous to let you know, as soon as I any way could, that my greatest concern and uneasiness for the very ill posture of affairs at Lille, which appeared in your's of the 24th, was, lest you should suffer your own mind to be too much affected with it, and let it prevail to the prejudice of your health, which must be the support of all those who really love their country and the public good; and when that is the question, I make no question for my part, but those will shew themselves to be the majority in England, though in the mean time nothing appears so much as the ill will of those, who care but little, either for one or the other.”

The urgent representations of the duke, incited the assailants to new exertions. On the night of the 20th the works were deemed sufficiently advanced, for an attack of the tenaillons, and the assailants were instantly strengthened by 5,000 english troops chosen from the covering army. It was resolved to assault at once the counterscarp of the Lower Dyle, that opposite the bastion on the right, and the places of arms between the horn-work, the bastion, the ravelin on the left of the river, and the covert way, as far as the Porte de la Madelaine. Prince Eugene placed himself in an advanced battery, to animate the troops by his presence. The signal being given, they rushed to the attack.



The fire was tremendous and the struggle sanguinary. The assailants giving way, Eugene hurried forward, and rallied those who were retreating. In the heat of the engagement a spent musket ball grazed his forehead, above his left eye, and struck off his hat, but fortunately occasioned no serious fracture. He was with difficulty persuaded to retire to his quarter, while the attack was continued. After a terrible conflict, however, the assailants succeeded in establishing themselves on the right of the angle of the left demi-bastion of the tenaillon, and on the left of the places of arms in the covert way, opposite the principal breach. This advantage was purchased with the loss of nearly 2,000 men.

On the ensuing morning the british general visited his colleague, and finding him preparing to mount on horseback, and resume his duty, pressed on him to remain in his quarters till he was perfectly recovered. He succeeded only by promising to take on himself the superintendence of the siege, as well as of his own army. The care and anxiety in which this additional command involved Marlborough, were increased by the unexpected discovery, that the stores began to fail, and that there was not sufficient ammunition to continue the attack more than four days. He was even importuned to raise the siege, by the dutch deputies, who were alarmed with the difficulty and expence of the enterprise.

During the confinement of Eugene, Marlborough superintended the siege, with as much activity and vigilance as if he had no other occupation, riding daily from his head quarters to the approaches, and returning in the evening. On the 23rd, in particular, he was in the trenches, when a grand attack was made on the tenaillon, on the left, and part of the counterscarp. He himself issued the requisite orders, animated the troops by his presence, witnessed their successful lodgment in the covert way, and did not retire, till they were masters of the whole tenaillon. A letter written to Godolphin the ensuing day, will shew the weight of his cares and labours.

"Sept. 24. Since my last, prince Eugene has received a wound in his head, which I thank God is no ways dangerous; and I



hope to-morrow or next day he may be abroad. Ever since Friday, that he was wounded, I have been obliged to be every day at the siege, which, with the vexation of its going so ill, I am almost dead. We made a third attack last night, and are not yet masters of the whole counterscarp; but that which is yet worse, those who have the charge of the stores, have declared to the deputies that the opiniatetry of the siege is such, that they have not stores sufficient for the taking of the town. Upon which, the prince has desired to speak with me to-morrow morning. My next will acquaint you of what is resolved, but I fear you must expect nothing good. I have this afternoon a letter from lieut.-general Erle, from Ostend. He is ill of the gout. The enemy has cut in three several places the canal of Nieuport, by which they have put that country under water, to hinder our communication with Ostend. However, I shall find ways of letting him know what I desire. I am so vexed at the misbehaviour of our engineers, that I have no patience, and beg your excuse that I say no more till the next post."

Notwithstanding these successes, the efforts of the assailants were opposed with equal spirit by the garrison. To remedy the want of ammunition, which began to be felt in the place, a body of horsemen, each loaded with a sack of powder, were sent by Vendome to cut their way through the besieging force; and though many fell victims to their temerity, they succeeded in carrying such a supply into the fortress, as considerably raised the spirit, and augmented the resources of the garrison.\*

In the midst of these operations, Marlborough had the satisfaction to receive a new and flattering proof of gratitude from king Charles. On the first intelligence of the victory at Oudenard, the king eagerly seized the opportunity, not only to repeat his offer of the administration of the Netherlands, but even proposed to grant it for life.

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\* For the contents of this chapter, we are principally indebted to the Correspondence—The Journal of the Siege, in Lamberti, t. 5.—The accounts in Ledyard and the foreign biographers, as well as the Memoires de Berwick—Brodric—Milner—Vie du Prince Eugene, and other authorities.



## KING CHARLES TO THE DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH.

“ *Barcelona, Aug. 8.* My lord, duke, and prince ;—If your letter of June 26th, delivered to me by general Stanhope, had not been very agreeable to me, you may believe, my lord, that I was transported with one, which I have received from the duke of Savoy, announcing to me the recent victory at Oudenard. I want expressions to testify the share I take in this new glory, which is added to your skill, merit, and courage. Since all your great actions in this war have had no other object than the recovery of my monarchy, you may judge of my heartfelt gratitude to you, for the beneficial effects to my cause, which must result from this glorious victory, not less perhaps than the reduction of my whole monarchy, if you will continue the same vigour in the prosecution of the war one year more.

“ Thus, my lord, it seems that to the hand which has secured the liberty of Germany and the Netherlands, Spain will also owe her's. With this confidence, you will find me, my prince, always willing to renew the patent for the government of my Low Countries, which I sent you two years ago, and to extend it for your life. You may depend on the fulfilment of my royal word ; and be assured that I will, in conformity with this promise, expedite the dispatches, as soon as I am in possession of Madrid. I need not recommend to you the propriety of maintaining this secret, as well from the consideration due to the elector palatine, as from a fear of giving umbrage to the States.” \*

Many of the duke's letters contain allusions to this grant, which was afterwards repeatedly made. His motives for declining an offer, which he was evidently anxious to accept, were, the fear of offending the dutch, of acting contrary to the opinion of the british cabinet, and of drawing on himself the importunities of the duchess, by whom it was vehemently opposed. He, however, flattered himself, that at some future period he might enjoy so honourable and lucrative a station ; for he observes, in a

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\* From the french original.



letter to Godolphin, "This must be known to nobody but the queen; for should it be known before the peace, it would create inconveniencies in Holland, and I beg to assure the queen, that it is not compliment, but real duty, that when the peace happens, if she shall not think it for her honour and interest that I accept of this great offer, I will decline it with all the submission imaginable."



## CHAPTER 73.

1708.

*Necessity of opening a new communication for the passage of supplies—Landing of general Erle, with the troops employed for the descent at Ostend—Measures adopted to facilitate the passage of convoys by that route—March of a grand convoy to the camp—Action at Wynendale—The enemy repulsed, and the convoy preserved by general Webb—New and ineffectual attempts of the french to cut off the supplies of the confederates—Movements of Marlborough—Death of Overkirk—Capture of Leffinghen by the enemy—Prosecution of the siege, and surrender of Lille—Farther plans of the british commander—Precautions of Marlborough and Eugene to obtain supplies—Attack of the citadel of Lille—Plan of the french to surprise Brussels—Marlborough and Eugene force the passage of the Scheld, and defeat the design—Correspondence of Marlborough on his situation and views.*

AS the enemies were completely masters of the route to Brussels, by which the army had hitherto received succours and supplies, it became necessary to open a new channel of communication. For this purpose, Ostend offered the only eligible point, and the services of the troops who had been selected for the descent on the french coast were called into action.

This expedition, which in the early part of the campaign, had excited such lively hopes, and occupied so prominent a place in the correspondence of Marlborough, had failed in its principal object. General Erle, who was chosen for the command, was the most improper officer, who could have been selected, for an enterprise which required decision, activity, and confidence. On the contrary, his letters to the duke of Marlborough prove that he looked rather to difficulty than to success, and that he not only acknowledged his own unfitness, but utterly disapproved all such hazardous undertakings. His original instructions directed him to make an attempt on the coast near St. Valory, where it was



expected he might be supported by a detachment from the army of Marlborough. But as no detachment of sufficient force could be spared, he was ordered to effect a descent on the coasts of Normandy or Brittany. The appearance of military preparations, and the assembly of the militia, were, however, sufficient to deter him from the attempt; and after lingering for some time in the bay of La Hogue, he returned to the Downs.

The design being utterly relinquished, Godolphin was desirous of transporting the troops to Portugal; but his wishes were overruled by Marlborough, who felt the necessity of a competent force at Ostend, to maintain his communications with England. Having obtained the approbation of the cabinet, he imparted the proper orders to general Erle, by captain Armstrong, the same confidential officer who had arranged, with prince Eugene, the movements before the battle of Oudenard.

The troops reached Ostend at the moment when their services were rendered doubly necessary, from the position of the enemy, and were accompanied by a fleet of transports, conveying an abundant store of ammunition, and other requisites. General Erle being now employed in a service adapted to his talents, carried into effect the instructions which he had received from the commander in chief, for facilitating the passage of supplies from the coast to the covering army. He partially drained an inundation, which the enemy had caused between Ostend and Nieuport, occupied Oudenburg, and threw bridges over the canal of Nieuport, near Leffinghen, where he also established a post. Having thus restored the communication, a large convoy was prepared, and 700 waggons were detached from the army of observation, to receive the supplies. This operation naturally called forth the same care, vigilance, and activity, as had attended the passage of the first convoy from Brussels. Vendome and Berwick were both desirous to attempt its destruction; but the task was finally confided to count de la Motte, who from long residence in these districts, was supposed to be intimately acquainted with the country. He was remanded from the vicinity of Brussels, and sent to Bruges, with a corps amounting to 22,000 men, which



was deemed more than sufficient to overpower any covering force, that could be furnished from the main army.

Marlborough, who yet continued in the camp at Lannoy, first detached two bodies of troops, consisting of twelve battalions of infantry and 1,500 horse, under generals Landsberg and Els, to protect its passage. On learning the movements of count de la Motte, he, on the 26th, sent a new detachment of 12 battalions, under general Webb, to advance as far as Tourout, in order to protect the march of the convoy from Cochlaer, through the wood of Wynendale; and soon afterwards, 26 squadrons and 12 battalions, under Cadogan, marched to Hoghlede, to cover its passage between Tourout and the camp.

On the 27th of September the convoy departed from Ostend, crossed the canal of Nieuport, at Leffinghen, during that night and the morning, and directed its course by Slype and Moerdyke, to defile through Cochlaer, behind the wood of Wynendale. The moment it commenced its march, the utmost vigilance and activity were displayed by all the officers on the line of its passage. General Webb detached 1,600 infantry, under the command of brigadier Landsberg, to strengthen the corps posted at Oudenburg, with orders after covering the convoy, to rejoin him at Tourout. This force arrived in time to prevent the occupation of Oudenburg by the enemy. Meanwhile the horse under Cadogan had reached Hoghlede, and count Lottum, with 150 dragoons, was sent forward to explore the road, by which the convoy was advancing, and join the escort. Approaching Ichteghem, however, he discovered several french squadrons, and returned to Tourout to give the alarm. On this intelligence, general Webb moved forward with the infantry, count Lottum with his small party of cavalry, forming the advanced guard, with orders to gain Ichteghem, by the way of Wynendale. Reaching Wynendale, they perceived the enemy, through the opening of the plain, between a low coppice and the wood of Wynendale. The quarter masters and grenadiers were instantly formed, and posted in the coppice, while general Webb, with the 150 horse, advanced to reconnoitre and amuse the enemy. As fast as the



infantry arrived, they were posted in order of battle, in the opening between the wood of Wynendale and the coppice, where the quarter masters and grenadiers were stationed. Scarcely had six battalions formed, before the enemy commenced a heavy cannonade; but the small party of horse kept its ground, with such firmness, that general Webb had time to complete his dispositions. The troops formed two lines, the left wing extending beyond the coppice, to prevent the enemy from turning that flank, and the right resting on the wood and castle of Wynendale. In the wood on the right was the regiment of Heukelom, forming an ambuscade, and another regiment was thrown into the coppice on the left. Parties of grenadiers were posted among the brushwood on each side, for the same purpose, with orders not to discover themselves, till they could take the assailants in flank. The regiments which escorted the convoy formed a third line, as they arrived.

On the first news that the convoy had departed, count de la Motte advanced to Oudenburg, but the post being already occupied, he hastened by Ghistel, to intercept it in the defile of Wynendale. Finding himself anticipated by the allies, whom he descried at 5 o'clock in the afternoon, he opened a cannonade, which lasted two hours. In the interval he formed his troops in several lines, the infantry in front, and the cavalry in the rear. He then advanced, in full confidence, to overwhelm a force which did not amount to one half of his own. Within a few minutes the enemy began the attack, but approaching the allied lines, were received by such a fire from the ambuscade in the wood, that the left wing gave way on the center. The fire of the opposite ambuscade was then opened, and soon threw their whole line into confusion. They, however, still advanced, and broke two battalions; but reinforcements being drawn up from the rear, they were repulsed. They made a third attempt, but the fire in front and flanks again throwing back their wings on the center, they retired in the utmost dismay. Neither the threats nor example of their officers could induce them to return to the charge; but after some distant and scattered volleys, they feebly relinquished the contest.



Towards the close of the action, major general Cadogan came up with some squadrons of horse, and offered to charge the retreating enemy; but it was not deemed advisable to encounter so superior a force of cavalry; and the commanders contented themselves with securing the convoy, which during the action had passed in rear of the wood, and arrived the same evening at Rousselaer. The next day it reached Menin, where it was welcomed with exultation; and on the last day of September, Marlborough was gratified by its passage through the lines of his camp, which in the interval had been established between Pont à Marque and Menin.

The correspondence will shew the effect of this brilliant action, and the opinion which the commander in chief entertained of general Webb, by whom it was achieved.

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

“Sept. 27. You will have seen by my last letter, the unhappy circumstances we are in, by the very ill conduct of our engineers and others. Upon the wounding of prince Eugene, I thought it absolutely necessary to inform myself of every thing of the siege; for before, I did not meddle in any thing but the covering of it. Upon examination, I find they did not deal well with the prince, for when I told him that there did not remain powder and ball for above four days, he was very much surprised. I own to you, that I fear we have something more in our misfortunes than ignorance. Our circumstances being thus, and the impossibility of getting a convoy from Brussels, obliged me to take measures for getting some ammunition from Ostend, which we could never have attempted, but for the good luck of the english battalions being there.

“Having time, I begin to write in the morning, but as the letters are not to go till the evening, I hope to send you some certainty of the convoy; I having sent yesterday major general Cadogan with 26 squadrons and 12 battalions to meet them, so that they might come with the greater safety, with which we must do our best; for should this not come safe, I am afraid we must not flatter ourselves of hoping to get any other, though you may



be sure we shall leave nothing unattempted. It is impossible to express the trouble this matter has given me; for I am sensible that not only her majesty, but all the common cause must suffer, if we miscarry in this undertaking, which we have but too much reason to apprehend. Our letters from Germany assure us, that on the 15th of this month a great detachment was made for this country, and that the elector of Bavaria is to come with them, which will give no little alarm in Holland."

"Sept. 29. I have kept this mail till now, that you may be informed of the success we have had, in bringing our convoy safe from Ostend. I must refer you to the particulars sent to the secretary's office, my head having ached extremely for these last two days. I must own to you, that I have not strength to bear long the necessary trouble I undergo; but I now hope for some ease, since prince Eugene will be abroad to-morrow. Last night, the french attempted to send in succours and powder into Lille. About 300 men forced their way through a palatine regiment; several were blown up and killed, and about 40 men and 4 officers taken prisoners, the rest returned to Douay. Our letters run much risk of being read by the enemy, which makes it not safe to write some things I have a mind to say."

"Oct. 1. In my last I had not time to give you any account of our last action, but that of referring you to what was writ to the secretary's office; I have since had a particular account. Our loss in killed and wounded is very near 1,000; by what the enemy left dead on the place, they must have lost at least three times as many as we. They had above double our number, all our horse except 300, and 2,000 foot, being sent on before, for the security of the convoy, so that there were not above 8,000 men; and it is said, by the officers who were left wounded on the field of battle, that they had 40 battalions and 46 squadrons, as also cannon."

"Webb and Cadogan have on this occasion, as they always will do, behaved themselves extremely well. The success of this vigorous action is, in a great measure, owing to them. If they had not succeeded, and our convoy had been lost, the consequence must have been the raising of the siege the next day. All



her majesty's subjects have had the good fortune this campaign in all actions, to distinguish themselves; so that I should not do them justice, if I did not beg the queen, that when this campaign shall be ended, she will be pleased to make a promotion among the generals of this army only, which will be a mark of her favour and their merit; for hitherto, though almost all the action has been in this army, yet every general has advanced equally with them, though two parts of three of them have not so much as served this war. If the queen and prince approve of what I desire, in favour of this army, I should be glad it might not be known to any body, till I have an opportunity of giving the names for their approbation. Count Corneille, M. Overkirk's son, has on this occasion behaved himself extremely well."

REPLY OF LORD GODOLPHIN.

"Sept. 27--Oct. 8. According to your commands, I have communicated to the queen and to the prince the favour of your's of the 1st of October. They both seemed very well pleased with the account of your success at Wynendale, and the satisfaction you express for the very good conduct of your troops upon that occasion. They agreed very readily to the distinction you desire for the general officers of your army, at the next promotion; and the prince added, it was his opinion, that distinction ought to have been made much sooner."

The safe arrival of this convoy, gave new energy to the army; while the recovery of Eugene relieved Marlborough from a load of care and labour, though not from anxiety. The besiegers continued to advance by the tardy movements of the sap, to raise new batteries, to complete the lodgments, which they had effected, and to fill up the ditch. At length, at mid-day, on the 3rd of October, they carried the tenaillon, under the direction of Eugene, while the besieged were sunk in repose; and the ensuing night established themselves on the salient places of arms, opposite to the great breaches. The lodgments were soon completed, new batteries mounted, and the trenches extended along the front attacked.

The slow, but irresistible progress of the besiegers, compelled



Vendome to make a new effort. He moved with a considerable detachment from the Scheld, passed through Ghent, joined count de la Motte, and advancing between Moerdyk and the canal from Bruges to Plassendael, opened the sluices, and inundated the country to the very border of the Dyke. He also reinforced the garrison of Nieuport. He thus hoped to render the communication utterly impracticable, by intercepting the passage between Ostend and Leffinghen, where a post of 1,000 foot and 600 horse was stationed.

This movement induced Marlborough to draw towards the enemy. Having sent forward a considerable detachment, he left a part of his army at Ronques, at the disposition of Eugene, and moving with the rest, crossed the Lys at Menin, on the 7th of October he encamped between Rombeck and Hoghlede, having his head quarters at Rousselaer. Determined to attack the french at Oudenburg, he the next day advanced to the heath of Wynendale; but on his arrival was disappointed to hear that Vendome had retired. On this news he returned to Rousselaer, and sent forward the infantry of the second line, under the prussian general Lottum, to be near the siege, but recalled him on the news that the enemy were increasing their force at Ghent and Bruges.

The inundation, caused by Vendome, put a momentary suspension to the arrival of stores and provisions. A new expedient was therefore devised. The ammunition was packed in skins, and conveyed in low flat boats, from Ostend to Leffinghen, where it was received by carriages, mounted on high wheels, and conveyed to the camp. In this difficult task, Cadogan distinguished himself, as he did on every occasion, which required extraordinary diligence and activity, and the convoys were brought in safety, in spite of the hostile batteries, and the incessant attacks of armed gallies.

The critical situation of affairs rendered it necessary to hold conferences with Eugene and the deputies, for the continuance of their difficult enterprise; and the chiefs of the army accordingly assembled at Menin on the 11th of October. This meeting was rendered melancholy by the loss of the veteran Overkirk, who



continued to act with his usual alacrity, till a few hours of his death, being under arms the whole night of the 22nd. Worn out with the fatigues of the service, and the infirmities of premature age, he expired, in his 67th year, in the camp, while the two generals and deputies were arranging their operations. The loss of this active, brave, and devoted veteran, drew a tear of sympathy, from both the commanders, particularly from Marlborough, who had ample cause to admire and estimate his devotion and docility, so different from the captious spirit of his colleagues. In recompence for his services, Marlborough obtained a pension from the british government for his son, count Corneille. Overkirk was succeeded in the command by count Tilly, who, to the activity of a less advanced age, added equal zeal and devotion.

We shall refer to the correspondence for those particulars, which we have purposely passed over.

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

“ *Rousselaer*, Oct. 9. You will know by this post that we are in great want of another convoy, so that I marched on Sunday morning, with 110 squadrons and 60 battalions, and camped that night at Rousselaer; and yesterday I was in hopes to have been in sight of the duke of Vendome, who was encamped at Oudenburg, to hinder our having any thing from Ostend. But as soon as he was informed of my being at Rousselaer, he decamped, and marched to Bruges. During the time he has been at Oudenburg, he has cut all the dikes; so that the whole country is under water, which makes it impracticable for our carts to pass; but I have sent to Ostend, to see if they can put the powder into bags, which may be brought by horses; for we hope to find a passage by which they may come. God knows how this siege may end; I have but little faith, and am quite uneasy, but resolved to persist, as long as there is the least hope.

“ Major general Webb goes for England; I write to her majesty by him. I hope she will be pleased to tell him, that she is very well satisfied with his services, and that when she makes a promotion, this winter, he may be sure of being a lieut.-general, which really this last action makes his due.



“ I am returned to this place, where I am conveniently camped, as well for assisting at the siege, as for assisting and protecting what we may get from Ostend. I dare not write some things I should be glad to say to you, which gives me a great deal of trouble ; for I see every thing is going to distraction, and that it is not in my power to help it.

“ The electoral prince of Hanover is this day gone for Ostend, in order to return to Hanover. The enemy has drowned the country to that degree, that he could take no part of his baggage with him.”

“ *Tourout, Oct. 8.* The uneasy march of this day cannot hinder me from repeating again the obligation the queen and all the allies have to major-general Webb, who will give you this letter ; and I beg you will present him to the queen ; and were it not for measures, I am obliged for the queen’s service, to keep with the States General, I should desire her majesty would declare him a lieutenant-general, which he does extremely deserve. But as it must be done with management with them, I humbly desire the queen will assure him, that when she makes a promotion this winter, he shall be one ; and I will be answerable, that not only now, but at all times, he shall deserve it from her.”

FROM LORD GODOLPHIN, IN REPLY.

“ *Newmarket, Oct. 7--18.* Major-general Webb brought me your letter to this place. I had heard of his coming, before I left London, so the queen was prepared to use him very kindly, and with a great deal of distinction, as I find she has done, both by what he says himself, and by a letter which I have received from her by him. But I am very uneasy, and so I find he is, at his having made himself incapable of serving with you, for the rest of the campaign, when there may yet be great occasion for men of service. Might it not be an expedient, if the queen should write to you, to give him the distinction of acting as a lieutenant-general now immediately ? or if this has its objections, might she not desire you now to acquaint the States, that she intends a pro-



motion? Pray let me have your answer, if either of these will do, that I may speak to her majesty to write accordingly, or what else you would have done in this matter."

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

"Oct. 19. Having had no letters since Mr. Craggs went from hence, I have little more to acquaint you, than that the waters are so grown upon us, that our communication with Ostend is at an end for some time. During the time we had the passage open, we have got above 1,600 barrels of powder, and a great many other things, which are of use.

"Poor M. Overkirk died yesterday, by which her majesty will save the pension I am told she gave to lord Grantham. It would be an act of goodness and generosity, if the queen would be pleased to give some part of it to count Corneille, who is as virtuous and as brave a man as lives. His father has been able, I fear, to leave him nothing. If I were not sure that he did deserve, and would be grateful to the queen, I would not say so much for him.

"We hope in four or five days to give a general storm, if they will venture it, which I fear they will. I wish I may be mistaken, since it will cost a great many lives. God continues to bless us with good weather."

After in vain attempting to prevent the passage of convoys over the inundation, Vendome resorted to new expedients. Langeon, who commanded the galleys of Dunkirk, prepared at Nieuport a flotilla manned with troops of the marine, to act on the canal, and a force of 50 companies of grenadiers and 1,000 dragoons was detached to second his enterprises. A species of amphibious warfare now took place; and a vigorous though ineffectual cannonade was maintained as well on the allied posts, as on the boats employed in conveying ammunition and stores. At length to intercept the communication entirely, the enemy determined to attack Leffinghen, which had not only afforded protection to the allied troops, but cut off the communi-



cation with Nieuport and other places on the frontier, and was now occupied by a considerable corps of english and dutch infantry, who were sustained by another post beyond Dixmund. Trenches were accordingly opened along the causeway of Bruges, and pushed with all the rapidity which the narrow front, and the difficulties of the ground would permit. The assailants profited by the negligence of the troops guarding the post. Taking advantage of a dark and rainy night, they opened a heavy fire from the trenches, to occupy the attention of the garrison, while parties of grenadiers traversed the inundation, on each side of the Dyke, to attack the rear, and cut off reinforcements from the small camp on the coast. This design succeeded. Fifty men who guarded a post on the side of Nieuport, were put to the sword, and the front of the village was instantly assaulted. The officers being absent from their duty, the garrison were completely surprised, and yielded at discretion, with a considerable sum of money, 1,200 barrels of powder, and other ammunition.

At the moment, however, when the french commanders deemed their labours crowned by this successful enterprise, the fate of Lille was decided.

The besiegers had continued to extend themselves along the covert way, and in spite of the gallant resistance made by the garrison, had perfected their lodgments, augmented their batteries, and by mines, and other warlike artifices, continued to ruin the defences of the place. On the 16th, they commenced the descent and passage of the principal ditch. The breaching batteries were now augmented, and no less than 55 pieces of heavy artillery, with 36 mortars and howitzers, were mounted in the lodgments on the covert way and outworks. Amidst a carnage, which seldom occurs even at a siege, the decisive moment approached. On the 21st, crowds of volunteers, carrying forward sand-bags and fascines, the enlargement of the trenches, the completion of the passage across the ditch, and a tremendous fire of artillery for 24 hours, alarmed the garrison with the prospect of an hourly assault. On the 22nd of October, therefore, after 60 days siege, Boufflers beat a parley at 4 in the afternoon. Hostages were immediately



exchanged, and conferences held for the surrender. Eugene treated the garrison with the generosity which their brave defence so justly merited. He paid the most flattering compliments to the heroic governor, and even left him to regulate his own conditions. The gate de la Madelaine was yielded to the allies at mid-day on the 23rd, and the remains of the garrison, amounting to 5,000 men, retired into the citadel on the 25th. The sick and wounded were to be conveyed to Douay, and prisoners on both sides exchanged. The government of the place was confided to the prince of Holstein Beck, who had distinguished himself by his skill and judgment in the siege.

By the capitulation of Lille, and the attack which was preparing against the citadel, the leading object of the campaign was nearly attained. Marlborough therefore resumed his original plan of carrying the war into the heart of France, and earnestly pressed the treasurer to obtain a powerful augmentation of troops, for the accomplishment of a design, which he considered as the only means to obtain a speedy and honourable peace. He made this request a particular article in his instructions to Sir Richard Temple,\* who conveyed the news of the surrender, and repeatedly and strongly enforced it in his subsequent letters. He also imparted the resolution adopted by Eugene and himself, to keep the field, till they had effected the reduction of Ghent and Bruges, the possession of which was not only necessary for the completion of their conquests, but even for the safety of their quarters. He farther stated, that either he, or his illustrious colleague must remain in Holland during the winter, as well for the purpose of forwarding the military preparations, and tranquillizing the dutch, as for guarding against any sudden and desperate effort on the part of the enemy.

While the attack was preparing against the citadel of Lille, measures were adopted by the allied generals, to obviate the difficulties in which they were placed, by drawing their supplies from the french frontier. At La Bassée they had stationed 13

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\* Afterwards lord Cobham.



battalions and 30 squadrons, and at Lens another considerable corps. Under the protection of these posts, numerous parties were continually pushed into the neighbouring province of Artois, and secured the greater part of the crops, which had either not been removed, or had hitherto escaped their researches. On the other hand, a detachment was sent to the side of Dixmund, to draw supplies of corn and cattle from the district of Furnes.

Meanwhile they acted with their usual vigour and decision against the citadel. The attack was already arranged, and the french garrison had scarcely quitted the town, before the troops were employed, in forming epaulements on the esplanade, and completing works to protect the opening of the trenches. At the same time, the extensive circumvallation was contracted, and a new line drawn from the gate des Malades to Haubourdin, from whence it was to be continued to the Lower Dyle.

On the 29th of October the trenches were opened, and the sap advanced to within forty paces of the exterior covert way. The besieging force was augmented with 9 battalions, and continued to push their approaches in spite of the inundations formed by the enemy. On the 8th they lodged themselves on the two salient angles of the covert way, and though checked by several vigorous sallies, still continued their progress. On the night of the 16th, they seized a place of arms, and on the 19th were masters of two points of the second counterscarp. The interval between that day and the 22nd was employed in enlarging their communications and strengthening their lodgments. The attack and defence were maintained with equal spirit, and the chiefs so lavishly exposed their persons, that Eugene had an aide de camp killed by his side, the prince of Bevern received a musket shot in the head, and M. de Surville, one of the principal officers of the french garrison, was mortally wounded.

During this important crisis, Vendome and the duke of Burgundy continued in the camp of Salsoy. Awed by the spirit and perseverance of their antagonists, they appear to have been embarrassed and confounded, and to have spent the time in



discussing plans of operation. What was proposed by Vendome was generally thwarted by Berwick, or over-ruled by the prince, and the hour, which was to decide the fate of the place, found them still uncertain, whether to restrict their enterprises to a war of convoys, or to make a great and desperate effort for raising the siege. Appeals were again made to the court, and Chamillard reached the camp on the 2nd of November, with injunctions to the chiefs to avoid a general engagement.

The letters of Marlborough, written at this period, will supply the necessary explanation on his views and circumstances.

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

“*Nov. 1.* Since my last I have had none from you; besides, I have instructed Sir Richard Temple so fully with all my thoughts, that I shall not for some time trouble you with long letters. We are carrying on our attack on the citadel, and hope by the middle of next month to be masters of it; for we do not think they will stay the last extremity. If they do, they must expect no capitulation. We have been blessed with extraordinary good weather, so that we have very few sick in the army, though we are now afraid the weather is changing; yet it will not be so troublesome to us as it must have been before we were masters of the town, for now the greatest part of the men, that attack the citadel, are quartered in the town, which is a very great ease.”

“*Rousselaar, Nov. 6.* Having a safe opportunity of sending this letter to Brussels, I shall write with more freedom than I have done for some time past. The greatest difficulty we now meet with, is the want of corn, so that we are more apprehensive of wanting bread, than of any thing the enemy can do. In order to see what corn we can get from the county of Artois, I sent yesterday major-general Cadogan to La Bassée, where there are already two thousand horse, and ten battalions of foot. He has taken with him ten squadrons more.

“The french are expecting detachments both from the Rhine and Dauphiné, being resolved to make their utmost effort in this country. I hope we may take the citadel before they come,



though we go on very slowly, being very careful of losing as few men as possible; for we cannot yet guess when this campaign may end, but as soon as we have the citadel, we shall then be more at liberty to act against the enemy; and I do assure you that our intentions are to do all that lies in our power to bring them to action. They give out, that as soon as the troops they expect join them, they will seek us. These resolutions seem more agreeable to the beginning of a campaign than the month of November. If God blesses us with farther success, before we go into winter quarters, there is no doubt of having a good peace; but if all things remain as they now are, the only way of having a speedy and good peace is, to augment the troops, so as that we may enter France the next campaign with a good superiority; and that the fleet may be assisting to us, which, with the assistance of Almighty God, is what will, in all likelihood, bring this troublesome war to a happy end, which is, I believe, more wished for by your humble servant, than by any other body living."

"*Nov. 16.* I know not whether it proceeds from the enemy, or that the letters are not come from England, but we have had none these last two days. Believing that this letter will go safe to Brussels, I shall venture to write more freely than by the post. We have been extreme uneasy for want of corn, not having in our stores for longer than this day, which obliged me to send Cadogan to La Bassé, where we got some, but not sufficient to make us subsist the remaining part of this month; so that Thursday last, I detached the earl of Stair with ten squadrons of horse, and as many battalions of foot, for Dixmund, with orders to attack the fort the enemy has on the canal at that place. He succeeded so well, that he made a lieutenant-colonel and upwards of 200 men prisoners of war, by which we have secured a passage into that country, and I hope to draw subsistence sufficient for the army from thence. They have already sent a thousand oxen and cows, and great numbers of sheep to Lille, where provision was much wanted. Notwithstanding the arbitrary government with which they have been governed, they are no ways inclined for us; but on the contrary, give as little assistance as is possible,



suffering their bills to be protested, though they have by them an advantage of 7 *per cent*. But I hope, when we have the citadel, every thing will mend, which we think will be by the end of this month. It might be sooner, but that we have great management both of our men and ammunition; besides, we employ also this time in repairing the breaches of the town. As we have had the visible protection of God Almighty on several occasions this campaign, we both hope and pray, that he will give us farther success, which we shall endeavour to seek, when we are masters of the citadel. Considering the losses we have had at this siege, and the frequent actions with the enemy, yet we are in as good a condition as can be expected, at this time of year, we having very few sick, and both men and officers full of resolution.

“ I beg of you to assure the queen, that I act with all my heart and soul, that this campaign may end very much for her glory and safety. The situation of the enemy, as well as our's, is such, that I think it impossible for either to take their winter quarters before we have an action, which, if it can be brought to be a general one, will decide the fate of this war. I could wish it might come time enough for the opening of the parliament; but I fear it must be the month of December, before we shall be able to send you good news.

“ Not knowing when I may have another opportunity of writing freely, I must again press you to take, what I believe to be the only way of bringing France to a speedy and good peace, which is, that you should not only resolve in England upon an augmentation of troops, but lose no time in prevailing with the States General to do the same; for their declaration would have a greater effect in France. I have, and shall continue to press them in Holland, which I hope may have its effect, their deputies here assuring me, that they are convinced there is no other way of bringing this war to a happy end. We could wish here, that the elector of Hanover and the duke of Savoy could have continued with their armies some time longer in the field, the french threatening us with the great numbers of troops they will bring into this country.”



FROM LORD GODOLPHIN, IN REPLY.

“ Nov. 12--23. It is above a fortnight since we have any letters from you by the post. I had the favour of your's of the 6th by Brussels, of the 8th by Ostend, and this day it was no small pleasure to me to see the outside of your's of the 16th, by the way of Brussels; but the inside of it does not give me so much satisfaction. I am sorry it will be at least a week before you have the citadel, and after that to find you think of beginning a new campaign, when you have been in the field a month longer than ever was known. Can you hope the good weather will continue to the end of the year? I am sorry to find you think there must be yet more action. If that must be, I believe it will be, because you have a mind to disturb their winter quarters, for I cannot think they will pretend to hinder your's. Lastly, I am sorry to find, that be the event of these things as one could wish, we must not hope to see you here till Christmas, or very near it.

“ In the mean time, till you do come, give me leave to assure you, no endeavour shall be wanting, nor pains omitted, on my part, to make every thing go on as you could wish it might do, at the opening of the parliament. I have got it into the speech, that an augmentation should be desired for Flanders, and I hope it will be granted.

“ I have been a good while of opinion, that somebody should be sent on purpose from the queen to the States, to press them very earnestly to declare themselves upon that matter. I have written to know your thoughts upon this for a month together, but not having had any answer, I believe my letters have not yet come to your hands. Upon the whole, as things now stand, I believe nobody will be sent, till there be a return from the parliament to the speech, by the addresses of either house; and I hope this will be such as may very much contribute to the success of him that carries them over.

“ I have had the honour to read your letter to the queen. She seemed to be much concerned that we were like to be so long without seeing you.

“ I think you have but too much reason to repine at the cold-



ness and indifference of the elector of Hanover and the duke of Savoy. For my part, I cannot help thinking there is most cause to complain of the latter. He has had most done for him, and had most in his power to do for us."

Marlborough was not however swayed by the more timid policy of the treasurer. But sensible that the most effectual mode of suppressing and foiling the cabals at home, was by success abroad, he persisted in his purpose; and we find his letters still filled with suggestions and proposals, for closing the actual campaign with glory, and opening the next with an equal prospect of success.

The french had observed the progress of the allies, in their attacks against the citadel, with greater tranquillity, because a plan was formed to divert them from their purpose, or make some amends for the loss of the place, by a more important capture. This design did not escape the vigilance of Marlborough, as we find by a letter to lord Godolphin, from Helchin, without date, but evidently written at this crisis.

"Your's of the 27th came so late, that I had not time by the last post to give you my thoughts, nor, indeed, have I as yet any time for other thoughts than what is now acting in this country, on the success of which, I think, depend the liberties of all Europe. The french are endeavouring to get all the troops that is possible together, and by the intelligence we have from M. de Vendome's army, as well as the motions of the duke of Berwick, it looks as if their resolutions were to act in Brabant; and though this army is very much weakened by the siege, I am resolved to venture every thing, rather than let them take Brussels, which, I believe, is their design, believing me too weak for the relief of it. I beg you to assure the queen, that I have that duty and love for her that I shall have no reserve in venturing every thing that may be for her service, hoping that God will protect her just cause. If it pleases God to give us one success more this campaign, I hope that may bring such a peace as may give her security abroad for the rest of her life. I do, from my soul, wish there were a better prospect at home; but by all the accounts I have, I see nothing but confusion, which is another argument for



my engaging the enemy, if possible ; for they will otherwise reap the advantage of our division."

At length this design was developed. While the french troops commanded the course of the Scheld, the elector of Bavaria, who had been recently called from the Rhine, prepared to surprise or capture Brussels, where his efforts were likely to be seconded by numerous partisans, and where the allies had formed their principal magazines. He assembled 15,000 men at Mons, and marched from thence on the 22nd of November. Arriving before Brussels, he summoned the place ; but M. Paschal, who had been appointed governor, with a garrison of 7,000 men, rejected all proposals, and made preparations for resistance. Trenches were accordingly opened, by the elector, on the night of the 24th, between the gates of Louvain and Namur, and pushed with such rapidity, that the assailants speedily lodged themselves on the covert way. In this imminent danger, the governor dispatched courier after courier to Marlborough, and in the mean time awed the partisans of the elector, by arresting the most disaffected, and by holding forth the prospect of instant succour, to deter those who were only waiting the event, to declare for the enemy.

On receiving intelligence of the danger, Marlborough proceeded to execute his purpose of relieving the place, by forcing the enemy in their strong positions behind the Scheld. This admirable enterprise, which was worthy the rest of so extraordinary a campaign, was concerted between the two great commanders, and carried into effect with equal energy, secrecy, and decision. The difficulty may be more readily conceived, when it is recollected that the front of the enemy was protected by a wide and deep river, which was bounded by precipitous banks, and that they had employed three months in fortifying their position. Their posts extended from Tournay, to the vicinity of Ghent ; but their principal force was collected above, below, and opposite Oudenard, which being considered as the only practicable passage for the allies, they spared no labour in preparing entrenchments, to withstand the most formidable attack.

It would have been almost impossible to force an enemy so



fully prepared, without the loss of half the army ; and, therefore, to lull his antagonists into security, Marlborough, as on other occasions, affected to pursue a design foreign to his real purpose. Reports were spread, that the allied troops were to be distributed into cantonments, till the siege of the citadel was finished ; and that an attempt would then be made, to effect a passage over the canal of Bruges, in the vicinity of Ghent. To give colour to these rumours, orders were issued, for the conveyance of forage to Menin and Courtray ; the field artillery was sent to Menin, and the proper officers employed to select quarters at Courtray, for the commander in chief and his staff, and cantonments in the vicinity for the troops. So completely were appearances preserved, that the troops themselves were deceived ; and both officers and men hourly expected the notice of a temporary repose from their labours.

After these preparatory measures, which were calculated at once to conceal and forward the real design, Marlborough broke up his camp on the 25th, and moved to Harlebeck, near Courtray. Here dispositions were made for forcing the passage of the Scheld on three points. In the morning of the 26th, a detachment of 16 battalions and 40 squadrons, under count Lottum, with a sufficient number of pontoons and artillery, were ordered to take the route of Gavre, to throw two bridges over the river, and if they encountered no opposition, to march towards Eename. About the same time, Cadogan, with ten battalions and the train of artillery, was sent forward to effect a similar passage near Kirkhoff. At seven in the evening, Marlborough began his march, in the same direction, with the rest of the main body, amounting to 30 battalions and 50 squadrons.

A reinforcement of five battalions and as many squadrons was also sent to the governor of Oudenard, who was enjoined to post them in the covert way, during the night, and at the first discharge of artillery on the other points, to sally forth against the enemy, who were stationed opposite the town. Collaterally with these dispositions, Eugene had left with the prince of Wirtemberg a sufficient force to restrain the besieged in the citadel, and at the head of



20 battalions and 50 squadrons, directed his march through Roubaix, to force the passage from Hauterive to Escanaffe. It was settled between the different commanders, that if they respectively effected their purpose, they should so order their movements as to unite on the heights above Oudenard ; or if they encountered unexpected opposition, that they should turn to the place, where the attempt was first successful.

The different columns reached their assigned points during the night and early next morning, expecting, as an eye witness observes, " to engage in the bloodiest day they had ever yet experienced ;" but such was the effect of the feints and false reports previously circulated, that they found the enemy totally unprepared, and unconscious of danger. A thick fog, rising from the river, contributed to conceal their operations to the last moment. Before the dawn, count Lottum laid his bridges near Gavre, without opposition, and immediately advanced against the hostile corps which was posted in that quarter. Soon afterwards the detachment of Cadogan effected their passage at Kerkoff, with the same good fortune, and the ten battalions were immediately posted in the meadows on the farther bank. A few squadrons of the enemy's horse catching the alarm, rode down as if to charge, but discovering the firm countenance, and prompt disposition of the confederates, they wheeled about, and withdrew. Arrangements were then made, for attacking the village of Berchem, where the hedges were lined with hostile infantry ; but no sooner was the signal given for advancing, than the enemy made a hasty retreat.

At this moment the main body, led by Marlborough himself, drew near, and general Fagel and the prince of Hesse first passed the bridges at Kirkhoff, with the second line of infantry and part of the horse, and were rapidly followed by the remainder, who were impelled by the presence and exertions of the commander in chief. A pursuit instantly commenced, after the hindmost squadrons of the enemy, who were overtaken and charged in a defile, but effected their escape to Tournay, with a trifling loss in men, and the greater part of their baggage. Eugene, in the interim,



had reached Hauterive, but hearing that the passage was already effected at Kirkhoff, he directed his march thither, and crossed over the bridges laid by Cadogan.

The troops having thus overcome the principal difficulty, moved towards the heights of Oudenard, where the chief force of the enemy was collected. Instead, however, of aiding the general dispositions, by a sudden sally, the governor of that fortress retained his troops quietly within the works, alleging in excuse, a counter order from the dutch deputies. Thus the enemy were enabled to withdraw towards Grammont, with the loss of about twelve hundred men, who were taken or killed by the foremost of the allied squadrons. The pursuit being suspended, the different corps of the army united, and encamped towards evening on the high grounds overlooking the Scheld.\*

This signal success, which was effected with so trifling a loss, was immediately announced to Godolphin, from Oudenard, where Marlborough took up his quarters the night after the passage.

“ *Oudenard, Nov. 28.* The disagreeableness of the french having it in their power to see all our letters, has made me for some time not very regular in writing. But from henceforward I shall write very punctually, for yesterday morning we forced the Scheld, and beat the troops that were posted about this town. Prince Eugene is gone back this morning for Lille, and I am marching for the relief of Brussels, which, if it be not taken by to-morrow night, I do not doubt, with the blessing of God, the saving of it. After which, there is necessity of my getting more powder to Lille, by which you may see that our campaign is not at an end, though my next letter must be dated in December, which is very unusual in this country.

“ My lord Haversham may be angry, but prince Eugene and myself shall have that inward satisfaction of knowing that we have

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\* The account of this operation is principally taken from a letter of captain Molesworth to his brother, he was an aide de camp of Marlborough, and accompanied Cadogan's detachment—From the Correspondence—Burnet—Ledyard—Dumont—Vie du Prince Eugene—and the articles in the Gazette.



struggled with more difficulties, and have been blessed with more success, than ever was known before in one campaign. If at last it shall bring a safe and honourable peace to the queen, I shall esteem myself happy. When you see a proper time, you will assure her of my concern for the death of the prince. I have four of your letters to thank you for, but I am in such a hurry, with the many orders I am obliged to give, for this march to Brussels, that I have not time; but I cannot end this without telling you, that I very much approve of Mr. Webb's being gratified with a government, but I do not think it for her majesty's service to give a promise before the vacancy happens, especially since he shall be made a lieut.-general this winter. I have for some days been so tormented with a sore throat, that if the time could permit it, my chamber were the properest place for me."

After the passage of the Scheld, Eugene returned to prosecute the siege of the citadel, and Marlborough, having stationed the main body of his troops at Omberg, proceeded with a strong detachment to Alost. Here he left part of his escort, and departed for Brussels, where he arrived on the 29th, a little before noon, as well to testify his satisfaction with the governor and garrison, for their brave defence, as to take measures for continuing the supplies to the army at Lille. He was received with demonstrations of joy and gratitude, being met without the gates by the gallant governor and the officers of the garrison. After commending their courage and conduct, he repaired to the governor's house, where he was complimented by the council of state, the magistrates of the town, and the deputies of the States, who gratefully attributed their deliverance to his rapid and skilful march. He was accompanied on this occasion by the dethroned king Augustus, who had personally engaged in all the operations before Lille. From Brussels he again wrote to Godolphin.

"Nov. 29. I gave you an account in mine of yesterday, of our having forced the passage of the Scheld. At my arrival last night at Alost, I had an account of the precipitate retreat of the elector of Bavaria. He began to draw off from the



siege two hours after he had knowledge of my passage, fearing I might have fallen upon him, if he had staid for the carrying of his cannon and wounded men, the leaving of which is most scandalous; and consequently must be a great mortification to the elector. Lord Hertford having a mind to return for England, I send these letters by him, so that there needs be no present; but the opportunity being safe, I shall venture to tell you, that the forcing of the Scheld was not only necessary for the saving of Brabant, but also for the sending more ammunition to Lille. So that as soon as I have given the necessary orders in this town, I shall return this evening to the army, to take such measures, as may secure the passage of one thousand barrels of powder from Ath to Lille.

“I cannot prove what I am going to say, but I really believe we have been, from the very beginning of that siege, betrayed; for great part of our stores have been embezzled. \* \* \* \* \* God is most certainly with us, or it would have been impossible to overcome the many difficulties we have met with.

“You are so pressing in your letters for my return, that I must tell you the truth, and beg you will not think it vanity, that if I should leave the army, it would not be in any body’s power to keep them in the field; so that you see the necessity. The truth is, that I am very ill in my health, so that if we should have very ill weather, it may kill me. But I must venture every thing, rather than quit, before we have perfected this campaign. My heart is in England, and nobody has greater desire for the enjoying quietness there than myself; but should I take ease at this time, I should hurt the queen and my country more than my whole life could repair.”

After partaking of a splendid entertainment, given by the governor, Marlborough returned the same evening to Alost, where he received the glad tidings that the besiegers had effected a lodgment on the second counterscarp of the citadel. From his correspondence, we find that in the midst of these extraordinary exertions, he was labouring under one of those feverish attacks to which he was constitutionally subject. His tender



solicitude on this occasion, to spare the feelings of the duchess, is no less conspicuous than that energy of character, which sustained him under bodily exertion, suffering, and debility.

TO THE DUCHESS.

"*Dec. 3.* As my greatest happiness is in your tenderness, and that I do flatter myself with your having a tender concern for me, I have endeavoured all I could not to let the army know the ill condition of my health, for these three last weeks, fearing some officers might write it to England, by which you might be made uneasy. But I thank God I am now much better, and if I could have two or three days quiet, I do not doubt but it would set me right, for my greatest uneasiness is a constant drought."

"*Dec. 6.* I have received your dear letter of the 19th, by which I see the kind concern you had at that time for me, which I shall ever, by my kindness, endeavour to deserve. You will have known by lord Hertford, by this time, the success God has been pleased to bless us with, considering the pains they had taken, by fortifying every place of the river, where they thought we could pass. I think it next to a miracle, our surprising them as we did. Our passage has had all the happy effects we could propose, which has encouraged me to take measures for the siege of Ghent, though the season is so far advanced, that I tremble every day for fear of ill weather. If we take Ghent, I think we shall have a certainty of a good peace, which is every day more and more wished for by me."

From Alost, Marlborough again moved on the 1st of December, and encamped between Belleghem and Oudenard. General Dedem, with 20 battalions, here passed the Scheld, and posted himself beyond, while general Hompesch remained on the side of Menin, with a corps of 38 squadrons and 8 battalions. The communications with Eugene were thus secured on every point, and avenues again opened for the passage of supplies.

During this interval, the approaches had been continued



against the citadel, and the batteries were already preparing. The first care of Eugene, on returning to the spot, was to apprise Boufflers of the passage of the Scheld, and offer him the most honourable conditions. But the marshal was too sensible of the importance of retarding the allies, to accept the overture. The siege was accordingly prosecuted with new vigour. On the 1st of December, the salient angles of the second covert way were carried; and before the 6th, the necessary lodgments and communications were made for raising breaching batteries on the counterscarp.



## CHAPTER 74.

1708.

*Reduction of the citadel of Lille—Ulterior projects—The french army distributed into winter quarters—Investment and surrender of Ghent—Evacuation of Bruges, Plassendael, and Leffinghen—Correspondence—Close of the campaign—State of the war in Spain—Proposals of the duke of Orleans to the allies—Military operations in Italy—Dispute and reconciliation between the emperor and the pope—Transactions on the Rhine—Dissatisfaction of the elector of Hanover.*

**W**HILE the british commander was anxiously expecting the surrender of the citadel, his active mind was employed in forming plans for the recovery of Bruges and Ghent. He was still also devising means for the farther prosecution of the war, and earnestly solicited his friends both in England and Holland to obtain such an augmentation of force, as would enable him to open the ensuing campaign at an early period, and with a decided superiority.

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

“*Dec. 3.* I agree with you that this campaign is already much longer than has been usual in this country ; but you will remember that I have formerly told you, we must end this campaign with the re-taking of Ghent, if possible. The length of the siege of Lille puts us to great difficulties ; for from henceforward, if we continue the army together, we must subsist them with dry forage, which is very difficult and expensive. This expence must be made by England and Holland ; for even with that, we shall find it very difficult to persuade the foreign troops that it is reasonable, at this time of the year, to be from their winter quarters. But I think the taking of Ghent and Bruges, with the augmentation which I hope will be made by England



and Holland, will procure an honourable and safe peace. I have proposed this expence to Holland by the last letters; and if they agree to it, I hope her majesty will approve of it.

“ I acquainted you in a former letter, that I had ordered lieutenant-general Erle to send five battalions to Antwerp, upon the first notice I had of the attempt on Brussels. I have now ordered him to leave at Ostend a brigadier with the six battalions, and himself, and the rest of the general officers, to return for England. I have also directed him to take as many officers, as is possible, of those six regiments with him for England, so as to recruit them, if possible, they being extremely weak.

“ For the troops of augmentation, there must be early care taken with the king of Prussia and others, to let them see that there must be no advance money given; but that we shall be willing to pay such troops as are not already in the service. If there be not great care taken in this matter, my lord Raby, by his flattery to the king of Prussia and that court, will spoil all. The 50,000 odd crowns was last year promised so solemnly, that they must be paid as soon as he has signed the treaty for this year; but I think it should stay for that. You know also, that the queen is engaged in honour to pay this winter the 200,000 crowns to the landgrave of Hesse. I know all these things must give you great trouble, but for God's sake let the queen's promises be kept sacred; for that will for ever establish her reputation, which is now very great.

“ I cannot end this letter, without assuring you that I know the difficulties of Holland to be so great, that I hope every honest man in England will be contented with their furnishing only one third in the augmentation; for it is most certain, that they now subsist only by credit, and that the ill affected in that country have no hopes left, but that England will insist upon their giving one half.

“ I have been troubled some time with the count Guiscard, which has given me the opportunity of being sure that his head is turned to impracticable projects; he has desired me to send you the inclosed paper, and at the same time tells me he has no money.



You must let me know what I am to say to him. If you can make any use of him, he is better any where than in England.\*

"I have this minute received a letter from prince Eugene, writ last night, that he hopes by Thursday to have all his batteries ready, and then he will summon the marshal, and at the same time let him know that he may send an officer to see our cannon and ammunition. After which, if he obliges us to make the breach, he must expect no other capitulation but that of being prisoners of war. The 1,000 barrels of powder I send to Lille, are this morning come out of Ath, and will be with the prince on Wednesday night; so that on Thursday or Friday, I hope the french will be obliged to see or hear them. I think the last will be the better, for though there are not above 4,000 men in the citadel, they consist of two regiments of horse, two of dragoons, and 22 of foot, so that there will be a great number of officers, and consequently an impossibility of raising the regiments for the next campaign. If we can be so happy to get every thing necessary for the attack of Ghent, I think to direct it, and the prince to cover the siege with the troops that shall march with him from Lille.

"God has blessed us for a long time with good weather, so that it would be ungrateful to complain; but this day we have rain with a southerly wind, which makes us fear we must expect much more."

"Dec. 6. Since my last I have received your's of the 19th, by which I see the letters from Holland had given you fears for Brussels and Antwerp. There was but too much reason for fears, for had not God favoured our passage of the Scheld, they must have been in danger; for not only the towns, but the people of

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\* In reply to his remarks on Guiscard, Godolphin observes, December 2, O. S. "I agree entirely in your character of him, and that he is better any where than here, as also that he wants money to carry him any where, though he had £.500 when he went from hence, to carry him first to you, and afterwards, by your approbation, to the duke of Savoy, and to concert with him how he might be of most use to his operations next year, either by his intelligences in Dauphiné, or in the Cevennes, to both which he pretends. I can propose nothing better for him, than to follow his first intentions; and if in order to it, you will direct Mr. Cardonnel to help him with his credit at Amsterdam or Brussels, with any sum not exceeding 4 or £.500, I will see it repaid; and he must give Mr. Cardonnel an account of his proceedings from time to time."



this country hate the dutch. Our passage of the Scheld has so disordered M. de Vendome's projects, that I hope in God we shall succeed in this undertaking of Ghent, which is of the last consequence, not only for the finishing of this campaign, but also for the operations of the next. As it is impossible for me to stay her majesty's orders, without hurting the service very much, I have taken upon me, hoping the queen will approve it, to send this day major general Cadogan to Brussels, in conjunction with the deputies of the States, to contract for the dry forage that must be delivered to the army during the siege of Ghent, the States having resolved to give it to those troops they pay. This extraordinary is absolutely necessary, so that I must beg you to lay it favourably before the queen and the lords of the cabinet; for should I have staid for orders, we might have lost the opportunity of making the siege, for both our horse and foot already suffer very much by the cold weather we now have.

“As we are assured by our letters from all parts, that the french draw all the troops in their power into this country, we have resolved to keep as many of the german troops as we can persuade to stay; so that I should wish you had sent, as I desired formerly, the two scottish regiments of foot; and, if it be possible, I could wish they might be yet sent to Antwerp, for God knows when this campaign may end, and we have many of our regiments very weak; yet I think we must have Ghent and Bruges, let it cost what it will. Our men are very hearty, and desirous of taking those two towns, so that I hope they will suffer a great deal before they grumble. This country is not used to see an army so late in the field, but they all suffer patiently, believing it is what will forward the peace.”

TO THE DUCHESS.

“Dec. 10. I am now struggling with my own health and the season, that if it be possible to finish the campaign with the taking of Ghent and Bruges, which, if God blesses us with success, I think we may, without vanity, say, that France will, with terror, remember this campaign for a long time, there never having been any in which there has been such a variety of action.”



Both Marlborough and Eugene were particularly anxious to reduce Boufflers to an unconditional surrender; but the advance of the season, and the state of the fortress induced them to relinquish this object, for the sake of ulterior advantages. The besieged having beat a parley on the 8th of December, at 7 in the evening, were admitted to a capitulation on the 9th, and the same day, marching out with all the honours of war, were escorted to Douay. On this occasion, the confederate chiefs vied in the testimonies of their respect to the gallant defender of the place, who obtained not only the merited rewards of his own sovereign, but the admiration of his conquerors. Thus ended a siege, which may be justly regarded as one of the most arduous and difficult, as well as one of the longest and most sanguinary, in modern warfare. The loss of the garrison amounted to 8,000 men, and that of the besiegers, in killed, wounded, and sick, or incapable, to no less than 14,000.

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

"*Dec. 10.* I am very glad to tell you, that prince Eugene sent col. Cronstrom to me yesterday, to let me know that he was to have possession of one of the gates of the citadel that day. I have taken measures with him for their sending 20 battalions and 30 squadrons to join me, with all expedition, so that I might give as little time as possible to those in Ghent to strengthen themselves, which they now do, by working day and night. You will see by the inclosed letter, which we have intercepted, the number of troops the enemy have for the defence of Ghent and Bruges, which are so numerous, that I am afraid they will be able to give us more trouble than were to be wished at this season; but the consequences of taking these places are so great, that we must venture every thing for the being masters of them. I never, in my life, felt colder weather than we have had for these last three days, so that our men and horses must suffer. I shall march to-morrow, so that my next march will be for investing the town, which will be as soon as I shall be able to have the cannon at Dendermond. I hope my next will acquaint you with the day. If God bless us with the taking of this place, and a good augmentation be



made, I think a good peace must follow before the middle of next summer."

The french monarch was discouraged by the failure of all his projects for the relief of the citadel of Lille. Calculating that the surrender of that fortress would close the campaign, and that Marlborough and Eugene would not expose an army, reduced by past exertions, to new hardships at the commencement of winter, he ordered his generals to strengthen the garrisons of Ghent and Bruges, and distribute their troops into quarters, in opposition to the remonstrances of Vendome, who was anxious to retrieve the disgrace which he had encountered in the course of the campaign.\* When, however, the movements of the confederates indicated the prosecution of farther operations, count de la Motte, who was charged with the defence of Ghent, was enjoined to maintain his post to the last extremity, and earnestly exhorted to imitate the gallant example of Boufflers.

Measures were, however, already adopted by the confederate chiefs, to abridge the time, and lessen the means of resistance. On the 11th of December, Marlborough quitted Berleghem, and encamped with the right at Melle, and the left at Merlebeck; and gave orders for laying bridges over the Upper and Lower Scheld, as well as over the Lys, for maintaining his communications. On the 16th, Eugene passed the Scheld, and halting his army at Eename, proceeded to Melle, where he held a conference with his colleague. The requisite arrangements being settled by a council of war, it was decided that Marlborough should direct the siege, and Eugene head the covering army. In pursuance of this resolution, a detachment was sent, on the 17th, from each army, one to take post at Gamarage, and observe the motions of the enemy beyond the Dender, the other to Osterzelle, to straiten Ghent, between the Upper and Lower Scheld. The ensuing day, the troops of Marlborough making a general movement in four columns, invested the place on all sides. Count Lottum between the Upper Scheld and the Lys; the prince of Hesse between

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\* Memoires de Berwick, t. 2, p. 55.



the Lys and the canal of Sas; the duke of Wirtemberg between the canal of Sas and the Lower Scheld; and count Tilly, to the south, between the Upper and Lower Scheld. Marlborough himself took up his quarters at Merlebeck, as the most convenient point to superintend the attack.

On the 24th the trenches were opened, by count Lottum, and no other resistance being encountered, except a single sally, the batteries were speedily in a condition to bombard the town. On the 30th, therefore, count de la Motte sent out a trumpet, to demand an honourable capitulation, which Marlborough granted, from an anxiety to spare his troops, as the frost had already commenced. The incidents of this enterprise will sufficiently appear in the correspondence.

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

“*Dec. 13.* The wind having been for some time in the east, we have had no letters from England. Till this frost breaks, we can neither break ground for our batteries, nor open our trenches, and which is yet worse, if this weather continues, all the canals will be frozen, so that we shall not be able to get forage from Holland, which is the only place that can furnish us. But my reliance is, that God, who has protected and blessed us hitherto, will enable us to finish it with the taking this town, which you will be sensible of the use it will be to us, when you read the inclosed letter.\* We begin to give dry forage to-morrow: we have contracted for as much as will serve us for three weeks, but after that time, the towns of this country, as well as the army, will, I am afraid, find no forage but what must be brought from Holland.”

“*Dec. 17.* I am to return you my thanks for yours of the 23rd and 26th, and I do, with all my heart, rejoice at what you write, that you believe every thing will go well in parliament. I pray God we may succeed in this necessary undertaking. The enemy knowing the consequence of our having Ghent, have left 30 battalions and 19 squadrons for the defence of it, which in

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\* An intercepted letter from the elector of Bavaria, on the necessity of defending Ghent to the last extremity, printed in Ledyard, vol. 2.



other countries would be thought a good army. Their numerous garrison, and the season of the year, have made them flatter themselves hitherto. But now they begin to see our ammunition boats, so that I had this evening a deputation from the town, to desire that their houses might not be burnt. You will see my answer in the paper which goes to the secretary's office, it being too long to trouble you with in this letter. To-morrow the town will be invested on all sides. After which, we must for some time have patience, till we get our cannon. By the next post I intend to let Mr. Walpole know what number of men we shall want for the twenty english battalions of this army. Those with Mr. Erle are in a much worse condition. He must let you know the numbers. Those in Spain and Portugal should also be taken care of."

"Dec. 20. I hope by this time the house of commons are come to a resolution for an augmentation, so that there may be time for the getting of the men. Besides the advantage it will be, that our friends as well as enemies may see that the war next year is to be carried on with vigour. I am earnest in this, because I think it will make an end of the war.

"The thaw continuing, the enemy now make use of the advantage of their sluices on the Scheld and Lys, by overflowing all they can; so that we are forced to make new ways for carrying of our cannon, which I hope we shall begin to do in three days, all diligence being used for the landing of them."

"Dec. 24. The inclosed is a copy of a letter writ by M. Chamillard to the count de la Motte. It should not be seen by many, for fear the french should hear of my having a copy. You will see by it, that he is not to manage his garrison, which, by a certain account we have from the town, consists of 34 battalions and 19 squadrons. However, I have no doubt of God's blessing us with success, though it may last something longer than we first proposed to ourselves. At this time we have very fair weather, which we make use of for hutting and covering ourselves, so that we may resist ill weather if we must have it; for the soldiers as well as officers are convinced of the necessity of having this town. Prince Eugene is returned from Brussels, and is desirous to be



going for Vienna, where he says his presence is necessary for putting the troops in a condition for the next campaign; but as he is also desirous of my going to the Hague with him for two or three days, he must stay till this siege is over, or not go to the Hague. What you say as to the prohibition of letters, is certainly very right, but the States will never consent to it. We shall open the trenches before the town this night, and before the castle to-morrow."

"*Dec. 27.* I have received the favour of your's of the 7th. Our frost left us about the same time your's did, and ever since we have had very fine weather, except yesterday and the day before, in which two days we had so great a fog, that we could not see ten yards before us; so that we could not see, till yesterday in the evening, where to place our batteries. We are now working so diligently, that I hope our cannon will fire on Sunday morning at farthest. In one of the sallies the french made yesterday, they carried into the town brigadier Evans and col. Groves, the latter dangerously wounded. They were so soon beaten back, that we did not lose above 30 men, which were all of lord North's regiment.

"You will see by the letter I have received from the States, which I have sent to Mr. Secretary Boyle, that they are desirous I should stay here till the beginning of the winter, in hopes the emperor will consent to send prince Eugene, in the beginning of March. I have told the prince that, provided the queen allows of it, I will take care of the months of January and February, and that he must take care of March and April, which he is willing to do. I am sure all the troops cannot be in their quarters till the beginning of February, so that this will not keep me above three weeks longer abroad, than naturally I must have been. But if the queen will have it otherwise, I will not stay one day, which I desire you will assure her.

"This fog, and my feet being wet every day in the trenches, has given me so great a cold and sore throat, that it is very uneasy to me to hold down my head, so that you will excuse my not answering your's till next post."



The surrender of Ghent produced an interesting spectacle. On the 2nd of January, the garrison evacuated the place with the usual honours of war, and were received, as they filed off, by Marlborough and Eugene, surrounded by their officers and soldiers. The march began early in the morning, headed by the commander and his suite; and the cavalcade was so numerous, that the procession was not concluded till 7 in the evening. After attending this ceremony, Marlborough supped with his colleague, enjoying the happy termination of their fatigues, and in the evening visited the town *incognito*. The following morning he examined the fortifications and trenches, and on his return was met at the gate of St. Leven by the magistrates, who, according to custom, presented him with the keys of the town in a gilt ewer. Returning the keys, with a gracious compliment, he was conducted through lines of burghers, under arms, to the town house, where he partook of a splendid entertainment. In the evening, the tower of the town house was illuminated; and, as if to make amends for their former defection, all ranks testified, by loud acclamations, their joy on returning to their obedience under the austrian sovereign.

The satisfaction which Marlborough felt on this occasion, was augmented by new success. The magistrates of Bruges arrived on the 2nd, to announce the evacuation of their town by the enemy, and to offer their submission. At the same time, intelligence was received, that on the capitulation of Ghent, the garrisons of Plassendael and Leffinghen had followed the example of Bruges, and retired into the french territory. Thus the enemy abandoned all the conquests which they had made during the course of the campaign.

The two generals having arranged the plan of winter quarters, and left the command to count Tilly, proceeded through Brussels to the Hague, where they arrived in the beginning of January.

TO LORD GODOLPHIN.

“ Dec. 31. I sent yesterday an express by Ostend, to acquaint her majesty that the troops of Ghent were to march out on Wednesday, if not relieved before. This place will secure



the conquest of Lille, and give us great advantages for the next campaign. The dutch thinking it for the service, as really it is, to keep the emperor's troops in this country, have assured the prince of Savoy that they will be willing to give their part for enabling them to subsist. I beg her majesty will approve of my assuring, that whatever the dutch will allow, England may do the same; for should these troops return for Germany, we should not have them till the month of July, at soonest. I have this morning sent a trumpet with letters to the governor and town of Bruges, offering them the same capitulation as given to Ghent; but if they give me the trouble of marching with the army, they must not expect it. I am afraid that I shall have the return of a civil answer, and the trouble of marching, which I shall give you an account of by my next. \* \* \* \* \*

“The prince of Savoy bids me assure you, that every thing possible will be done to finish the dispute with the pope.”

“*Ghent, January 3, 1708--9.* I was yesterday, from ten in the morning till six at night, seeing the garrison of Ghent and all that belonged to them march by me. It is astonishing to see so great numbers of good men, to look on, and suffer a place of this consequence to be taken, at this season, with so little a loss. As soon as they knew I had possession of the gate of this town, they took the resolution of abandoning Bruges. This campaign is now ended to my own heart's desire; and as the hand of the Almighty is visible in this whole matter, I hope her majesty will think it due to him, to return public thanks; and, at the same time, to implore his blessing on the next campaign. I cannot express enough to you the importance of these two towns, for without them we could neither be quiet in our winter quarters, nor open with advantage the next campaign.

“I shall to-morrow give the necessary orders for separating the army, so that in two days they will be all on their march for their winter quarters. I must go with prince Eugene for some few days to the Hague, after which, I shall take a little care of my health.

“I desire you will give my humble duty to her majesty, and assure her that I do, with all my heart, pray that the Almighty God



may bless her arms the next campaign, as visibly as he has been pleased to do in this."

Thus terminated this extraordinary campaign, perhaps one of the most scientific occurring in the annals of military history. From the commencement to the close, the confederates had to struggle against a force far *superior in numbers*, to attack an army posted in a position considered as impregnable, to besiege a place of the first magnitude, at the very moment when they were themselves in a manner invested, to open and maintain their communications in spite of innumerable obstacles, both of nature and art, and, finally, to reduce, in the depth of winter, two fortresses defended by garrisons, which, in other circumstances, would have been considered as forming an army of no common magnitude. Nor can we omit paying a due tribute of approbation to the merits of Vendome, whose firmness, perseverance, and spirit, rendered him a rival worthy of his great antagonists; and whose skill and resources, though thwarted by his prince and colleagues, alone saved the french monarchy from that degradation which seemed the natural and inevitable consequence of the defeat at Oudenard.

The stupendous events in the Netherlands having diverted our attention from objects of less importance, we shall now take a brief retrospect of the military operations in other quarters.

Spain, the principal object of the war, first claims our notice. By repeated and urgent remonstrances, Marlborough had at length induced the emperor to send to the support of his brother, 7,300 men, who, in the commencement of the year, landed at Barcelona. But notwithstanding this succour, the disastrous events of the battle of Almanza was still deeply felt. The army in Catalonia was weak and discouraged, without money, magazines, or clothes, and instead of offensive operations, was scarcely competent to defend the frontier. The same jealousies and disputes still reigned, and lord Galway unwillingly resumed his irksome post; but his presence produced a continual cause of irritation in the mind of the king and the spanish ministers. The death of count



Noyelles, commander of the austrian forces, which happened in April, increased, instead of diminishing the existing difficulties ; for the influence which he possessed over the mind of the king, though often injuriously exerted, had yet preserved some consistency in the military operations. Particular jealousy was also shewn of the portuguese troops, who were considered as an incumbrance to the country, without contributing to its defence. The most pressing instances were accordingly made for the departure of count Staremburg and the austrian troops, who were yet to be detached from Italy ; and the command held by Noyelles was transferred to count Uhlfeld, an officer without military talents, and whose chief merit was, a conciliating and docile temper.

To remove one of the many sources of contention which had so long existed, a british squadron was sent to convey the portuguese troops to their native country, and they were accompanied by Galway, who eagerly seized the first opportunity to withdraw from his obnoxious post. At Lisbon they were strengthened by supplies and recruits from England, and sent to the frontier to divert the attention of the enemy. But the same jealousies which had been manifested against Galway in Spain, were displayed in the portuguese court ; and after a long contention, he was excluded from the supreme command. Even his colleague, Das Minas, was discarded, as a general of too enterprising a character, and the direction of the army was consigned to the marquis of Fronteira, who was not likely to overpass the limited views and orders of his court. Galway, who still remained at the head of the british troops, was invested with the character of ambassador ; but all the interest of his own government could not secure to him any predominant influence in the direction of military affairs.

At length Staremburg arrived at Barcelona, and the command of the british and dutch troops in Spain was transferred to general Stanhope and count Belcastel, who were both invested with the character of ambassador from their respective governments. The troops were drawn from their quarters, and camps were formed on the road to Cervera and Lerida. But they were too weak and ill-provided to undertake any movement of impor-



tance ; and, at the latter end of June, the Bourbon chiefs invested, without obstruction, the important fortress of Tortosa. Although this place was the key of Catalonia on the side of Valencia, the fortifications had been left in an imperfect and dilapidated state, and the garrison, consisting of palatines, were disaffected, and little disposed to make a vigorous resistance.

Sir John Leak having reached Barcelona with the fleet which had conveyed the succours to Lisbon, a council of war was held by the military and naval chiefs ; but their deliberations merely served to exhibit their perilous situation. The only hope of relieving Tortosa rested on the speedy arrival of further austrian reinforcements, which had been so long promised, and so long delayed, and the admiral proceeded to Italy to transport them to the scene of action. He was at the same time commissioned to convey the princess Elizabeth Christina of Brunswick Blackenburgh, who was destined to share the tottering throne of the austrian prince. He returned with 8,000 men ; but the time which had been wasted in delays and deliberations, rendered this succour of no other avail, than to avert the fate of Catalonia ; for the governor of Tortosa had surrendered the place after a faint defence of a month, and part only of the garrison joined the confederate troops, who were now assembled in the camp of Constantine, the rest having deserted to the Bourbon standard. Staremborg took post at Cervera, and prevented a design which had been formed by the Bourbon commanders, to unite the two armies in Roussillon and Aragon ; but in accomplishing this object, he was obliged to sacrifice Denia, which was reduced by the chevalier d'Asfeld, in November, and to witness the investment of Alicante, the only remnant of the austrian conquests in Valencia. These losses were in some degree compensated by the reduction of Minorca and Sardinia. The first was accomplished by the incredible exertions and consummate skill of general Stanhope, and the latter effected by the count of Cifuentes, recently created marquis of Almonzel, who sailed with a small force and obtained possession of Sardinia, by the assistance of the natives.



In the course of this campaign a singular incident demands our attention. The capital of Spain had been agitated by the same feuds and jealousies as the rival court of Barcelona. Philip was governed by his young and spirited queen, and she in her turn swayed by the celebrated princess Orsini, who had been selected to direct the inexperience of both.\* This aspiring woman was involved in perpetual contentions with the duke of Orleans, who commanded the army, as well as with the castilian nobles; and numerous intrigues and counter plots existed, not only between the two Bourbon courts, but between the courtiers of both nations.

The partial successes of the campaign, on the side of Catalonia, could not counterbalance the embarrassment arising from these contentions; and Louis, like the allies, found the peninsula a constant drain for those resources which his misfortunes in the Netherlands rendered necessary in other quarters. Deeming the cause of his grandson hopeless, he suggested, or connived at a design, formed by the duke of Orleans, to succeed Philip in the throne of Spain, or at least to secure a part of the peninsula, by a private accommodation with the allies. Towards the close of the campaign, the duke availed himself of a former intimacy between his dependent, Dubois, and general Stanhope, to offer his assistance in reducing Spain, provided the allies would accede to a partition of the country, and allow him to retain Navarre and some of the northern districts with the title of king. The communications being transmitted to the british government, it was deemed a favourable opportunity to hasten the humiliation of Louis; and the general was authorised, by instructions from the secretary of state, to offer the french prince, with the assent of Charles, which was previously obtained, the possession of Navarre, and the assistance of the allies in annexing to that territory Languedoc, with such of the southern provinces of France as their united forces could subdue. Not only Stanhope, but the british cabinet appear to have been captivated by the disclosure of this plausible scheme, and great hopes were entertained of

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\* Memoirs of the Bourbon Kings of Spain, chap. 15.



drawing considerable advantage from the defection of the duke of Orleans, who was beloved by his army. But Marlborough viewed the negotiation with less sanguine eyes, and considered the attempt as made by the connivance of Louis, to create dissensions with the courts of Barcelona and Vienna. He observes in a letter to Godolphin :

“ *Hague, Jan. 23.* I send over by this opportunity an officer that is sent express from Mr. Stanhope. His letter to lord Sunderland will inform you as to what has passed with the duke of Orleans. He desires my opinion, which I am fearful of giving, in a matter of this consequence. But I really believe the duke of Orleans would not act this part, but that he has the king of France’s permission.”

TO GENERAL STANHOPE.

“ *Jan. 26.* I read and forwarded your letter to the earl of Sunderland, and do entirely agree with your sentiments in that matter. I am persuaded the duke of Orleans could never venture so far without direction from court, the rather, for that by what I have heard from other parts, the king of France begins to despair of being able to keep his grandson on the throne. However, it is a matter of such consequence, that I dare give no opinion of my own in it ; but I hope you will soon be instructed from England how far you may proceed.”

The event justified his sagacity, for the design being either purposely or accidentally disclosed to the court of Madrid, the clandestine intercourse was suspended, and Louis himself interfered to soothe the resentment which Philip conceived at what he considered as an insidious attempt to deprive him of his crown.\*

In Italy the event of the campaign was far from corresponding with the heavy charges incurred by the allies, and the expectations

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\* Letter from general Stanhope to the earl of Sunderland, Nov. 11, 1708—Memoirs of the Bourbon Kings of Spain, ch. 16—Memoirs de St. Simon, who has given an interesting account of the conversations which passed between Louis and the duke of Orleans on this mysterious subject, t. 5, p. 11—Instructions from lord Sunderland to general Stanhope, Dec. 10.



conceived from the prowess and spirit of the duke of Savoy. Satisfied with having recovered his dominions, he was principally anxious for his own security and personal aggrandisement, and seized every opportunity to start objections against any distant or offensive enterprise. At the opening of the spring, he refused to act, till the court of Vienna had conferred on him the investiture of part of the Montferrat, which had been promised him by the treaty of 1703 ; and when the influence of Marlborough had procured the accomplishment of his wishes, he availed himself of the tardiness of the german reinforcements, to invent new pretexts for delay.

At length the arrival of the austrian general, Daun, with a considerable corps of troops, left him no farther excuse ; and he yielded to the importunities of the british court in taking the field. With a force of 35,000 men he scaled Mont Cenis and the Little St. Bernard, as if with a design to penetrate into Savoy. Having by this manœuvre drawn the attention of his antagonist, marshal Villars, to the side of Fort Barraux, he suddenly invested the small forts of Exilles and Perusa. Villars could not arrive in time to obstruct his operations, and the fall of these places, which held out only a few days, was followed by the investment of the more important fortress of Fenestrelles, where the french had erected a strong citadel after the destruction of Pignerol. The siege of this place detained him till the end of August, when the fall of the autumnal snows precluded all farther operations. Both parties then retired to their quarters, and the only fruit of the campaign was, the possession of the passes leading across the Alps, which was not likely to produce any other advantage, than an additional security to Piemont. This irruption also incidentally caused a diversion in favour of the allies in Spain, by obliging the french to reduce their army in Roussillon, for the purpose of strengthening that in Dauphiné, under marshal Villars.

Another contention contributed to weaken the army in Italy, and to disappoint the hopes conceived of the operations in that quarter. From the commencement of the contest for the spanish succession, Clement the eleventh, the reigning pope, had mani-



fested a decided partiality towards the Bourbon cause, and consequently equal hostility towards that of Austria. This conduct led to jealousies and irritation on both sides, until Clement publicly provoked the emperor, by excommunicating the germans for exacting contributions in the duchy of Parma. Joseph repelling this insult by asserting his sovereign rights over all the cities of Italy, the pope was urged by the instigation and promises of the french, to recur to temporal arms in aid of his spiritual pretensions. He raised troops, opened the treasures of St. Angelo, made preparations for war, and endeavoured to form a new holy league among the states of Italy. But his impotent resentment was soon foiled. The emperor was not of a temper to be alarmed by the thunders of the Vatican; and the german troops had no sooner recrossed the Alps into Piemont, than marshal Daun marched with a corps towards the ecclesiastical state. The hasty levies of the church were speedily dissipated, Comacchio was captured, Ferrara besieged, and Bologna threatened, while a corps of austrians from Naples advanced to menace the opposite frontier, and the combined fleet, which had recently subjugated Minorca, blockaded the principal ports of the ecclesiastical state. During these contentions, Marlborough laboured to prevent a war, which was likely to spread through Italy, and divert the attention and efforts of the allies from the french frontier. In his correspondence with the austrian ministers, we find him labouring to extenuate the conduct of the pope, and soothe the resentment of the emperor. He had at length the satisfaction to succeed in mediating an accommodation, though he could not restore cordiality. The emperor accepted an apology, and the pope agreed to refer the existing disputes to arbitration, to give Charles the title of king, to reduce his force 5,000 men, to grant the imperialists quarters, and a free passage through his territories, and to leave Comacchio in the possession of an imperial garrison, till all arrangements were completed.

From our narrative of military operations in the Netherlands at the commencement of the campaign, the reader will doubtless have anticipated a series of bickerings with the elector of



Hanover. A prince who was ambitious of military fame, and who valued himself on his splendid prospects and personal influence, must have possessed an unusual portion of generosity and moderation, to witness, without displeasure, glories in which he was not permitted to share. He could not so far repress his feelings, as to appreciate the necessity of that profound silence which Marlborough and Eugene had maintained on the intended junction of their two armies; and, therefore, he resented their prudent reserve as unjust and disrespectful towards himself. This feeling operated with double force, when he compared his own limited sphere of action with the brilliant career, which two generals, whom he regarded as foreigners, had opened in a quarter more exposed to observation; and every success which marked their progress, contributed to aggravate his disappointment and sharpen his chagrin. His discontent was increased by the jealousies which prevailed between the courts of England and Hanover, and particularly by the lukewarmness, which the resentment of Anne obliged her ministers to maintain towards his family. These feelings were inflamed by the insinuations of the party agents, who were privately deputed to Hanover, to increase the odium fostered against the general and the treasurer. Hence, though at the head of an army amounting to 30,000 men, and superior to that of the enemy, the elector sullenly refused to act offensively; and coldly looked on, while detachment after detachment was drawn from the Rhine, to swell the french force in the Netherlands. Hence the campaign on the Rhine was distinguished by no event of importance; and after wasting the season in mere camp details, the elector quitted the scene of action, with the same sullenness and discontent which he had manifested at its commencement and during its progress.

The indications of displeasure which escaped from the elector, were described by Mr. Howe, who attended him as british agent, in mysterious, and often exaggerated terms, and made a deep impression on the sensitive mind of the british commander. In transmitting one of these accounts to Godolphin, Marlborough observes :



“ Mr. Cardonnel having shewn me Mr. Howe’s letter. I could not omit sending it to you ; but I should think it should be communicated only to the queen, for if Mr. Howe be not mistaken, their behaviour is very extraordinary, and very wrong, I think, for their own interest. But passion is very capable of making men blind.”

On the other hand, Godolphin laboured to soothe the dissatisfaction of his friend, by arguments, which do credit to his moderation and sound sense.

“ *Sept. 29--Oct. 10.* As to the elector of Hanover, I agree that what you say of his conduct is certainly true, and yet I am of opinion, that Mr. Freeman should endeavour to manage him, if possibly he can ; for I can plainly see, by what lord Sunderland throws out upon some occasions, and also by other ways, that the elector’s ill-humour and uneasiness is fomented from hence by some of both sides ; and he is told that he has been very ill used by you as well as by prince Eugene, in not leaving him a *stock*\* sufficient to carry on the trade in those parts to advantage. Now, though nothing of this be really true, yet we must allow a little for impressions, which people here are inclined to believe, whether they be true or not true. My only fear is, that people may take a handle from hence to do ill offices to you in England.”

“ *Dec. 6--17.* As to the letter you send me from Mr. Howe, I think it is so little fit to be shewn to any body, that I am not inclined to shew it even to the queen, who is but too apt to take prejudices to that court ; and I doubt Mr. Howe is so too.”

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\* An equivocal expression adopted to signify an army, in order to conceal the cypher more effectually.



## CHAPTER 75.

1709.

*Renewal of the struggle for the promotion of Somers—Hostile threats of the whigs—Accusation against admiral Churchill—Threatened censure of the prince of Denmark—The queen professes her acquiescence in their demands—Death of the prince—Somers appointed president of the council, Wharton lord lieutenant of Ireland, and lord Pembroke high admiral—Minor arrangements in favour of the whigs—Temporary renewal of the intercourse between the queen and the duchess.*

**D**URING the stay of Marlborough in the camp of Rouselaer, he was visited by Mr. Craggs, who was deputed on the part of Godolphin and the whigs, to describe the state of political affairs in England, and to propose those arrangements, which could not be accomplished by a less direct communication. From the period of his departure, the letters of Marlborough contain less reference to domestic transactions, either because the vigilance of the enemy obstructed his epistolary intercourse, or because a definitive plan of conduct was already concerted. On his return, however, to the Hague, his correspondence with his friends in England, resumed its usual character and interest.

Notwithstanding the communications conveyed through the channel of Mr. Craggs, the former difficulties recurred with double force. The impatience of the whigs increased at the obstacles which obstructed their admission to power, and they even turned their resentment against the two ministers, who had so long and fruitlessly endeavoured to promote their cause. Lord Somers, laying aside his natural reserve, peevishly complained to Swift, in a casual visit, of the ingratitude, which his party had experienced from those two noble persons, adding, “after the service which I and my friends have performed in promoting



the Union, they will hardly treat me with common civility.”\* When these querulous complaints fell from a nobleman of such caution and sedateness, what could be expected from the impetuous temper of Sunderland? In a letter to Somers, after inveighing against the conduct of Marlborough and Godolphin, and asserting that they were not capable of doing any right thing, with a good grace, he recommends extorting their acquiescence, adding, “if it continues to be pressed by all of us, they must and will do it at last. If these instances should prove fruitless, when the proper time is come, which I think is just before the meeting of parliament, let us take our leave of them, by quitting, and have nothing more to do with them.”†

Soon afterwards, therefore, Sunderland, in the name of the leading members of the party, again announced to the duchess a distinct and decided resolution, to withhold their support from government, unless their demand was granted, a commission which the duchess did not hesitate to execute, and support with her customary zeal.

Nor were the duke and Godolphin the only objects of their invective. Not only Sunderland and Halifax, but even Somers ascribed their repeated disappointments to a want of zeal in the duchess herself; and we find them occasionally receiving the representations and excuses of her agent, Mr. Maynwaring, with a degree of sullenness bordering on incredulity. Besides their disappointment at the delay respecting the promotion of Somers, other causes, though of minor consideration, contributed to inflame their resentment. These were, the difficulties which still obstructed the arrangement for the offices of attorney-general, and solicitor-general, and speaker.

They did not, therefore, hesitate in carrying their hostile denunciations into effect. After recurring to the invitation of the electoral prince, and every other irritating topic, they decided on resuming their attack against the admiralty, which they well knew

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\* Swift's Change of Ministers, p. 14.

† Hardwicke State Papers, vol. 2.



would sensibly affect the feelings of the queen for her husband, and of the duke of Marlborough for his brother. The imprudent conduct of the prince of Denmark, and of his adviser, admiral Churchill, unfortunately furnished a plausible pretext for their determination.

The prince not only fomented the partiality of the queen to the tories, but expressed a personal antipathy to Somers. When he found the whig interest too powerful to be combated, he secretly encouraged the duke of Somerset in his attempts to divide them, and through his agency, endeavoured to lure lord Wharton, by holding forth hopes that the queen would admit him, or any of the party into power, provided she could be spared the mortification of receiving into her service a nobleman who had shewn so little consideration for himself. Wharton contemptuously rejected this indiscreet proposal, and by his communication of the overture, increased the resentment of the other chiefs.\*

The conduct of admiral Churchill himself, aggravated the discontents of the party ; for the more zealously he was supported by the queen and prince, the more he appears to have exerted his influence to the prejudice of the whigs, in spite of his brother's incessant remonstrances. By the effects of this mutual irritation, his removal from office became a matter of state, and the whigs prepared to expel him, as a step preparatory to a direct attack against the prince. In this cabal, the duchess, as usual, took an active part. We find her not only importuning her husband with incessant complaints, but addressing a letter to the queen, full of bitter invectives, and declaring that all the brilliant services of the duke could not shield his brother against the clamours of the nation. Her violent language made as little impression on this, as on other occasions ; and Mr. Churchill was attacked on one side, and defended on the other, with equal resolution and perseverance. At length Godolphin not only found it necessary to

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\* This conversation is detailed in a letter from Mr. Maynwaring to the duchess.



gratify the whigs, but himself became sensible that the only resource which remained, was, to remove the obnoxious favourite from his situation. His unbiassed opinion weighed with the duke, and we find the copy of a letter to his brother, indicating the warmth with which he entered into the feelings of the duchess and Godolphin.

“Oct. 19, 1708. Finding you still continue in the prince’s council, and the parliament now so near, I cannot be so wanting, either to you or to myself, as not to tell you plainly, with all the kindness of a brother, and the sincerity of a friend, that if you do not take an unalterable resolution of laying down that employment, before the parliament sits, you will certainly do the greatest disservice imaginable to the queen and prince, the greatest prejudice to me, and bring yourself into such inconveniencies as may last as long as you live, and from which it is wholly impossible to protect you. Whereas, on the other side, if the considerations of making the queen’s affairs more easy next session, of avoiding a great deal of trouble and disagreeableness to the prince, and of real danger to yourself, as well as prejudice to me, prevail with you to comply with my earnest desire in this thing, I think I could be answerable to you, that you could not fail of finding your advantage in it, doubly to what you do now, both in profit and quiet. These motives being all of them as strong as it is possible for me to suggest, I hope you will give me the satisfaction of letting me know very soon, that my mind may be at ease in this matter, and that you have virtually laid down before my coming over.”

This was doubtless a serious sacrifice on the part of the duke, and both the treasurer and the duchess hoped that the resignation of the admiral would restore cordiality. It appears, however, that the whig lords were so incensed against the prince, and so determined to force themselves into power, that they would not be satisfied with the resignation or dismissal of his obnoxious favourite, though it had hitherto seemed to be their principal object. Their pertinacity was strengthened by a wish to have



the management of the admiralty transferred to lord Pembroke, that his two posts, the presidency of the council, and the vice-royalty of Ireland, might be vacated for Somers and Wharton. In vain the lord treasurer endeavoured to soothe their resentment, and persuade them to content themselves with the dismissal of the admiral, by offering to propose\* a law for rendering the council responsible. In this resolution they appeared immovable, and were supported by Newcastle, Devonshire, Townshend, and some of the more moderate of the party. It was evident, indeed, that no compromise could be effected, and that the prince himself would be sacrificed, unless lord Somers was admitted into office.

The danger which menaced a person so dear, operated powerfully on the feelings of the queen, who seeing no other resource, to screen her husband from an attack, notified to lord Godolphin a reluctant, but unqualified acquiescence in the demands of the whigs.

FROM LORD GODOLPHIN.

“*St. James's, Oct. 22--Nov. 2.* The queen is at last brought to allow me to make such condescensions, which, if done in time, would have been sufficient to have eased most of our difficulties; and would yet do it, in great measure, if the whigs will be but tolerably reasonable; and I am really of opinion, that if you were in England at this moment but 48 hours, all might yet go well, I mean as to the public.”

Even after this solemn promise, however, the queen suspended her decision, as well from her prejudices, as from the indisposition of the prince, who had long been sinking under a mortal disorder. An interval of some days elapsed, which was marked with the utmost anxiety, till the long expected dissolution of the prince superseded all other considerations. The treasurer felt the peril of the crisis, and in the most pressing terms urged Marlborough to hasten his return to England.

“*Oct. 29.* My last will have prepared you in some measure

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\* Mr. Maynwaring to the duchess.



not to be surprised with the news of the prince's death, which happened yesterday, about two in the afternoon. Nature was quite worn out in him, and no art could support him long.

"The queen's affliction, and the difficulty of speaking with that freedom and plainness to her, which her service requires, while she has so tender a concern upon her, is a new additional inconvenience, which our circumstances did not need, and will make it more necessary than ever, that you should not delay your return to England ; for I really foresee, that unless that can be compassed very, very soon, it will be next to impossible to prevent ruin. I should not write so pressingly upon this head, if I were not entirely convinced of the necessity of it ; and I cannot mingle any thing else in the present letter, because I think nothing else that I can say, is of half so much consequence."

This melancholy event, however, finally removed all difficulties, and silenced all objections. Admiral Churchill lost his office and influence, by the dissolution of the board, and the death of his patron. Lord Pembroke was nominated lord high admiral, the vice-royalty of Ireland was transferred to lord Wharton, and the place of president of the council, so long the subject of contention, was conferred on lord Somers, who candidly acknowledged his obligations in a letter to the duke of Marlborough.

"*Nov. 30.* My lord ;—Be pleased to allow me the honour to congratulate your grace upon the good news which the earl of Hertford brought us. We heard of it before from Ostend, but we could not be so sure of the truth of such a success, as the importance of it to the common cause required, to put us at ease, till an express arrived from your grace. This campaign seems to have been as long and as full of difficulties as any one reads of in history ; and by what has been already done, and what your grace gives hopes we may hear before the end of it, is like to prove as glorious, and, by the blessing of God, as productive of great events, as ever was known. It gives a near prospect of a safe and honourable peace to Europe, and to your grace no remote view of some rest, after the fatigues and dangers of so many glorious campaigns.



“ I do not pretend to acquaint your grace with the honour the queen has been pleased to do me, in admitting me into her service, but rather to return my humble thanks to you on that account, since I am well assured, without your grace's concurrence, nothing of that nature had been done. I hope your grace will believe, that according to my poor capacity, I will serve her majesty diligently and faithfully, and that I shall always be with the utmost truth and respect, &c.”

Before these arrangements, the minor difficulties respecting the offices of attorney and solicitor general were obviated. Sir James Montague was appointed attorney general, on the 19th of October, and his vacant place was conferred on Mr. Robert Eyre. An appointment was also found for Sir Peter King, who had been originally a candidate for the solicitorship, and was supported by the zealous whigs. As the queen refused to yield to his nomination, in resentment for his violent attacks on the admiralty, he was first proposed for the situation of speaker ; but the dispute respecting this important station, being settled by a compromise with the court, in favour of Sir Richard Onslow, he was gratified with the appointment of recorder to the city of London, which was purposely vacated, by the nomination of the actual recorder to the office of baron of the court of exchequer. By these arrangements the whigs were apparently gratified, and again tacitly coalesced with the court. The joint influence of the united parties being predominant in the new parliament, the proceedings met with no difficulty, in foreign affairs and the grant of supplies ; and encountered only a faint opposition, on the part of the scottish members, in regard to the arrangements arising from the Union.

With the death of the prince of Denmark may be connected an event, not unworthy of a place in these pages, although it produced no permanent effect on the state of domestic politics. This was, the temporary renewal of the intercourse between the queen and the duchess.

After the last acrimonious interview, a sense of wounded pride induced the duchess to remain silent, in conformity with the reso-



lution which she had announced to the duke; and the unusual interval of several weeks appears to have elapsed, without any communication between her and the queen. As the crisis of the prince's last malady approached, her feelings of respect and attachment towards her sovereign revived; and she sent a letter of condolence to her afflicted mistress, though she could not avoid recurring to their recent altercation.

“*Windsor Lodge, Oct. 26.* Though the last time I had the honour to wait upon your majesty, your usage of me was such as was scarce possible for me to imagine, or for any body to believe, yet I cannot hear of so great a misfortune and affliction to you, as the condition in which the prince is, without coming to pay my duty, in enquiring after your health; and to see, if in any particular whatsoever, my service can either be agreeable or useful to you, for which satisfaction, I would do more than I will trouble your majesty to read at this time.”

She had scarcely written this letter, before farther accounts of the prince's danger induced her to travel all night, and repair to Kensington. She desired the person charged with her letter, to inform the queen that she waited her majesty's commands. She was accordingly summoned into the royal presence, in the afternoon; but the queen received her, to use her own expression, “very coolly and like a stranger.” It was not to be expected that, after the recent dispute, the queen should accept this mark of attention, introduced as it was with expressions calculated to recal her past indignities; but the duchess was not discouraged by the repulse. She again waited on the queen the ensuing morning, and was present at the moment when the prince expired. With affectionate zeal she removed her royal mistress from this sad spectacle to her closet, and desiring the other attendants to withdraw, she knelt down, and endeavoured to soothe the agonies of her grief, continuing in that posture till the first emotions had subsided. She then urged the imprudence of remaining in a place, which must continually awaken her sorrow, and pressed her to remove to St. James's. Her importunities were for a considerable time fruitless; but at



length her arguments prevailed. The queen delivered her watch to the duchess, desiring her to retire till the hand had reached a particular point, and ordered her to send Mrs. Masham. Though shocked at this mark of preference, the duchess withdrew, but did not summon the favourite, from an unwillingness to shew her own decline of influence, before the crowd which was collected in the antichamber. After preparing her own coach for the queen's reception, and desiring the company to retire, while her majesty was passing, she returned at the appointed moment, announced that the carriage was ready, and excused herself for not delivering the message to Mrs. Masham, adding, "your majesty may send for her at St. James's, when and how you please."

The queen acquiesced, and Mrs. Hill, the sister of Mrs. Masham, approaching to put on her hood, her majesty gave her some commission in a whisper. As she passed through the gallery, leaning on the arm of the duchess, Mrs. Masham herself appeared, accompanied by Dr. Arbuthnot, one of the physicians of the household. The queen did not speak, but cast on her a look of regard. After giving some orders, relative to domestic business, she entered the carriage; and immediately desired the duchess to request the lord treasurer to order an examination, whether there was room in one of the royal vaults at Westminster to receive the body of the prince and her own; and if not, to select another place of burial.

Having escorted her majesty to St. James's, and induced her to take some refreshment, the duchess retired, and the lord treasurer was admitted. But the queen soon followed her to her apartment, and not finding her there, sent a note, which marks her minute attention to all the details of the interment.

"I scratched twice at dear Mrs. Freeman's door, as soon as lord treasurer went from me, in hopes to have spoke one more word to him before he was gone; but nobody hearing me, I wrote this, not caring to send what I had to say by word of mouth; which was, to desire him, that when he sends his orders to Kensington, he would give directions there may be a great many



yeomen of the guards to carry the prince's dear body, that it may not be let fall, the great stairs being very steep and slippery."

In the evening the duchess found the queen at table, and attended by Mrs. Masham, who instantly retired. The duchess carefully avoided any allusion to the new favourite, and the queen treated her with marks of renewed regard and familiarity. This was, however, a mere momentary change; for the duchess observes, that in her subsequent visits, she either found Mrs. Masham with the queen, or retiring on her entrance, and, indeed, reaped nothing from this sacrifice of her pride, except the mortification of observing the superior favour of her rival, and the decline of her own influence.\*

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\* From a narrative of the events, which took place on the death of the prince of Denmark, by the duchess.



## CHAPTER 76.

1709.

*Political and military arrangements at the Hague—Marlborough induces the dutch government to consent to an augmentation of troops—Obtains from the emperor a promise, that his troops should winter in the Netherlands, and that succours should be sent from Naples to Spain—Conclusion of the accommodation with the pope—Ineffectual labours to conciliate the duke of Savoy, and to reconcile him with the court of Vienna—Arrangements with the king of Prussia, for the continuance and augmentation of his troops.*

**I**N the general arrangements, Marlborough had not only to combat the intrigues of the party in Holland, who were obstinately bent on peace, but he had likewise to resist the exorbitant demands of the dutch government, for the extension of their barrier, and particularly for the possession of Ostend. He encountered additional difficulty in vanquishing their objections to the intended augmentation of troops. He found the pensionary timid and hesitating, the adherents of France pertinacious and vehement, and even the best intentioned, more deeply impressed with their own financial embarrassments, than with the importance of the stake for which they were contending. He, however, exerted, with effect, his customary influence over the mind of Heinsius, overawed the partisans of France, and extorted the consent of the government to an augmentation of 6,000 men, which, though not equal to the urgency of the case, was yet commensurate with their means, and proportionate to the supply which he had obtained from the british administration.

In his negotiations with the imperial court, Marlborough experienced no difficulty respecting the conduct of the war in the Netherlands, as Eugene, who was the channel of his commu-



nications, was no less satisfied than himself, that the principal effort of the enemy would be made in that quarter. It was therefore readily settled, that the imperial troops should winter in the Netherlands, and that a proper augmentation should be made. As the States refused to consent that both he and Eugene should be absent at the same time, he obtained from his colleague a promise to return to the Netherlands, in the latter end of February, and himself wrote to procure the sanction of the emperor.

“The prince of Savoy,” he observed, “will communicate to your imperial majesty the letter of the States, urging the necessity that one of us should remain in the Low Countries, during the ensuing winter; and as there is no time to receive the necessary orders, we have agreed, under the good pleasure of your imperial majesty, that his highness should immediately depart for Vienna, with the hopes that your imperial majesty will consent to his return, to relieve me towards the latter end of February. Having since received the approbation of the queen, on the conclusion of the campaign, we repaired hither without delay, and instantly began to concert with the States, and the ministers of the allied powers, the measures for an augmentation of troops, and the necessary preparations, for opposing the mighty efforts of the enemy the ensuing campaign in the Netherlands, whither they are drawing from the Rhine and Italy 52 squadrons and 51 battalions more than they had last year. We find the States well disposed to make all possible exertions; but in truth their efforts have so much exhausted them, that we cannot expect the assistance necessary in the present extremity. I can assure your imperial majesty, that the state of England is not much better, the queen having strained every nerve; so that we are under the necessity of imploring your assistance, and earnestly exhorting your imperial majesty to forward, with all possible expedition, the succours of troops, as well for Italy as other quarters, which, with all due submission, policy, as well as the principles of war, require in the present crisis, leaving, however, the 20,000 men under the command of the duke of Savoy, since we expect a powerful diversion on the side of Piedmont in our favour,



provided a speedy accommodation can be effected with the pope, either by persuasion or force.

“ I ought not to conceal from your imperial majesty, that the prospect of an approaching peace induces the States to make their final exertions, with the hopes that the next campaign will be the last ; so that we ought not to omit any effort which may lead to a happy termination of the war. Your imperial majesty will permit me to refer you for further information to the prince of Savoy, who will deliver this letter, and do justice to my respect and devotion.” \*

Meanwhile the negotiation for peace had produced a considerable sensation at the court of Vienna ; and the proposal relative to the cession of Naples and Sicily to the Bourbon prince, again prompted the emperor to anticipate the sacrifice of his interests, by adding the conquest of Sicily to that of Naples. Marlborough, however, strenuously combated a design, which would create the same mischief as the invasion of Naples, and, at length, not only succeeded in dissuading him from the enterprise, but even obtained a promise, that he would send from the army in Naples a farther succour of 3,000 men, to the assistance of his brother. This resolution was communicated in a letter from the emperor himself, dated Jan. 28, to which we find a grateful and respectful reply from the duke.

“ *Feb. 13.* Sire ;—I received with profound respect the letter which your imperial majesty did me the honour to write me the 20th of last month, with that of count Sinzendorf, in which I observe, with great pleasure, the resolution you have taken, to assist his catholic majesty vigorously, in order to bring the war in Spain to a happy termination. Within three days I shall depart for the Hague, where I will not fail to represent, in a proper light, the laudable designs of your imperial majesty to the States, in order to induce their high mightinesses to concur in them ; and I do

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\* Translated from a copy of the original which is preserved in the archives at Vienna, communicated by his imperial highness the archduke John.



not doubt, that the queen, my mistress, will continue, as she has hitherto done, to exert her utmost efforts for procuring the restitution of the spanish monarchy to its legitimate sovereign. I write by this post to the court on the subject, and I flatter myself that your imperial majesty will soon find it confirmed by the count de Gallas. With regard to myself, I am persuaded that you will do me the justice to believe, that I have never spared my exertions, to promote the interests of your august house, and that I shall never cease to testify my respectful and inviolable attachment."

While engaged in these negotiations, Marlborough had the satisfaction to hear that the long pending dispute with the see of Rome had been arranged, on terms no less honourable to the emperor than advantageous to the common cause. The particulars of the transaction were communicated by the marquis de Prié, imperial ambassador at Rome.

THE MARQUIS DE PRIÉ TO THE DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH.

"*Rome, Jan. 18.* My lord;—The anxiety which your highness has manifested, to be acquainted as early as possible with the termination of the engagement, which his imperial majesty has formed with this court, obliges me to impart to your highness the fortunate conclusion of the treaty, which, after much dispute and difficulty, was signed the 15th of this month, by cardinal Paulucci and myself, as plenipotentiaries of the pope and the emperor. I have every reason to hope that this sincere reconciliation will, in future, remove every subject of suspicion, and overthrow all the hopes of our enemies; since not only the public, but the court itself has sufficiently known the reason that his imperial majesty had to take umbrage at this armament, and the moderation with which he has acted in the occurrence. The new levies of the pope will be disbanded in a fortnight, his troops and his garrisons will be re-established on the antient footing; and all suspected and foreign officers are already dismissed. His holiness has even engaged to prevent all the intrigues which the malcontents



of Naples, who are settled at Rome and in the ecclesiastical state, may employ against the repose of that kingdom. Comacchio is to remain in the hands of the emperor, till the rights of the emperor and of the holy see have been explained and discussed, in the congress, which I am to hold with a deputation of cardinals. The differences which exist, relative to Parma and Placentia, will be examined in this same conference, in order to treat on them amicably; that his holiness and his imperial majesty may reciprocally satisfy each other, and render mutual justice on their respective pretensions.. These my lord, are the most essential articles of the treaty, of which the publication has been deferred, till it has received the ratification of his imperial majesty.

“ I have obtained a point still more essential for the glory of the most august house, and for the interest of the common cause. It is the acknowledgment of his catholic majesty king Charles 3d, to whom his holiness grants all the prerogatives which depend on the holy see; among which, are the Crusado, the Indultos, and the nomination, as well to bishoprics and benefices, as to the cardinals' hat. His holiness will send a nuntio to the court of Barcelona, and will receive at Rome an ambassador from his majesty. He will even grant a bull, with regard to the ecclesiastics of the kingdoms which shall be under his obedience, in conformity with that which has been granted to the duke of Anjou, which has occasioned so many abuses in Spain, to the great prejudice of the public cause. The Spanish people may thus be entirely disabused of the false impressions given by the ecclesiastics, who are partisans of that prince. We have every reason in the world to hope that this declaration of his holiness, which renders justice to the rights of king Charles the third will favour the success of the allied arms, which no longer encounter the same obstacles from the prejudices of the spanish people.

“ All the french party at this court have made inconceivable efforts to oppose our accommodation, and above all, to prevent this acknowledgment which is thought likely to be very fatal to the duke of Anjou. After having employed all sorts of machinations, by



means of their numerous partisans and emissaries, they have acted openly by protests and menaces. Your highness will easily judge to what a degree the disquietude and resentment of France have been excited, by the last letter which the marshal de Tessé wrote to his holiness. The ministers of the two crowns have declared very openly their intention of quitting this court, and breaking off all communication as soon as this acknowledgment shall be published. Notwithstanding these protests, the pope shews much good disposition, and even firmness, to support the assurances that he has already given, and to proceed to this declaration in form, in a congregation of cardinals to be held for the purpose. I shall be too fortunate, if this petty dispute, which we have had with this court, should terminate in a quarrel with that of France; and if the pope should be obliged, by the violent proceedings of the enemy, to favour the interests of the public cause. I have endeavoured to make known to the pope and the sacred college, that those of this court, and even of all Europe, will be incontestably attached to the entire re-establishment of the spanish monarchy, under the antient domination of the most august house of Austria.

“ We have thus terminated this engagement, which gave so much alarm to all the allies. All the imperial troops and auxiliaries are going as soon as possible to quit the ecclesiastical state, according to the orders of the emperor. They will repair to their usual winter quarters, after having drawn near three months subsistence from this country.

“ I thought proper to beg vice-admiral Whitaker to suspend the bombardment of Civita Vecchia, in order not to irritate this court and raise new difficulties to the treaty. I continue at present the same instances in promoting a reconciliation. The pope hopes that his imperial majesty will employ his good offices with her britannic majesty, and that they will not be useless, in relieving us entirely from disquietude. He strongly protested to me, that he had given no succour in money to favour the expedition to Scotland.



“ Our quarrel with the pope being entirely terminated, and the disarming being already begun, there will be no more difficulty in the embarkation of the troops for Catalonia, which would have been very dangerous, while we were in very great alarm for the armaments of this court, and the troubles which our enemies fomented in Naples. I have had directions from the king to hasten the conclusion, which I have executed as I ought, although the orders of the emperor, and the attention of cardinal Grimani will render my cares very little necessary. I beg you, my lord, to accept this new assurance of the perfect attachment with which I am, &c.”

“ *Rome, May 18.* My lord ;—Your highness will doubtless have learnt by way of Lisbon, that the nuntio has been driven out of Madrid, and that the nuntiature there has been shut up, a thing unheard of in Spain, and what was never done at Vienna, at the very time when we were in the greatest misintelligence with this court. The duke of Medina Sidonia, who was charged with the commission of intimating this to the nuntio, left in his hands, the protest of which I do myself the honour to send you the annexed copy. The offensive terms in which it is conceived, and the precipitate resolution that has been taken, mark sufficiently the resentment entertained at Madrid, in consequence of the acknowledgment of king Charles the third, and of the assurances which have been given by the pope, although these have not been hitherto published. The nuntio reported to the pope, that the council was divided on this deliberation. The wisest ministers were not willing to proceed to such an extremity, without being assured that France would enter into the same engagement ; but those who are more zealous Anjouists, have rather followed passion than the interest of the duke of Anjou, in carrying things to a rupture. They have even published, by this proof of resentment, the acknowledgment of his catholic majesty, and undeceived the people from the error, into which the ecclesiastic partisans of that prince had led them, as well with regard to the justice of his cause, as to the impressions they had given that this was a war of



religion. It is pretended that the council of the cabinet (in which the princess Orsini, and the french ambassador have a great share) has much contributed to this resolution. The step has produced so bad an effect in Spain, and so much prejudice to the interests of the duke of Anjou, that many people have suspected that the good spaniards and well-intentioned have given the impulse to all this, to complete the ruin of that prince's affairs.

“ I have done all I could to inflame the indignation of the pope against a son who is so little grateful, that he has forgotten, in an instant, all the distinctions and favours he has hitherto enjoyed. I have taken this indirect way to urge him no longer to keep any measures, and to publish the acknowledgment in the consistory, which is still stopped by some little difficulties, on certain points to which the pope lays claim, as well with regard to sequestrations as to the counter-declaration of nullity, which his imperial majesty has made relative to Parma and Placentia. I have discovered from good authority, that the strongest reason which at present restrains the pope is, the reports which the french propagate here, that the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily will fall to the share of the duke of Anjou. Although I have contradicted these ill-founded rumours, the french partisans, who are very numerous, do all they can to intimidate this court, and to shew the danger of having a powerful and hostile prince for a neighbour. The same reports have been spread at Naples by the Anjou party, and have inspired the ill-intentioned with new courage. What gives them more appearance of truth is, seeing Sicily still in the hands of the enemy ; and as this conquest is very easy, both from the good disposition of the people, and the weakness of the enemy, we cannot convince this court, that the two maritime powers will not furnish transports, because they are of opinion that the enterprise should not be attempted, lest it should disconcert their views of a partition. These are false reasonings, which, however, make much impression, and prevent us from tranquillizing the



kingdom of Naples, and bringing back this court intirely. Hence it is to be wished, that we could quickly draw the enemy from that kingdom, or at least shut them up in Messina.

“The duke of Medina, and cardinal del Giudici have received orders to depart, and are, in fact, gone this week; so that we are masters of the field of battle. Although the change is very considerable here, I hope this court will enter still more into its true interests, and that the successes of the campaign will contribute more to it than negotiation, which will always be carried on to more advantage the instant we press the least to enter into it. It is certain that the pope appears much alarmed, lest Naples and Sicily should be detached from the body of the monarchy, because this court would be reduced to slavery, if those kingdoms were to fall into the hands of a prince of the house of Bourbon.”

Among the different cares which pressed on the attention of Marlborough during his continuance at the Hague, we may assign a prominent place to the arrangements with the duke of Savoy. This prince, as usual, making the attainment of one acquisition the prelude to a new demand, required the cession of the Vigevenasco, which he had before claimed of the court of Vienna, or in lieu of it, the Novarresi. He claimed also the imperial fief of Savona, in liquidation of his arrears. He strenuously laboured to interest the maritime powers in his behalf; and declared his resolution not to take the field unless his wishes were gratified. In addition to these pretensions, he even solicited the queen to negotiate a marriage between his son and an archduchess. These proposals encountered the same opposition as his former demands from the court of Vienna, who now finding his services less necessary, suffered their jealousy of his encroaching and ambitious spirit, to obliterate their sense of the obligations, which he had rendered at the most dangerous crisis of the war.

At the same time that he produced this series of demands, he suggested different plans of operation, for the ensuing campaign, which he conceived calculated to lure the attention of the



allies. The principal was, a proposal to penetrate into Upper Dauphiné, on which point three objects presented themselves: the reduction of Mont Dauphin and Briançon; the capture of Fort Barraux, and an irruption into the heart of the Lyonnois; and the last and most important, an invasion of Franche Comté, where he proposed to act in concert with the army on the Rhine, provided that army was commanded by prince Eugene. For this object, he required a force of 50,000 men, a considerable subsidy in money, and an absolute authority over all the troops under his command, both in the field and in quarters.

Marlborough was perfectly aware that the project was too extensive and chimerical to be realised, and that many of the conditions were proposed with a conviction that they could not be granted. But the services of a prince who held the keys of Italy, and who was at this time sedulously courted by France, were too important to be undervalued. As it was therefore necessary to retain him in the interest of the alliance, the british general laboured to procure such a compliance from the court of Vienna, as would prevent his defection. With this view he deliberated on the proposed projects with prince Eugene, in the presence of count Maffei, minister of Savoy, count Schulemberg, the imperial envoy at the Hague, and general Palmes. They approved the design of penetrating into the Lyonnois, and Palmes was commissioned to promote the pretensions of the duke at Vienna. He was afterwards to repair to Turin, and convey such assurances from the queen as were calculated to satisfy him that no endeavours would be wanting, to obtain the fulfilment of his demands, and to forward his design of invading the Lyonnois.\* Marlborough was however too well acquainted with the characters both of the emperor and the duke, to place any reliance on the successful event of this arrangement; and he drew but an unfavourable augury of the effect which was likely to result, from the military operations on the side of the Alps.

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\* Instructions for general Palmes on his mission to the duke of Savoy.



The negotiations with the court of Berlin were attended with the same difficulties as at the close of every campaign. The king of Prussia, as usual, produced a long series of complaints and demands. He cavilled with the dutch for obstructing his pretensions to the petty county of Meurs, and for delaying to discharge the arrears of their subsidies. He even expressed displeasure with the british government, for undervaluing his services, and omitting any mention of his name in the speech or address, while they lauded and rewarded the zeal of the landgrave of Hesse and the elector of Hanover. These grievances were accompanied with the usual threat of withdrawing his auxiliary troops. His example influenced the dependants of his court; for the grand chamberlain expressed strong jealousy at the applications which were made to other ministers; and his lady demanded the same gratification for her assistance, as had been granted to count Piper through his countess.\* Lastly, lord Raby, who had been maintained in the office of british ambassador, by the influence of Marlborough, emulated the querulous style of those with whom he associated, by expatiating on the slights with which he had been treated, in being refused the order of the garter, the title of earl, and a place in one of the public departments. He even profited by a temporary journey to England, to pay court to Harley and Mrs. Masham.

The interference of Marlborough could alone obviate the mischiefs arising from this combination of jarring interests, and his interposition was attended with the usual effect. A single letter from him appeared to pacify the king of Prussia; while the chamberlain and his lady either obtained a partial gratification, or yielded to the change of sentiment which they perceived in their sovereign. Lord Raby was awed by that master spirit, which habit had taught him to respect, and we find his letters soon resuming the language of compliment and adulation. In short, the brief interval of a few weeks produced a sudden

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\* Letter from general Palmes to the duke.



change in the lowering aspect of the prussian court; and the auxiliary troops were not only permitted to continue in the stations, where their services had been employed with advantage, but the king consented to an augmentation of 5,000 men for the ensuing campaign, an acquisition of no ordinary value in the eyes of the commander in chief, who expressed the highest opinion of their valour and discipline.\* This revolution of sentiment was announced in the most gracious terms by the king himself.

Notwithstanding this solemn promise, and the apparent renewal of his good humour, the capricious monarch soon began again to contend for more advantageous terms, and accused the duke of having spoken slightly of himself, and of neglecting his interests. His chagrin was augmented by the intrigues of lord Raby.

To pacify the monarch, lieut.-general Grumbkow was deputed to Berlin, with the hope that an accurate knowledge of the king's character, and an acquaintance with the cabals of the court, would enable him to effect an accommodation. He was authorised to grant the allowance of bread and forage to the cavalry, and instead of the former mode of payment for the infantry, to offer a subsidy, by which the king would be entitled to the extra pay of a company in each regiment, and to the salary of more officers than he was obliged to maintain. Marlborough also remitted the usual deduction of  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent., which, as commander in chief, he was empowered to receive from all the princes who furnished auxiliary troops. General Grumbkow transmitted an interesting account of this mission, which proved in every point satisfactory.

*“Berlin, March 9. My lord;—I arrived here Tuesday last, and the same evening saw my lord Raby, but I could not draw much information from him. I went the next morning early to the*

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\* To lord Godolphin, Dec. 20, and Letter from the duke of Marlborough to lord Raby, June 31, 1709.



house of M. Ilgen, who told me that the grand chamberlain was mortally ill of a pleurisy, accompanied with a high fever; that I should find the king very obstinate on the point of the fifth battalion, which he had dismissed; and that the field marshal and he were extremely eager that this affair should be finished, so that he placed his hope only in me. He begged me, in the name of God, to speak freely to the king. I said that should not be long delayed, and, at the same time, a servant of the king, who had heard of my arrival, was already in search of me. His majesty received me with much affection, embraced me warmly, and after a moment's conversation, inquired for the health of your highness, adding, 'Is he still my friend, and does he sometimes remember me?' I told him, that your highness would be much more his friend, if his majesty would reflect a little more, and pay a little more attention to the just propositions made him on your part. He said, 'Can I do more than I do? I make treaties, and yet the emperor breaks his word with me, as well as Holland every moment. This disgusts me. Besides, it is impossible, without great inconvenience to give more than three battalions, and he is a wretch who would advise me otherwise.' Being then quite full of the republican air, which I had recently breathed in Holland, I told him boldly, that I thought he was a wretch who should advise him not to do it, and that I would prove this by many arguments. He said, with much emotion, 'You speak very boldly, and you may perhaps repent it, if your arguments are not conclusive.' I replied, if he would listen to them, without prejudice or prepossession, he would find them so; and in about half an hour I changed him so entirely, that he sent for the field marshal, and, in my presence, related to him word for word what I had said, ordering him, as an honest man, to give his opinion on what ought to be done. The field marshal in a few words observed, that it was necessary, not only to do it, but that if he was master, he would advise him to do still more, to oblige the queen, and preserve so true and good a friend as your highness. The king then said, 'Well, it is decided; consult, and see what



‘you think ought to be done. I shall not be the person who will make the most difficulties.’ On this the field marshal retired, and I remained half an hour longer with the king, and he told me his views, which are not ill digested. I shall give your highness a detail of them, when I have the honour to see you.

“As I thought there was a little bitterness where your highness was concerned, I turned him so many ways, that he observed, he would tell me what was the matter. But as he was persuaded that it was false, by all I had told him of your highness, I must not speak a single word of it to you. ‘First,’ he said, ‘I have been informed that the queen refused to take my troops entirely into her pay, which would have relieved me much, and that it was no one but my lord duke who prevented her. Secondly, that you had shewn in many instances this campaign, that you did not think it necessary to have much regard for a prince, whom you managed as you pleased, and that you made a good use of his troops, because he understood nothing of the business.’ I told him for the second article, nothing was more ridiculous than to imagine such a thing; since even if your highness was capable of a similar thought, you had too much discernment to speak of it to any one. For the first, I thought he who had spread the report would have much difficulty to prove it. At last the king swore, that if your highness would continue his friend, he would do every thing in the world to give you pleasure. But he ordered me to remind you of every thing he had done, from consideration for the queen, and particularly for your highness during this war, there being no prince, except the emperor and the two maritime powers, who had so many troops in the field as himself, although he had neither crowns nor states to expect, like the elector of Hanover, the duke of Savoy, and the elector palatine. But he hoped that your highness would continue in the same sentiments which you had testified to me, namely, to promote a close alliance between himself and Great Britain, when attempts should be made to conclude a peace.

“On the morrow we examined the project in the presence of the



prince royal, the field marshal, M. d'Ilgen, and Messrs. Krant and Beck. I had much trouble to make them comprehend many things, and to prevent them from introducing into the project a thousand points which would not have been accepted on the part of your highness. The words are changed, but the sense and foundation are the same, except 50 rations more, which they demand for each battalion, during the winter, and without which the officers cannot subsist. When I opposed this article, the prince royal told me he was persuaded your highness would grant that, and when it was considered that we sent all our best and finest troops, and that the king paid the regiment of Mecklenburgh entirely, and added two squadrons more, he was very well assured that your highness would make no difficulty, since the maintenance of 14 squadrons, of which the king received the agio for only 12, cost him, besides the subsidy, three hundred thousand francs. After some other remarks, he continued, with a petulant air, 'My lord duke may grumble to no purpose. If he lays his hand on his heart, he must own that he does not find among other princes so much facility and so much good faith as with us; and if this new corps is not as fine as that of count Lottum, let him accuse me; for I am sure he will be satisfied, and I will pledge my word that the troops shall be on the Meuse the 1st of May.'

"Afterwards, the prince insisted much on the article of not putting the infantry in garrison, in the maritime places, or those of Flanders, alleging the treaty for the hanoverians, and shewing letters from our officers, who are in garrison at Lille, and who bitterly complain.

"The rest is such as I think your highness will find no difficulty in, and there will be no objection with regard to the  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent, I having told them that it should be abated, with which they are satisfied.

"Lastly, I am in the joy of my heart that this business is finished, and that I have been happy enough to justify the confidence which your highness has reposed in me. And I may assert that



the king has never shewn me more confidence and friendship than since I have opened his eyes on many things. My lord Raby could not refrain from shewing me how much he is piqued, because your highness did not name him to sign this treaty. He assured me that if he had chosen to exert himself, the court would have solicited your highness for him to have had that satisfaction, which has not happened to him since his residence here ; but that he did not wish to insist on it, for fear of displeasing your highness. All I can say is, that he has not seen the king since I have been here ; and that he has told one of his confidants with a sneer, that I played the minister of the queen so well, he had no occasion to interfere. I must own, that if Madame la Grande Chambellane was as much mistress as she wishes, the thing might have gone as lord Raby desired. But happily it is not so ; and the king told me this evening that he was delighted because the business had passed through the hands of general Cadogan. \* \* \* \* \*

“ The king dined at noon with the prince royal, and has made him a considerable present. The prince is highly gratified to serve this campaign. He presents a thousand compliments to your highness, for whom he has an hundred bottles of Tokay. He will go from hence the 26th of next month, and will travel post to Brussels.”

The king announced this fortunate change himself, in a letter to the duke.

“ *Berlin, March 9.* My cousin ;—Brigadier Grumbkow has just delivered to me the letter which you wrote to me on the 24th of February, and has at the same time explained to me the conditions on which you were pleased to agree with me, touching the augmentation of my troops in the Low Countries. As the said brigadier praised much the good intention which you have displayed on this occasion for my interests, and as you have very obligingly assured him, that you would always continue the same, both with regard to my interests during the war, and to those which concern me in peace, I have not only chosen to testify to



you, by this letter, the obligation I am under to you, but to give also, above the 12 squadrons that you have asked of me, two others, as a more certain proof of the zeal and warmth I feel in giving pleasure to the queen your mistress, and to yourself; and to concur with all my forces in the glorious designs that you have formed for the ensuing campaign. I will tell you at the same time, that except a few necessary explanations, for which I refer you to Grumbkow, I have accepted your offers, and do not doubt that you will be satisfied with the counter project which will be delivered to you, and that you will give full power to general Cadogan, to sign it on the footing above mentioned with brigadier Grumbkow, when he shall arrive at Brussels, which will be at the end of this month.

“ I cannot avoid also stating to you, that as I have deemed it necessary to join to the new corps, which I send you, a lieutenant-general, a major-general, and a brigadier, I do not doubt that you will gratify them with such douceurs as may enable them to serve with comfort; and as besides I know perfectly the service which I have received from brigadier Du Troussel and Grumbkow, I will pay all the consideration you can wish, to what you write me in their favour.

“ Moreover, my cousin, I am glad of this opportunity to tell you again that notwithstanding the court of Vienna has not paid me the money for the recruits, which has been owing to me several years, and notwithstanding I see no appearance of touching any part of it, for a long time, I have nevertheless given orders that the recruits necessary for the troops I have in Italy should march immediately, hoping from your equity, that you will be pleased to employ the credit, which her majesty ought so justly to have with the emperor, to induce him at last to give me the requisite satisfaction, as well with regard to these recruits, as to many other articles, which I have long solicited at the imperial court with much reason, but without any appearance of success.”\*

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\* Translated from the french original in the Marlborough Papers.



Marlborough had thus the satisfaction of forming the most advantageous arrangements with the principal members of the Grand Alliance for the ensuing campaign; and he would have proceeded without delay to attend his parliamentary duty in England, had not his presence been required at the Hague, to watch the negotiations for peace which the king of France had recently opened with the dutch government.



END OF VOL. II.



















Coxe, William,

Memoirs of John Duke of Marlborough with his original correspondence ;  
collected from the family records at Blenheim and other authentic sources

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